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Abstract 
Considerable research has been undertaken into the nature and consequences of 
contemporary and future global climate change, yet detailed regional studies 
concerning these dynamics prior to the twentieth century have only recently begun to 
emerge. This thesis investigates this historical climate-society interface over a c. 400-
year period of socio-political change in southeast Africa. This spans the development, 
expansion and impoverishment of African state structures, and the arrival of the 
Portuguese and its impacts, between c. 1450-1830 in the Zambezi-Limpopo region, and 
the origins and events of socio-political transformation between c. 1760-1828 in the 
KwaZulu-Natal area. 
 Previous hypotheses have proposed causal relationships between precipitation 
variability and this societal change, though these are predominantly built upon an 
apparent coincidence between the inferences of a narrow range of datasets. This cross-
disciplinary study therefore reframes this research area by placing the interlinked 
concepts of vulnerability and resilience at the centre of its approach to tie past climate 
variability and societal development. First, past climate variability is evaluated using a 
wide range of proxy-documentary precipitation records over the last millennium, and 
then reconstructed using wind data from ships’ logbooks in the early-nineteenth 
century. This analysis reveals good agreement between sources on the evolution of 
precipitation variability. Similarly, palaeoclimatic, written and oral sources display 
strong coherence between the increased variability of precipitation and recorded 
climate impacts, such as in the onset and amelioration of Little Ice Age cool-dry 
conditions in the 1570s-1590s and 1790s-1820s. While this suggests that direct climatic-
induced stress increased in times of regional or global climatic change, extensive 
analysis of food security, livelihoods and socio-political vulnerability from written and 
oral sources indicates that longer-term, structural vulnerabilities of individuals and 
communities were crucial in conditioning the plurality of human responses to and the 
overall significance of past climate variability across southeast Africa. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The consequences of contemporary and future climate change are amongst the most 
complex challenges that face humankind over the next century. While uncertainties 
remain over the nature of climate change itself, it is the interface between climate and 
society where knowledge gaps are most considerable, and are particularly acute in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where vulnerability is high, and adaptive capacity is low (Niang et 
al. 2014). It is perhaps surprising, then, that investigation into the implications of past 
climate variability has only recently begun to emerge, with very little of this centred on 
the seemingly data-deficient Southern Hemisphere prior to the twentieth century. The 
processes of socio-political transformation and disaggregation that marked the second 
millennium AD in southeast Africa (Figure 1.1) are, to some extent, an exception to this, 
and constitute a prime case for cross-disciplinary inquiry. The aim of this thesis is to 
investigate the significance of climate variability in these social, economic and political 
developments that played a large part in shaping southern Africa as it is known today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1 Map of southeast Africa with main sites and political units mentioned in the text. 
Approximated state extent from Huffman (2007). Numbers denote palaeoclimate time series 
shown in Figure 1.4: (1, 2) Makapansgat Valley Cold Air Cave speleothem isotopes (Holmgren 
et al. 1999; Holmgren et al. 2003), (3) Lake Sibaya diatom assemblage (Stager et al. 2013), (4) 
Limpopo faunal remains (Smith 2005) and (5) Karkloof Yellowwood tree-ring width (Hall 1976). 
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1.1 The second millennium AD in southeast Africa: an overview of 
societal change 
Processes of socio-political transformation spanned much of the second millennium AD 
in southeast Africa prior to the imposition of regional colonial rule in 1890. Bantu-
speaking agropastoralists came to the region in the early first millennium AD 
(Phillipson 1993; Huffman 2009b; Badenhorst 2010), and the evolution of dispersed 
farming communities and parochial chiefdoms into a number of complex states and 
kingdoms has provoked much scholarly interest. The initial emergence of socio-
political complexity and centralised political units is rooted in the Shashe-Limpopo 
basin (Figure 1.1) (Huffman 2000, 2009b; Pikirayi 2013b). By the late-first millennium 
AD, material culture (Wood 2012) and Arabic documents (Burke 1962) indicate that 
trade links had been established between the stockade village of Schroda and the 
Indian Ocean network at the Afro-Swahili settlement of Chibuene (Figure 1.1). 
Succeeding the Zhizo people at Schroda (c. 900-1000), the leaders of the Leopard’s 
Kopje people (c. 1000-1220 at K2) developed a new socio-political order and are said to 
have established sacred leadership (Huffman 2008, 2009b). This process, along with a 
great increase in economic activity, materialised in the development of southern 
Africa’s first territorial state, Mapungubwe (c. 1220-1300), and the emergence of the 
‘Zimbabwe culture’, an archaeological term incorporating several second millennium 
political units defined by factors such as class distinction and monumental architecture 
(Pikirayi 2001, 2013b; Chirikure et al. 2013). Beginning with Mapungubwe, these 
Zimbabwe culture polities dominated African socio-political activity in the Zambezi-
Limpopo region in the centuries prior to the coming of colonial rule (Figure 1.1). 
Around the time of Mapungubwe’s decline, regional power shifted north to the 
Zimbabwe plateau. One Zimbabwe culture site, Great Zimbabwe, grew to become an 
urban complex home to around 18,000 people, state capital of an estimated 60-90,000 
km2 territory (Figure 1.1), and dominated regional power relations for at least 150 years 
(Huffman 2007; Pikirayi 2013a). The rulers of the Zimbabwe state used their newly 
acquired wealth, as well as innovation, to finance the building of elaborate stone 
structures at the capital (Figure 1.2), which represented the largest of many other 
centres across its wider state territory (Beach 1994; Huffman 2014). The decline of Great 
Zimbabwe (c. 1450-1520) and its surrounding state structure came at a time when 
European expansion was creating the origins of the modern globalised world, with the 
Portuguese settling at Sofala in 1505 (Figure 1.1), while the focus of the Indian Ocean 
trade shifted north towards the Zambezi (Pikirayi 2013a). Prior to this, however, and 
overlapping with Great Zimbabwe’s demise, two successor states emerged: the Mutapa 
(or ‘Monomotapa’) to the north and the Torwa (or ‘Butua’) at Khami to the southwest. 
The late-fifteenth century was characterised by civil wars, and also marks the 
commencement of overlap between the frontiers of archaeology and written history. 
The Torwa area was largely beyond the first-hand knowledge of the Portuguese, but 
the history of the Mutapa state is illuminated from numerous accounts of those based 
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at Sofala or on the Zambezi who visited it from the early-sixteenth century and 
eventually conquered it a century later. As a result of the extensive Portuguese 
interaction with the state, it was also well-known in Europe at the time and appeared 
dominant on early maps of the African continent (Figure 1.3) (Mudenge 1988). The idea 
that the Mutapa state constituted a formally administered ‘empire’, however, is 
exaggerated and now widely discredited, although the maximum territorial extent of 
the state is the subject of disagreement in the secondary literature (Randles 1975; Beach 
1980; Mudenge 1988). The Mutapa state did nonetheless exert rule and influence over a 
considerable area of present-day northern Zimbabwe (Figure 1.1), probably reaching 
the coast south of the Zambezi delta by the mid-sixteenth century (Beach 1994). 
Between there and the Save river, three breakaway leaders refused to acknowledge the 
authority of the Mutapa after being sent to control these strategically important areas, 
and thereafter formed the Manyika, Teve and Danda kingdoms (Figure 1.1). 
 The territorial extent, population, prestige, wealth and political stability of the 
Mutapa state underwent decline from the late-sixteenth century. Constructions of 
stone-built capitals ceased, civil war became incessant, and protracted leadership 
struggles became the norm (Pikirayi 1993). In the early-seventeenth century, a 
humiliating treaty was signed that made the Mutapa a vassal of the King of Portugal, 
and allowed increased numbers of Portuguese, who were not subject to any laws, 
unrestricted access to the territory and its gold mines (Newitt 1995). The Portuguese 
occupation was never secure, but it was only when the Rozvi, a new political force who 
had re-united the Torwa area, attacked Portuguese trading fairs in the Mutapa state 
and Manyika kingdom in 1693, that the Mutapa could re-assert its independence, while 
the Portuguese retreated to their Zambezi towns of Sena and Tete (Figure 1.1). By 1700 
the era of Zimbabwe culture state formation had ended, and although the Rozvi were 
able to keep the Portuguese in line, the eighteenth century brought about the gradual 
decline and impoverishment of the African polities in the Zambezi-Limpopo region. 
Insofar as the formation of African state structures is concerned, the Zimbabwe 
culture states were the exceptions to the rule by their unique presence in the ~1000 km 
zone inland from the Kenyan coast to the Cape until at least c. 1700 (Beach 1994). From 
the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards, however, a second focal point of 
socio-political transformation in southern Africa developed in present-day KwaZulu-
Natal and adjacent parts of Mozambique, Swaziland, and the South African highveld 
(Figure 1.1), where large, centralised kingdoms emerged. At the same time, the Dutch 
and the British were vying for control of the Cape Colony in the southwest, while 
increased demand for cattle and ivory extended the trade zone further south to supply 
new merchant traffic. Similarly, the demand for slaves from French settlement on the 
Indian Ocean islands and elsewhere brought new pressures on the entire Indian Ocean 
coast. In the early-nineteenth century, widespread raiding and demographic upheaval 
affected large parts of KwaZulu-Natal, while expanding, centralised kingdoms such as 
the Zulu, Ndwandwe, Gaza and Ndebele consolidated their authority over others. 
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FIGURE 1.2 The great enclosure at Great Zimbabwe. Photograph courtesy of H. Huhtamaa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.3 Map showing the ‘Monomotapa’. By Willem Janszoon Blaeu, 1635. 
 
In the formation of these polities, renowned rulers such as Shaka Senzangakona 
of the Zulu used diplomacy, through enabling the voluntary submission of 
neighbouring chiefs, and war, through raids and confrontations, to consolidate smaller 
chiefdoms into the overlordship of the Zulu kingdom (Eldredge 1992, 2014; Wright 
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2010). The precise causes and events of this period, often termed as the ‘mfecane’ or 
‘difaqane’, are infused with controversy for historical reasons which will become clear 
in the next chapter. Broadly, however, this controversy centres around the persistence 
of the view of nineteenth century European observers that the heightened violence and 
migrations at this time were a sole consequence of the excessively militaristic Zulu 
kingdom and its ruler, Shaka, which conveniently ‘depopulated’ swathes of southeast 
Africa for European settlement (Etherington 2001). By contrast, recent research has 
convincingly shown that these events occurred both prior to and during Shaka’s rule, 
and were prompted by multiple internal and external actors (Hamilton 1995; Wright 
2010; Eldredge 2014). Despite such comprehensive assessment, the lines of argument 
made by nineteenth and early- to mid-twentieth century writers still persist in parts of 
the literature, a fact which Eldredge (2014) states has had unfortunate effects on 
modern politics that rely upon these false assessments of African history. Nevertheless, 
while many agree that the magnitude of violence and devastation was exaggerated by 
European observers, it is undeniable that the scale of violence and migrations of this 
period were unprecedented in the history of southern Africa. Not only were polities in 
KwaZulu-Natal and on the South African highveld affected, but the raiding and 
population movements spread as far Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania, where in the 
former, the Rozvi eventually succumbed to one migratory group in the 1830s. 
In the half-century leading up to the onset of colonial rule in 1890, socio-
political affairs became centred around the volatile relationships between African 
political units and the increasing presence of Europeans. The expansion of British 
power in KwaZulu-Natal, the treks of Dutch stock-farmers across the South African 
highveld, and the revival of Portuguese power in Mozambique posed profound threats 
to the survival of African socio-political organisation, and by 1890, much of the African 
continent had been colonised by European powers following the ‘scramble for Africa’. 
Although in some cases this new structure allowed for the partial continuation of the 
functions of pre-colonial polities, their political and economic rights were strictly 
bound to conform to the objectives of the colonists (Eldredge 2014). This abruptly 
diminished the independence of all African polities, and ended the state formation and 
disaggregation that spanned much of the second millennium AD. 
The main events alluded to in this introductory overview took place within two 
geographical sub-regions of the southern Africa (Figure 1.1). The first is the area 
between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers comprising present-day Zimbabwe, as well 
as south-central Mozambique and parts of northern South Africa and eastern 
Botswana, while the second relates to present-day KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. These 
areas will form the core focus of the thesis, though a slightly greater sum of attention 
will be lent to the Zambezi-Limpopo area due to the longer timespan, higher number 
of case studies, richer body of climate-society discussion and hypotheses in the 
literature, and the superior availability of historical sources since AD 1505. By contrast, 
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the thesis represents the first serious attempt to re-visit climate-society connections in 
early-nineteenth century KwaZulu-Natal since the early-1990s (Eldredge 1992). 
The rest of this introduction proceeds to outline the questions over the causes of 
socio-political change, with a particular focus on climatic discourses, before placing 
these in the context of historiographical and wider global perspectives on climate-
society linkages. The final two sections define the overriding aims and research 
questions of the thesis, and discuss some implications of this research. The multiple 
arguments of justification for this research are referred to throughout these sections. 
 
1.1.1 The causes of socio-political change 
Historians and archaeologists of Africa have long debated the causal processes 
involved in the emergence of complex political units and the recurrent socio-political 
change that followed. As Beach (1994) argues, the reason for this at first appears to be 
simple; the mineral wealth and abundance of exportable resources such as gold and 
ivory were found in large quantities in the Zambezi-Limpopo area. This meant that 
mercantile capital flowed into this region from c. AD 800 onwards as opposed to the 
comparatively resource-poor areas of eastern and southern Africa, which in turn 
prompted the unequal distribution of wealth in African society, class distinction and 
political centralisation (Mitchell 2002). Yet this also subjected societies to external 
economic and geopolitical fluxes, meaning political units’ hold over trade was never 
secure. The later development towards large political units in the KwaZulu-Natal area 
then similarly followed the expansion of trade into that region as a response to the 
increased demand for its cattle and ivory and increased wealth in imported goods 
(Huffman 2004). State transformation processes, however, are not so simply explained. 
Research elsewhere in Africa has shown that pre-colonial states developed based upon 
local wealth, such as in western Uganda by c. 1400, and in the Congo by c. 1000 (Beach 
1994). Moreover, trade-related activities in southern Africa involved a small number of 
people in comparison to the main livelihood activities of subsistence crop cultivation 
and cattle herding, both of which have been shown to have held social, political and 
ritual importance in each sub-region (Murimbika 2006; Huffman 2007; Eldredge 2014). 
 A relatively recent general rejection of trade and external contact as the 
principal stimulus for the emergence and decline of centralised political structures and 
social change has provoked extensive debate regarding the causal mechanisms of these 
processes. Within various disciplines and through diverse methodological approaches, 
an array of explanations have been put forward. These include the aforementioned 
links to the Indian Ocean trade network and control over trade goods (Pwiti 1991, 2005; 
Huffman 2004; Sinclair et al. 2012), wealth in cattle (Garlake 1973, 1978; Denbow 1986), 
control over resources such as gold and ivory (Phimister 1974; Swan 2008; Huffman 
2009b; Pikirayi 2013b), external economic changes affecting demand for these resources 
(Phimister 1976; Pwiti 1991, 2005; Eldredge 1992), the ideology of sacred leadership 
(Huffman 2008, 2009b), warfare and coercion (Beach 1998; Kim and Kusimba 2008; 
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Chirikure et al. 2013), human-induced environmental degradation (Guy 1980; Connah 
2001; Pikirayi 2005), and defensive responses to colonial influence (Cobbing 1988a). In 
the last two decades, there has also been an upsurge in the literature on the past 
relationships between climate variability and human activity concerning both southern 
Africa and further afield (Hannaford et al. 2014). In southern Africa, precipitation 
variability has been causally linked to the defining moments of the rise and decline of 
the Mapungubwe and Zimbabwe states, and the origins of political centralisation, 
heightened violence and migrations in the KwaZulu-Natal area in the early-nineteenth 
century (Hall 1976, 1981; Guy 1980; Ballard 1986; Newitt 1988, 1995; Eldredge 1992; 
Huffman 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2010a; Pikirayi 2001; Tyson et al. 2002; Holmgren and 
Öberg 2006; Manyanga 2007; Garstang et al. 2014). 
 
1.1.1.1 Climatic discourses and southern African state transformation 
The effect of climate on human activity and wellbeing is, in the broadest sense, first 
mediated through its impacts on the biophysical realm. In the southern African case, 
the quantity and timing of precipitation are particularly implicated due to their critical 
role in food production and wider subsistence options (McCann 1999; Ekblom 2004). 
Precipitation in southeast Africa is characterised by high spatial and temporal 
variability. The majority of its rain falls between November and March, and it therefore 
constitutes the Summer Rainfall Zone (SRZ). The increasing availability and resolution 
of palaeoclimate proxy data in recent decades has offered unprecedented insight into 
climate variability beyond the relatively short instrumental record. Abrupt changes in 
moisture have been shown to occur in the SRZ over the long-term (multi-decadal and 
centennial scales), with persistent near-decadal dry and wet phases reported over the 
last six millennia (Ekblom et al. 2012). Similarly, high inter-annual variability of rainfall 
promotes frequent shorter-term wet or dry conditions which are highly significant for 
food security both today and in the past (Ekblom 2004). However, complexities in 
developing palaeoclimate records from the Southern Hemisphere low latitudes mean 
that this inter-annual variability is seldom reflected in proxy records, and for much of 
the pre-instrumental period, relatively sparse and limited resolution data are relied 
upon. Data limitations are discussed further in Chapter 3, yet despite these, the overall 
increase in knowledge has been used by many to argue that past shifts in moisture 
availability inferred in some natural proxy and man-made documentary climate 
records, were coincident with, and thus contributory to societal change (Figure 1.4). 
 Even prior to the development of palaeoclimate proxy data, archaeologists 
recognised the possibility of a longer-term role for rainfall variability in the human 
events of the Zambezi-Limpopo region (Summers 1960, 1969). From analyses of the 
instrumental record in Zimbabwe, then Rhodesia, it was commonly argued that 
drought conditions were experienced in the central and northern parts of the country 
about once in every five years (Summers 1969; Beach 1977, 1980). In his earlier work, 
historian David Beach was at pains to remind readers that drought played an 
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important socio-economic role in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, yet paucity of scientific 
evidence limited contextualisation of scanty written observations of this phenomenon. 
Beach later muted his viewpoint on the significance of drought after historian John 
Iliffe (1990) argued that drought-induced famine alone was seldom significant in the 
history of Zimbabwe, and factors such as violence were more important in determining 
the severity of environmental stress. Malyn Newitt, however, frequently placed 
drought at the centre of causal explanations for major socio-political events in the 
Zambezi-Save area (Newitt 1988, 1995). Notwithstanding Newitt’s skill in integrating 
climatic stress into wider socio-political and economic factors, his claims as to the 
magnitude and significance of drought both lack scientific corroboration and tend to 
go far beyond the evidence base. Similar problems have plagued investigation of 
causal climate-society pathways relating to political transformation in the KwaZulu-
Natal area. Here, Guy (1980) and Eldredge (1992) posited that severe drought at the 
turn of the nineteenth century was a prime stimulant of political centralisation, while 
Ballard (1986) and Newitt (1995) drew on documentary and oral evidence for drought 
and famine to argue that this was a prime cause of the dislocations of the period. 
 A later branch of southeast African climate-society historiography came after a 
review of the climate of the last 2000 years in southern Africa conducted by Tyson and 
Lindesay (1992). This seminal paper advanced the hypothesis of coupled warm-wet 
and cool-dry conditions acting over multi-decadal and centennial timeframes. 
Moreover, Tyson and Lindesay made the first attempts at dating the southern African 
manifestations of the Medieval Climate Anomaly (MCA) and the Little Ice Age (LIA) in 
the northern hemisphere, then thought to be between c. AD 900-1300 and c. 1300-1850 
respectively. Archaeologist Tom Huffman (1996) used this synthesis to point to an 
apparent coincidence of shifts between periods of warm-wet and cool-dry conditions 
with periods of societal change dated in the archaeological record, most notably the 
development of societal complexity, the rise and decline of the Mapungubwe state, the 
decline of Great Zimbabwe and the violence, raiding and state formation of the early-
nineteenth century (Figure 1.4). Several other archaeologists, as well as climatologists, 
have since followed this line of thought (Pikirayi 2001; Tyson et al. 2002; Holmgren and 
Öberg 2006; Huffman 2007, 2008, 2009b) (Table 1.1; Figure 1.5), and climate variability 
now forms a prominent causal hypothesis of socio-political change in this region. These 
hypotheses, though, primarily stem from the coincidence between periods of inferred 
climate variability and socio-political change. As a result of this, hypotheses regarding 
the significance of climate variability in the pre-written record cases of Mapungubwe 
and Great Zimbabwe have been subject to frequent alteration in light of the 
development and analysis of palaeoclimate data. Moreover, it is only recently that the 
more complex pathways through which such climate variability may have induced 
societal stress have been elaborated (Murimbika 2006; Huffman 2008). 
 Each of these hypotheses are outlined in detail in the next chapter, yet it is 
already notable that these more recent historical climate-society debates are confined to 
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the margins in discussion amongst African historians, who have tended to favour other 
explanations for social change outlined in Section 1.1. In part, this relates to source 
material, as where the climate-society hypotheses are most prominent, archaeological 
records dwarf the small number of Arabic documents that exist prior to the arrival of 
the Portuguese. Nevertheless, few historians have grappled with the abundance of 
documentary material in the Zambezi-Limpopo region after 1505 and in the KwaZulu-
Natal area after 1824 to evaluate the socio-political significance of climate variability. 
On the other hand, this situation can be strongly linked to wider global perspectives in 
the climate-society historiography, which are examined in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.4 Timeline of selected events, culture-history sequences, and palaeoclimate 
variability inferred from the proxy sources mapped in Figure 1.1. Gold shading: existing 
climate-society hypotheses not extensively re-examined in the thesis; green shading: re-
examination of existing hypotheses and original consideration of climate-society interaction. G. 
Zim. – Great Zimbabwe; Map. – Mapungubwe, Nde. – Ndebele. 
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TABLE 1.1 ‘A general correlation between culture and climate on the Zimbabwe plateau and 
adjacent regions’ (after Pikirayi 2001). Note that the human and palaeoclimatic chronology has 
since changed. 
Year AD Climate Major political, social and economic events 
1810-1900 Cool and dry Nguni wars, raids, migrations and settlement; abandonment of 
Nyanga terrace complex 
1790-1810 Warm and wet Pit enclosures and terraces in Nyanga Highlands 
1675-1790 Cool and dry Rise of the Rozvi in the south-west; Khami collapses and 
political power shifts to Danangombe; expulsion of the 
Portuguese from the Mutapa state and Manyika; depopulation 
in the north; Karanga migration southwards 
1425-1675 Warm and wet Abandonment of Great Zimbabwe; pit structures in Nyanga 
Highlands; the Torwa state emerges at Khami; the Mutapa 
state emerges in Mukaranga; Portuguese appear in northern 
Zimbabwe; civil wars and disruption in the north 
1290-1425 Cool and dry Abandonment of Mapungubwe and Toutswe; development 
and fall of Great Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe state. 
900-1290 Warm and wet Intensive pastoral production and gold mining in the south-
west; intensification of trade with the Indian Ocean coast; rise 
of Mapungubwe state in the Middle Limpopo Valley 
700-900 Cool and dry Trade with the Indian Ocean coast initiated; displacement of 
Zhizo population by the Leopard’s Kopje farmers; emergence 
of chiefdoms in the south and south-west 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.5 ‘Climate time series derived from analysis of stalagmites from Cold Air Cave, 
Makapansgat Valley, South Africa, together with historical information’ (Holmgren and Öberg 
2006). The top series shows δ18O variations reflective of changes in temperature and moisture 
and the bottom series shows temperature changes in °C anomalies from 1961-1990 normal 
derived from changes in colour. The numbers represent: 1: shift from Schroda to K2; 2: shift 
from K2 to Mapungubwe; 3: decline of Mapungubwe; 4: decline of Great Zimbabwe and 5: 
Difaqane/mfecane. 
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1.2 Climate and history: historiographical perspectives and new paradigms 
The Holocene, that is, the current geological epoch, holds numerous case studies where 
scholars have posited climate variability as the chief causal factor in the ‘collapse’ or 
transformation of societies (Figure 1.6). In addition to the southern African examples, 
case studies such as the decline of Norse settlements in Greenland and the collapse of 
Easter Island societies have their own considerable scholarship, and are perhaps best 
known for their popularisation by Jared Diamond in his volume ‘Collapse’ (Diamond 
2005). Nonetheless, climatic explanations for such change have been controversially 
received within the interpretative disciplines of history and anthropology, as well as 
within branches of the more positivist disciplines of climatology, archaeology and 
geography, with some questioning a revival of climatic determinism (Chambers and 
Brain 2002; O’Sullivan 2008; Liverman 2009; Livingstone 2012). In light of such claims, 
and in order to contextualise the southern African debate, it is necessary to give a brief 
historiographical background to the interface between climate, history and society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.6 Prominent mid- to late-Holocene ‘collapse’ case studies (after Diamond 2005). 
 
 In the early-twentieth century, American and European geographers routinely 
emphasised the agency of climate over the agency of humans, putting forward the idea 
that climate was the master narrative in shaping human history (Hulme 2011a). 
Concerns regarding overpopulation and questions over whether European settlers 
could prosper in the tropics led scholars like Ellsworth Huntington in his 1915 
‘Civilisation and Climate’ to propose that racial character, intellectual vigour and the 
ranking of civilisations were all inherently related to climate (Hulme 2011a; 
Livingstone 2012). In particular, analyses of regional climate-society relationships were 
suffused with racial sentiments in that the frequent variability of the mid-latitude 
weather systems was suggested to have led to an energetic character and a vigorous 
work ethic, while the tropical climates were associated with promoting languidness 
and indolence (Livingstone 2012). The British politician and writer Sydney Markham 
developed similar arguments in his 1942 volume ‘Climate and the Energy of Nations’, 
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where he linked climate variability to the rise and fall of past civilisations and as an 
explanatory variable in contemporary geopolitical issues. In the decades of post-
Second World War technological sophistication that followed, climate determinism 
became increasingly antiquated, with the idea that humanity could control its 
environment becoming more prominent. As a consequence, nature-society 
explanations, also tainted by the heavily racial aspects of earlier scholarship, were 
pushed to the margins of mainstream academic geography, and led many geographers 
to re-align with either the natural or social sciences (Sluyter 2003; Hulme 2011a). 
 Over the last two decades, the increasing availability and resolution of 
palaeoclimate proxy data, coupled with concerns over contemporary global climate 
change, has contributed to a resurgence in hypotheses proclaiming the significance of 
climate in human history (Middleton 2012; Hannaford 2014). The rapid accumulation 
of palaeoenvironmental data has led archaeologists and palaeoclimatologists in 
particular to search for correlation, and in turn causation, between climate variability 
and social change. Though clearly distinct from the discredited determinism of the 
early-twentieth century, many argue that climate has regained its former position in 
explaining the performance of past societies (Coombes and Barber 2005; Livingstone 
2012). While questions over a revival of determinism in southern Africa will be 
addressed in the next chapter, it is essential to here provide insight into the conceptual 
bases of the relationship between climate and society in the modern literature, and 
accordingly outline the premise upon which this investigation is built. 
 A number of scholars have pointed out the prevalent inadequacies in past 
climate-society studies and their theoretical underpinnings. Hannaford (2014) related 
the spectrum of modern approaches on historical climate-society interaction to the 
conceptual hierarchy presented by geographer Robert Kates (Figure 1.7), and claimed 
that a lack of coherent methodological and established interdisciplinary approaches for 
such investigation were responsible for renewed suggestions of determinism. Such 
conceptual and methodological problems of tying environmental change to human 
development have indeed been a persistent problem since Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s 
pioneering 1971 ‘Times of Feast, Times of Famine’. A frequent result of this is an approach 
that resembles the simple input-output model shown in Figure 1.7 (a), where climate is 
viewed as a monocausal determinant in societal transformation of the ‘collapse’-type 
scenario. Coombes and Barber (2005) term this approach ‘black box’ determinism, and 
add that it is palaeoenvironmental and archaeological researchers who are most often 
guilty favouring correlation over examination of the complex interactive processes 
between climate and society. Although changes in climate can certainly have 
significant biophysical consequences, only tentative suggestions may be made on this 
basis. For example, it is not wrong to assume that shifts to a drier climate may have 
impacted upon crop cultivation and food supply, but little can be said about whether 
societal transformation was environmentally triggered from a merely correlative 
approach. The fundamental problem, then, is that scenarios of collapse in distant 
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societies are not necessarily wrong, but often lack real understanding. This is because 
the impacts of climate variability affect complex ‘socio-ecological systems’ shaped by 
the interaction of multiple stressors, as shown in model (c) in Figure 1.7, which leads to 
a strongly non-linear human response (Walker et al. 2004; Folke 2006; Endfield 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.7 Hierarchy of models of climate-society relationships (modified after Kates 1985). 
Shading indicates key research areas relating to societal impacts. 
 
 If there exists a need for scholars to shift focus away from the more pessimistic, 
environmental disaster meta-narratives towards assessments that clearly decipher 
climate-society linkages (Endfield 2012), written history, where available, is one way 
through which this can be achieved (Adamson 2014). Written history offers the 
potential to illuminate the ways societies coped, or failed to cope with climate 
variability. Moreover, it provides source material to more explicitly attribute the 
significance of climate variability in social change amongst the complex, diverse and 
intertwined forces that shaped past societies that are frequently overlooked in 
monocausal explanations (Butzer 2012; Carey 2012; Livingstone 2012). While 
palaeoclimatologists and archaeologists have been accused of neglecting these aspects, 
it is often the case that historians and anthropologists have also failed to engage with 
the scientific evidence when considering climate-related factors, or have disregarded 
climatic aspects altogether. In many cases they are justified in doing so, as climatic 
shifts may be less relevant in many historical questions, yet McNeill (2014) adds that a 
predominant reason for this is that many historians are uneasy in assigning agency to 
any other forces than people, and thus arguments that attribute historical agency to 
non-human agents are often dismissed as environmental determinism. 
 As will be shown in the next chapter, recent discussion on the role of climate 
variability in southern African history has increased in its sophistication. Still, causal 
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climate-related explanations still rely to a large extent upon the coincidence of 
incompletely understood and often ambiguous palaeoclimate datasets with societal 
events. In this region, the limited availability of palaeoclimatic data, and as will later be 
shown, numerous problems in its interpretation, have in part contributed to the lack of 
detailed engagement with climate-society questions among historians. Yet as southern 
Africa is characterised by high climate variability, environmental vulnerability, as well 
as a comparatively long written record, it constitutes an interesting case for the 
application of cross-disciplinary approaches regarding the complexity of these 
interactions that have moved to the fore in other regions (Endfield 2007, 2012; Bulliet 
2009; Brook 2010; Pfister 2010; Dugmore et al. 2012; Ellenblum 2012; White 2012; Parker 
2013; Adamson 2014; Hannaford et al. 2014). In pursuit of these aims, consideration of 
relatively recent paradigms such as vulnerability and resilience have been placed at the 
centre of the most fruitful approaches within the sub-disciplines of historical 
climatology and climate history (Pfister and Brazdil 2006; Butzer and Endfield 2012; 
Carey 2012; Nash and Adamson 2014). These are later discussed in Section 2.4. 
 
1.3 Aims, research questions and scope 
The overall aims of this thesis are fourfold, (i): to conceptualise and methodologically 
advance how climate variability can be tied to historical process; (ii): to investigate and 
reconstruct the nature of past climate variability and its uncertainties over the last 
thousand years in southern Africa; (iii): to explore long-term and changing African 
human vulnerability and response to climate variability and (iv): to move towards a 
more detailed understanding of the consequences of past climate variability on 
southern African socio-political change. These aims can be broken down into a series of 
overriding research questions, particularly: 
1. How can evidence of pre-instrumental climate variability be theoretically and 
methodologically tied to southern African historical processes? 
2. How did the southern African climate, particularly SRZ precipitation, vary over 
the last millennium and how reliable or uncertain is this? 
3. How did southern African precipitation vary in the early-nineteenth century, 
and how can this be reconstructed? 
4. What was the degree of human vulnerability to climate variability and how did 
this condition societal response to climatic stress throughout the early-sixteenth 
to early-nineteenth centuries in the Zambezi-Limpopo region? 
5. Can the impacts of and responses to climate variability and stress be detected in 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century KwaZulu-Natal, and how 
significant was this in the events of the period? 
6. What was the overall significance of climate variability in socio-political change 
in both the Zambezi-Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal areas over these 
timeframes? 
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 It is important to note here that although each of the aims and research 
questions are topics worthy of investigation in their own right, the intrinsic value of the 
thesis does not lie in any individual aim, but rather in bringing these together to 
understand the complexity of interaction between climate and society. This means that 
the disciplinary, theoretical and methodological scope of this thesis is necessarily wide, 
and overlaps into historical climatology, climate science, climate history, historical 
geography, African history and climate impacts analysis. The reach of the study also 
branches out to other disciplines such as archaeology, imperial history, development 
studies, anthropology and oral history. 
 The organisation of this thesis is both thematic and chronological. Chapter 2 
reviews the physical and human background of the study regions, and critically 
overviews the state of knowledge on past climate variability, socio-political 
transformation, and their interaction. This review chapter concludes by establishing a 
conceptual framework for historical climate-society analyses in a southern African 
context, while placing this further into the wider global context of historical climate-
society critique and investigation. Chapter 3 comprises an analytical review of multi-
decadal SRZ precipitation variability over the last 1200 years using proxy and 
documentary sources, and further evaluates evidence for the precipitation 
manifestations of the MCA and LIA. Chapter 4 uses a novel methodology to 
reconstruct early-nineteenth century southern African precipitation from wind data in 
ships’ logbooks and modern climate reanalysis data. Chapter 5 examines human 
vulnerability and response to climate variability in the Zambezi-Limpopo area between 
c. 1450-1830, and discusses how this interacted with other hypothesised causal factors 
and contemporary events. Chapter 6 investigates written evidence for the significance 
of climate variability in the origins of state formation in KwaZulu-Natal and the 
consolidation of and instability in the Zulu kingdom in the 1820s. Chapters 7 and 8 
discuss and conclude the investigation by bringing the analysis together and 
evaluating the role of climate variability in southeast African history. 
 To add a final word on scope, it has already been noted that the Zambezi-
Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal areas constitute the focus of this thesis, yet owing to 
space constraints, the analysis will focus predominantly on certain political units and 
people groups. In the region between the Zambezi and the Limpopo rivers, the thesis 
gives most attention to the larger political units such as the Zimbabwe and Mutapa 
states and the Manyika and Teve polities, as well as some more decentralised groups 
on the Zambezi and Mozambique coast who came to reside under the jurisdiction of 
the Portuguese. Clearly, a millennial timeframe stretching back to the Leopard’s Kopje 
chiefdom is too extensive for the kind of detailed study proposed here. Therefore, 
while discussion of past climate variability will cover the last 1200 years in order to 
clarify ambiguities in the palaeoclimate record, detailed analyses of societal 
vulnerability and response will be mostly limited to the period after AD 1505 when 
more extensive written source material becomes available. 
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 Analysis on the KwaZulu-Natal area will consider the role of climate, aided by 
the reconstructions presented in Chapter 4, in the origins of political centralisation in 
the late-eighteenth century and the processes of consolidation in the Zulu kingdom 
under Shaka in the early-nineteenth century. Previous scholarship on this subject has 
often been criticised for being ‘Zulu-centric’. This thesis will, to an extent, follow this, 
but for different reasons to those pursued throughout most of the last two centuries. 
Primarily, this is because there exists a greater wealth of documentary material for a 
study of climate-society interaction for the Zulu kingdom in the 1820s, and when 
combined with oral evidence, this far outweighs that which exists for other political 
units such as the Ndwandwe and Ndebele. While the spatial, temporal, ethnographic 
and demographic scope of the thesis is necessarily restricted, it would be misleading to 
think that nothing of significance happened outside these frontiers and time-span, and 
it is therefore important to be cognisant of the other inhabitants and states that 
populated southern Africa. 
 
1.4 Implications 
The overriding and most significant outcome of this thesis is that it will represent one 
of the first concentrated attempts at cross-disciplinary investigation into the interaction 
between climate and southern African society prior to the twentieth century. Involved 
in this is the use of diverse datasets, methods, and theoretical concepts, which require a 
number of essential first steps that will be of wider interest, particularly for African-
focussed research. Indeed, the establishment of the conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological foundation for this study and its case examples will advance the 
further investigation of past climate-society interactions in African contexts, or more 
generally those prior to the availability of instrumental climate records (as in 
Hannaford 2014; Hannaford et al. 2014). By focussing on southern Africa, this research 
also answers long-standing calls for interdisciplinary research on the pre-colonial 
period, which, with the exception of the historiography of the Cape Colony, is still 
lacking (Beach 1998; Chirikure et al. 2013; Eldredge 2014). The significance of the pre-
colonial period is apparent in that the ramifications of its many developments remain 
important today. Whether in the form of the name of kingdoms, rural livelihood 
practices, drought coping strategies, cultural and ritual practices, or in residual forms 
of community identification in the twenty-first century nation state, understanding of 
the pre-colonial period is of importance for African communities today. 
 In addition to improved understanding of climate-society interactions, the 
analysis of the nature and uncertainties of past climate variability itself will provide 
state-of-the-art insight over a 1200-year period. This is not only important for 
consideration of societal events, but for the understanding of the long-term functioning 
of the earth system, which in turn improves knowledge on the limited understanding 
of inter-annual and multi-decadal climate variability in data-deficient regions with a 
short instrumental record such as southern Africa. Similarly, although recent research 
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has begun to provide new inter-annual records for southeast Africa, this thesis will use 
a novel source of historical climate data to provide independent climate records for the 
first half of the nineteenth century. By utilising wind data from ships’ logbooks, the 
reconstructions will also develop a novel methodology and demonstrate their potential 
in climate reconstruction. 
 The theoretical insight of this research is not only limited to understanding 
specific events or climatic changes, but relates to how deep-rooted and fundamental 
processes of nature-culture interactions operate. This debate is therefore of relevance 
for contemporary climate change discourses, which invariably situate Sub-Saharan 
Africa as the most vulnerable region to climate change (Boko et al. 2007; Niang et al. 
2014). Climate model outputs, for instance, project that warming in this region in this 
century is very likely to be higher than the global average, with increases in extreme 
wet and dry seasons projected in most sub-regions (Christensen et al. 2007; Niang et al. 
2014). Although sophisticated model-based climate impact studies are far more 
complex than the simplistic approach outlined in model (a) in Figure 1.7, critics argue 
that understanding of the causal consequences of climate change for society remains 
limited (Hulme 2011a). Reactions against the dominant methodological discourse have 
recently emerged, one of which argues that the predictive authority of climate 
modelling over geography and other environmental and social sciences has left the 
future of humankind ‘reduced’ to climate (Hulme 2011a). Similarly to climate 
determinism, this so-called climate reductionism is suggested to have resulted in an 
elevated position of climate as a universal predictor and causal variable, and an over-
determined future where the biophysical impacts of climate ‘explain’ the performance 
of future societies. 
 Owing to the urgency of contemporary environmental challenges, and the 
stated vulnerability of the African continent, the notions of determinism and 
reductionism across different timescales raise the need for such new lines of research at 
the climate-society interface in Africa (Hannaford 2014). Indeed, few have taken up the 
task highlighted by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) in its 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) to address the fact that “there are still few detailed 
and rich compendia of studies on ‘human dimensions’, interactions, adaptation and 
climate change (of both a historical context, current, and future-scenarios nature)” 
(Boko et al. 2007, 450). One could therefore argue that the understanding of past 
climate-society relationships has shifted from the comparatively narrow attention 
within the disciplines of archaeology, anthropology and environmental history and 
taken on a new significance regarding contemporary climate change. Studies such as 
this one can consequently contribute to present discussions of how nature and culture 
shape each other, rather than the predominant examination of how nature has or will 
shape society, and is thus certainly a matter of significance for the framing of climate 
change and its impact upon policy and public debates (Hulme 2011b). 
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Chapter 2. The second millennium in the pre-colonial period 
Marked socio-political, cultural, economic, and as will later be shown, climatic change, 
occurred in the second millennium AD in southern Africa prior to colonial rule. At the 
turn of the second millennium, the largest communities in the region were at most 
decentralised, small-scale chiefdoms, yet by the time the Portuguese settled at Sofala in 
1505, two complex state structures with large capitals had developed and declined 
(Figure 1.4). Although the focus period in Chapter 5 does not extend back beyond c. 
1450, it is crucial to consider the second millennium as a whole in the Zambezi-
Limpopo area, as many of the factors connected with the origins of state formation, 
complex society and urbanism developed long before the fifteenth century. Any 
analysis of the past, though, must first provide insights into certain key frameworks if 
it is to be understood. This chapter therefore initially outlines the physical geography, 
climate system and pre-second millennium settlement of the wider study domain of 
southern Africa. Subsequently, the chapter will overview each focus region and period 
individually, both in terms of local environmental peculiarities, the economy and 
society of their inhabitants, and discourses on socio-political transformation. 
 
2.1 Geography, climate and settlement 
Regional environmental differences and changes had a variety of influences on human 
history, particularly in pre-industrial times. On the broadest scale, factors such as the 
spatial variability of rainfall, disease vectors, and the differential abundance of 
minerals presented populations with opportunities and constraints. Moreover, changes 
in these factors by natural variability or the exhaustion of finite resources provided 
further challenges. On the other hand, human innovation and agency conditioned, 
sometimes by buffering, while at others exacerbating, the significance of environmental 
change. Before attempting to analyse the nature of environmental change and the 
impact of such changes, the physical environment of the study domain and the natural 
mechanisms controlling its changes must be understood. 
 An absolute geographical delimitation of the study domain for the thesis is 
imperfect and artificial, for society was ultimately not bounded by major geographical 
features such as mountain ranges or rivers. Nonetheless, two main terms will be used 
to address the research area. ‘Southern Africa’ refers to the landmass of Africa south of 
the Zambezi (Figure 2.1), including the more arid western part of the region where 
farming communities were less prominent. The descriptor used more widely 
throughout is ‘southeast Africa’. This term is alludes to the more specific domain of 
societal events under consideration, and broadly refers to land east of the Kalahari, 
northeast of the Great Kei river, and south of southern shores of Lake Malawi (Figures 
1.1 and 2.1). This domain corresponds to the present-day nation states of Zimbabwe, 
the south-eastern part of South Africa, the southern half of Mozambique, and to a 
much lesser extent, eastern Botswana, southern Zambia, Swaziland and Lesotho. 
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FIGURE 2.1 Physical map of Africa. 1: Zambezi-Limpopo region; 2: KwaZulu-Natal area. Data 
sources: Natural Earth (2014); USGS SRTM (2014). 
 
 Two major physiographic features or units of southern Africa are the interior 
plateau and coastal lowlands, which are separated by a third major feature, the ‘Great 
Escarpment’. In its maximum extent, the escarpment stretches from the Namibian 
highlands, down to the Cape Fold Mountain Belt, east to the Drakensberg, and into 
northern South Africa. The escarpment then re-emerges in the Eastern Highlands of 
Zimbabwe, which lie to the north of the lowland expanses of the Limpopo valley and 
Mozambique coast. Apart from these extensive lowland areas, the rest of the coast has 
only thin strips of lowland running inland to a maximum of ~150 km (Figure 2.1). On 
the contrary, the majority of the region consists of a plateau of variable height, which is 
at its maximum in the Drakensberg (~3500 m) and of a lesser height in the Kalahari 
area. Minerals are most abundant in the interior plateau regions. Iron-bearing rocks are 
common in much of the region, while gold and copper deposits were spread across 
much of Zimbabwe, parts of the Limpopo valley, and northern South Africa. 
 Freshwater availability is an important factor in societal development, and this 
differs profoundly across the region. The major catchment in southern Africa is the 
Zambezi, which rises in the Zambia-Angola border region and flows eastwards along 
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the northern border of Zimbabwe into central Mozambique and then the Indian Ocean. 
Two other major river catchments flowing into the Indian Ocean are the Save and the 
Limpopo. The former mostly flows through Zimbabwe, while the latter in its 
ephemeral flow drains northern South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Further south, 
other major rivers are the Orange, Vaal and Caledon, while numerous smaller 
catchments flow between the Great Escarpment and the coast, including the Thukela, 
Phongolo, Great Kei, Great Fish and Olifants. Freshwater lakes are relatively rare in 
southern Africa, and are mostly restricted to the southeast coast. A number of salt pans 
are also found in the interior, the largest being the Makgadikgadi in Botswana. 
 A number of biogeographic classifications exist for southern Africa, the most 
widely used of which derives from Rutherford and Westfall (1988). The main units of 
this classification under consideration in this thesis include moist woodland (miombo), 
dry woodland savanna, mixed woodland savanna and grassland. Miombo spans much 
of the Zimbabwe plateau area, where Brachystegia and Julbernardia are among the 
dominant species of vegetation and often form a closed canopy (Mitchell 2002). Mean 
annual precipitation in this biogeographic area is generally above 500 mm, while 
perennial water bodies are frequent. Diverse fauna are present in miombo areas, with 
elephant, wildebeest, giraffe and buffalo common. Further south are the savanna areas, 
which constitute the most extensive unit in the region. These areas receive less 
abundant rainfall, and surface water is more scarce. Dry woodland savanna areas 
include the Zambezi and middle Limpopo valleys, which are dominated by mopane 
trees and shrubs (Pikirayi 2001). Moisture stress is common in these areas, meaning 
drought-resistant flora such as baobabs are common. Mixed woodland savanna 
(bushveld) covers most of the Mozambique lowlands, the upper Limpopo valley, low 
altitude areas of KwaZulu-Natal and the northern part of South Africa. Trees such as 
Acacia are common here, as are subtropical thornbush, scrub forest, and fruiting trees 
such as marula. The savanna zone supports a high diversity of mammals, with 
elephant, rhinoceroses, hippopotamuses, buffalo, lions, leopards, giraffes, zebras and 
numerous antelope species common. Grassland is found on South Africa’s central 
plateau which forms the area of the present-day Free State, and extends into parts of 
Lesotho, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. Vegetation is dominated by grasses of 
both ‘sweet’ and ‘sour’ species, which offer varying palatability to cattle and prevail in 
the drier and wetter parts of the area respectively (Guy 1994). Trees are comparatively 
rare, with wild plant foods including bulbs and tubers. Fauna common to this area in 
pre-colonial times were the black wildebeest, springbok, and the now-extinct quagga. 
 
2.1.1 The climate of southern Africa 
Climate and its variability exert considerable influence on each of the biophysical 
components discussed above. As southern Africa lies within 35° of the equator, its 
temperatures are generally above the global mean, and provide few constraints to 
plant growth barring the highest altitude areas (Grove 1990). Nevertheless, the region 
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experiences a cooler climate than others at similar latitudes. This is primarily due to its 
elevation and tapering geography, the latter factor making it more accessible to cooler, 
maritime air. The cooler parts of the region generally comprise the interior areas 
adjacent to the escarpment, whereas the hottest regions are low-lying areas such as the 
Zambezi and Limpopo valleys. Evaporation is generally high, and precipitation is the 
most crucial factor for surface water availability and the replenishment of aquifers. 
This means that it is also the most important climatic variable for societal development. 
 As southern Africa is situated at the interface of the temperate, subtropical and 
tropical climate zones, as well as the Indian, Atlantic and Southern Oceans, its 
precipitation is influenced by several atmospheric and oceanic systems. These are shifts 
in the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), the mid-latitude westerlies, sea-surface 
temperatures (SSTs) and the development and position of continental and oceanic 
anticyclones. Moreover, these modulating influences are affected by regional and 
hemispheric climate modes such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Indian 
Ocean Dipole (IOD), Southern Annular Mode (SAM), and their interplay. Such factors 
mean that regional precipitation amounts and regimes are characterised by high spatial 
and temporal variability, an indication of which is given in Figure 2.2. Although parts 
of the region are well-watered, moisture stress and drought are the most frequent and 
serious environmental hazards in the region (Nicholson 1996, 2000; Ekblom et al. 2012), 
and are discussed further in Section 2.1.1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2 Spatial variability of southern African precipitation 1950-2000. Data source: 
WorldClim (2014). 
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 Rainfall distribution in this region has a marked seasonality, with two main 
zones making up the annual rainfall cycle (Figure 2.2). In the east and the interior the 
SRZ is defined as where ≥66% of mean annual precipitation falls between October and 
March. This zone receives precipitation predominantly associated with the southern 
edge of the ITCZ and easterly airflow from the Indian Ocean (Nash and Grab 2010), 
and constitutes the primary focus region of the thesis. In the southwest, the 
comparatively small Winter Rainfall Zone (WRZ), where ≥66% of its precipitation falls 
between April and September, receives its rainfall from temperate frontal systems as 
the westerlies migrate equatorward each winter (Reason and Jagadeesha 2005). 
Between these two zones is also a narrow area that receives year-round rainfall, with 
maxima around spring and autumn (Chase and Meadows 2007). 
 Pronounced spatial variability in rainfall totals is present across the SRZ. Near 
the tropics, the climate is dominated by descending air associated with the poleward 
side of the Hadley Cells for most of the year, meaning semi-arid to arid conditions 
prevail with the exception of the eastern part of southern Africa. Accounting for this 
east to west gradient in rainfall levels (Figure 2.2) are variations in moisture source and 
topography, and this is further enhanced by the arid conditions arising from the cold, 
upwelling waters of the Benguela current off southwest Africa, and the warm Agulhas 
current off the southeast coast. Over the eastern portion of South Africa, including 
KwaZulu-Natal, the dominance of anticyclonic conditions means that moisture is 
derived from air masses moving eastward from the southwest Indian Ocean. Rainfall 
distribution, however, is strongly influenced by topographic variations (Figures 2.1 
and 2.2). As this moist maritime air moves westward, much of its precipitation falls on 
the Drakensberg and Soutspansberg ranges, a process which is enhanced by 
orographic effects. These humid, high altitude areas experience an increase in 
precipitation with altitude of around 100 mm per 100 m, while rainy days can total 120-
140 per year (Tyson and Preston-Whyte 2000). In KwaZulu-Natal, mean annual rainfall 
ranges from ~750 mm in the northern interior to 1250 mm along the coast and in the 
mountains, where local variation is caused by differences in altitude and proximity to 
the coast and its warming oceanic currents. Further inland, much moisture is lost due 
to orographic effects, resulting in a decline in moisture on the other side of the 
escarpment. Similarly, low-lying areas such as the Zambezi and Limpopo river valleys 
are dry, where ~300-500 mm is received annually, while exceptionally arid conditions 
are found on the coast of Namibia and the adjacent coasts of South Africa and Angola 
(Figure 2.2), where less than 50 mm is received annually over a period of around 10 
days. Seasonal rainfall quantities are crucial to the requirements of cereal agriculture. 
In general, widely used staple crops of sorghum and millet require >350 mm of rain 
during the summer season, and >500 mm over the course of the year, with nocturnal 
temperatures of >15 °C (Huffman 1996, 2007). Agropastoral settlement was therefore 
generally limited to the miombo, savanna and grassland areas in the eastern half of 
southern Africa, but as will be discussed later, past precipitation changes did enable 
present-day drylands to be extensively settled and cultivated in the past. 
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 In areas north of around 22° S, such as the Zimbabwe plateau, disturbances of 
the ITCZ, a zone of persistent low tropospheric airflow convergence, is the main agent 
modulating rainfall (Nicholson 2000). Over Africa, the ITCZ and associated rain belts 
migrate with the sun from the northern to southern hemisphere between July and 
January. Generally, maximum convergence, cumulus convection, cloudiness and 
precipitation occur equatorward of the major flow discontinuity (Tyson and Preston-
Whyte 2000). Rainfall is therefore considerably more uniform in quantity in ITCZ-
sensitive areas, with only localised drier areas in the Zambezi valley and the Angolan 
coast. Thunderstorms and intense instability showers are also common here. 
 SSTs in the surrounding oceans also exercise influence over SRZ rainfall 
variability (Reason and Jagadeesha 2005; Neukom et al. 2014). This relationship is 
particularly strong in the southwest Indian Ocean, where warmer SSTs are associated 
with increased easterlies and thus moisture convergence over southeast Africa, while 
cooler SSTs diminish easterliness and reduce moisture convergence. Warmer SSTs 
promote the formation of tropical-temperate troughs across South Africa, which are the 
main SRZ rainfall-producing synoptic system, and lead to increased precipitation in 
areas like KwaZulu-Natal, as well as further north in Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
(Reason and Jagadeesha 2005). Neukom et al. (2014) demonstrate the strong link of 
SRZ rainfall with SSTs over a wider area, and found that 40% of SST grid cells south of 
20° N showed significant (p <0.05) correlations with SRZ rainfall. In the WRZ, 
however, only 2% are significantly correlated to precipitation amounts, which are 
confined to smaller areas in the southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans around 40° S. 
 Particularly strong correlations are observed between SRZ rainfall and SSTs in 
the tropical Pacific by way of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (Nicholson 2000). 
During its cool phase, or in La Niña conditions, southeast Africa, Australia and South 
America typically experience synchronous wetter conditions, whereas in its warm 
phase, or El Niño events, these areas tend to be drier. Specifically, La Niña conditions 
and associated changes in atmospheric circulation in the tropical Pacific modulate the 
rainfall of southeast Africa by creating negative pressure anomalies over land, 
strengthening easterly winds, and affecting the location of the major cloud band 
convergence zones, which locate preferentially over southeast Africa (Tyson and 
Preston-Whyte 2000). By contrast, in El Niño conditions, positive pressure anomalies 
tend to form over southeast Africa, along with weakened Indian Ocean easterly waves 
and lows, while cloud bands tend to locate over Madagascar and the Indian Ocean, 
creating drier conditions in parts of southeast Africa. However, ENSO events do not 
always create anomalously wetter or drier conditions in the SRZ, as upper-level 
atmospheric circulation features such as the Quasi-Biennial Oscillation (QBO) also 
modulate its influence. Other Southern Hemisphere climate modes, such as the SAM, 
have a very limited influence on SRZ precipitation, but exert stronger influences on 
WRZ rainfall (Neukom et al. 2014). 
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2.1.1.1 Inter-annual to centennial variability 
Though high spatial variability is apparent in the factors discussed above, southern 
Africa is also characterised by high temporal precipitation variability on intraseasonal, 
inter-annual and longer timescales. Although the mean circulation of the atmosphere 
generally controls the regional climate, wetter or drier monthly and seasonal 
conditions are predominantly associated with changes in the frequency, intensity and 
persistence of rainfall-producing weather systems, which are also influenced by large-
scale climate modes such as the ENSO (Ratna et al. 2013). In the SRZ, synoptic-scale 
tropical-temperate trough systems and their associated cloud bands are a dominant 
contributor to seasonal rainfall. A major moisture source for tropical-temperate trough 
development is via easterly winds from the adjacent Indian Ocean, with strengthened 
easterly winds resulting in stronger moisture fluxes towards southeast Africa (Ratna et 
al. 2013). Inter-annual variability in the WRZ, by contrast, is influenced by the strength 
of the winter storm systems and disturbances forming over the South Atlantic and 
Southern Ocean in the mid-latitude westerlies (Chase and Meadows 2007). 
 In order to understand longer-term rainfall variability, extended precipitation 
timeseries are needed. A small number of continuous meteorological records in 
southern Africa were kept in the latter years of the first half of the nineteenth century, 
and became sufficiently dense to enable wider-scale analysis of climate variability in 
the latter part of the century (Hulme 1996, 2001). Prior to the meteorological record, 
however, man-made documentary archives and natural palaeoclimate proxies, such as 
tree-rings, cave speleothems and lake sediments must be drawn upon. From these 
records it is known that wet and dry years in the southern African SRZ tend to cluster 
together over near-decadal periods, and affect the entire region, with phases of this 
nature reported over the last six millennia (Ekblom et al. 2011, 2012). Longer pulses of 
rainfall variability have also been shown to cluster over periods lasting multiple 
decades or centuries, but evidence for this is drawn primarily from palaeoclimate 
proxy data, which in this region are scarce and difficult to interpret. 
 The challenges of reconstructing past climates from these palaeoclimate proxy 
data are discussed at length in Chapter 3, yet it is known from these sources that the 
last 2000 years have witnessed substantial variability in rainfall and temperature 
(Figure 1.4) (Holmgren et al. 2012; Nicholson et al. 2013; Stager et al. 2013). This long-
term variability is believed to fit to a general model of atmospheric forcing, where in 
periods of anomalously warmer global temperatures, the ITCZ is strengthened over 
southern Africa, resulting in more rainfall in the SRZ, whereas the inverse occurs in 
periods of cooler global temperatures (Ekblom and Stabell 2008). Further linked to this 
is the position of the circumpolar westerlies, whereby an equatorward shift in their 
northern margins increases precipitation in the WRZ in southwest southern Africa, but 
is thought to restrict the southward mobility of the ITCZ, reducing SRZ rainfall (Stager 
et al. 2013). This mechanism is also believed to account for the marked long-term 
antiphase relationship between precipitation in the southern African SRZ and the bi-
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modal rainfall region of East tropical Africa (Nicholson 2000; Ekblom and Stabell 2008). 
Moreover, in the southeast, where SSTs in the adjacent tropical Indian Ocean exert 
strong influence on its efficacy as a moisture source, a warmer ocean would mean 
strengthened south-easterly trade winds, resulting in more moisture advection coming 
directly from the ocean (Sundqvist et al. 2013). Complexities in developing 
palaeoclimate data from the southern hemisphere low latitudes, however, mean that 
the inter-annual variability discussed in Section 2.1.1 is seldom reflected in proxy 
records, and for much of the pre-instrumental period, relatively sparse and limited 
resolution data are relied upon. 
 The precise state of knowledge on palaeoclimate variability will be discussed in 
the later sections of this chapter and analysed in Chapter 3, yet an introduction to this 
is required here. Palaeoclimate datasets in southern Africa began to grow in number 
from the 1980s in conjunction with the objectives of the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Programme, but these were generally limited to low-resolution records from 
pollen and faunal remains. Tyson and Lindesay (1992) conducted a review of these 
data, and advanced the hypothesis of coupled warm-wet and cool-dry conditions 
acting over multi-decadal and centennial timeframes (Table 2.1). This paper also 
categorised a number of periods by their predominant climatic inferences, and 
postulated that the southern African equivalents of the MCA and LIA in Europe lasted 
from about AD 900-1300 and 1300-1850, with a warming spell between about 1500-1675.  
 
TABLE 2.1 Qualitative summaries of precipitation variability since c. AD 1000 from review of 
Tyson and Lindesay (1992) and Stager et al. (2013), with probable decadal error ranges. 
Tyson and Lindesay 1992 Stager et al. 2013 
Year AD Climatic conditions Year AD Precipitation conditions 
  1860-1880 Dry 
1790-1810 Warm and wet 1760-1860 Wet 
1675-1780 Cool and dry 1740-1760 Dry 
  1670-1710 Dry 
1500-1675 Warm and wet  1590-1620 Dry 
  1540-1570 Dry 
  1470-1540 Wet 
1300-1500 Cool and dry 1430-1450 Dry 
  1390-1420 Wet 
  1370-1390 Dry 
  1340-1370 Wet 
  1310-1330 Dry 
900-1300 Warm and wet 1220-1280 Wet 
  1170-1220 Dry 
  1100-1170 Wet 
  1040-1090 Dry 
  1000-1040 Wet  
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 A number of higher-resolution proxy data have been obtained and published 
since Tyson and Lindesay’s study, and while general similarities have been observed, 
marked differences in precipitation signals and interpretation exist between these more 
recent records. A recent qualitative synthesis of three proxy precipitation records, 
including a tree-ring, lake diatom assemblage and speleothem by Stager et al. (2013) 
(Table 2.1) also demonstrates broad similarities with that of Tyson and Lindesay (1992). 
Nevertheless, Stager et al. (2013) considered only three records in their analysis, while 
half of one was inexplicably omitted. Moreover, even if there exists some agreement on 
a general picture of multi-decadal and centennial palaeoclimate variability over the last 
millennium in the SRZ, understanding of change on decadal and inter-annual scales is 
still extremely limited. Lack of data certainly plays a part in this, but this has increased 
in recent years, and a major problem is that there has been no regional study of the 
range of palaeoclimate proxies since that of Tyson and Lindesay over two decades ago. 
 As rainfall variability on these timescales is crucial for food production, and 
moisture stress is the most severe environmental hazard in the region, a major 
consequence of the above issues is that the limited range of data used to examine past 
climate-society relationships in past studies are not fit-for-purpose. Indeed, as will be 
shown later in this chapter, consideration of palaeoclimate variability and society has 
been restricted to hypotheses regarding the drying out or aridification of areas rather 
than the impacts of shorter-term drought. For instance, archaeological remains of 
farming settlement from presently arid areas such as the Limpopo valley give reason to 
suggest that these areas were wetter in the late-first to early-second millennium, and 
that past climate change did affect the sustainability of settlement in these areas. 
However, these debates have far too often tended to sway into the collapse-based 
approaches introduced in Section 1.2, contributing to the dearth of regional scholarship 
on the impact of environmental hazards such as drought in the historical period prior 
to colonial rule (broadly c. AD 1500-1890). In this latter period, considerably more data 
sources exist to analyse past climate-society interaction, which enable more 
consideration on the nature and impacts of drought, as well as other important climate-
related factors such as excess of rain, floods and locust plagues, all of which could 
affect the functioning of the food systems upon which people depended (Beach 1994). 
Climatologically, a wider range of natural and man-made data and chronologies now 
exist to reconstruct decadal- or even sub-decadal scale precipitation changes in 
southern Africa, which enable more precise identification of periods of moisture stress. 
Despite this potential, it must be borne in mind that whether a marked reduction in 
rainfall translates to significant societal impacts depends on the situation of the 
population, their habitual standard of living, and their ability to accommodate food 
shortages, all of which are variable parameters (Goudie et al. 1996; Pfister 2010). The 
next sections shall critically overview environmental, economic, social, political and 
cultural dynamics and their changes in the two focus regions from the coming of 
Bantu-speaking people to southern Africa to the mid-nineteenth century, when 
European colonial powers begun to overpower large parts of the region. 
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2.1.2 Early-farming communities: migrations, settlement and livelihoods 
This thesis is primarily concerned with Eastern Bantu-speaking people, particularly 
those who spoke Shona and Nguni (Figure 2.3). There is general agreement that Bantu-
speaking groups migrated to southern Africa from the north from around the early-
first millennium AD (Figure 2.3), and thereafter displaced, assimilated or traded with 
Khoisan-speaking hunter-gatherer groups (Phillipson 1993; Mitchell 2013). Unlike 
hunter-gathers, the majority of Bantu-speaking people lived in settled communities, 
combined cultivation with herding, forged iron, and made or used pottery. These first 
millennium early-farming communities were ancestral to the second millennium 
Shona, who comprised the majority of the population in the Zambezi-Limpopo area 
prior to the 1820s, and were involved in state-building activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3 Major languages of Africa (after Collins and Burns 2007) and hypothetical 
dispersion routes of Bantu languages from 1: Proto-Bantu homeland and 2: region of secondary 
dispersal (after Phillipson 1977). Numbers indicate successive centres. 
 
 As agropastoralists, most of these early-farming communities chose to live in an 
environment consisting of ‘broken country’, with alluvial and colluvial soils that 
enabled cultivation with an iron hoe (Huffman 2007). Cultivation was garden-based, 
and faunal remains indicate that this was centred around the principal crops of pearl 
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millet (Pennisetum americanum), finger millet (Eleusine coracana) and sorghum (Sorghum 
bicolor) (Huffman 2007). Pulses such as groundnuts (Voandzeia subterranean) and 
cowpeas (Vigna unguiculata) were also grown, while the gathering of wild plants and 
hunting were practised as insurance against crop failure (Beach 1977, 1980; Mitchell 
2013). Domestic animals, including cattle, sheep, goats, chickens and dogs formed a 
prominent part of subsistence strategies. Initially, sheep and goats were more 
numerous than cattle, but this situation began to shift from around AD 700 (Mitchell 
2002). Although cattle herding was important to Shona-speaking communities, crop 
requirements seem to have played a greater role in the choice of settlement location. A 
topic that has generated significantly more discussion, however, relates to the 
interpretation of space within settlements. A predominant theory is that Eastern Bantu-
speaking people organised their settlements according to a model known as the 
‘Central Cattle Pattern’ (CCP) (Huffman 2007), which explicitly links the ‘worldview’ 
of the settlement’s inhabitants to cattle for purposes such as bridewealth payments, 
sacrifice to ancestors, and political relations. The settlement organisation of certain 
groups changed with the emergence of class distinction in around the thirteenth 
century, where elites lived in a new ‘Zimbabwe Pattern’ layout, and commoners lived 
in homesteads organised according to the CCP (Huffman 2009b). These and other 
models posited by Huffman are important in understanding social organisation, but 
are not without their critics (Hall 1998; Badenhorst 2009; Marks 2011). For instance, 
while not denying their existence, the opposing view notes that they are deliberately 
ahistorical, and “stand in the way of any more nuanced sense of historical 
development, let alone of human agency” Marks (2011, 138). Throughout this thesis, 
consideration will be given to each of these standpoints in order to generate a dialogue 
that is attentive to both, rather than further dividing debate into worldview versus 
political process and idiosyncratic agency. 
Migrations of Nguni-speaking groups from the interlacustrine region of Africa 
to the KwaZulu-Natal area of South Africa occurred at around AD 1100 (Huffman 2004; 
Parsons 2007). These migrations have been causally, although relatively speculatively, 
linked with climatic fluctuations on the basis of the antiphase relationship in 
precipitation variability between southern and East Africa. This theory implies that 
inverse precipitation patterns between the two regions in palaeoclimate records around 
these times were a dominant push factor which drove these groups to less populated 
areas in southern Africa (Tyson et al. 2002; Huffman 2004, 2007), yet little evidence 
exists to support such a theory. Nguni groups differed markedly in economy, society, 
politics and culture to the Shona-speaking groups in the Zambezi-Limpopo area. For 
instance, Huffman (2004) notes that the major difference relative to other societies in 
southern Africa was the dichotomy between cattle and agriculture. Although these 
again consisted of sorghum, the two millets, cattle, goats and sheep, Nguni-speakers 
“greatly exaggerate the dichotomy between men and cattle on the one hand and 
women and agriculture on the other”, which creates a “patrilineal, pastoral arrogance” 
that “permeates the whole of Nguni life” (Hammond-Tooke 1993; Huffman 2004, 82). 
C apter 2: The s cond millennium in th pre-colonial peri d 
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
 29 
Because of the emphasis on cattle, and the volatility of this form of wealth, Nguni 
society institutionalised raiding (Huffman 2004), which according to Huffman helps 
explain why political units prior to the nineteenth century in the KwaZulu-Natal area 
were limited to small-scale chiefdoms in contrast to the Zimbabwe culture states 
further north. Nguni settlements reflected this emphasis on pastoralism. Beehive 
houses, the “premier symbol of pastoralism throughout Africa” were built like 
pastoralists in East Africa (Huffman 2004, 83), and contrary to other agropastoral 
communities, settlements were located on slopes above fertile agricultural land. 
This broad period from the earliest Bantu-speaking settlement in southern 
Africa to 1840 is termed the ‘Iron Age’ by some (Huffman 1970, 1972, 2007; Hall 1987; 
Maggs 1989; Badenhorst 2010). Despite its structural convenience, it has been noted 
that this term, borrowed from European prehistory, has become symbolic of older 
approaches to material culture and group identity (Schoeman 2013). In addition, it 
overemphasises the use of iron over other technologies and creates an illusory 
representation of societies as “static blocks rather than complex, dynamic entities” 
(Mitchell 2013, 657). Consequently, this thesis will use ‘farming communities’ or 
‘agropastoralists’ when making broad reference to these communities. 
 
2.2 Zambezi-Limpopo state transformation (c. AD 900-1840) 
2.2.1 Physical geography and environment 
The first and main case region, often referred to as ‘Zambezia’, incorporates the stretch 
of land bounded north to south by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers, and east to west 
by the Indian Ocean and Kalahari desert (Figure 2.4). Central to this area is present-day 
Zimbabwe, as well as parts of Mozambique, where land is traditionally classified into 
lowveld, middleveld and highveld. Lowveld refers to land below 900 m, such as the 
low-lying, drought-prone Zambezi and Limpopo valleys. Land between 900-1250 m is 
classed as middleveld, and accounts for most of the plateau formation that dominates 
the interior, while land rising above 1250 m to around 2500 m constitutes the highveld 
and Eastern Highlands. East of the highlands, land runs down to the woodlands that 
border the Indian Ocean on the Mozambique coast, and in the southeast it steeply 
descends to an expanse of low-lying land that stretches as far as Maputo Bay. To the 
southwest, a gradual extension of middleveld reaches into the Kalahari desert. 
 Intrusive igneous rocks including granite, gneiss and dolerite dominate most of 
the plateau (Summers 1960; Pikirayi 2001). A major geological feature of the region is 
the mineral-rich geological formation known as the ‘Great Dolerite Dyke’, which 
straddles Zimbabwe from south to north-east, and where quantities of gold, copper 
and iron were mined extensively in the pre-colonial period (Phimister 1976). The soils 
of the region, largely determined by the underlying geology, are of a high spatial 
variability. Granites of the central plateau are associated with sandy, heavily textured 
and leached sub-soils, which offer poor fertility (Pikirayi 1993). The brown soils of the 
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gold belt and dolerite dyke, however, are considerably more fertile, and coincide with 
areas of medium to high rainfall. The Zambezi, Shashe-Limpopo and Save basins all 
receive relatively low rainfall (Figure 2.2), and the soils here are heavily leached 
(Pikirayi 2001). The soils of the north-western area, drained by the Gwai-Shangani 
system, are mainly aeolian, and are thus shallow and infertile (Summers 1960). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4 Physical geographical features of the greater Zambezi-Limpopo area. 
 
 The drainage system of the plateau and lowveld areas is dendritic, and the land 
is deeply dissected by rivers that start in wide, shallow valleys and cut down through 
the edge of the plateau until they merge in the Zambezi valley, the coastal plain or the 
southeast lowveld (Beach 1994). Of the numerous rivers, only parts of the Zambezi, 
Limpopo, Save, Pungwe and Runde are navigable by small crafts at certain times of the 
year, but this may have been different at various times over the last millennium 
(Mudenge 1988). Rivers such as the Tugwi-Runde and Mazowe-Ruya were also the 
source of the alluvial gold washed from upstream (Phimister 1974). 
 The vegetation is mostly made up of mixed woodland and savanna. Occasional 
stretches of plains of tall elephant grass are found on the plateau, while semi-tropical 
forests are present in the southeast of Zimbabwe and the Zambezi valley. In particular, 
miombo woodland is found on the granites and dolerites of the relatively wet plateau. 
In the south to southwest of the area, dry grass veld and semi-arid scrubland is found, 
and provides nutritious grazing-land to cattle all year round. Similarly, mopane tree 
savanna of the arid lowland basins and the far west provides further excellent grazing 
potential (Pikirayi 2001). The dominance of savanna vegetation provided suitable 
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habitat for a wide range of fauna. Strategically important for pre-colonial communities 
were vast herds of elephants that were hunted for their meat and ivory, prides of lions 
and leopards for their skins, and innumerable other non-domestic animals for food 
(Beach 1977). As well as offering habitat, woodlands were important in that they 
provided charcoal for fuel and smelting, as well as woodwork crafts. 
 This basic overview of the region’s physical features is useful to set the overall 
scene for the events of the last millennium, but when considering human development, 
it is essential to move beyond consideration of purely physical parameters and view 
both the long-term and dynamic cultural landscape of the region, as its inhabitants did 
not see it in such categorical terms (Beach 1980; Pikirayi 2001; Manyanga 2007). As 
Beach (1980) states, possibilities of preferences for certain soil types (see Sinclair 1987, 
2012) must be set against factors such as precipitation, grazing potential, access to 
water resources, defensive suitability, and access to trade routes. 
 In an analysis of these broader scale environment-society connections in pre-
colonial Zimbabwe, Beach (1994) identified a ‘Great Crescent’ of pre-colonial 
population which in his view reflected long-term preference for a certain kind of 
environment, though this was not strictly based around either soils, vegetation, 
precipitation or geology. Rather than a single physical feature, a range of features 
including a mixture of soil types, grazing, woodlands, and defence possibilities were 
said to have accounted for this preference. The only apparent anomaly identified by 
Beach was that the main goldfield formed a crescent in the opposite direction, which 
would imply that good farming and gold mining were only possible for a minority 
(Beach 1994). Yet the difficulty with this theory, or any other wider theory relating to 
the influence of the environment on pre-colonial society, is that there exists a lack of 
reliable, evenly covered archaeological data in Zimbabwe to understand demographic 
change in detail. Moreover, failure to incorporate important early-second millennium 
human activity in the Shashe-Limpopo basin (Huffman 2009b) further undermines the 
Great Crescent theory (Manyanga 2007). Particularly important here is long-term 
climate variability, which has since been strongly linked to the late-first and early-
second millennium societal development in the Shashe-Limpopo basin. Indeed, 
although present conditions are relatively inhospitable for farming communities, the 
lowveld of the Limpopo and Zambezi valley do represent areas where significant 
human activity took place over the last millennium. As far as the rest of the region is 
concerned, though, the most demographically favoured areas appear to have been the 
middleveld and highveld areas on the plateau between 900-1500 m, whereas particular 
areas less favoured for settlement included the south-eastern lowveld, where low 
rainfall, poorly developed soils, and tsetse fly combined to discourage extensive 
settlement (Beach 1994; Pikirayi 2001). The area to the west of the plateau, which 
consists of very sandy soils, was similarly not favoured due to severe agricultural 
limitations. With these factors in mind, then, the basic influence of the environment on 
economic, social and political dynamics will be borne in mind throughout the thesis. 
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2.2.2 Economy and society 
Portuguese written sources made frequent reference to the food systems, livelihoods, 
trade relations and socio-political organisation of the inhabitants of the Zambezi-
Limpopo region, enabling depth to be added to archaeological records. Most previous 
analyses of the regional economy prior to colonial rule, however, have focussed on 
individual aspects such as mining or trade, or examined these as ‘modes’ and 
‘branches of production’ (Beach 1977, 1980; Bhila 1982; Mudenge 1988). This general 
examination outlines, and to an extent, re-assesses the economy and society of the 
inhabitants of this region across the broad timeframe of the second millennium, which 
is essential background for consideration of socio-political security. Although the 
following is a generic and somewhat ahistorical overview, it must be remembered that 
not all of the inhabitants and polities in the region participated in all livelihood 
activities. Geographical and environmental factors, as mentioned above, were not the 
same in all areas, while social and technological factors likewise influenced the type of 
livelihoods practised in different space-time contexts. It is also essential to consider 
aspects such as the relative importance of the various livelihoods to different parts of 
society. This involves the different activities in which people spent the limited number 
of hours in every year, but also contrasting activities over years, decades and centuries 
(Beach 1977). This key concept of time will be alluded to in this initial assessment, but 
will be analysed at greater length in Chapter 5, where dynamic temporal changes such 
as climate variability, political change, resource availability, disease and global 
economic change are assessed in the context of socio-political formation and security. 
 
2.2.2.1 Food system 
There exists strong consensus that the most important activity involving the greatest 
number of people over the course of the second millennium was food production, 
primarily by growing crops, supplemented to various extents by the keeping of 
domestic animals, hunting, and gathering (Summers 1969; Phimister 1974, 1976; Beach 
1977, 1980, 1994; Bhila 1982; Mudenge 1988; Pikirayi 1993, 2001; Huffman 2000, 2007). 
By contrast, Portuguese accounts make it clear that other livelihood activities, such as 
mining, trade, manufacturing and metal-working were secondary to food production, 
the most commonly cited of which states that: 
“The land abounds with rivers of good water, and the greater number of the Kaffirs 
are inclined to agricultural and pastoral pursuits, in which their riches consist” 
(Bocarro 1631-49, 355). 
 Cultivated crops primarily included those brought from the Sudanic zone north 
of the equator, such as sorghum, the two millets, and groundnuts. Asian crops like rice, 
sugar cane and bananas were already established by the time of Portuguese arrival in 
1505, while the later American crops included maize and tobacco (Beach 1977). The 
entire list of cultivated crops, when including vegetables and local plants, is relatively 
long, yet there is general agreement that sorghum and millet formed the backbone of 
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agricultural production for most of the pre-colonial period. These were used to 
produce a stiff grain porridge widely eaten across the region (Monclaro 1573; Beach 
1977, 1994; Bhila 1982; Mudenge 1988), while most other vegetables, nuts, salt and 
other grains were used for relish. Despite broad agreement in these factors, the range 
and relative importance of cultivated crops did vary across the landscape and changed 
over time, but this has so far received little attention.  
 The cultivation process began with the preparing of fields and planting in the 
dry winter months. Seeds were planted at the onset of the summer rains, though the 
exact time of planting depended on the individual crop. Crops matured by the end of 
the rains and were harvested in the early part of winter. Drying and threshing 
followed in mid-winter; thereafter, part of the crop was put into the next cycle as seed, 
and that left over was stored as food for the village (Mudenge 1988). The effectiveness 
of grain storage played an important part in ensuring the food supply lasted until the 
next harvest became available, yet earlier debates around the efficacy of storage were 
inconclusive, primarily through lack of evidence (Beach 1977, 1980, 1994; Mudenge 
1988). Beach (1977, 1980) claimed that few crops could be kept for more than two or 
three years, while Mudenge (1988) put this timeframe at three to five years due to the 
air-tight, stone-raised granaries used, which in his view lessened the significance of 
drought. Grains that were good for storage included sorghum and finger millet. 
Sorghum was also drought-resistant, though finger millet, which was more widely 
grown, was less drought resistant than sorghum and pearl millet. Beach (1977) 
conceptualised the complexity of drought impacts on agriculture in a four-year cycle: 
“If the crops sown in the early summer of Year 2 were hit by a drought, the crops 
sown in Year 1 and harvested in the winter of Year 2 would last until the winter of 
Year 3. But even if the rains of Year 3 were good, before the crop of Year 3 could be 
reaped in the winter of Year 4, the crop of Year 2 would have run out. The 
consequence of this could be terrible, and worse if there were two or more droughts in 
succession. It is not surprising that every year saw a certain amount of tension until it 
became certain that the crops were secure” (Beach 1977, 43). 
 As well as drought, crops were subject to rains that came too soon or too late, 
too much rain, locust plagues, damage by elephants, hippopotamuses and baboons, as 
well as frosts and floods (Pikirayi 1993, 2001). As will be shown later, documents and 
oral traditions do allude to the impact of drought, highlighting an inherent insecurity 
of the agricultural system. Yet it must be borne in mind that drought conditions were 
not the inter-annual norm in most parts of Zimbabwe, but have been commonly 
assigned an incidence of one year in five from analyses of the instrumental record 
(Scoones et al. 1996). Adaptive mechanisms and coping strategies were used to buffer 
the impact of drought, but no method could completely offset agricultural losses. For 
instance, people often resorted to hunting and gathering, or moved to areas less badly 
hit (Beach 1980; Pikirayi 2003). On the other hand, a wider range of crops could be 
planted, such as the more drought-resistant pearl millet, but this brought problems of 
storage compared to finger millet. In the event of delayed rains, a later crop could be 
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planted, but may have been of an inferior quality to the earlier ones (Beach 1977). 
People could also regularly grow a larger crop, as was done in some areas when 
markets opened up, but aside from the limitations of storage, the growth of a surplus 
by a household was treated with suspicion, causing tension at the village level 
(Randles 1975; Mudenge 1988). Problems with transport also limited opportunities 
such as the trade of grain, as few navigable rivers and the rare use of oxen for transport 
prevented this on a significant scale (Beach 1994), but trade in foodstuffs was practised 
locally (Bhila 1982; Ekblom 2004). It is critical at this point to note that each of these 
fine-scale processes make examining the impacts of individual droughts extremely 
difficult where data is sparse, and new methods are required to move beyond simple 
extrapolations from palaeoclimate data onto an assumed unchanging fragility of an 
agricultural society over multi-centennial timeframes. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
environmental realities of the area meant its agricultural base had fundamental 
insecurities, which could only be buffered so far by storage and coping strategies. 
Other components of societies’ food systems did, however, offset this to an extent. 
 Domestic animals reduced food system dependence on agriculture alone, and 
the keeping of sheep, goats and cattle provided a source of food that both lived longer 
than grain could be stored and could reproduce. The proportion of these three 
domestic animals varied across the region, but generally goats outnumbered cows and 
sheep (Beach 1977, 1980; Badenhorst 2010). Sheep were much rarer with the exception 
of areas such as Manyika (Bhila 1982). Dogs were also kept for hunting, vermin control 
and security, and chickens were common, though pigs were rare outside of the 
Zambezi valley (Beach 1994). Unquestionably, however, the cow was regarded as the 
superior domestic animal (Huffman 2007). The amount of meat supplied from the cow 
by far exceeded that of the goat or sheep, and the social importance of cattle across 
southern Africa such as for payment in bride-price and tribute to rulers is well attested 
(Beach 1977; Garlake 1978; Huffman 1982, 2007). Factors such as raiding, disease and 
drought presented hazards to cattle keeping, but through careful breeding and herding 
it was possible to increase wealth in cattle and provide a buffer to the insecurities that 
came with crop cultivation. Despite its importance as a source of food, the social role of 
cattle meant that the primary purpose of herding was to increase its population and for 
powerful minorities to accumulate them (Beach 1994). Along with its elevated social 
importance came unequal distribution, and for the poorer segments of society stealing 
cattle was the most direct way to acquire wealth (Beach 1977), while cattle was given as 
payment to gold miners (Mudenge 1988). Beach (1977) also notes that cattle could also 
be sold for grain, but this was unlikely to occur unless this was in very short supply. 
 Wild animals provided a further source of food. Hunting had been long-
established by the ancestral inhabitants of the region and from elsewhere, where 
techniques such as trapping were advanced. Hunting took place on individual and 
group levels, and in times of scarcity could involve large, organised parties (Santos 
1609; Beach 1977). Portuguese documents show that the range of animals hunted by 
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groups was enormous, yet although it provided an addition to the diet, its proportional 
contribution to this was limited, and it was not the central component of the food 
system. A risk of hunting was also that local animal populations could be depleted if 
communities relied on it too much, which could make the population more vulnerable 
to drought in the longer-term. Certainly, in the more populous and elite settlements, 
the proportion of wild animal to domestic animal bones show that hunting was not as 
important as cattle-keeping as far as sources of meat were concerned (Plug 2000). 
 Wild plants collected by women and children could also provide a dietary 
supplement, and nutrition from wild fruits, vegetables and insects was to be found in 
the hinterland of settlements. Gathering was particularly important in times of scarcity, 
where a limited grain supply forced a reliance upon wild fruits, herbs and insects 
especially amongst the poorer parts of society. Even locusts, a common cause of crop 
destruction, were a source of food, but none of these food sources could adequately 
replace the centrality of the staple grains to the diet and economy of most of the 
region’s inhabitants (Beach 1977; Bhila 1982; Mudenge 1988). 
 
2.2.2.2 Livelihoods and trade 
Important resources in the village economy were salt and iron, which often had to be 
obtained via local trade. Although ‘specialist’ groups existed to procure and sell such 
resources, Beach (1977) states that they only practised this to supplement their existing 
wealth rather than rely upon their specialisation for subsistence. Salt was an essential 
commodity, and could be obtained by either burning and filtering certain plants or 
extracting and evaporating saline earth from salt springs or pans. This latter method 
produced the best quality salt, and key salt-producing areas such as eastern Botswana, 
and the Zambezi and Save valleys supplied people over a wide area. Iron was 
generally found in the high number of small deposits across the region (Summers 
1969), and was most useful for the manufacture of the hoe, as well as for weapons. 
Other livelihoods such as copper-working, potting, and weaving were carried out in 
various parts of the landscape, while some later groups grew and sold tobacco (Beach 
1977). Involvement in this local trade facilitated the build-up of stock, and thereby 
provided an additional buffer to offset environmental hazards. 
 Links to inter-continental trade were market-oriented (Mudenge 1988; Beach 
1994), being heavily linked to global demand for gold, ivory, and to a lesser extent, 
copper (Phimister 1976; Pikirayi 2001; Pwiti 2005; Swan 2008). Trade contacts were 
established between the Shashe-Limpopo basin and Muslim traders at Chibuene 
(Figure 2.5) in the ninth century (Burke 1962; Sinclair et al. 2012), where ivory and 
alluvial gold was traded for cloth and beads. The mining of gold reefs begun around 
the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries, when trade links were also established with 
India (Phimister 1976; Huffman 2007). People prospected, mined, washed and milled 
the gold, and either local traders took this to the Indian Ocean coast, or Muslim traders 
came inland to buy it. Muslim coastal cities acted as middlemen in the trade until c. 
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1500, when the Portuguese started to overrun the trade. Reef mining was mostly 
seasonal, and was conducted by ordinary farmers in the dry season before the summer 
rains flooded the mines (Phimister 1976). The distribution of exploitable reef gold 
deposits was uneven (Figure 2.6), and those distant from it were not involved in the 
industry. Estimates of gold exports from Portuguese documents and archaeological 
remains of workings vary, but the general temporal characteristics are fairly clear. Peak 
production occurred between the twelfth and mid-fifteenth centuries, with a steep 
decline at this point, followed by a gradual decline towards the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, and by the mid- to late-nineteenth century nearly all payable reef 
deposits had been worked out (Summers 1969; Phimister 1976). The major contribution 
of gold mining to society was that rulers could tax both production and trade, and it 
therefore played a supportive role in reinforcing the political system of polities 
(Mudenge 1988; Mitchell 2002; Huffman 2007; Pikirayi 2013a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.5 Important sites in the Indian Ocean trade network. 
 
 Ivory was the other resource sought by inter-continental traders, though was 
also important as a food source (Santos 1609). Upon the killing of an elephant, the ruler 
usually took one of the tusks as tax, the meat was distributed among the community, 
and the hunter kept the other tusk. According to Beach (1977), tusks could be used to 
pay the bride-price of a wife, allowing more croplands to be opened up and planted by 
the addition of her labour to the family, or could be used to buy iron ore. Ultimately, 
though, ivory went to the coastal trade. The ivory trade increased in importance from 
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around the early-sixteenth century onwards, and eventually overtook that of gold over 
the next centuries (Phimister 1976). 
 The significance of mining and trade has been both over- and understated in 
the literature. It is now agreed that these industries were secondary to most of the 
region’s inhabitants, and relied upon the part-time efforts of agropastoral communities, 
yet it could be argued that its significance was disproportionately higher than simply 
the number of people involved in these economic activities would suggest. Indeed, 
rapid reactionary responses to trade are evident in the historical record (Beach 1994; 
Pwiti 2005), while imports of cloth and beads were valued forms of wealth and have 
been linked with augmenting and intensifying inequality and class structures in the 
earlier polities of this period (Huffman 2009b). The taxes acquired from these activities 
also provided polities with material wealth to support political structures, which in 
turn enabled more tribute, service and fees to be appropriated from the population. 
Still, mining had its limitations. Geological and technological constraints meant that 
only small-scale gold mining could be conducted, while the human risks associated 
with reef mining are widely attested in Portuguese accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.6 Major gold-producing areas and trade routes of the region (after Huffman 2009b). 
 
2.2.2.3 Socio-political organisation 
This thesis focusses primarily on complex socio-political structures, meaning it is 
necessary to consider the various levels of societal organisation. Mudenge (1988) 
outlined this on a hierarchical level – from territory, to ward, to village, to household –
and claimed that this could be applied to most polities in the region, including those 
prior to the written record. Beach (1994), however, criticises this hierarchy as being too 
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neat and ignorant of the fluid process of historical change. If not rigidly applicable to 
every inhabitant and polity of the region, though, the outline presented by Mudenge 
gives an insightful idea of the general structures of socio-political organisation. 
 The smallest social unit was that of the family or household, involving the man, 
his wives and children. As well as a social unit, the family represented the basic unit of 
the food system, the growth of crops in family gardens. Weeding and planting the 
gardens were tasks dominated by women, as well as stamping and grinding corn and 
gathering wild foods. Mudenge (1988), however, claims that it is wrong to assume that 
men took no part in agriculture, a point later echoed by Beach (1994), as it was their 
duty to clear ground for the new gardens, as well as thresh the grain crops. Cattle 
keeping and hunting were, by contrast, the realm of the male, reflective of the wider 
dominance of the male in the significant sectors of the political economy. 
 The village is regarded as the next level of the social system, and was headed 
by the most senior member of the family that founded the village. The sizes of villages 
varied across the landscape, with a population typically ranging from tens to several 
hundred, and in unusual cases into the thousands (Huffman 2007). Villages were often 
not permanent settlements, and shifted due to rotating land that was used for 
cultivation. Mudenge (1988) adds that mutual assistance was common in villages, 
particularly in times of scarcity and in activities such as hunting and fishing, while 
assistance in gardens and fields was given in return for the brewing of beer. Yet Beach 
(1994) asserts there was a difference in ideology and practice as far as communal work 
was concerned, adding that the bulk of work was done by and for the individual 
household, by whom the produce was kept. 
 A number of villages constituted a ward under the rule of a sub-chief. 
Territoriality was important at this level, where boundaries were defined by natural 
features such as rivers (Huffman 2007). The population within a ward could also 
attend ‘work parties’ as was the case at village level, which could involve several 
hundred people (Mudenge 1988). At the time of planting and harvesting, each village 
sent people to work in the sub-chief’s gardens, where a surplus was enforced, meaning 
that the sub-chief was expected to assist with provisions in the event of crop failure. 
 Above the ward level was the chiefdom, ruled by a chief. These typically 
ranged between anything from a few hundred to several thousand square kilometres 
with relatively well-defined boundaries and variable populations, commonly into the 
tens of thousands (Huffman 2007). The chief received income from judicial fees and 
labour tribute, particularly in the cultivation of fields by local ward populations. Other 
tribute from sub-chiefs located further away included cattle, grain and gold. Hunters 
also paid tributes in the form of elephant tusks, meats and skins, while traders passing 
through a chiefdom usually had to pay tolls or present gifts to the chief (Beach 1980). 
Such wealth was frequently used in the inter-continental trade, from which they 
procured cloth and beads. 
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 The highest level of society was the kingdom or state. States were of 
considerable size and population and enforced higher levels of ‘service’ and tribute 
than chiefdoms. In the Mutapa state, for instance, the population in the ward where the 
ruler’s zimbabwe (stone-built capital) was located paid their tribute through labour 
service, which would probably have involved several thousand men and women 
(Conceição 1696; Mudenge 1988; Huffman 2007). Grains were also sent as tribute to the 
ruler, particularly from the poorer chiefdoms without gold, ivory or cattle. An 
important factor that impacted on the upper levels of society relates to internal rivalries 
and power struggles at multiple levels, which often ended in civil war (Beach 1994). At 
the highest level, it is known from the Mutapa state that ruler succession was often 
arbitrated by force, with only six out of 46 rulers being father-son successions 
(Mudenge 1988), and it was often those with powerful allies such as the Portuguese on 
the Zambezi who had a better chance to succeed (Newitt 1995). The scale of impact of 
wars is the subject of further debate. Mudenge (1988, 84), suggests that “perhaps 
succession wars did more to weaken the Mutapa state than any other single factor”, 
whereas, Beach (1980) states that several factors acted to limit the extent of these wars, 
chiefly the lack of a surplus to support a military force. This meant that warfare was 
conducted on a relatively small-scale in most cases, although the small size of 
communities meant that any casualties represented a significant loss. 
 Political leadership was also tied to various spiritual beliefs, a prominent aspect 
of which that has received recent attention is rainmaking (Huffman 2007, 2008, 2009b), 
a ritual process conducted to bring rain that took different forms across wider Sub-
Saharan Africa. Archaeological and ethnographic research (Murimbika 2006; Schoeman 
2006) has provided multi-layered evidence, albeit sometimes contested (Beach 1998; 
Marks 2011), regarding this ideology and the corresponding ‘worldview’ of the 
governed population. This cognitive model relies on the disputed view that individual 
behaviour was governed by rules and regularities, and therefore that clusters of 
symbols in the archaeological record give meaning to social organisation (Huffman 
1982, 1986a, 2007). At Mapungubwe and later Zimbabwe culture sites, sacred 
leadership is in this case said to be based on a mystical relationship between the 
leadership, ancestors and God, who made it rain. Importantly, in this interpretation, 
rain and agricultural success were placed in the hands of the leadership, meaning this 
new elite Zimbabwe Pattern rainmaking system constituted a ‘nationalised’ version of 
the previous system (Huffman 2008). Drought-induced agricultural failure could 
therefore have been interpreted as supernatural displeasure in the leadership. The 
widespread applicability of Zimbabwe Pattern rainmaking is disputed (Pikirayi and 
Chirikure 2011), though Huffman (2014) is of the opinion that there was a breakdown 
of Zimbabwe Culture sacred leadership in the Mutapa area in the sixteenth century, 
which was replaced by the persistent internal rivalries, power struggles and ‘collateral 
succession’ reported by Mudenge (1988) and Beach (1998). 
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 A final word on socio-political dynamics to be considered in the later analysis 
relates to another inconclusive debate on pre-colonial demography. This stems from 
the fact that the population of the Zimbabwe plateau area was less than 900,000 in 1920 
(Iliffe 1990; Beach 1994), seen as a relatively low figure, for which no single factor has 
been identified as dominant. Beach (1994) claims that the area was ‘remarkably 
healthy’, with the main hazards being pneumonia, dysentery, infant mortality and 
malaria, but none of these have been strongly linked with the restricted growth of the 
population. As stated above, warfare was conducted on a relatively small scale, and the 
extent of destruction caused by the arrival of Nguni-speaking groups in the early-
nineteenth century has frequently been exaggerated. Drought and famine were 
suggested as an alternative reason for this (Beach 1977, 1980), as oral traditions often 
spoke of catastrophic famines, yet Beach (1994) states that famines were not major 
causes of mortality, but rather were a form of ‘non-fatal’ stress as people could survive 
on hunting, gathering and trading. 
 This background overlooks a number of temporal and geographical differences 
that were critical in influencing the vulnerability of societies to climate variability. 
Renewed scrutiny of Portuguese  documents will be conducted in Chapter 5 in order to 
re-examine these factors, and some questions for this later analysis include: 
• How did the type and balance of cultivated crops vary across space and time? 
• How did the type and balance of domestic animals vary across space and time? 
• How advanced were coping strategies against drought, and how did these 
differ between socio-political units? 
o Did the relative importance of hunting and gathering differ? 
o Does evidence suggest that social networks, trade and alternative 
livelihoods provided a robust buffer against drought? 
• How widely was the perception of drought linked to the leadership? 
 
2.2.3 Social and environmental change in the Zambezi-Limpopo area over the 
last millennium 
The pre-colonial period in the last millennium is most often depicted as a transition 
from primitive to complex society, involving population increase (Table 2.2), socio-
economic and political sophistication, and a trajectory of states rising and falling 
(Raftopoulos and Mlambo 2009). This representation has been met with criticism, 
particularly regarding its linearity and the focus on states alone. While this research is 
primarily concerned with complex state structures, it will not endeavour to reinforce 
this linearity and will keep factors such as inter-polity and group interaction in mind. 
Moreover, consideration will be given to some of the smaller polities that are well-
covered by Portuguese written records, such as Teve and Manyika, and smaller 
communities in the vicinity of Afro-Portuguese settlements. It is also important to note 
here that although the term ‘pre-colonial’ will be frequently used, it carries a number of 
inadequacies, and here refers explicitly to the period prior to 1890. 
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2.2.3.1 Societal complexity and the ‘Nile of South Africa’ (c. AD 900-1220) 
The development of societal ‘complexity’ is set at the beginning of the second 
millennium AD, and the Zhizo-Leopard’s Kopje-Mapungubwe cultural development 
sequence at the Shashe-Limpopo confluence is widely believed to have played a critical 
role (Huffman 2000, 2008, 2009b; Pikirayi 2001; Mitchell 2002) (Figure 1.1). By the tenth 
century, Zhizo people had established political and economic independence in the 
Limpopo valley area (Huffman 1972; Hanisch 1980). Rather than agriculture, however, 
the siting of settlements away from floodplains and evidence for a relatively dry local 
climate until c. AD 1000 (Smith 2005) leads Huffman to prescribe the presence of the 
Zhizo population to the ivory trade (Huffman 2007). Indeed, large numbers of beads 
and local ivory objects found at Schroda suggest that Zhizo people were the first in the 
interior to directly take part in trade with the coast (Wood 2000) (Figure 2.7), while 
Arabic documents such as that written by Al-Mas’udi in 915 also attest to long-distance 
trade in gold and iron with the ‘land of Sofala’ (Burke 1962). According to Huffman 
(2007), this could refer to alluvial gold panned in the Schroda area, and the iron may 
have come from Zhizo settlements in the Tswapong Hills area of Botswana, while 
Schroda itself acted as a distribution centre for imported beads and cloth. A 
contemporaneous Persian account adds that the country of Sofala was invaded by the 
‘Wak Wak’ (Indonesians) in AD 945, presumably causing disruption to the trade, and 
speaks of cannibals and rich goldmines in the higher elevated interior (Burke 1962). 
 
TABLE 2.2 Population estimates for the Shashe-Limpopo basin (Huffman 2010b). 
Period Sites Time span Population 
outside capitals 
Capital 
population 
Total 
Mapungubwe 122 50 6,100 5,000 11,100 
Transitional 125 50 6,250 2,500 8,750 
K2 160 200 2,000 1,500 3,500 
Zhizo 30 100 750 300 1,075 
 
Zhizo people maintained authority of the area for around 100 years, but most 
moved west to Toutswemogala in present-day Botswana when Leopard’s Kopje 
agropastoralists moved north into the basin at around AD 1000±25 (Figure 2.8) 
(Denbow 1986; Denbow et al. 2008). The two groups thereafter became competitors, 
with the latter dominating the region and controlling the long-distance trade network 
(Huffman 2007). Some Zhizo people stayed in the Shashe-Limpopo area, and the 
Leokwe ceramic style produced by Zhizo and Leopard's Kopje people demonstrates 
the interaction of communities across social and ethno-linguistic boundaries (Calabrese 
2000). The kin-based, ancestral Shona-speaking Leopard’s Kopje society centred at K2 
took over trade relations with the Indian Ocean network, and it is here that climate has 
been more strongly linked with the processes that eventually culminated in the rise of 
Mapungubwe, southern Africa’s first urban centre and state capital. Primarily, this 
relates to the interpretation that the period AD 900-1300 was the manifestation of the 
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regional equivalent of the MCA in Europe, which resulted in overall warmer and 
wetter conditions (Tyson et al. 2000). Although precipitation in this period has since 
been shown to be more variable than initially realised (Figure 1.4), agricultural 
expansion permitted by generally wetter conditions enabling population growth is 
thought to be key to Mapungubwe’s rise (Huffman 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009b; Manyanga 
2007; Smith et al. 2007). Leopard's Kopje people are thus said to have taken advantage 
of the favourable climate at the time, cultivating sorghum and millet on the floodplains 
of the Shashe River (Huffman 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.7 East African connections to the Indian Ocean trade network prior to c. AD 1500. 
 
As well as evidence for contemporaneous wetter conditions from palaeoclimate 
data (Figure 1.4), this suggested climatic favourability stems from the fact that at 
present, large tracts of the Shashe-Limpopo basin are semi-arid, and in most years 
receive insufficient rainfall to support even modest subsistence cultivation. On this 
basis, the archaeological evidence for settlement and agricultural activity expansion 
from the eleventh-thirteenth centuries has been used as a primary indicator for climate-
permitted human activity (Huffman 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009b). According to Huffman, 
flooding and its silt deposits would have been a seasonal occurrence in normal years at 
this time, potentially giving multiple yields of sorghum and millet in an extended 
growing season (Huffman 2008). In this interpretation, climate was therefore a major 
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facilitator of the population growth that contributed to the development of societal 
complexity. Others, however, place less importance on climate, arguing that the 
pathway towards complexity was predominantly built upon a change in concept of 
cattle from communal property to private ownership, and its transformation into 
power by the distribution of herds to loyal followers (Garlake 1978; Raftopoulos and 
Mlambo 2009). Yet data from early-farming communities show that cattle were an 
important factor in economic power, status and social dominance long before K2 
(Huffman 1990). In both cases, however, a growing stock of surplus wealth from the 
Indian Ocean trade network is frequently linked as a tipping point, augmenting and 
intensifying pre-existing wealth and social differentiation from cattle ownership (Voigt 
1983; Mitchell 2002; Huffman 2008, 2010b; Sinclair et al. 2012). 
 
2.2.3.2 Mapungubwe, collapse and rainmaking (c. AD 1220-1300) 
At around AD 1220, the Leopard’s Kopje capital, inhabited for some 200 years, abruptly 
shifted less than a kilometre from K2 to Mapungubwe (Figure 2.9), and with it came 
the development of what Huffman regards as the first ‘class-based bureaucracy’ in the 
region (Huffman 2009b). The major significance of this shift is that the K2 leader 
moved uphill at Mapungubwe, which was the first time that a senior leader became so 
physically separated from his followers in southern Africa (Gardner 1963; Huffman 
2007). Explanations for this shift are few, and include an increase in cattle wealth, a re-
configuring of its social value (Pikirayi 2001), and an increase in the importance of 
metallurgy and its tightly-controlled production in political leadership (Miller 2001). A 
prominent theory, however, relates to the ideology and spatial expression of sacred 
leadership, as outlined in Section 2.2.2.3, where rain also plays a pivotal role 
(Murimbika 2006; Schoeman 2006; Huffman 2008). As Mapungubwe had previously 
been a rainmaking hill, the leader living on the top is said to have acquired power, 
which served to emphasise the supernatural relationship between the ancestors, God 
and rain (Huffman 2007). In Huffman’s view, the shift to Mapungubwe therefore 
represents an alteration to the existing rainmaking system and the expression of spatial 
patterns to accommodate the patterns of a new social order. The tying of rain-control to 
the Mapungubwe leadership brought with it new risks, especially as in the new 
worldview agricultural success became increasingly associated with rulers. It is on this 
basis that Huffman speculates about the impact of drier conditions reflected in certain 
palaeoclimate records in the early-thirteenth century (Figure 1.4) in relation to their 
coincidence with the shift to Mapungubwe and the origin of the new rainmaking 
system. This hypothesis proposes that the return of generally wetter conditions was 
interpreted as a supernatural sanction, facilitating the rise of the new order, and 
accounting for the placement of palaces atop of old rainmaking hills thereafter. 
Although frequently criticised for its structuralism and assumptions surrounding the 
notion of ‘worldview’, Huffman’s model represents the most comprehensive model of 
leadership dynamics in the region, and as such is hard to dismiss (King 2011). 
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FIGURE 2.8 Approximate extent of the Mapungubwe state (~30,000 km2) (after Huffman 2007) 
in relation to other, contemporaneous or partly contemporaneous settlements and polities. 
 
During its relatively short period of fluorescence (from about AD 1220 to 
1300±20), Mapungubwe rose to the top of a five-tier settlement system (Huffman 2007), 
and formed part of a prestige goods network where cattle and military service flowed 
in to Mapungubwe, while glass beads and cloth were redistributed to regional centres 
(Mitchell 2002). Yet in accounting for the transformation of society and early state 
formation itself, climate has been suggested to play a pivotal role as part of a suite of 
factors (Huffman 1996, 2008, 2009b; Meyer 1998; Plug 2000; Tyson et al. 2002). Indeed, 
coupled with the palaeoecological setting of the Shashe-Limpopo basin, referred to as 
the ‘Nile of South Africa’ (Huffman 2000), rainfall is seen as the key variable, and 
without sufficient quantity, processes such as population increase (Table 2.2) could not 
have operated in the basin today (Huffman 2008). 
 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that a change in moisture availability has also 
been linked to the decline and fragmentation, or ‘collapse’, of the Mapungubwe state 
between around AD 1290-1320. Archaeologists and climatologists have strongly linked 
this with the apparent contemporaneous onset of the LIA inferred from the δ18O 
palaeoclimate proxy record from the T7 stalagmite in Cold Air Cave, Makapansgat 
Valley, South Africa (Figure 2.9). On this basis, Tyson et al. (2002, 132) claim that “the 
coincidence of the Mapungubwe collapse with the end of the moist medieval warm 
period… strongly suggests that deteriorating climate was an important contributory 
factor in the decline of Mapungubwe”. Similarly, in an examination of the impacts of 
rainfall variability on vegetation in the Shashe-Limpopo basin using the SAVANNA 
model, O’Connor and Kiker (2004, 49) concluded that “Mapungubwe disappeared as a 
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result of a decrease in mean annual rainfall”. In these explanations, abrupt LIA cooling 
and drying put an end to this time of plenty, adversely impacting the viability of 
floodplain agriculture on which a population of several thousand were dependent, 
contributing to state collapse (Huffman 2008). However, these suggestions only 
consider ecological dynamics, and the results are taken out of context with just passing 
acknowledgement made to the complex interaction of other factors. Nonetheless, 
Huffman (2008) asserts that in the prevailing worldview, agricultural failure was 
interpreted as supernatural displeasure in the king's rule, potentially leading to a 
succession dispute, the abandonment of the town, and perhaps even the Shashe-
Limpopo basin as a whole (Huffman 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.9 δ18O and calibrated temperature series for the T7 stalagmite, Cold Air Cave, 
Makapansgat Valley, South Africa. Holmgren et al. (1999). 
 
Pointing to the resilience of local socio-ecological systems to change, however, 
Manyanga (2007) and Smith et al. (2007) dispute this explanation. Manyanga provides 
evidence of occupation in the basin after AD 1300, suggesting that political decay was 
not matched at several commoner sites on the Zimbabwean side of the basin. This is 
put down to the resource exploitation potential of local circumscribed environments 
and ecological niches which offered diverse subsistence opportunities (Manyanga 
2007). While arguments against environmental degradation and depopulation as an 
adequate causal explanation alone are convincingly made, this evidence does not 
fundamentally challenge the assertion of climate-driven agricultural system collapse 
leading to state decline. Furthermore, it is questionable to what extent a subsistence 
buffer of circumscribed environments could sustain the Mapungubwe state as an entity 
in the event of suggested sustained drier conditions. This brings the model of 
rainmaking and political security at the capital into focus once again, specifically the 
extent to which drought could have affected or destabilised the political, social and 
economic structure and security of the state as a whole. Others have also countered this 
linkage suggesting that other palaeoclimate records, including another stalagmite from 
Cold Air Cave, point to a later onset of the LIA at around AD 1500-1600 (Mitchell and 
Whitelaw 2005; Smith 2005). In this interpretation, the viability of subsistence 
cultivation was not under threat as climatic conditions were still relatively wet, 
meaning socio-economic and political choices were of more significance (Kim and 
Kusimba 2008). 
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A problematic situation here is that the conflicting signals and disputed 
interpretations of proxy precipitation variability have directly contributed to divergent 
claims regarding causation. Recent research in the fields of palaeoclimatology and 
historical climatology has further advanced this picture. The application of up-to-date 
age models and consideration of the variability between records has shown that it is 
less clear whether the MCA and LIA can be simply characterised as consistently warm-
wet and cool-dry (Nicholson et al. 2013). This is a crucial point, as the debate 
surrounding the decline of Mapungubwe has been in the grip of disputes over the 
timing of these periods. Equally important is that further analysis of the Cold Air Cave 
speleothem records indicates that regional surface temperature may be a more 
important driver of stalagmite δ18O than precipitation (Sundqvist et al. 2013). Given 
that considerable debate surrounding past climate–society interactions has involved 
these factors, these new findings warrant a re-evaluation of earlier hypotheses. 
In addition to these climatic explanations, competition with the newly 
urbanising Great Zimbabwe, as well as changes in the dynamics of the Indian Ocean 
trade and the increased international demand for gold, have been linked to 
Mapungubwe’s decline. In this view, the leaders of the Gumanye people at Great 
Zimbabwe were ideally placed to take control of the gold trade at a time of high 
demand, and therefore could have outcompeted a troubled Mapungubwe (Huffman 
2009b). Some of the Mapungubwe population moved west to Lose Hill in the Toutswe 
area (Kiyaga-Mulindwa 1990), and defensive walling at some sites in this area may 
suggest competition with Great Zimbabwe, but this is speculative (Huffman 2007). 
 
2.2.3.3 Great Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe state (c. AD 1280-1450/1520) 
Upon Mapungubwe’s fragmentation, it is now generally agreed that a cultural 
diffusion rather than a simple northward movement of Mapungubwe people onto the 
Zimbabwe plateau took place. The Zimbabwe state grew out of the Gumanye culture, 
whose chiefdom had large quantities of cattle, but until the late-thirteenth century had 
only limited quantities of imported goods (Beach 1994). One suggestion is that a 
Gumanye dynasty built up enough power to overrun the trade between Mapungubwe 
and the coast, leading to the rise of the state. This could have taken place by the 
Gumanye rulers trying to control the trade that passed through their lands to the 
south-western goldfields by imposing a tax on traders, as is later recorded in sixteenth 
century Portuguese documents (Beach 1994). This hypothesis would imply that the 
early Zimbabwe state possessed the military strength to undercut and benefit from the 
exertions of the Mapungubwe population, which thereby contributed to the rise of the 
state by the possibility to divert labour from agriculture into financing skilled builders. 
Another widely suggested possibility is that the plateau offered a more 
favourable environment and climate for the support of a large urban complex and 
territorial state (Pikirayi 2001; Huffman 2009b). Indeed, the spatial variability of the 
regional climate is one of several proposed factors relating to the enhanced economic 
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base of the Zimbabwe state. Specifically, climatic conditions in the zone of higher 
rainfall along Zimbabwe’s southeast escarpment are suggested to have allowed a 
flourishing agriculture in the hinterland of the capital (Figure 2.2.) (Huffman 2008). 
Nonetheless, the capital hinterland and core of the state had few special advantages for 
agriculture or pastoralism, while the most abundant gold reef mining areas were 
situated at a distance from the capital (Summers 1960), although alluvial gold may 
have aided the formation of the state capital and its heartland (Phimister 1974; Figure 
2.10). In attempting to clarify this link between environments, resources and state 
formation, Pikirayi focusses on resource control. Accompanying control over trade, this 
line of thought points to the centralised authority of Great Zimbabwe as a product of 
the need to manage the variety of resource assets and environmental hazards, and 
perhaps crucially the gold in its hinterland (Pikirayi 2005). Similarly, Beach (1994) 
suggests that the construction of outlying stone-built zimbabwe may have acted as 
centres for economic as much as political purposes. For instance, the zimbabwe in 
eastern Botswana may have pursued interests in the trade from salt pans, while those 
in the poorer agricultural land of the west would have dealt with local goldfields. It is 
nevertheless important to remember that most of the population were concerned with 
subsistence food production, and thus zimbabwe reflected the interests of the elite. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.10 Approximate extent of the Zimbabwe state (after Huffman 2007) in relation to 
other, contemporaneous or partly contemporaneous settlements and polities. 
 
Pikirayi further endeavours to consider the dynamism of the period, and is 
critical of the way this view is often negated (Pikirayi 2005). Of particular interest here 
is gold mining and trade, of which Great Zimbabwe was ideally situated to participate 
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in the latter. Arabic documents such as that of ibn Battuta in 1331 make reference to 
gold coming from Sofala, which was sourced from the hinterland of ‘Yufi’, a month’s 
journey from Sofala (Burke 1962); almost certainly a reference to the Zimbabwe plateau 
goldfields (Pikirayi 2013a). External sources also explain that increased state expansion 
in the southeast African interior in the eleventh to fourteenth centuries coincided with 
the substantial accumulation of wealth at East African coastal towns such as Kilwa. 
The contemporary demand for gold across East Africa, the Persian Gulf, India, the Far 
East and Europe led to increased pressure to exploit all known and workable sources, 
which affected the directions and intensity of commerce (Sutton 1990; Pikirayi 2013). 
Gold and the trade in exotic goods were subject to a volatile world market with 
unpredictable and abrupt price fluctuations, which Sutton (1990) states had destructive 
impacts on the poorly developed areas of the trading network. As well as external 
vulnerabilities, regional developments involving spatial shifts and competition also 
affected Zimbabwe’s hold over the gold trade. Sometime in the fifteenth century, the 
Zambezi became the most important trade route in southeast Africa, and meant that 
long-distance trade was channelled through the north. The expansion of Ingombe Ilede 
in the northwest (Figure 2.10), where copper was extensively mined and traded with 
the Indian Ocean network, also attests to this, and coincides with the gradual decline of 
Great Zimbabwe’s control over the gold trade. 
Archaeological evidence suggests that Great Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe 
state remained at the height of regional power until c. AD 1450 (Huffman and Vogel 
1991). Although there is general agreement that the state was peripheral to mainstream 
developments in the area by the time Portuguese written sources become available 
after AD 1500, one second-hand Portuguese document (Barros 1552), possibly referring 
to events three decades earlier (Pikirayi 2013a), notes a continued occupation of the site 
for at least a further half-century. The decline of the state as a whole, however, remains 
dominated by speculation rather than consensus, and most scenarios focus on 
geopolitical and economic processes. One line of thought proposes that the height of 
state expansion in the late-thirteenth century set the conditions for its decline by a 
process of overstretch, and thus with the spatial shifts in demographic and economic 
power came breakaway units, the gradual loss of control of the capital hinterland and 
the gold trade, and the rise of successor states (Pikirayi 2005). Moreover, Phimister 
(1976) notes that the relatively quick exhaustion of gold deposits within the state 
hinterland, which possibly took just one dry season to work out a pre-colonial mine, 
may have been an important contributory factor. With time the Zimbabwe state may 
have been forced to rely upon goldfields further away, meaning control of these 
resources was made more difficult. As radiocarbon dates and ceramic facies show that 
Khami began to grow before the decline of Great Zimbabwe (Van Waarden 1987; 
Huffman 2009b), this possibly suggests a period of political and economic competition. 
Accordingly, the loss of control of the south-western goldfields in the Khami area may 
have harmed Great Zimbabwe’s participation in the long-distance trade network. 
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Climate has received comparatively less attention here, yet some speculation 
emerged suggesting that the cool-dry conditions observed in certain palaeoclimate 
records in the fifteenth century (Figure 1.4) may have undermined the agricultural base 
of Great Zimbabwe and its growing population (Holmgren and Öberg 2006). This was 
later dismissed because of Great Zimbabwe’s location in a high rainfall zone, as 
Huffman (2007) suggested that agriculture was viable even with a drier climate most of 
the time. Conversely, due to the conflicting signals and interpretations of palaeoclimate 
data at this time, others assert that the abandonment of the state occurred at a time of 
generally warmer and wetter conditions, meaning climate was likely not a central 
factor (Pikirayi 2013a). Moreover, the tight structural link between Great Zimbabwe 
and Mapungubwe proposed by Huffman is disputed by some on the basis that this is 
unsupported by the material culture at the Great Zimbabwe (Pikirayi and Chirikure 
2011). Pikirayi and Chirikure also add that it would have been suicidal for a chief or 
leader to completely entrust rainmaking functions to himself as it would have invited 
political instability in times of drought, particularly if climate variability and 
rainmaking was indeed a significant pathway to a loss of authority at Mapungubwe. 
On a different but not entirely unrelated note, Summers (1960) tentatively 
speculated that climate variability may have reduced the navigability of the Save river 
for small sea-going vessels sometime before 1500, which could have impacted upon 
trade patterns with the Indian Ocean network. Paucity of evidence, however, limits 
comment on this suggestion. Other speculative environment-related explanations 
include the thought that Great Zimbabwe grew too big for its local environment (Beach 
1980; Connah 2002; Pikirayi 2005). In this view, the exploitative nature of sustaining a 
population of ~18,000 people affected the ability of the local hinterland to supply food, 
firewood and grazing. Connah, for instance, suggests that local population pressures 
could have had marked impacts on soils, vegetation and wildlife, even claiming that 
“without fundamental changes in technology and agricultural system, it [Great 
Zimbabwe] was fated to destroy itself” (Connah 2002, 256). Pikirayi takes a slightly 
more cautious stance and, although agreeing with the possibility of extensive 
ecological degradation, he urges that this was a consequence of mismanagement by the 
ruling elite (Pikirayi 2005). However, scant evidence supports such assumptions, and 
any standalone environmental collapse conclusion, regardless of the level of socio-
political culpability, would seem more categorical than the available evidence allows. 
Also to this debate must be added the system of tribute and service mentioned in 
section 2.2.2.3, where harvests from the ‘ward’ (i.e. a further distance the immediate 
hinterland of the town) supported the elite. If functioning, this would have reduced the 
vulnerability of the rulers to local environmental problems as they could draw upon a 
wider area. While most of these causal factors remain at the level of informed 
guesswork, the contemporaneous growth of the Mutapa and Torwa states were 
certainly important. 
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2.2.3.4 The Mutapa and Torwa states and Portuguese arrival 
The early- to mid-fifteenth century saw the emergence of the two successor states: the 
Mutapa in ‘Mukaranga’ in the north and the Torwa at Khami (Figure 2.11). This was 
followed in the early-sixteenth century by the new influence of Portuguese 
mercantilism after they gradually overran the Muslim traders on the Mozambique 
coast (Figure 2.12). The apparent direct successor to Zimbabwe was the Torwa state. 
Khami had become the largest functioning capital in the region, with ~13,000 people 
sheltered there, and was capital of a large territory (Huffman 2007). As well as frequent 
reference to gold, Portuguese documents allude to the abundance of cattle in the Torwa 
area, the keeping of which was ideally suited to its environment (Pikirayi 2001). The 
state also controlled copper and salt deposits around the Makgadikgadi Pans to the 
west, and traded for tin with Sotho-Tswana people at Rooiberg in northern South 
Africa (Huffman 2007). The Torwa state was undoubtedly a rival to the Mutapa state, 
and evidence for this is first encountered in Arabic documents written by Ahmad-ibn 
Madjid (1502) relating to a civil war, while the Portuguese found the Torwa state vying 
for control of the Zambezi valley trade routes upon their arrival (Alcáçova 1506). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.11 Approximate extent of the Torwa state (after Huffman 2007), and the Mutapa, 
Manyika and Teve polities (after Mudenge 1988). 
 
 Also prior to the eventual fall of Great Zimbabwe, the Mutapa state was 
growing in the north of the plateau (Figure 2.11), and far more is known about this 
polity because of the proximity of Portuguese observers. It is frequently suggested that 
the origins of the Mutapa dynasty lay in Great Zimbabwe, and it is here that oral 
traditions begin to play a role in the understanding of regional developments. Mutapa 
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traditions speak of how their leader, Mutota, moved north from the ‘Guruhuswa’ 
region (meaning “area with tall grass”) to the north (Abraham 1962; Pikirayi 2013a). As 
this may be identified as the south-central or south-western plateau area (Garlake 
1973), some interpret this to mean that the last king at Great Zimbabwe became the 
first Mutapa ruler. Huffman (2007, 425), however, notes that “the present data neither 
support nor refute the hypothesis that a Great Zimbabwe dynasty relocated north to 
start the Mutapa state”. Whatever the origins, there is agreement that the northward 
extension of the Zimbabwe culture was in some way related to economic factors, 
including gold, ivory and cattle (Beach 1994; Pikirayi 2013). The basis of the Mutapa 
economy was agriculture, while Portuguese documents make it clear that cattle 
retained importance, with large numbers recorded for elite ownership of cattle. The 
Mutapa utilised the Zambezi trade route to the coast (Figures 2.6 and 2.11), providing 
it with comparatively straightforward access to the inter-continental trade network. Yet 
the relative importance of gold mining in the Mutapa state operated on a considerably 
smaller scale than in the Zimbabwe state or in the contemporary Torwa polity 
(Phimister 1976), and the resultant limited surplus wealth is matched by the reduction 
in scale of prestige buildings from the sixteenth century onwards (Pikirayi 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.12 East African connections to the Indian Ocean trade network after c. AD 1500. 
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 By the end of the fifteenth century, knowledge of events in the interior 
increases. The Mutapa state was expanding by 1490, and from then until 1506, a civil 
war took place involving a usurper, as well as the Torwa polity (Alçacova 1506; Beach 
1998). Upon first contact, Portuguese accounts show that the Mutapa state occupied 
much of the northern plateau (Figure 2.11). Although there is evidence that the state 
reached the coast south of the Zambezi delta by the 1550s (Beach 1994), the state lost 
authority in the Eastern Highlands and on the Mozambique coast. Important in this 
process were the three breakaway territories of Manyika, Teve and Danda (Figure 
2.11), of which Friar João dos Santos wrote: 
“The kingdom of Monomotapa is situated in the lands of Mocaranga… all of which 
lands formerly belonged to the empire of Monomotapa, and at present are divided 
into four kingdoms, viz. the kingdom of Quiteve [Teve], the Kingdom of Sedanda 
[Danda] and that of Tshikanga [Manyika]. This division was made by an emperor of 
Monomotapa, who not wishing to, or not being able to govern such distant lands, 
made three of his sons governors thereof” (Santos 1609, 273). 
 The Portuguese proved to be a key player in southeast Africa from the early-
sixteenth century (Figure 2.13). They introduced guns and disease, intermarried with 
African communities, and impacted upon the nature of trade, food production, warfare 
and political succession (Newitt 1995). The first Portuguese settlement was established 
in 1505, when Pero d’Anhaia established a fort and factory at Sofala with the intention 
to control the regional gold trade. As part of the expansion of their Estado da Índia, forts 
were also established further north on Mozambique Island and after intense conflict 
with the Muslim inhabitants of Kilwa (Figure 2.12). The road to Portuguese commercial 
supremacy in southeast Africa, however, was not a simple usurping, and after only 10 
years it was reported that the profits from the trade were not even sufficient to pay the 
overheads of the settlement (Newitt 1973). First-hand accounts such as that of Antonio 
Fernandes (1515) demonstrate that Muslim traders outmanoeuvred the Portuguese in 
the interior as they continued to trade with the Mutapa state and Manyika kingdom at 
bazaars (marketplaces) which had been developed earlier around gold mining centres. 
 Between c. 1506-1515, it was reported that the lands from the coast to Manyika, 
Barwe and the Mutapa state were in a state of relative peace (Almada 1516). Following 
this period of calm, however, the first evidence becomes available of Portuguese 
meddling in African politics with their backing of chief Nyamunda of the breakaway 
Danda polity. Some Portuguese supplied Nyamunda with firearms, after which his 
power grew markedly until it overran much of the territory around Sofala (Newitt 
1995). Nyamunda sought to control the trade between the Portuguese, the Mutapa and 
Manyika in order to contain the strength of his neighbours, and so began to disrupt 
trade routes to and from Sofala. At the same time, gold production in the interior 
dropped markedly, for Portuguese traders made little effort to understand the nature 
of the local market, but instead sought to extract very high profits from European cloth 
which was not in demand (Bhila 1982). A number of the Portuguese population were 
also driven by individual motive. ‘Sertanejos’, or backwoodsmen, undermined their 
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gains by underselling goods to make their personal fortunes using Muslim traders as 
middlemen (Bhila 1982). With the trade disturbed, disagreements intensified into a 
civil war between the Danda and the Mutapa and Manyika polities, which left the 
Portuguese at Sofala under a blockade (Newitt 1973). The Portuguese were eventually 
forced to spend considerable effort undoing their interference, by which time Sofala 
had become an economic backwater (Beach 1994; Newitt 1995). Bhila (1982) also claims 
that drought and food shortages were a cause of the civil war on the basis of food 
shortages at Sofala, but the possibility and precise pathway of this linkage are unclear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.13 Portuguese influence in southeast Africa. Adapted from Newitt (1973). 
 
 By 1530-1531, a Portuguese factory had been established at Quelimane, the 
main entry point to the Zambezi, and Vicente Pegado ordered the founding of Sena 
and Tete, the first Portuguese settlements on the Zambezi (Figure 2.13). By the early-
1530s the development of Mutapa-Portuguese relations were also underway. After 
their failed attempt at channelling trade through Sofala, the Zambezi settlements 
aimed to promote a deeper involvement in the gold-producing areas of the interior. In 
the 1570s, the Portuguese established overlordship over a number of the Tonga-
speaking small-scale chiefdoms proximate to their Zambezi settlements. Although the 
European population was nearly always in the low hundreds, seventeenth century 
estimates put the number of Tonga warriors that the Portuguese could draw upon at 
Sena and Tete at 30,000 and 8000 respectively (Rezende 1634). This demanded food, 
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and consequently an abundance of documentary material on food production in the 
Zambezi valley as the Portuguese began to expand their agricultural activities. The 
Mutapa state enjoyed a period of political stability from 1530-1550, with only minor 
conflict between the state and the Teve polity, while a revolt amongst the Zambezi 
Tonga communities against the Mutapa state began in c. 1550 (Beach 1994). Compared 
to other periods, though, the early- to mid-sixteenth century was relatively peaceful. 
 
2.2.3.5 Conflict, famine and ‘climatic instability’ on the Zambezi  (c. AD 1560-1600) 
In 1560, Father Dom Gonçalo da Silveira led a Jesuit mission to the Mutapa zimbabwe to 
convert Mutapa Negomo, a young and impressionable ruler who had recently 
succeeded his father. Silveira’s spiritual influence over the Mutapa upset a number of 
interests in the state. Traditional Shona leaders, a vital component in the political 
cohesion of the state, were dismissed as frauds by the mission (Mudenge 1988). 
Moreover, Muslim traders sensed the danger of having Silveira so close to the Mutapa 
ruler, for his intolerance of Muslims would have consequences on their presence and 
trading activities. Those with common interests formed an alliance and influenced 
Negomo into believing Silveira was a wizard who, among other things, would bring 
drought and famine to the country, and upon this his death was sealed. This situation 
made for an uneasy relationship between the Mutapa, Portuguese and Muslim 
populations, and contributed to the formulation of the expansionist policies and armed 
intervention pursued by the Portuguese for the next two decades, when widespread 
conflict erupted. Newitt (1995) adds this event marked the commencement of a major 
phase of ‘climatic instability’ in southeast Africa, involving recurrent famine and locust 
plagues in the Zambezi valley, and reports of cannibalism among the ‘Zimba’ north of 
the Zambezi (Newitt 1995; Pikirayi 2003). 
 In 1569, Francisco Barreto was appointed leader of an expeditionary force in the 
conquest of Mutapa by the Portuguese Crown and the expulsion of Muslim traders 
from the area. Barreto’s army arrived at Sena from Mozambique Island in 1571, and 
their first target was the Tonga, whose revolt against the Mutapa was an inconvenience 
to Portuguese economic activities (Beach 1980). The Tonga hid their already depleted 
food supplies from the invading force, and small meat rations were all that was 
available to feed Barreto’s army. So weak was Barreto that he relieved his frustrations 
by allowing a massacre of any Muslims in sight. Francisco de Monclaro, a priest who 
accompanied the expedition, stated that Barreto took 17 Muslims prisoner, whom he: 
“Convicted and [had] slain with strange inventions. Some were impaled alive, others 
tied to trees in the extreme branches thereof, the branches being forcibly brought 
together and then released, the victim being thus rent asunder. Others still were cut 
up with axes from the back, others with bombards, all this serving to strike terror and 
astonishment into the people of the land” (Monclaro 1573, 236). 
 These acts substantially reduced Muslim presence up the Zambezi, which 
together with growing Portuguese dominance of the coast, left them in control of the 
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inter-continental trade. In their attempted conquest over the Mutapa state, however, 
the expedition had less visible success, and although the Mutapa ruler Negomo 
appears to have ceded some of his outlying wards adjacent to Tete to the Portuguese 
(Newitt 1995), a high number of the 700-strong army of musketeers perished, and only 
a “rabble of malcontents” returned to Sena (Mudenge 1988), Barreto died in Sena in 
1573, and was succeeded as leader of the expedition by Fernando Vasco Homem, 
whose interest turned to the goldfields of the Manyika kingdom. His expedition set off 
from Sofala with 412 men, and defied the ruling Quiteve of the Teve polity by 
marching through his territory to reach Manyika. The Quiteve was opposed to this, 
fearing that his own ivory-oriented trade would be diminished if formal trade with the 
lucrative goldfields of Manyika was established. Conflict broke out between Homem’s 
force and Quiteve’s army, but the Portuguese triumphed and Quiteve abandoned his 
zimbabwe. Upon reaching the Manyika kingdom, Homem signed a friendship treaty 
which gave the Portuguese free access to the mines and to barter for gold, although the 
low price of gold, geological problems, and technological restrictions meant that the 
famed gold mining region of Manyika provided a reality check for the Portuguese: 
“Our men finding themselves in the country where report said everything was gold, 
expected to find it in the streets and woods, and to come away laden with it. The 
governor saw the difficulty with which the Kaffirs extracted the gold… the risk being 
so great that every day numbers were in imminent danger of being buried in the 
mines, it being altogether a poor and miserable business” (Couto 1616, 389). 
 The Portuguese force withdrew in 1575, and by the 1580s the situation in the 
Mutapa state itself seemed not altogether different as it was before Barreto’s arrival. 
Yet a key socio-economic impact of expanded Portuguese-Mutapa contact was that a 
number of feiras (markets, or fairs) were established from the last quarter of the 
sixteenth century onwards (Figure 2.14), which formed a dominant part of trade 
relations on the Zambezi and in the interior. The main three feiras at the end of the 
sixteenth century in the Mutapa state were Luanze, Bocuto and Massapa, while in 
Manyika the most important feira was Chipangura, each of which was occupied by a 
small Portuguese population. At Massapa, near the Mutapa’s zimbabwe, a captain was 
elected to ensure that the trade kept moving and that the Mutapa received presents to 
keep good relations. While peace and relatively smooth trading operations prevailed 
until the mid-1590s, the feira system meant that the Portuguese were closer than ever to 
the Mutapa state, and this proximity was matched by growing influence (Newitt 1995). 
 In the late 1590s, incursions of Maravi (Malawi) armies on Mukaranga became 
frequent, which created new instability south of the Zambezi. The encroachment of 
these warriors on the Mutapa state led Negomo’s successor, Gatsi Rusere, to enlist the 
support of the Portuguese. These first invaders were pushed back, and on their retreat 
destroyed the food they came across so that the Mutapa-Portuguese force could not 
sustain its chase. In the first of a series of decisions that led Beach (1980) to question the 
sanity of the Mutapa ruler, Rusere had his commanding officer put to death for giving 
up the chase. This unpopular decision triggered a revolt, led by Matuzianhe, and 
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relentless civil war, which led Rusere to increasingly rely upon Portuguese at the feira 
to maintain his position. At the same time, a second wave of Maravi warriors crossed 
the Zambezi, but were driven away by a Mutapa-Portuguese force, a result which 
pleased Rusere who then relaxed the ban on Portuguese carrying firearms in the state 
(Beach 1994). Ravaged by the ongoing civil war, Rusere once again appealed for 
assistance in 1606. One powerful Portuguese, Diogo Simões Madeira, raised an army to 
aid the Mutapa in return for concessions, among which included the ceding of all the 
mines in the state to the Portuguese (Newitt 1995). While this was undoubtedly a 
triumph for the exploitative intentions of Madeira, this was a disastrous outcome for 
the security of the state. Temporarily relieved, Rusere went on the offensive against the 
Barwe polity, and on the way attacked the Tonga who were now under Portuguese 
jurisdiction. At the same time, Matuzianhe made further gains against Rusere’s forces, 
and it was only when Madeira drove back his army that Rusere could recapture his 
capital in 1609 (Mudenge 1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.14 Portuguese feiras of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and greater area of 
seventeenth century prazo society. 
 
2.2.3.6 Portuguese dominance in the seventeenth century 
The outcome of this intensified period of conflict was that Gatsi Rusere, now of 
diminished prestige, controlled a state substantially weakened by civil war on the one 
hand, and faced by increased Portuguese ambition after the ceding of the mines on the 
other. The treaty resulted in an influx of private Portuguese traders into the area, and 
the opening of new feiras and mining camps, which were later fortified and acted as 
centres of military activity. Rusere’s attitude towards the lawless Portuguese hardened, 
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and until his death in 1624, he maintained his rule by exploiting divisions within the 
factional Portuguese population. Yet the precedent of the last two and a half decades 
set the tone for the rest of the century, and rulers were now faced with the choice of an 
all-African policy to contain the power of the Portuguese, or to rely upon costly 
Portuguese assistance to maintain their rule (Newitt 1995). Gatsi Rusere was succeeded 
by his son, Nyambo Kapararidze. In 1628, Kapararidze confronted the Portuguese in 
the state militarily, allegedly because his tribute (curva) payment was delayed, but was 
forced to retire in 1629 after heavy losses against the high number of Tonga soldiers 
under Portuguese command (Mudenge 1988). The Portuguese overran Kapararidze’s 
zimbabwe, and appointed Mavura, the first of whom some call the ‘puppet’ Mutapa 
rulers, as his successor. The price for this support was that the Mavura had to sign a 
treaty of vassalage to the Portuguese Crown, meaning the ruler was now effectively a 
Portuguese client. Rather than receive tribute, Mavura was expected to pay tribute to 
the Portuguese, who were now to have the final say in political succession in the state. 
Moreover, in addition to Negomo’s earlier land grant around Tete, more lands 
surrounding the town were annexed by the Portuguese Crown and turned into estates, 
or prazos (Figure 2.14) (Mudenge 1988; Newitt 1995). 
 Prazos operated on a system of lease as in a manorial economy, and extended 
over a considerable area in the Portuguese jurisdiction (Figure 2.14). Portuguese prazo-
holders were thus elevated to the traditional positions of chiefs, or ‘senhors’, over much 
of the Zambezi valley and its predominantly Tonga-speaking population. Senhors 
collected tribute, controlled game rights, chose headmen, and controlled justice and the 
performing of certain ritual functions (Newitt 1973). As the formerly small hinterlands 
of Portuguese settlements expanded into large tracts of Crown-owned land, their 
growing numbers of inhabitants were classified into two broad groups: ‘colonos’ and 
‘slaves’ (Newitt 1973). Colono was the Portuguese word used to describe free Africans 
residing in the crown lands, whose rights to marry, have children and be allocated land 
were retained, while still being ruled by a village headman (Newitt 1973). The major 
difference, however, was that a fixed amount of tribute now had to be paid to the 
profit-seeking prazo-holder instead of an African chief. According to Newitt (1995), 
‘slavery’ in the pre-nineteenth century Zambezian context was very much an economic 
term. A slaves activities ranged from tasks like mining and hoeing gardens to the 
administering of the prazos, commanding military forces, and trading expeditions. As 
well as those slaves taken as captives through the raiding of decentralised polities, a 
high number submitted to the Portuguese for security, which in turn required the 
upkeep of a robust food supply to hold the groups together (Newitt 1995). 
 Kapararidze united African feeling against the Portuguese, and along with the 
Manyika polity he fought back in 1631, but his eventual defeat came against Sousa de 
Meneses in mid-1632 (Mudenge 1988). The Portuguese then asserted authority in 
Manyika, where they killed the ruling Chikanga and installed another ruler on the 
throne, who then agreed to a vassalage treaty. Teve was also ruled by a Portuguese 
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nominee called Peranhe, who was later renamed Dom Sebastião in gratitude of 
Portuguese assistance. In return for armed intervention to secure his position in the 
1640s, the whole northern part of the kingdom was ceded to the Portuguese warlord 
Sisnando Dias Bãyao. In 1644, Bãyao and the Portuguese were also involved in a civil 
war in the Torwa state in an intervention which meant that they had now altered the 
political structure of each of the main centralised polities in the Zambezi-Limpopo 
region. When a junior brother failed to usurp the king, he sought help from the 
Portuguese, whereupon Bãyao took an army to support him in the hope of establishing 
new trade relations. Although it is unfortunate that no one literate was involved in the 
campaign, or that nobody wrote about it, it is known that Bãyao’s army won (Beach 
1980). Upon the sacking of Khami, Bãyao left for Sena to prepare for the new trade, but 
died soon after, while the army disappeared (Huffman 2007). Beach (1980) notes that 
after the civil war, no ruler appears to have been able to control the fragmented Torwa 
area, while the last date for Torwa rulers controlling the southwest was 1683. 
 Mutapa Mavura died in 1652 and was succeeded by his son, but in 1663, the 
prazo-holders on the Zambezi fought and killed him, upon which Mukombwe became 
ruler of the state. In terms of prestige, wealth and size, the decline of the Mutapa state 
to this point was profound. Involved in this was the gradual loss and depopulation of 
Mukaranga, its well-watered arable and grazing lands, and the small amount of gold 
that remained. Although originally backed by the Portuguese, Mukombwe adopted a 
more independent stance, and in 1678 he refused to recognise vassalage to Portugal. 
Mukombwe also seems to have encouraged the Tonga near Sena to rebel in the 1660s, 
and by the early-1680s the Mutapa threatened Portuguese settlement on the Zambezi. 
 
2.2.3.7 The rise of the Rozvi and its impacts 
The Rozvi at Danangombe reunited the Torwa area in the late-seventeenth century, 
and although much smaller (Figure 2.11), the state was built upon the foundations laid 
by its predecessor. The polity is best remembered for its campaigns against the 
Portuguese under its leader Changamire Dombolakonachingwango. The Portuguese, 
learning of Changamire’s power, planned to combine forces with Mutapa Mukombwe 
and destroy him. Mukombwe invaded the Rozvi area but was easily dispersed by 
Changamire, and died shortly after in 1692. According to Conceição’s Treatise on the 
Rivers of Cuama, the best source on the Rozvi, Changamire supported the claims of 
Nyakunembire as Mutapa ruler, while the Portuguese had groomed a different son of 
Mukombwe named Dom Pedro. Nyakunembire enlisted the help of the Rozvi to 
enforce his rule, and Changamire’s army thereafter destroyed the feira of Dambarare in 
1693, which caused the Portuguese in Mukaranga to flee to the Zambezi towns upon 
hearing the news. Changamire thereafter pursued a policy of the total expulsion of the 
Portuguese from the interior, and it was probably only his death in 1696 that prevented 
the Rozvi from marching on Sena (Newitt 2009). The Rozvi state itself continued into 
the early nineteenth century with an economy primarily based on agriculture and 
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herding (Phimister 1976). Huffman (2007) argues that the Zimbabwe culture only 
continued to exist by way of the Rozvi state, as it was largely independent of 
Portuguese influence. Presumably, as sacred leadership is said to have continued in the 
Rozvi state, so did the tying of rain to political rule and thus the interpretation of dry 
spells. Where Huffman (2007, 2014) differs with others, particularly Beach (1998), is 
that he believes ‘collateral’ political succession started in the Mutapa area and with it 
went sacred leadership, though it is unclear whether Huffman believes that the 
Zimbabwe Pattern ideology of rainmaking also broke down here. This is a crucial point 
if the changing interpretation of dry conditions are to be understood. 
 After Changamire’s death, rival political groups struggled for power in the 
Mutapa state, with one backed by the Portuguese and another by the Rozvi. Mudenge 
(1988) states that between 1694-1709, nine rulers took and lost the leadership, and the 
eventual ruler following these civil wars was Samutumbo Nyamhandu, who ruled 
until 1718. The politics of the state were then dominated by a persistent struggle 
between two ‘houses’: Nyamhandu and Boroma. Mudenge (1988) adds that the Rozvi 
were too far away to play any real role in the state after 1702, while the Portuguese 
were ultimately unable to take advantage, leaving the state relatively independent 
from around 1720 onwards. One key change during Nyamhandu’s reign, however, 
was that the state shifted from Mukaranga to the dry Zambezi lowlands in the 
Chidima area (Pikirayi 2003). In Manyika, the immediate consequence of Changamire’s 
attack on the feira of Masekesa was that trade now centered on Teve, which was never 
free of Portuguese influence despite attempts to shake it off, and before long prazos and 
gold trading centres were opened up. The Rozvi retained political authority in the 
Manyika kingdom for at least a decade, and probably until the mid-eighteenth century 
(Bhila 1982). Masekesa, however, was re-established in 1719, but under different terms 
to its previous operation, meaning that Manyika rulers exercised more power with 
Rozvi support, thus avoiding the loss of sovereignty and political dislocation of the 
previous century. To these ends, the era of Portuguese dominance in the African 
polities seemed well and truly broken (Beach 1994; Newitt 1995, 2009). 
 In the late-eighteenth century, political instability became predominant in the 
Mutapa state. Between 1751-1766, João Moreira Pereira reported that there had been six 
Mutapa rulers and that the country was plagued by civil war. This led to a breakdown 
in political authority, as central power structures could not be built up, and once again 
social and political organisation at the upper levels of the state became paralysed. 
Newitt (1995) adds that for around a decade from 1759, the middle Zambezi was 
affected by drought and locust swarms, which apparently led to banditry becoming 
commonplace, and served to disrupt trade and dislocate social networks. In addition to 
this, the state practically fragmented into two areas, Chidima and Dande (Figure 2.11), 
after the 1760s. Peace was restored in 1769, and the period from then to 1806 saw only 
three Mutapas. Yet this low number was not indicative of political stability, for a bitter 
and protracted power struggle between rivals Changara and Ganyambadzi ensued 
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throughout much of the rest of the century. According to Mudenge (1988) and Newitt 
(1995), a severe drought hit the Zambezi area in 1795 and persisted until around 1800. 
Mudenge links this to the beginning of the end for the Rozvi state in the southwest, 
while in the Chidima area, the drought was reported to have impoverished traders. At 
the same time, a chief in the area attacked Zumbo which led to its abandonment. As a 
result, trade, and consequently the flow of goods into the Mutapa polity declined, 
while the Portuguese that did maintain contact with the state became more interested 
in slave raiding to feed the expanding slave trade on the Mozambique coast (Newitt 
1995). Rozvi power gradually receded in the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
and after several encounters with movements of Nguni-speaking agropastoralists from 
the south, the polity succumbed (Beach 1994). The Teve and Manyika polities were also 
impacted by raiding in the 1830s, though Newitt (1988) claims that it was drought and 
famine that brought about the demise of the traditional and commercial life in the 
Zambezi-Limpopo area. Later in the nineteenth century, the Portuguese eventually 
came to overpower the Mutapa, Manyika and Teve polities. 
 
2.2.4 Climate and Zambezi-Limpopo socio-political transformation: key questions 
Changes in moisture availability have been strongly linked with moments of socio-
political change in this region prior to the availability of written sources. A relatively 
speculative correlation of dated archaeological records and palaeoclimatic change has, 
to an extent, deepened in sophistication towards the consideration of socio-cultural 
interactions with climatic stress. Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of scholarship 
relies exclusively upon the ambiguous signals of a limited range of palaeoclimate 
proxy data to demonstrate that abrupt climatic changes were drivers of change 
(Hannaford 2014). These general conclusions built on correlation can be misleading, 
and tend to overlook the interactive relationship that exists between climate and 
society leading to a portrayal of humans as passive recipients of climate change. 
Clearly, the state of the climate itself is crucial, but is far from the only important 
factor. Simple cause–effect models are therefore inadequate, and must consider the 
socio-economic, political and cultural context for a specific area (Hannaford et al. 2014). 
 The upsurge in climate-society causal links in recent decades has led some 
critics to argue that a shift has taken place in contemporary archaeoanthropology and 
palaeoclimatology towards a growing ‘environmental collapse’ paradigm, which gives 
primacy to environmental and climatic influence (Middleton 2012). According to 
Middleton, three broad environmental collapse mechanisms are symptomatic of this 
paradigm shift. One sees climate as the primary driver of historical change; another 
views complex societies inducing environmental degradation and exceeding ecological 
carrying capacity; and the third concerns catastrophic events such as earthquakes. 
Others have also pointed to a resurgence in climate and environmental determinism. In 
a seminal paper, Hulme (2011a) notes that the quantitative nature of climate data has 
frequently led to an elevated position for climate as an explanatory variable in human 
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activity, while humans are often depicted as ‘dumb farmers’ passively awaiting their 
fate. Applying this line of reasoning to the southern African past, Hulme’s thesis is 
manifest in that quantitative and credible knowledge of past climate variability has 
frequently led to a direct transfer of authority regarding its consequences, in some 
cases allowing little for human agency, adaptation and innovation. Clear examples of 
this in southeast Africa relate to the abandonment of Mapungubwe and the suggested 
climate-driven migrations of Nguni- and Sotho-Tswana-speaking communities from 
East Africa to southern Africa (Tyson et al. 2002; O’Connor and Kiker 2004). 
 While climate has sometimes been depicted as a grand narrative, albeit perhaps 
unintentionally, it is equally the case that others have dismissed the role of climate as 
background noise, relegating environmental interaction to a footnote in human history 
(Hulme 2011a). For instance, in the period after 1505 when written sources become 
available, there has been less focussed attention regarding climate-society linkages. 
This in part relates to the points raised in Section 1.2, but notwithstanding the fact that 
cultural choices were pivotal, there is a risk of disconnecting from the reality that the 
climate of southern Africa is highly variable and that drought is a factor that influenced 
the decision-making of its pre-colonial population. The dearth of detailed historical 
climate-society scholarship in this period perhaps also stems from the skewed focus of 
the written sources towards trade and Mutapa-Portuguese relations. This has led many 
to prescribe the events of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries to the destructive nature 
Portuguese influence (Mudenge 1988; Beach 1980, 1994; Pikirayi 2001). Certainly, the 
Portuguese played a key role in degrading the sovereignty and prestige of the Mutapa, 
Manyika and Teve polities, and serve as prime examples of the destructive influence of 
the Portuguese on complex African society, yet to look at the Portuguese as the only 
stressor is misleading, as internal processes and events had a significant influence here 
too. According to Hulme, these contrasting positions comprise the opposing fallacies of 
climate ‘determinism’ and ‘indeterminism’, where the former has commonly been 
adopted by geographers, palaeoclimatologists and archaeologists, and the latter by 
historians (Judkins et al. 2008; Hulme 2011a). Still, rather than a widespread revival of 
climate determinist explanations, the scepticism surrounding climatic causes may be in 
part due to the language employed and its narrative power. Indeed, there is inherent 
difficulty in understanding causality in the distant past, and the complexity in 
communicating findings to numerous fields and sub-fields can result in suspicion. 
 In spite of the above critique, it is perhaps surprising that climate has been 
given such limited consideration after 1500 given the continued importance of 
subsistence agriculture, while the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries appear to have 
been the coolest and driest part of the LIA (Stager et al. 2013) (Figure 2.15). The work of 
Newitt (1995) and Pikirayi (2003) are rare exceptions to this, yet are not without their 
problems. Neither study incorporates scientific data into consideration of reported 
climatic stress, while the specific pathways through which this stress impacted upon 
socio-political events is often oversimplified as ‘dislocation’ or ‘devastation’. 
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FIGURE 2.15 A. Qualitative summary of palaeoprecipitation and B. Summary of Summer 
Rainfall Zone palaeoprecipitation inferred from Lake Sibaya, Cold Air Cave T7 stalagmite and 
Karkloof tree-ring records. Grey hatched bars represent drier periods. After Stager et al. (2013). 
 
 This synthesis raises further key research questions to those highlighted at the 
end of Section 2.2.2, which will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 5, including: 
• How might a reanalysis of the wider range of existing palaeoclimate data alter 
previous climate-related interpretations of socio-political change prior to 1500? 
• Was climate variability a significant factor in the decline of the Zimbabwe state? 
• Do proxy records of climate variability and Portuguese written records of 
climate-related events display correspondence between c. 1505-1830? 
• How did the vulnerability and response of centralised political units, such as 
the Mutapa state, to climate variability vary and change over this period? 
o How can this be investigated over a c. 300 year period? 
• How did Portuguese expansion affect the vulnerability of communities to 
climate variability in the hinterlands of Portuguese settlements, such as Sena 
and Tete, and later the inhabitants residing on the prazo lands? 
o How this compare to the centralised polities? 
• What was the societal significance of climate variability in relation to factors 
such as Portuguese influence in southeast Africa from c. 1505-1830? 
 The next part of this chapter will provide a similar overview for the KwaZulu-
Natal area, the second focus region of this thesis. 
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2.3 Socio-political transformation in KwaZulu-Natal (c. AD 1760-1840) 
The years from c. 1760-1840 constitute a discrete period in the history of southern 
Africa (Wright 2010). This notion is particularly true of the predominantly Nguni-
speaking population in the area that forms present-day KwaZulu-Natal in the 
southeast of South Africa (Figures 1.1 and 2.16), where between the mid-eighteenth 
century and the 1830s small-scale chiefdoms developed into centralised kingdoms, 
such as the Zulu, Ndwandwe, Gaza and Ndebele. This section provides environmental, 
economic, social and political context to this area, and synthesises hypotheses on the 
causes of the heightened violence, migrations and state formation in these decades. 
 
2.3.1 Physical geography and environment 
The area under consideration in much of this second part of the thesis lies between the 
Phongolo and Thukela rivers. However, this period was characterised by change 
across much of southern Africa, and therefore the greater area of concern here is the 
land bounded by the Great Kei river, the Kalahari Desert, Delagoa Bay and the Indian 
Ocean (Figure 2.16). The physiographic configuration of this area is pronounced. The 
Great Escarpment and the Drakensberg range – which peaks at heights of up to ~3500 
m in the South Africa-Lesotho border region – separates the interior highveld from the 
narrow strip of low-lying coastal plain. Consequently, a series of aligned river 
catchments, the main being Mfolozi, Thukela, Mhlatuze, Mkuze and Phongolo, run 
from west to east into the Indian Ocean. These rivers have cut deep valleys on their 
westward journey to the ocean, the sides of which are fed by incised streams. This 
means that a great deal of the well-watered land eastwards of the Great Escarpment is 
‘broken country’, often viewed as favourable for human settlement (Mitchell 2002). 
 The region’s basement geological formations of granite and gneiss have 
undergone considerable tectonic disturbance and have been metamorphosed from 
their original forms. These formations are predominantly overlain by quartzitic 
sandstones (Hall 1981), commonly divided into the Beaufort, Ecca, and Natal groups. 
Beaufort group sandstone and mudstone forms the foothills of the Drakensberg 
escarpment (Figure 2.16), adjacent to which on the coastal side is Ecca group shale and 
sandstone and a narrow band of Dwyka tillite. This separates these groups from the 
older Natal group sandstone and Natal Metamorphic granite and gneiss, which 
dominate a ~100 km stretch of land from the coast south of Cape St Lucia. North of 
this, the coastal regions are mainly underlain by Drakensberg group basalt and 
dolerite, with a ~50 km band of silt and unconsolidated sediment dominating the coast. 
In contrast to the Zambezi-Limpopo area, however, non-ferrous ores are less abundant. 
 As is the case in the Zambezi-Limpopo region, soils are closely related to the 
underlying geological formations. The most fertile soils are found on the clay-rich 
Beaufort sediments, which have a high agricultural potential, although these soils have 
poor moisture retention where the land is characterised by steep slopes, as well as 
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being highly erodible. Ecca and Dwyka sediments also provide good agricultural soils 
on the less steep slopes of KwaZulu-Natal. Less fertile are the Natal group sandstone 
and Natal granite sediments between about the Mhlatuze to Mzimvubu rivers, which 
are coarser and shallower. Soils on dolerite, however, provide very good agricultural 
potential except on steeper ground. Beyond the dunes in the area of coastal sands north 
of Cape St Lucia, medium-textured red soils also have high agricultural potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.16 Physical geographical features of the greater KwaZulu-Natal area. 
 
 As well as soils, vegetation was of prime importance for grazing. A number of 
different vegetation types are found in KwaZulu-Natal, though these have been subject 
to considerable change over the second millennium by the impacts of human activity 
(Neumann et al. 2008). The region was heavily wooded prior to the arrival of the first 
farming communities; when dense bush and forest dominated the wetter coastal and 
higher altitude areas, while the drier river valleys and the area to the west of the 
Lubombo mountains (Figure 2.16) were covered with savanna-type vegetation. Much 
of this was replaced by grassland over the course of the second millennium, 
particularly inland, although the area remained sufficiently wooded to provide fuel 
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and materials for construction (Guy 1994). In the river valleys, where rainfall is lower, 
savanna commonly known as bushveld is found adjacent to the rivers. In the well-
watered upland areas where the sources of the rivers are found, ‘sweetveld’ grasses are 
common in the understory of forests, and provide nutritious and palatable grazing 
throughout the dry winter months (Guy 1980). On the contrary, ‘sourveld’ is found in 
the higher rainfall regions such as the coast and the highlands, where maximum 
nutrition is present only after the spring rains. Between the two types is also mixed 
veld, which provides good grazing for around six months in the year. Guy (1980, 1994) 
suggested that the high concentration of these different grazing types in KwaZulu-
Natal made it an unrivalled region for stock-keeping, as herders could move cattle 
between the different grasses over the course of the year. Indeed, earlier archaeological 
evidence revealed that on a broad scale, homesteads tended to cluster in areas with 
access to both sweetveld and sourveld (Hall 1981). In addition, the trypanosomiasis 
disease carried by tsetse fly was confined to the border areas of the region and the 
deepest river valleys, which also made KwaZulu-Natal ideal for herding. 
 As well as differences in human vulnerability, the physical environment meant 
that drought had variable impacts upon the population of KwaZulu-Natal. As with the 
rest of the SRZ, drought is critical in the January to April period when grain crops are 
filling out, yet risk of moisture stress is comparatively lower in the coastal areas south 
of Cape St. Lucia (Figure 2.16). This is because these littoral areas have high humidity 
throughout the year, and so periods of excessive rainfall are equally harmful to human 
activity, where flooding of poorly drained areas of the coastal plain can reduce the area 
suitable for cultivation (Hall 1981). By contrast, the risk of drought is higher in the drier 
river valleys and highlands. Negligible rainfall is received in winter in these areas, and 
therefore low summer rainfall can impact negatively upon biotic productivity for 
several months after the immediate drought has passed. Through its differential spatial 
impacts, climatic stress similarly impacted stock-keeping and the balance between 
lowland and upland grazing, which requires nutrient supply throughout the year. 
 Overall, it is clear that the physical environment of KwaZulu-Natal provided 
certain advantages for agropastoral communities. Its humid, sub-tropical climate, 
permanent rivers, and varied distribution of woodland, grassland and arable land 
provided opportunities for mixed farming and widespread settlement, while tropical 
diseases were confined to its border regions. Nevertheless, climate variability, which 
manifested through either too little or too much rainfall, did impact upon crop 
cultivation and grazing in different parts of the region. 
 
2.3.2 Economy and society 
In contrast to the Zambezi-Limpopo region, written information, although limited, 
provides information on the economic and socio-political structure of Nguni-speaking 
communities before and after their transformation between the mid- to late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries, if not on the process of change itself. Evidence prior to 
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the mid-eighteenth century comes from archaeological records, historical linguistic 
studies and a small number of documents, all of which have considerable limitations of 
depth. Pre-nineteenth century written accounts are scarce in this area in comparison to 
the Zambezi-Limpopo region as it lay south of the Indian Ocean trade zone, and the 
majority derive from accounts of shipwrecked travellers. However, these exceed the 
quality of the aforementioned Arabic documents, and contain important information to 
supplement archaeological data on economic and socio-political organisation from as 
early as the sixteenth century. After the 1820s, a much greater body of written and oral 
evidence is available for KwaZulu-Natal, largely due to the increased European 
presence in the expanding Cape Colony. This background will therefore adopt a less 
‘ahistorical’ approach than Section 2.2.2, and will consider the socio-political and 
economic situation both prior to the mid-eighteenth century and in the 1820s, when 
written sources make reference to socio-political structures akin to kingdoms or states. 
 
2.3.2.1 Socio-political organisation 
Written and archaeological evidence has led most scholars to rule that socio-political 
organisation was confined to small-scale units of varying size, population and 
structure before the mid-eighteenth century (Wilson and Thompson 1969; Maggs 1989; 
Wright and Hamilton 1989; Huffman 2004; Wright 2010). Although one writer 
speculates that states comparable to the Shaka’s Zulu kingdom existed from an earlier 
date (Etherington 2001, 2004), narratives of journeys through KwaZulu-Natal and 
adjacent areas from the shipwrecked crews of the Sao Thomé (1589), the Santo Alberto 
(1593) and the Stavenisse (1687) do not suggest that this was the case. Similarly, a dearth 
of archaeological evidence for development towards state formation before the latter 
half of the eighteenth century reinforces this evidence (Huffman 2004), and rather 
implies that a high number of small-scale chiefdoms populated the area. According to 
Maggs (1989), the Santo Alberto (1593) account indicates an average width of about 15-
20 km per territory, which is comparable with the polities in central KwaZulu-Natal 
immediately prior to late-eighteenth century state transformation, while others suggest 
a variable territorial extent ranging from a few hundred to several thousand square 
kilometres, and a population of a few hundred to several thousand individuals (Wright 
and Hamilton 1989).  
 Despite general similarities in the size and population of political units, there 
were important differences in their organisation. Wright and Hamilton (1989) state that 
in some chiefdoms, rule consisted of a more distant ‘managerial’ political and ritual 
authority, while in others, physical force played a central role under a dominant chief. 
Common to all units, however, was their make-up of a fluctuating number of villages 
and communities composed of scattered homesteads (Maggs 1989). Communal bonds 
were made through ties of neighbourhood, kinship, clientship and marriage, while the 
chiefdom as a whole was also bound together by ritual, acts of allegiance, and the 
redistribution of tribute from the chief to politically important followers (Wright 2010). 
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It is important to note that prior to the mid-eighteenth century, these chiefdoms were 
generally fluid and insecure entities, with frequent disputes over access to resources 
such as cattle and grazing land leading to peaceful and violent transition (Maggs 1989). 
This volatility was in part due to the decentralised nature of polities, and the lack of 
institutions through which chiefs could effectively command their populations. 
Accordingly, armed units assembled on a local basis and answered to community 
leaders, meaning the paramount chief struggled to exercise force over dissident or 
breakaway factions (Wright 2010). The extent to which coercive power, repression and 
exploitation could be used by powerful chiefdoms to subjugate others under direct rule 
was therefore generally restricted, and those that were subordinated still maintained a 
level of autonomy, often leaving room for fission and fragmentation (Wright and 
Hamilton 1989). 
 Several lines of evidence exist to show that marked change had taken place in 
the last decades of the eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth century. This 
means that when oral traditions begin to offer extensive information in the early-
nineteenth century, these mostly relate to the largest groups such as the Zulu and 
Ndwandwe (Huffman 2004). In addition, the first literate people settled among the 
Zulu in 1824, when it was an established kingdom, and its forerunner, the Mthethwa 
polity, no longer existed. Accounts from European traders, notably Henry Francis 
Fynn, who arrived in Natal in 1824, and Nathanial Isaacs in 1825, provide evidence on 
Zulu customs, and critical analysis of these in conjunction with oral sources allows a 
background to be assembled on the economy and society of the Zulu and, to an extent, 
other political units in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 Oral histories indicate that in the latter third of the eighteenth century, a shift in 
the social and political relationships previously described began to take place (Wright 
2010). The rulers of some chiefdoms in both the KwaZulu-Natal area and on the 
interior highveld heightened their power-bases over their own people and other 
groups, while raiding and conflict underwent an amplification (Wright and Hamilton 
1989). In the Phongolo-Thukela area, the Ndwandwe, Mthethwa and Qwabe 
chiefdoms were expanding, while the Mabhudu chiefdom became established around 
Delagoa Bay. At the same time, many of the smaller groups had either fragmented, 
been incorporated into, or subjugated by, the larger polities shown in Figure 2.17 
(Eldredge 1992, 2014). Archaeological evidence in the form of an increased number of 
huts in aggregated settlements, and an increase in stone-built settlements in the interior 
grasslands of KwaZulu-Natal also suggests that population growth took place during 
in this period (Huffman 1986b; 2004, 2007; Maggs 1989), while the territorial extent of 
the main polities was now considerably larger than previously. 
 As well as territorial expansion, Wright (2010) adds these changes entailed 
evolving political, social and economic relations between the rulers and ruled. A 
crucial development in the more centralised polities mentioned above came with the 
organisation and control of age-sets of young men, known in Zulu as ‘amabutho’. These 
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groups could be controlled for purposes such as military duties and hunting, and as 
they grew, increased amounts of tribute could be extracted in the form of cattle, young 
women, and labour, which could in turn be used to expand the amabutho further (Guy 
1994). In the Zulu kingdom amabutho were divided into ‘amakhanda’ (barracks) across 
the heartland of the kingdom, while in the larger kingdoms in general, amabutho were 
used as military units for both expansive operations and to guard cattle, as well as for 
domestic activities such as construction and the cultivation of the chief or king’s fields 
(Wright 2010; Eldredge 2014). Amabutho can therefore be viewed as a ‘production unit’ 
which operated on a reciprocal basis under the control of a chief, who in return for 
increased tribute was responsible for offering protection, sufficient agricultural and 
grazing land, and crucially the potential to build up the holdings of cattle that enabled 
men to establish their own homesteads. Amabutho were therefore a key advantage and 
reinforcing aspect in political power, but had to be satisfied by the paramount chief 
otherwise the premise of the system would be undermined. By contrast, in the less 
centralised chiefdoms, most of the military force remained made up of local men of all 
ages, as chiefs struggled to establish firm class distinctions and institutions (Guy 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.17 Some important sites and polities prior to major migrations and state formation in 
KwaZulu-Natal and adjacent areas. 
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 Reflective of their increased differentiation and stratification, larger polities 
consisted of three social tiers (Wright 2010). The aristocracy, made up of the ruling 
families and a cluster of other related families formed the top level. Rulers exercised 
varying degrees of power, where stronger rulers like Shaka of the Zulu, Soshangane of 
the Gaza and Mzilikazi of the Ndebele held considerable power over amabutho, and 
were able to militarise them for defensive and aggressive means, as well as to maintain 
perceived dissent from within the society (Eldredge 2014). On the other hand, other 
rulers continued in a more managerial style, while Wright (2010) states that their 
polities were held together less by internal force and fear and more by external threats. 
The chiefs of subordinate chiefdoms, who held less power but generally retained their 
positions, also made up this tier. Below this were commoner families in the heartland 
of the kingdom. These formed the main part of the kingdom’s body politic, from which 
young men who made-up the amabutho were drawn (Wright 2010; Eldredge 2014). At 
the bottom were poorer families of dependents who recognised political overlordship 
but generally did not play any role in political affairs. These members were mostly 
situated on the margins of the kingdom, and were seen as outsiders and inferiors by 
the other two tiers (Hamilton and Wright 1990; Wright 2010). 
 Despite the increased wealth concentration at the upper levels of society, 
Etherington (2001) adds that polities remained dependent on the economic and social 
functioning of the homestead. Increased demand for cattle, grain, women and young 
men were sought from these homesteads, yet there existed a delicate balance in not 
pushing this tribute too far, as this could undermine the system on which the society 
depended. Indeed, the stability of livelihoods, mostly the production of a surplus in 
cattle, underpinned the existence of the aristocracy. Rulers and sub-chiefs were also 
obliged to assist poorer homesteads in times of famine, for instance by releasing 
amabutho from service where labour was needed (Wright 2010). In the case of the Zulu, 
another indicator of the increasing authority of polities was that the choosing of 
marriage partners and the timings of marriages came to be directed by the state. This is 
reflective of a shift in gender relations on the whole, where wives and daughters were 
more firmly controlled by male homestead heads and the state itself (Eldredge 2014). 
 Force was not the only method of maintaining the stability of complex political 
units, and ideology played a more important role than force in legitimising leadership 
and genealogical seniority over subordinate chiefdoms (Eldredge 2014). Ritual and 
ceremonial routines therefore developed or acquired heightened political importance. 
The ruler initiated the performance of important ceremonies such as the ‘first fruits’ 
festival, which legalised the consumption of harvests. Rainmaking was also crucial in 
the perception of climate-related hazards, but differed to that of the Zambezi-Limpopo 
area, as here rainmakers, or ‘inyangas’, were special doctors who attempted to influence 
supernatural forces through the manipulation of rain medicines (Huffman 2004). These 
were not simply politically important functions, but in the views of the population 
resembled life or death. 
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2.3.2.2 Food system 
The food systems of communities in the KwaZulu-Natal area were not altogether 
dissimilar to those of the Zambezi-Limpopo region. Although a pastoral ideology 
dominated, agricultural produce was needed for subsistence (Huffman 2004). Sixteenth 
and seventeenth century shipwreck accounts make it clear that sorghum and millet 
were the principal crops, with sorghum probably the most widely cultivated of these, 
while archaeological evidence has also shown that grain was stored and sealed in flask-
shaped pits dug in cattle byres (Maggs 1989). These grains were supplemented by the 
cultivation of vegetables and legumes, including beans, groundnuts, gourds, melons 
and pumpkins. Cultivation was generally tended to by women, though it is not strictly 
true that men took no part in cultivation (Eldredge 2014). A major change in the food 
system of some communities in KwaZulu-Natal, however, came with the introduction 
and spread of maize. Little detail is known about the dynamics of its introduction, 
though studies by Hall and Maggs (1979) and Maggs (1982) revealed archaeological 
evidence of special maize grindstones at a number of sites in the interior area of 
KwaZulu-Natal, and therefore suggested that these areas cultivated maize as a staple 
crop from the early-eighteenth century. Maize matured in around three months, 
required less labour and protection from birds, and in the best-watered areas with 
fertile soils, two or three crops could be grown in a field in one year (Eldredge 1992). 
This increased productivity over previous staple crops with the same labour force has 
accordingly been linked to population increase in areas of KwaZulu-Natal that were 
sparsely populated prior to the late-eighteenth century. Yet maize is more water-
demanding and sensitive to water deprivation than previous staple crops, and thus its 
widespread adoption would have changed the dynamics of drought impacts (Hall 
1976; Hall 1998; McCann 2001; Huffman 2004). 
 The relative importance of agricultural production in the food systems of the 
KwaZulu-Natal area did differ from further north. As noted in Section 2.1.2, Nguni-
speaking communities placed greater emphasis on cattle and pastoral livelihoods, 
which were heavily linked socio-cultural customs and were the domain of the male. 
Shipwreck accounts all reveal an abundance of cattle in the KwaZulu-Natal area, as 
well as quantities of dogs, sheep and goats, though animals such as pigs and fowls 
were introduced later. The inhabitants of this region were skilled herders, and shifted 
their stock from one pasture to another, making use of sweetveld and sourveld land in 
different seasons (Guy 1994). Little pre-eighteenth century written evidence is available 
on the importance of cattle for wealth, and for ritual, family and political relations, yet 
such practices did extend back to this time (Huffman 2004). Nevertheless, major 
changes relating to cattle-keeping and food security came with the transformation of 
socio-political organisation. Prior to the development of amabutho, families lived in 
homesteads throughout their lives and only paid small amounts of tribute to rulers 
(Wright 2010). In the early-nineteenth century, though, cattle and men from these 
homesteads were forfeited in larger quantities to the royal capital and amakhanda, and 
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were also required in the maintenance of the new social system (Eldredge 2014). This 
demanded that cattle were replaced, the fastest way to do so being to seize them by 
force from other communities (Etherington 2001). As the amabutho expanded, so did 
the dependence of the ruling houses on it for maintaining and expanding their power, 
which in turn meant that ever more cattle were required for redistribution as rewards. 
While raiding had probably been a feature of life in KwaZulu-Natal earlier than this, 
most scholars agree that this acquired a new dynamic in the early-nineteenth century 
with the rise of the amabutho-based polities, and eventually grew into full-scale conflict 
to accumulate more grazing land as well as the cattle itself (Wright 2010). Cattle were 
similarly key in other socio-cultural practices, notably marriage, where marriage 
alliances often involved high numbers of cattle exchanged as bridewealth. Thus, with 
more cattle a man could marry more wives. 
 The hunting and the gathering of wild resources were also important to Nguni-
speaking communities, the former of which was conducted by men provided skins, 
and later, ivory for export, as well as meat. Wild plants were predominantly eaten by 
women and children, but were eaten by men in times of scarcity (Maggs 1989). 
Although KwaZulu-Natal is amply supplied with river and sea fish, oral traditions and 
documents assert that fish were avoided because of a taboo. Indeed, only the poorest 
communities living on the coast collected shellfish or speared fish found in rock pools 
(Wilson and Thompson 1969). 
 A further stressor that affected the security of the food system was drought, 
and when seasons or multiple years of moisture stress hit, crops were often stunted or 
failed altogether, meaning people had to resort to grain stores, eat cattle or subsist on 
wild plants and animals (Hall 1981; Eldredge 1992; Etherington 2001). Presumably, 
communities in better-watered areas with reliable rainfall and permanent rivers were 
less vulnerable, while cultivating a mix of crops and keeping a variety of domestic 
animals provided another good defence to food scarcity. Yet the vulnerability and 
resilience of communities was also affected by factors such as conflict and political 
instability, and coordinating response to all of these factors required a high level of 
organisation. Multiple food system stressors thus raise key questions of interactions 
between factors such as conflict, environmental stress and food insecurity, specifically 
the impact of climate and conflict on organised food systems. Indeed, when politically 
important rituals such as rainmaking and the first fruits festival are added to this, a 
dynamic emerges with which climate variability intersected, yet has not been given 
substantial treatment in the literature. 
 
2.3.2.3 Livelihoods and trade 
Basic livelihoods outside of subsistence farming were the manufacture of clothing from 
the hides of slaughtered cattle, and cooking utensils from glass, wood and clay. Most 
evidence on other livelihoods prior to the late-eighteenth century, however, centres 
around metal-working, where archaeological records show that iron was smelted in 
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most villages to produce hoes and weapons (Maggs 1989). Other mineral resources in 
the KwaZulu-Natal area were relatively scarce, and metals such as brass and copper 
were obtained through trade in exchange for grain or cattle, and later tobacco, with 
polities on the South African highveld or in the Delagoa Bay area. Medicines and 
ornaments also formed part of this more local system of trade. The quantities involved 
were generally small, a fact which Maggs (1989) claims is reinforced by the fact that the 
iron, copper and brass possessed by shipwrecked parties was highly sought-after by 
men armed partly with iron spears and partly with wooden pikes. By the 1530s a 
Portuguese ship made an annual voyage from Sofala to the natural harbour of Delagoa 
Bay to purchase ivory. Although this trade did not penetrate further south at this time, 
some merchandise, such as cloth, beads and copper, did reach the area, probably 
indirectly from the highveld (Etherington 2001). Competition for this trade in the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland has been linked with the expansion of some polities in the area 
such as the Inhaca. Similar processes may have occurred on a much smaller scale in 
KwaZulu-Natal with shipwrecked travellers, who often encountered difficulty when 
crossing rivers in the area as a result of the attempts by chiefs to control the trade 
passing through his territory. While these small quantities of trade enhanced the 
unequal distribution of resources in the area, this appears to have made little difference 
to the overall organisation of livelihoods, society or politics in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 These livelihoods underwent change in the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth 
century. Technological change was reflected in the development or introduction of 
different types of grindstones and iron-smelting equipment (Maggs 1989). Importantly, 
however, iron-smelting was no longer conducted in every settlement, which suggests 
that imports of metals had increased. This expansion in trade mostly occurred through 
Delagoa Bay, where from around the 1760s increased numbers of English, Indian and 
other merchants came to buy ivory from chiefs in the vicinity of the bay in exchange 
for cloth, beads and metal (Hedges 1978). Similarly, trade was expanding on the 
highveld by way of the Cape Colony, where Dutch stock farmers used the Khoekhoe as 
middlemen to barter beads and iron implements for cattle with chiefdoms in this area. 
 Although the polities in the hinterland of the Delagoa Bay were the most 
immediately affected by the expanding trade, political leaders in KwaZulu-Natal 
sought to acquire new forms of wealth to increase their status, which means that it 
could have been a source of competition and conflict. In the late-eighteenth century, 
the trade in ivory declined and the export of cattle increased as British and American 
whalers began to use Delagoa Bay as a base at this time, which increased the demand 
for a foodstuffs including cattle (Alpers 1976; Wright 2010). The humid, tsetse-infested 
area proximate to the bay, however, was not ideal cattle country, and meant that local 
chiefs looked to import cattle from the regions further south to sell to the whalers 
(Huffman 2004). In contrast to elephants and their tusks, cattle were fundamental to 
subsistence, ritual, status, wealth and ideology in homesteads across KwaZulu-Natal, 
and its export in any serious number would have required replacement cattle to fulfil 
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these needs. By the mid- to late-1810s, trade in both ivory and cattle is suggested to 
have been lower than previously (Wright 2010), but by 1824, the Zulu kingdom was 
connected to another source of trade with the arrival of British traders at Port Natal. 
Traders travelled through the country exchanging manufactured goods, such as hoes, 
knives, metal cooking utensils, cloth and beads for cattle, hides and ivory. According 
Eldredge (2014), Shaka valued the traders’ presence for their goods and the access they 
offered to the Cape Colony government, but he always sought to maintain tight control 
over their activities and was anxious that they did not trade with other rival polities. 
While these imported commodities were valued by the inhabitants of KwaZulu-Natal, 
perhaps the only new items were firearms, as most others were manufactured by 
craftsmen prior to this. Indeed, crafts offered a livelihood opportunity for a small part 
of the population without being directly dependent on cattle. This suggests that the 
economic impact of the Port Natal trade in the mid- to late-1820s was small. In the 
nineteenth century, the production of metal goods, such as hoes and spears, increased, 
and some who produced these items attained power through trading (Etherington 
2001). On the other hand, Maggs (1989) adds that reliance upon trade for a dependable 
income was difficult apart from where trade routes could be controlled. Mining, crafts, 
manufacturing and consequently trade, were therefore at most supporting activities 
that involved only a small part of the population (Guy 1994). 
 This background overview has shown that consensus exists on the range and 
relative importance of economic and livelihood activities in the mid-eighteenth to 
early-nineteenth centuries, and has also demonstrated the level of knowledge on socio-
political organisation in the early-nineteenth century. This is in contrast to the 
Zambezi-Limpopo region, where less detail is currently known on these factors and 
particularly their changes over time. Nonetheless, some key questions for investigation 
in Chapter 6 include: 
• How did the dependence on crop cultivation and pastoralism vary between the 
Zulu kingdom and its subordinate polities in KwaZulu-Natal? 
• How did socio-political institutions and ritual affect the perception of drought 
and crop failure, and how strongly was this linked to the leadership? 
• How was food security affected by the interaction of climate variability and 
other stressors, particularly conflict and cattle raiding? 
• How advanced were adaptive methods and coping strategies against drought? 
 While comparatively few questions are raised over spatial differences and 
temporal changes in economy and society in the KwaZulu-Natal area, less consensus 
exists on the factors that caused the transformation of social, political and economic 
life, as well as the impacts of heightened conflict in the early part of the nineteenth 
century. The next section overviews the debate and hypotheses relating to the origins 
and events of this transformation and conflict previously termed the ‘mfecane’. 
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2.3.3 Socio-political change in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century 
In accordance with the review of the economy and society of the KwaZulu-Natal area 
in the previous section, this part of the review, and indeed the later analysis in Chapter 
6, will consider the developments and hypothesised climatic links of this broader 
period in two parts. The first will focus on the debate regarding the origins of socio-
political transformation in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, while the 
second part will investigate the consolidation of centralised political authority and the 
intensification of conflict and migration in the mid-1810s to 1830. Before this, the notion 
of the mfecane as an organising concept for these processes is critically analysed. 
 
2.3.3.1 The ‘mfecane’ as a concept 
In the 1810s to 1830s, KwaZulu-Natal and several other areas of southern Africa were 
directly or indirectly affected by unprecedented demographic upheaval, social and 
political transformation, and intensified conflict. Scholarship relating to these events 
traditionally centred around the notion of the so-called mfecane (or difaqane), a term that 
has been used in various ways, but most implicate the rise of the Zulu kingdom as the 
main trigger of these dramatic changes. This paradigm stems from the pre-1980s 
‘settler historiography’ of white South Africans, who treated these decades as a period 
defined by the apparent destructive expansion of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka, 
which supposedly initiated a destabilising chain reaction of violence, migrations and 
state formation. Although this was later reframed as a purely local event of African 
initiative by Omer-Cooper (1966), the traditional historiography argued that the 
resultant ‘depopulation’ had left lands devastated in order to advance settlers’ claims 
as bringers of peace in an empty land (Etherington 2001). 
 In the late-1980s, the concept of the mfecane and its Zulu-centric line of 
explanation came under new scrutiny. This was initially led by Julian Cobbing (1988a), 
whose research led historians into thinking about the wider explanations for this 
change. The early-1990s research that followed then reframed mfecane debates in two 
major ways. Firstly, consensus emerged that it was no longer possible to view the 
origins of socio-political transformation in KwaZulu-Natal as an isolated period which 
resulted from the colonial-era notions of the ‘wars of Shaka’ in the 1820s. Instead, the 
heightened conflict at this time needed to be set in a broader, multi-causal context since 
around the mid-eighteenth century (Wright 2010). Secondly, it was accepted that the 
KwaZulu-Natal area was only one of a number of separate focal points regarding the 
origins of political instability, and events elsewhere, such as on the highveld, in the 
expanding Cape Colony, and at Delagoa Bay, were of comparable importance. 
 In more recent years, use of the term mfecane has continued by some scholars as 
an organising concept or has been given different meanings (Omer-Cooper 1992; 
Huffman 2004, 2007; Schoeman 2013). However, African historians have invariably 
discontinued the term altogether as many see it as being inseparable from an out-dated 
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paradigm (Etherington 2001; Wright 2010; Eldredge 2014). In addition, the fact that 
there now exists widespread consensus that the wholesale attribution of contemporary 
events to the Zulu kingdom is undue means that there are very few merits to retaining 
the term as an organising concept. Indeed, the umbrella term of the mfecane vastly 
oversimplifies a complex reality of political centralisation and consolidation, social 
change and subordination, as well as migration and violence, into a simple cause-effect 
model. Furthermore, the term ignores the now widely accepted viewpoint that the 
events of the early-nineteenth century had their origins in the accelerated processes of 
socio-political change beginning in the mid- to late-eighteenth century. In this thesis, 
the term is dropped for these reasons. 
 
2.3.3.2 The origins and causes of transformation in KwaZulu-Natal 
If consensus exists that the origins of state transformation must be pushed back to the 
mid-eighteenth century, the debate around the conditions that made this period 
uniquely conducive to such occurrences is marked by sharper divisions. On face-value, 
oral traditions and written sources emphasise the ‘great man’ attributes and military 
innovations of rulers such as Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa and Shaka of the Zulu 
(Etherington 2001). Eldredge (2014), however, has shown that a number of innovations 
credited to Shaka in the traditions, like the use of the stabbing spear, existed before his 
rise to power. Furthermore, extensive work by Carolyn Hamilton and Dan Wylie has 
done much to improve understanding of the various images and myths created of 
Shaka both during his rule and in later reconstructions (Hamilton 1992, 1998; Wylie 
1995). Yet even if it is accepted that strong leaders were important, it is perhaps the 
case that underlying structural factors provided opportunities for innovators to exploit. 
Numerous hypotheses on such factors have been put forward since the 1940s, which 
have often been categorised as ‘internal’ and ‘external’. Internal factors centre around 
population pressures with the introduction of maize (Gluckman 1960; Maggs 1989; 
Huffman 2004), deteriorating grazing land (Guy 1980; 1994), the growth of amabutho 
(Wright and Hamilton 1989; Wright 1995, 2010), and changing responses to famine and 
environmental crises (Eldredge 1992). On the other hand, external stimuli relate to 
responses to growing inter-continental trading opportunities (Smith 1969; Hedges 
1978), the impact of pronounced climate variability towards the end of the LIA (Hall 
1976, 1981; Huffman 2004), defensive responses to the slave trade on the Mozambique 
coast (Cobbing 1988a), and similar reactions to increased pressures of raiding and 
firearms along the frontier of the Cape Colony (Etherington 2001; Wright 2010).  
 Gluckman (1960) was the first to move away from the focus on great man 
theories, and proposed that over-population created an imbalance between population 
and resources that led to increased competition, political consolidation and warfare. 
This theory was later popularised by Omer-Cooper (1966), yet even if there is evidence 
for population growth, scant evidence exists to argue that a critical density had been 
reached. In a similar line of explanation, other scholars have suggested that either 
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environmental degradation or climatic changes and the introduction of maize created 
new conditions in which societal developments occurred. Jeff Guy proposed that socio-
political transformation had its roots in a coupled crisis relating to food production and 
environmental degradation, where inadequate grazing resources were born out of 
imbalances between pastoralism and grassland ecology (Guy 1980). Guy hypothesised 
that a decline in grassland productivity resulted from over-stocking and centuries of 
unscientific farming practices, which caused soil erosion, bush encroachment, and 
pasture deterioration on sweetveld grassland in particular. Linked to this was 
increasing population density, where the productive capacity of the environment was 
constrained as it became less possible to convert forest and bush to grass and arable 
land, and migration to new areas became difficult. Consequently, increased violence 
broke out over diminishing resources, and chiefdoms that had access to a variety of 
grazing types, such as the Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and Zulu, became major political 
units with the aid of this ecological advantage. A major issue with Guy’s arguments, as 
with environmental degradation pathways in the decline of Great Zimbabwe, is lack of 
evidence, while the existence of seasonal grazing rotation goes against his argument of 
unscientific misuse of pastures. Moreover, if there had been ‘overpopulation’, then it is 
hard to understand why areas of fertile land, such as in southern KwaZulu-Natal, were 
not used for herding, or why excess cattle could not have been culled. Similarly, by 
overlooking cultivation, Guy’s thesis does not explain why the total area of land under 
cultivation could not have been increased to boost food production (Hall 1981). 
 Martin Hall advanced thoughts on potential climatic pathways using a 
dendrochronological record from a Yellowwood tree felled in 1912 in the Karkloof 
forest, KwaZulu-Natal (Hall 1976; Figures 1.1 and 2.18). Implicit in this hypothesis is 
the introduction of maize to KwaZulu-Natal through Delagoa Bay sometime around 
the early-eighteenth century (Maggs 1982), the cultivation of which is suggested to 
have had twofold implications. The first, as a result of the high yields of maize relative 
to sorghum, is said to have increased the regional capacity for population growth. 
Furthermore, the extensive cultivation of maize on formerly marginal lands was said to 
have been made possible by a period of increased rainfall towards the end of the LIA 
between 1750 and 1800 inferred in the Karkloof tree-ring record (Figure 2.18). The 
second implication of maize cultivation, however, was that its consumers were subject 
to increased vulnerability due to the crop’s high sensitivity to water deprivation. The 
heightened vulnerability of a large population is therefore said to have set the scene for 
the apparently drought-induced famine known to Nguni-speaking communities as the 
mahlatule famine in the early years of the nineteenth century (Guy 1980; Ballard 1986; 
Eldredge 1992). According to some, this famine caused a serious breakdown of social, 
political and economic institutions in KwaZulu-Natal, led to treks of survival in search 
of food and the expansion of political units in order to gain control over a wider range 
of grazing, which enabled them to counter the effects of local drought and food scarcity 
(Ballard 1986; Guy 1980). 
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FIGURE 2.18 Karkloof Yellowwood tree-ring width curve after adjustments to the calendar 
dates. Wide widths relate to increased precipitation. After Hall (1976) and Vogel and Fuls (2001). 
 
Notwithstanding uncertainties over the extent of maize cultivation in 
KwaZulu-Natal, a number of scholars have pointed out the seeming inadequacies with 
the hypothesis of drought creating or contributing to socio-political transformation in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Wright and Hamilton (1989) regard this possible causal pathway as 
speculative, while Etherington (2001) claims that drought had always been a factor 
facing societies, and thus it is unclear why it should have been more significant at this 
time. This latter view, however, makes little provision for contextual factors that made 
societies vulnerable to climate variability. In partial answer to this, Eldredge (1992) 
importantly observed that environmental and climatic stress can be part of the causal 
dynamics rather than a lone, monocausal driving-force mechanism. In her view, the 
expansion of trade stimulated increasing inequalities within and between polities, 
which undermined traditional strategies of averting famine by fostering an unequal 
distribution of food in times of scarcity (Eldredge 1992). Severe drought in the 
mahlatule famine thereby contributed to revolution and reorganisation among some 
political units in KwaZulu-Natal at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Eldredge 
1992). Bonner (1983) also accepted the suggestion that drought could have been a 
contributory factor, and concluded that shortages of cattle as a result of the mahlatule 
famine led the aristocracy of the Sobhuza’s Dlamini-Ngwane group to increase their 
control over the newly formed amabutho to strengthen their power. 
 Although some of the scenarios presented above are certainly feasible, a major 
problem is that the evidence-base used is relatively thin. Indeed, as is the case of the 
Zambezi-Limpopo region prior to written records, such scenarios can be quite realistic 
for the first stages but, with branching possibilities, they often become complex and 
separated from the evidence that exists (Beach 1998). Physical environmental and 
climatic hypotheses are also often postulated in very general terms, with little 
consideration of how pre-existing agricultural livelihoods varied or how the impacts 
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and interpretation of the alleged climate variability differed between societies. Perhaps 
the biggest difficulty of the climate-related hypotheses, however, is that evidence for 
climate variability itself over this period has been drawn from a very limited range of 
sources. These include the tree-ring from the Karkloof forest (Hall 1976), which is 
subject to numerous problems as is later discussed in Chapter 3 (Woodborne pers. 
comm.), and a small number of oral testimonies relating to the mahlatule famine 
(Hannaford et al. 2014). Moreover, some historians have inadequately relied upon 
archaeological records as an indicator for both climate variability and societal change 
as opposed to palaeoclimate proxies. Further consideration must therefore be given to 
the precise pathways through which climate variability, food production and the 
environment influenced socio-political transformation. This means developing new 
chronologies of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century climate variability, and 
re-examining the written and oral sources that can shed light on the changing interplay 
between the food system and social and political dynamics. 
 A major external stimulus linked with the acceleration of state formation 
processes relates to the expansion of inter-continental trading opportunities at Delagoa 
Bay (Smith 1969; Hedges 1978). After about 1750, there was a substantial increase in the 
demand for ivory by European traders, at which time Delagoa Bay and its hinterland 
was a growing source of this trade. Around the 1780s, the demand for ivory was 
gradually replaced by an increase in the demand for cattle to supply European and 
American whaling ships. In this context, Hedges (1978) suggested that chiefdoms 
steered, expanded or even initially organised amabutho both towards elephant hunting 
and cattle raiding to increase their own wealth in imported commodities. The resultant 
competition for control of the expanding trade and subsequent rise in cattle raiding 
around the end of the eighteenth century has therefore been said to have undermined 
the social order and led to widespread violence, as cattle not only had importance for 
subsistence, but had high social importance in bridewealth and as tribute (Huffman 
2004, 2007). Similarly, supplying the ivory trade could have been volatile as elephant 
populations may have declined in certain areas. Nevertheless, the booty from cattle 
raids, which was also redistributed to followers, may have been particularly crucial as 
it gave chiefs a way to satisfy their people and hold their chiefdoms together. Equally 
important is that the increase in the import wealth of certain chiefdoms, such as the 
Mabhudu polity around Delagoa Bay, and slightly later the Mthethwa, is said to have 
transformed political and socio-economic inequality both within and between 
communities (Eldredge 1992). This meant that some polities were able to extend their 
domination over neighbouring chiefdoms while pushing others away. 
 Chiefdoms such as the Mthethwa are thought to have shown particular 
responses to trade opportunities, and thus were wrapped up in attempts to control the 
trade in ivory and cattle by way of territorial expansion and the increased mobilisation 
of their amabutho. While increasing competition for trade and a possible associated 
intensification of conflict may have contributed to socio-political transformation, there 
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is little evidence to suggest that this was the main cause, as other chiefdoms in the 
KwaZulu-Natal area with less involvement in the trade, such as the Dlamini, Hlubi 
and Qwabe, also expanded and developed amabutho at some stage. Explanations here 
are relatively thin, though it is possible that this expansion occurred as a defensive 
response to these new developments in the political economy of the region (Wright 
2010). Trade was also subject to changes beyond the control of African communities. 
For instance, the Portuguese are known to have favoured different polities at different 
times both in the Zambezi-Limpopo region and in the Delagoa bay area, which 
apparently acted to both centralise and fragment power in both areas, as well as to 
increase localised conflict (Wright and Hamilton 1989; Beach 1994). 
 Cobbing (1988a) also suggested that the slave trade played a major role in 
political centralisation, and linked the entire process of state formation and regional 
conflict with a defensive response to its associated pressures. This hypothesis has been 
roundly dismissed, however, on the grounds that an extensive slave trade (over 1000 
slaves exported per year) at Delagoa Bay did not begin until after 1823, when state 
formation processes were already well-advanced (Smith 1969; Harries 1981; Eldredge 
1992; Etherington 2001). Prior to this, the principal catchment area for slaves was to the 
north of Delagoa Bay, where slaving operations were largely focussed on the Zambezi 
for export to sugar plantations on Mauritius, Reunion and the Comoros, and later for 
export to Brazil (Newitt 1995). As well as criticism over the evidence-base of Cobbing’s 
claims, his arguments have also been suggested to view processes of African state 
transformation as entirely reactive, discrediting the notion of internal forces being 
responsible for change in pre-colonial African societies (Eldredge 1992). On the 
contrary, it is undeniable that the translation of opportunities or threats into political 
consolidation was solely a product of human agency and innovation, and was 
thereafter facilitated by the institutions of some polities that enabled their growth. 
 Before considering the causes and events of intensified conflict in the 1810s to 
1830s, it is important to note that similar processes of transformation occurred in the 
Sotho-Tswana-speaking communities on the highveld. A full consideration of these 
events is beyond the scope of the thesis, yet there is consensus that the late-eighteenth 
century was marked by growing conflict among the chiefdoms in the area of the Vaal 
river and the southern fringes of the Kalahari (Etherington 2001). These processes have 
been linked with similar causes to those in KwaZulu-Natal, and include maize, trade, 
and defensive responses to conflict on the Cape frontier (Wright 2010). 
 
2.3.3.3 Political consolidation and conflict in the 1810s to 1828 
In comparison to the late-eighteenth century, the period of widespread insecurity in 
the 1810s to 1830s is relatively well-understood in terms of its chronology and events. 
This is because of an increase in the volume of oral traditions, particularly relating to 
the Zulu kingdom, while European traders wrote first-hand accounts of KwaZulu-
Natal from the 1824 onwards. Before commencing a synthesis of the history these 
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decades, it is important to refer to a recently published volume - The Creation of the Zulu 
Kingdom - by Elizabeth Eldredge. One of Eldredge’s most pertinent reflections is that 
there now exists more scholarship on the personality of Shaka than the nature and 
causes of the events that took place in KwaZulu-Natal during his reign. To an extent, 
this is understandable, as the historiography surrounding this period was previously 
centred around the notion of the ‘wars of Shaka’. Rejection of this concept, however, 
was convincingly achieved in the 1990s, yet the last decade-and-a-half has done 
comparatively little to advance understanding of the process of Zulu expansion during 
the reign of Shaka. Indeed, one could argue that the scholarship has gone beyond 
refutation of sole Zulu culpability towards understating the involvement of the Zulu 
kingdom in conflict or raiding in KwaZulu-Natal in the early part of the nineteenth 
century. Eldredge’s work is thus refreshing because it leaves such historiographical 
hang-ups behind, and critically re-analyses both oral and European sources to 
document the events that took place in KwaZulu-Natal during the reign of Shaka. 
 After the mahlatule famine in the first years of the nineteenth century, KwaZulu-
Natal was dominated by several newly emerged chiefdoms, including the Mabhudu, 
Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and Qwabe (Figure 2.17). By the 1810s, competition and 
repeated conflict between two of these polities, the Ndwandwe under Zwide, and the 
Mthethwa under Dingiswayo, had grown to surpass other rivalries (Eldredge 2014). In 
particular, Zwide’s Ndwandwe was aggressively expanding and subjugating other 
chiefdoms, while the Mthethwa chiefdom was less autocratic in its economic 
organisation, and sub-chiefs incorporated into its domain were encouraged to retain a 
greater degree of autonomy (Wright 2010). At this time, the Zulu chiefdom, ruled by 
Senzangakona, was relatively small, and was largely under the domination of 
Dingiswayo. Upon Senzangakona’s death in 1816, Dingiswayo installed Shaka, the 
former’s eldest son, as Zulu chief. Shaka was encouraged to restructure and strengthen 
his amabutho, and to expand his power in the Mthethwa domain to defend against the 
Ndwandwe (Wright and Hamilton 1989). In about 1817, an intensification of raiding 
between the Ndwandwe and the Mthethwa resulted in the defeat and break-up of the 
latter and the capture and killing of Dingiswayo, which according to Etherington 
(2001) gave Shaka the opportunity to establish his Zulu chiefdom as the predominant 
power south of the White Mfolozi and carry on the resistance against Zwide. 
 Shaka immediately sought to bring new chiefdoms, such as the Qwabe under 
Phakathwayo, under his overlordship. These confrontations are thought to have been 
relatively short-lived with few casualties, as Shaka sought to subdue chiefs, 
expropriate their cattle and incorporate their people into his orbit rather than crush 
them (Eldredge 1992, 2014; Etherington 2001). By 1819, however, the Ndwandwe 
resumed their aggression against the Zulu, causing heavy losses of cattle (Wright and 
Hamilton 1989). In response, Shaka withdrew his amabutho and cattle into the core of 
the kingdom, and apparently hid or destroyed crops and grain stores to prevent the 
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Ndwandwe pursuit. Zwide was then forced back to his capital, after which his 
kingdom fragmented, probably due to internal political tensions (Wright 2010). 
 The break-up of the Ndwandwe kingdom was marked by three groups: those 
under Soshangane and Zwangendaba, which moved into the Delagoa Bay area, while 
the other under Msane moved to the eastern part of present-day Swaziland. A group of 
Khumalo under their chief Mzilikazi also moved away from the conflict towards the 
upper Vaal river, where they seized grain, raided for cattle and incorporated people 
from Tswana and Sotho chiefdoms on the eastern highveld (Etherington 2001). Indeed, 
by 1823, Mzilikazi’s Khumalo were increasingly known to Sotho-speaking people as 
‘Matabele’, and ‘Ndebele’ to Nguni-speaking people, which translates as marauders 
(Wright 2010). Similarly, other chiefdoms such as the Thembu, Chunu, and Ngwane 
moved out of this zone of instability at this time (Wright 1995; Eldredge 2014). To 
revive his kingdom, Zwide moved north of the Phongolo into the eastern part of 
Swaziland, which was already under his domain after he pushed away the Dlamini. 
These shifts enabled Shaka’s Zulu kingdom to expand north of the White Mfolozi, but 
most historians agree that suggestions that he ruled all the way north to Delagoa Bay 
are exaggerated, and it seems that his kingdom did not extend much further north of 
the Mkhuze river (Eldredge 2014). At this stage, Shaka still lacked the capacity to 
actively expand south as well as north, meaning his aim was to consolidate, stabilise 
and secure his borders. To meet these objectives, though, neighbouring chiefdoms 
needed to be either broken up, incorporated as clients into his own, or pushed away. 
 The dominant kingdoms between the Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean at the 
beginning of the 1820s seem to have been the Zulu under Shaka, the Ndwandwe under 
Zwide and the Gaza under Soshangane. The Ndwandwe moved again in these years, 
this time northwest to the Nkomati river, where Zwide established a large following by 
overpowering smaller chiefdoms and taking their cattle. The breakaway Gaza polity 
under Soshangane settled in the Delagoa Bay hinterland where they raided for food 
and cattle, although trade may have accounted for part of Soshangane’s decision to 
locate there, as cattle-herding is restricted by the presence of the tsetse fly (Hedges 
1978). The Gaza polity may have also raided the decentralised Tsonga-speaking 
communities north of Delagoa Bay for slaves, a process which was aided by their 
apparent weakening due to the severe drought reported by Newitt (1988) in the 1820s. 
Their proximity to growing Portuguese slaving, however, was a source of instability 
for the Gaza (Liesegang 1970). As the Ndwandwe and Zulu kingdom’s were 
strengthening to the west and south, other rival Ndwandwe breakaway groups under 
Zwangendaba, Nxaba and Msane were expanding towards central Mozambique and 
eastern Zimbabwe, where they raided Manyika, Teve and the Sofala hinterland until 
being driven out by Soshangane. Instability was also widespread on the highveld at 
this time. This has been linked to a drought that prevailed between around 1820 to 
1823, which according to Etherington (2001) interacted with new factors, such as the 
presence of armed Griqua and Kora raiders, and acted to exacerbate conflict by causing 
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‘treks of survival’ for food and grazing land (Ballard 1986). This drought was also 
picked up in the Karkloof tree-ring record from KwaZulu-Natal (Hall 1976; Vogel and 
Fuls 2001), where five consecutive, very narrow annual rings were found between 1817 
and 1823, although the dating on this specimen is questionable (Woodborne pers. 
comm.). On current evidence, it is unclear whether this drought, or the drought in the 
mid- to late-1820s reported by Newitt (1988, 1995), also affected KwaZulu-Natal. 
 In contrast to the migratory polities described above, Eldredge (2014) notes that 
the Zulu continued to use force and diplomacy to expand outward from the core of 
their territory between the Thukela and Mkhuze river. Here, Shaka ruled over an 
amalgamation of previously autonomous chiefdoms, who retained their own 
hereditary chiefs, but answered and paid tribute to their overlord. Although the 
kingdom may have constituted a “zone of relative stability” (Wright 2010, 228), 
Eldredge (2014) argues that Shaka employed arbitrary violence towards his own 
people, possibly reflecting the insecure base of his power. In addition, Shaka often 
promoted his own candidates to assume rule over subordinate chiefdoms, reflecting 
the despotic nature of his rule (Eldredge 2014). This dominance was able to be asserted 
by the control he held over the Zulu amabutho, where increased booty of cattle, the 
incorporation of people and extension of land enabled Shaka to reciprocally demand 
more tribute, grow his amabutho, and increase the military capacity of his kingdom. 
 From 1824, British traders arrived at Port Natal (Figure 1.1). Eldredge (2014) has 
shown that Shaka, who maintained close contact with the traders, became increasingly 
aware and anxious of the expansion of European power through the Cape Colony. At 
the same time, internal instability was also causing insecurities in Shaka’s hold on 
power. In 1826, renewed conflict with the Ndwandwe kingdom came to a head, and 
Shaka mounted a major offensive against the Ndwandwe under Zwide’s successor, 
Sikhunyana. Zulu forces overwhelmed the Ndwandwe army, seizing a high quantity 
of cattle, and apparently also destroying grain and killing numbers of women and 
children (Eldredge 2014). This ultimately caused the Ndwandwe kingdom to implode, 
after which the Zulu and Gaza kingdoms were the dominant polities east of the 
Drakensberg. Yet this also opened the way for new political forces, most notably the 
Ndebele kingdom on the interior highveld, and the revival of the Swazi (formerly 
Ngwane) kingdom. Shaka’s reign at this time was reaching its climax. Internal events 
such as the upheaval that followed the killing of his mother, Nandi, in 1827, created 
tension within the kingdom, and according to Eldredge (2014) were a major reason for 
his murder in 1828. Immediately prior to this, Shaka launched successive raids against 
Faku’s Mpondo chiefdom to the south, carrying off high numbers of cattle, and then to 
the chiefdoms far to the north around Delagoa Bay, which was less successful. The 
motives for these decisions are unclear, particularly as Shaka’s usual raiding territory 
was south of the Thukela (Etherington 2001), but whatever the causes, his brothers, 
Dingane and Mhlangana, turned back from this second expedition and stabbed Shaka 
to death at his then capital, Dukuza, after which Dingane assumed the leadership. 
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2.3.4 Climate and socio-political transformation in KwaZulu-Natal: key questions 
As this abridged synthesis has shown, destruction only accounts for part of the history 
of this period. Rather, numerous forces appear to have prompted polities to displace, 
fragment and subjugate others. The provision of security in the form of cattle, crops 
and land were particularly key in providing internal stability, and meant that leaders 
could effectively mobilise their amabutho for aggressive or defensive means. Polities 
that could not provide these essentials were more vulnerable to the aggression of 
others, or to other forces such as climatic stress or slave-raiding. 
 Etherington (2001, 154) raises the point that intensified raiding south of the 
Drakensberg was “more a sign of success than distress… [as] famine-stricken, weak, 
hungry and disorganised people could not have undertaken the arduous journeys over 
difficult terrain which this form of long-distance raiding required”. While there is 
perhaps some truth in this suggestion, Etherington’s argument raises a more important 
issue. This is that unlike parts of the highveld, the literature has so often been engaged 
in questioning Zulu responsibility in instability that, beyond consideration of Shaka’s 
desire to increase their wealth and grow the ranks of their amabutho, the question of 
why Zulu or Ndwandwe raids took place when and where they did has not been fully 
answered. More importantly for the aims of this thesis, little to no consideration has 
been given to the possible impacts of climate variability during the 1820s for KwaZulu-
Natal itself. This is perhaps partly because it has been asserted by some historians that 
as the core of the Zulu kingdom was relatively well-watered, drought and food 
shortages were rarely a problem except in severe droughts such as the mahlatule. A 
more significant barrier to questioning the impact of climatic stress in KwaZulu-Natal 
at this time, though, is the paucity of written observations of weather and climate from 
the area. The development of further historical climate records at this time is therefore 
crucial to assessing climate-society interaction which has been strongly linked to 
contemporary events both on the highveld, and in Mozambique and the Zambezi 
valley. In addition to raiding, this pathway may have also been relevant to the internal 
instabilities in the Zulu kingdom that intensified from around 1826, for which 
Etherington (2001) has called for other explanations to be sought other than the quirks 
of Shaka’s personality. Thus, a study of the interaction between climate variability, 
conflict and food security is overdue for the KwaZulu-Natal area. Key questions for 
this investigation consequently include: 
• How did climate vary in KwaZulu-Natal and adjacent areas in the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries? 
• Was the mahlatule famine drought-induced, and did it promote political 
centralisation amongst the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe as some have suggested? 
• How did climate variability and food security affect the internal political 
stability, institutions and ritual practices in the Zulu kingdom in the 1820s? 
• Was climate variability a significant factor in the heightened raiding across 
KwaZulu-Natal in the 1820s? 
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2.4 Connecting climate and society: a methodological framework 
The preceding review has analysed the existing climatic and non-climatic hypotheses 
for societal change in pre-colonial southeast Africa. One of the most important points 
to arise from the critique is that few studies have used the extensive range of sources 
and approaches required to consider the nature and consequences of climate variability 
in any detail, meaning that a clear understanding of the changes taking place in 
southern African society and politics at the time is restricted. This section shall position 
the investigation to answer this critique in terms of its conceptual approach, data 
sources and broad-scale methodology. In doing so, the research areas of climate 
history, historical climatology, and vulnerability are centrally located in the analysis. 
 
2.4.1 Integrative approaches to climate, history and society 
The ways through which southern African historical climate-society scholarship can 
address the difficulties analysed above have been pointed out by Hannaford et al. 
(2014), and by others in a wider global context (Pfister and Brazdil 2006; Pfister 2010; 
Endfield 2012). The challenge of providing such integrated perspectives, however, is 
underscored by the fact that no discipline, methodological approach or data source is 
alone capable of formulating detailed linkages between human and natural systems 
(Berkes and Folke 1998). Thus, a fundamental requirement involves the integration of 
approaches from the natural and social sciences. This cross-disciplinary imperative 
thereby aims to improve knowledge on both the nature of past climate variability and 
understand its interaction with society as a linked ‘socio-ecological system’ (Gallopín et 
al. 2001). As relatively interlinked frameworks, climate history, historical climatology, 
vulnerability, resilience and integrated history, to name but a few, have gained 
momentum in their ability to link palaeoclimatic, palaeoecological, historical and 
archaeological sources (Redman and Kinzig 2003; Folke 2006; Constanza et al. 2007; 
Crumley 2007; Pfister 2010; Butzer and Endfield 2012; Carey 2012). On the basis of 
these frameworks, Hannaford (2014) suggested three broad areas that can contribute to 
the study of climate-society interactions on various spatial and temporal scales in the 
southern African past, which are: 
1. Reconstructing and assessing past weather and climate variability; 
2. Investigating the vulnerability and resilience of past economies and societies to 
climate variability and extremes, and; 
3. Assessing the impacts of climate variability and their interaction with other factors. 
 These areas are outlined in their aims, sources and key research areas in Table 
2.3, with further consideration of how these can be of importance for contemporary 
climate-society research. Before discussing how climate and society can be 
conceptually connected, though, it is important to outline the first research area, which 
is relatively independent of the latter two. On this first point, it is important to consider 
the nature of the climate variability or weather event in question, according to criteria 
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such as severity, frequency and spatial range, as well as its impacts on the biosphere 
(Pfister 2010). Prior to the nineteenth century in southeast Africa, this relates almost 
entirely to proxy sources. Clearly, the production of new-high resolution proxy records 
and the development of better temporally resolved records from existing sites would 
deepen understanding in this area, yet it is mostly the interpretation of one or two 
sources with ambiguous signals that has been the subject of extended debate in the 
region. This means that an updated review of regional proxy data over this period is 
needed to establish a clearer picture of past precipitation variability. In this case, the 
incorporation of a wider range of proxy-documentary data into analyses is key, with 
particular reference to the criteria listed above. Moreover, this exercise should move 
away from blanket consideration of periods such as the MCA or LIA as wet or dry, as it 
has been shown that there is no evidence for multi-centennial periods over the last 
millennium being consistently warm-wet or cool-dry in the SRZ (Nicholson et al. 2013). 
 
TABLE 2.3 Scope of African climate history (after Hannaford 2014). 
 1. Climate Reconstruction 2. Climate-society interaction 3. Climate change impacts 
A
im
s 
To further understanding of 
late-Holocene climate 
variability. 
To deepen knowledge on long-
term socio-environmental 
interaction and vulnerability. 
To assess climate impacts 
and their contextual 
importance in African 
societal development. 
S
ou
rc
es
 
Documentary data; 
missionary reports, 
administrative records, oral 
traditions, ships’ logbooks. 
Palaeoclimate data; tree 
rings, speleothems, lake 
sediments, coral. 
Global Climate Models. 
Other; rain gauge records. 
Archaeological and written 
records, oral traditions. 
Environmental geospatial data; 
soils, minerals, vegetation, 
water resources. 
Palaeoenvironmental data; 
pollen records, animal and plant 
remains. 
Knowledge of past 
climates, environments and 
interaction with society, 
archival sources, 
environmental models, 
resilience and systems 
theory. 
K
ey
 r
es
ea
rc
h
 a
re
as
 
Past interaction 
• Reconstructions of spatial 
and temporal climate 
variability. 
• Importance of various 
mechanisms of climate 
variability to humans (for 
instance, impacts of El 
Niño Southern Oscillation 
on drought in southern 
Africa). 
• Economic, social, political and 
cultural role of climate and 
the environment. 
• Physical and socio-cultural 
factors that influenced the 
vulnerability of past societies. 
• Adaptation measures to buffer 
potential climate impacts. 
• Socio-environmental 
resilience to climate 
change.  
• Significance of climate 
change impacts among 
different groups. 
• Contextual interaction of 
impacts with other 
factors important to these 
groups. 
Past-future connections 
• How the magnitude of 
past climate variability 
compares to that 
projected in the future. 
• Important modes of 
variability in the past, 
particularly those linked 
to drought, and their 
projected changes in the 
future. 
• Long-term economic, social, 
political and cultural 
importance of climate and the 
environment to various 
groups. 
• Changing causes, mechanisms 
and timescales of 
vulnerability. 
• Successful and problematic 
adaptations to climate change. 
• Human significance of 
climate over the long-
term and its changes. 
• Causes of changing socio-
environmental resilience. 
• Projected climate change 
impacts on historical land 
and resource divisions. 
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 From the nineteenth century onwards, a number of inter-annual documentary 
rainfall reconstructions are now available from different parts of the region. These 
chronologies consist of semi-quantitative ‘wetness indices’ produced from letters, 
journals and reports written by missionaries and colonial authorities, as well as 
newspapers, diaries and travelogues (Vogel 1989; Kelso and Vogel 2007; Nash and 
Endfield 2008; Nash and Grab 2010). A further data source for the nineteenth century is 
the Africa-wide precipitation database from 1801–1900 (Nicholson et al. 2012), which 
also consists of wetness indices for 90 regions across Africa, although the inter-annual 
values for each area were often classified secondary sources as opposed to the 
aforementioned chronologies. One other contemporaneous source that can add to these 
are the wind and weather observations held within the ships’ logbooks of the 
Climatological Database of the World’s Oceans (CLIWOC) (Garcia-Herrera et al. 
(2005a) and the English East India Company (EEIC) digitised dataset (Brohan et al. 
2012), which extend back to the late-eighteenth century. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, 
the wind field in the southwest Indian Ocean is a key modulating factor in SRZ 
precipitation, whereby strengthened easterly flow generally implies increased 
precipitation. Thus, the fact that these logbook data surround southern Africa due to 
the ships’ routes to the Far East means that they provide a source to reconstruct 
precipitation (Hannaford et al. 2014). 
 As previously stated, however, it is not enough to base climate impact-analysis 
on physical factors alone. According to Christian Pfister, the question as to “which 
sequences of climatic situations mattered depends upon the impacted unit and the 
environmental, cultural and historical context” (Pfister 2010, 28). Translating this into 
data availability, inter-annual records are clearly desirable, yet few are available before 
the nineteenth century. Although this means that a lower-resolution picture of human–
climate interaction is achievable, it is possible to examine the mediating context in 
which climate interacted by illuminating concepts such as the vulnerability and 
resilience of societies and economies to climate and weather events. 
 
2.4.2 Vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity 
The concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and adaptive capacity are critical to assessing 
long-term risk and the magnitude of present weather and climate impacts, though are 
often overlooked when considering the past (Pfister and Brazdil 2006; Leroy 2006; 
Tainter 2006; McNeill 2008; Carey 2012). One body of literature, climate history, has 
taken up the task of applying these frameworks to the past, and a growing number of 
studies are beginning to illustrate how climate formed part of a dynamic interplay with 
a number of human and environmental factors in past events or change. This moves 
approach away from both the climatic determinism of the twentieth century and the 
‘collapse’-oriented scholarship of recent decades, and, by placing human agency at the 
heart of its approach, offers a more nuanced way of understanding climate-society 
interactions (Ogilvie 2010; Carey 2012). 
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 Many of these studies use the socio-ecological system as their underlying 
concept. This coupled system theorises that societal and biophysical subsystems 
operate in mutual interaction, and are exposed to multiple, interacting perturbations 
(van der Leeuw 2001). In order to understand the impacts of stressors on these systems, 
they are evaluated in terms of their vulnerability, or the susceptibility to harm (Adger 
2006), and resilience, or the ability of a system to achieve a desirable state in the face of 
change (Folke 2006). Vulnerability and resilience are not simple opposites but are 
complementary framings (Turner II 2010). Vulnerability seeks to understand the 
weakest parts of the system to disturbances, while resilience examines the 
characteristics of the system that make it more robust to perturbations. Moreover, 
adaptive capacity is a concept that links these traditions, and examines the ability of an 
individual, community or system to prepare for stress in advance or to adjust to the 
effects caused by the stresses (Engle 2011). 
 
2.4.2.1 Vulnerability 
Although vulnerability is conceptualised in different ways for different purposes, it 
generally has three key parameters, which are exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive 
capacity (Adger 2006). Exposure relates to the nature and extent to which a system 
experiences stresses, whether environmental or socio-political. Sensitivity involves the 
likelihood of a system to be changed or affected by perturbations, and adaptive 
capacity is the ability of a system to cope or change to manage environmental hazards 
or socio-political change, as well its ability to expand the range of variability with 
which it can cope (Adger 2006). As well as environmental exposure, then, the 
vulnerability of livelihoods occurs when individuals or communities have insufficient 
entitlements, or ‘capital’, or where there is a breakdown in social relations or 
institutional participation (Bohle et al. 1994; Adamson 2014). Adger (2006) notes that 
contemporary experiences of vulnerability are felt or perceived as ‘insecurity’. This can 
both relate to a lack of food or livelihood security and persistent strife and conflict. 
Vulnerability is manifest at several scales, and has multi-level interactions between its 
components, including livelihoods and social structures, that determine the 
vulnerability of the socio-ecological system as a whole (Turner II et al. 2003). Other 
vulnerability-related terms that will be used in the later chapters are ‘fragility’ and 
‘robustness’, and are used here to refer to the degree of vulnerability at the systems 
level. Individual vulnerabilities may occur within a robust system, although they may 
also undermine it and contribute to systemic fragility (Adamson 2014). A number of 
scholars have noted that vulnerability is not a desirable state, and is generally seen as a 
negative property (for instance Engle 2011). Although it will be used extensively in the 
later analysis chapters, this will not reinforce simply negative perspectives, as ‘low 
vulnerability’ is clearly a positive characteristic. 
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2.4.2.2 Resilience 
Resilience, which will be used less regularly in this thesis, has its origins in the 
ecological sciences (Holling 1973; Engle 2011). Unlike vulnerability, resilience is an 
entirely internal property of a system and relates more to shifts between states in 
systems rather than structural changes within the system (Adamson 2014). Thus, it is 
not simply its opposite. This means that resilience includes concepts such as the 
magnitude of environmental or socio-political disturbance that a system can absorb 
before it changes to a radically different state, as well as the capacity for self-
organisation both in advance and in response to shocks (Adger 2006). A frequent 
criticism of resilience, however, is that it remains less attentive to the social aspects of 
socio-ecological systems (Engle 2011). Moreover, as it is hard to measure, translating 
resilience into practice is fraught with difficulty. Like vulnerability, resilience can 
operate at multiple levels and scales, while loss of resilience at some scales can increase 
it at others (Walker et al. 2004). Resilience also relates to the opportunities that 
disturbance can create in terms of system renewal and the emergence of new 
trajectories (Smit and Wandel 2006). 
 
2.4.2.3 Adaptive capacity 
Adaptive capacity is most often seen as a bridging concept between vulnerability and 
resilience, and is highly influenced by socio-political factors such as social networks, 
governance and institutions (Engle 2011). Adaptive capacity is made up of diverse 
components which can alter the exposure to risks stemming from climate variability, 
absorb or recover the losses resulting from its impacts, and exploit new opportunities 
that arise in the process (Adger and Vincent 2005). The term adaptive capacity 
specifically relates to the potential for adaptation to take place, for instance by the 
strength of social networks, and thus strictly conveys the resources available for 
adaptation. Yet even if this exists, it is not always the case that individuals and 
communities use it effectively to adapt to climate variability. This process of adaptation 
itself can operate on numerous spatial scales and through various social agents, 
whether by individuals or the upper levels of the political unit, though these are often 
not independent of each other. According to Adger and Vincent (2005), however, 
adaptations on all levels are usually reactionary rather than anticipatory. An important 
difference also exists between adaptive capacity and coping strategies, which may 
involve a temporary change in food source or bartering for food as opposed to more 
formalised relief structures. 
 
2.4.2.4 Vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity in southeast Africa (c. AD 1500-1830) 
The concepts outlined above will be centrally located in examining the consequences of 
past climate variability in southeast Africa. To infer more detailed links between 
climate and society, though, written source material is needed. Prior to this, 
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conceptualising vulnerability and others elements is more difficult, and to make any 
sort of statements on the impact of past climate variability, comprehensive analytical 
models such as that in Figure 2.19 (b) are helpful (Hannaford et al. 2014). This by no 
means advocates a rigid, universally applicable model for a given territory or society, 
but is aimed at demonstrating how complex climate-society relationships can at least 
be conceptualised. For instance, the representation of this in Figure 2.19 presents two 
such models of contrasting detail in relation to the decline of Mapungubwe. Panel (a) 
shows a simple ecological cause-effect collapse model based on palaeoclimatic data 
and corroboration from the archaeological record. Here, both the limited consideration 
of factors and the timeframe of this model result in a pathway more indicative of 
environmental collapse. By contrast, (b) demonstrates the interactions between the 
critical components that require consideration when examining climate variability and 
the decline of the Mapungubwe state. In this more complex framework, the existing 
work on the region fits into different parts of the model. For example, the 
environmental setting of the state, the biophysical impacts of climate change on local 
vegetation, socio-cultural perception of drought, and human interaction with the 
environment in the form of subsistence and livelihoods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.19 Simple and complex socio-environmental conceptual models relating to the 
decline of the Mapungubwe state (modified after Butzer 2012). 
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 In contrast to the broader conceptual modelling approach outlined above, the 
availability of written sources allows the aforementioned frameworks to be utilised 
more extensively to uncover the various factors that affected human-climate dynamics. 
By illuminating vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity, differences in the 
impacts of and responses to climate variability can be evaluated both within 
communities and across the landscape. Moreover, differences in cultural factors, 
including rainmaking and ritual practices, can be integrated into these areas as 
suggested by Carey (2012). 
 In the southeast African case, a major task remains to document the differential 
and changing livelihood, socio-political and cultural relationships that existed with the 
landscape, which can offer insight into vulnerability and resilience that goes beyond 
previous consideration of ‘favourable’ environments. Of particular importance here are 
links between the environment and the economic base of the society in question, 
specifically food systems. This is imperative both as subsistence food production is 
widely recognised as the most important livelihood activity to the greater number of 
the pre-colonial population, and because food-related livelihoods are ‘climate-
sensitive’ (Barnett and Adger 2007). A promising approach built on these factors is 
demonstrated by Ekblom (2012) in considering historical vulnerability and resilience in 
Chibuene, Mozambique. Here, written, palaeoecological and archaeological evidence 
for changing livelihoods, resource utilisation and economic security were examined in 
order to illustrate vulnerability and resilience over multi-centennial periods. Manyanga 
(2007) has applied a similar approach to the Shashe-Limpopo basin, where by focusing 
on resource exploitation in the range of micro-environments in the Mapungubwe state, 
new perspectives are offered regarding the subsistence options and economic base of 
the state beyond floodplain cultivation (Manyanga 2007). Such an approach could be 
fruitfully applied to political units and communities such as the Mutapa state, Manyika 
kingdom and Tonga populations living in the Portuguese jurisdiction, where 
underutilised written sources supplement archaeological and environmental data. 
 Furthermore, adaptive capacity and coping strategies have received little 
attention in southeast Africa, where practices such as food storage and distribution 
could have buffered or displaced external impacts in order to avert food scarcity, 
famine or social distress. Examining how society adapted to externally imposed change 
from written and oral sources may therefore yield further clues regarding the internal 
workings of society which affect resilience, notably human resourcefulness, the rigidity 
of social and political networks and adaptation strategies (Hannaford et al. 2014). 
Further elucidation in this area may also help to understand potential preparedness 
and response to environmental risk in periods prior to the availability of written 
sources, for instance in the decline of Great Zimbabwe. However, these factors changed 
over time through both external and internal reasons, such as colonial influence, 
warfare and changing political dynamics, and these shifting parameters, though 
difficult to assess, must be taken into account where possible. 
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 Although only some areas have been suggested here, consideration of 
vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity in coupled socio-ecological systems may 
provide a more rewarding approach than a focus on abrupt events of change or 
‘collapse’. This follows the observations of James McCann, who suggested that in 
Africa the “real value of linking the environment to historical process may lie in a more 
subtle, nuanced view of how environmental conditions set a context for social and 
historical interaction” (McCann 1999, 268). Source material and its temporal resolution 
in the Zambezi-Limpopo region necessitates a focus on changes over longer-term, sub-
decadal to decadal periods, while inter-annual consideration of climate-society 
interaction can only be achieved after the first detailed written accounts were recorded 
in 1824 in the KwaZulu-Natal area. Nevertheless, applying this approach over a c. 325 
year period in the former region will allow original conclusions to be drawn on the 
relative and shifting importance of the factors that made some societies vulnerable to 
climate variability and others more resilient. This is a question of prime importance if 
the consequences of climate variability are to be understood. 
 The following four chapters will investigate the nature and consequences of 
past climate variability in the two focus areas. Chapter 3 will analyse a wide range of 
palaeoclimate datasets and documentary reconstructions to assess the dominant 
signals of precipitation variability in southeast Africa over the last 1200 years, and test 
for the presence of extended periods of warm-wet and cool-dry conditions in periods 
such as the MCA and LIA. This will provide background to the analysis of societal 
dynamics in the Zambezi-Limpopo region in particular. Chapter 4 will reconstruct late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century precipitation variability in South Africa using 
ships’ logbooks. These reconstructions will provide seasonal reconstructions at points 
in both the SRZ and WRZ, and will be used alongside other sources in analysis of 
climate-society interactions in the KwaZulu-Natal area. Chapter 5 will use written 
sources to examine the vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity of political units, 
such as the Mutapa state, and less centralised communities, such as those in the 
hinterlands of Portuguese settlements. This will allow assessment of the significance of 
climate variability in socio-political change. Chapter 6 will analyse the role of climate 
variability in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century socio-political and 
economic transformation using written and oral sources relating to KwaZulu-Natal. 
The overall significance of climate variability in pre-colonial southeast Africa will then 
be discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 3. Precipitation variability over the last millennium 
High-resolution, high-quality palaeoclimate records are required to understand spatial 
climate patterns and forcing processes on timescales of relevance for human societies 
(Jones et al. 2009; Holmgren et al. 2012; Masson-Delmotte 2013). Most high-resolution 
palaeoclimate records come from the polar regions or from the middle to high latitudes 
in the northern hemisphere, and although the number of data are growing, there 
remains a comparative paucity of records from the southern hemisphere low latitudes, 
particularly southern Africa (Figure 3.1). Indeed, a considerable proportion of the 
debate over the human significance of past climate variability in this region directly 
stems from the differing interpretations of, and ambiguities between, the few regional 
palaeoclimate proxy records that exist (Hannaford et al. 2014). As outlined in the 
previous section, this demands both the re-interrogation of palaeoclimate sources from 
across the region, as well as the incorporation of datasets published more recently, 
which are yet to be considered with respect to societal change. This chapter therefore 
takes the form of an analytical review, designed to address a range of questions raised, 
often indirectly, in the literature. Such an undertaking is overdue, the last text 
dedicated to this task over a millennial scale being in 1992 (Tyson and Lindesay 1992). 
 This investigation will consider a comprehensive range of palaeoclimate proxy 
sources over the last millennium from the SRZ, where the societies under examination 
developed. As precipitation was of principal importance to pre-colonial farming 
communities, the analysis will focus on this variable rather than temperature. Because 
these variables are often difficult to differentiate, however, this study will first examine 
the palaeoclimatic inferences of the available proxies, before considering the general 
evolution of precipitation variability over the last millennium. The incorporation and 
analysis of a broader range of datasets follows the work of Neukom et al. (2014), where 
proxy-documentary records over last 200 years in southern Africa were statistically 
integrated to produce multi-proxy reconstructions. Although this analysis will broadly 
follow this approach, there is less scope for the statistical integration of records into a 
millennial multi-proxy reconstruction due to their reduced resolution and quantity 
prior to the nineteenth century. The chapter will also evaluate the precipitation 
manifestations of the variably dated MCA and LIA in the southern African SRZ by 
applying methods used elsewhere (Osborn and Briffa 2006) to gain insight into their 
temporal dynamics. Documentary-reconstructed nineteenth century rainfall variability 
will be introduced here, but this will mostly be assessed in the next chapter to facilitate 
inter-annual comparison with the ships’ logbook reconstructions. Furthermore, sparse 
written records of climate variability from the sixteenth to nineteenth century will be 
presented in order to facilitate independent comparison with the proxy records. To 
conclude, the chapter will summarise these findings on a regional level, and will 
consider sub-regional precipitation variability to inform the later chapters which assess 
the societal significance of climate variability. This means lending focus to criteria such 
as the spatial range of variability, rather than simply accepting the data on face-value. 
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3.1 Data and methods 
3.1.1 Proxy-documentary sources 
Southern Africa is relatively sparsely covered by palaeoclimate data, yet there are now 
several datasets from the region which represent changes in precipitation and/or 
temperature (Figures 3.1 and 3.2; Table 3.1). Unlike most other regions, however, no 
dominant data source exists, meaning a diverse range of proxies of varying resolution 
must be incorporated into any comprehensive analysis of its past climate. As the aim of 
this investigation is to inform past climate-society interaction, only records with an 
adequate resolution will be analysed, which is here defined as multi-decadal or higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1 Spatial distribution of palaeoclimate proxy and documentary data obtained for the 
southern African region. The shading indicates approximate extent of Portuguese documentary 
sources. Reference datasets are shown as hollow dots. Labelled datasets are used extensively. 
 
3.1.1.1 Dendrochronological records 
Tree-ring studies are frequently the main source of high-resolution palaeoprecipitation 
indicators in regional investigations, though are relatively few in number in southern 
Africa. Three records are available from the SRZ, located in KwaZulu-Natal, the 
Limpopo Valley and northern Zimbabwe (Figure 3.1). The KwaZulu-Natal record is 
taken from a single Yellowwood (Podocarpus falcatus) tree that was felled in 1916 in the 
Karkloof forest. Subsequent analyses of the tree-ring growth pattern by Hall (1976) 
produced a ring-width curve dating back to AD 1320, the fluctuations of which were 
interpreted as representing past precipitation variability. While this investigation has 
been widely cited, the only data currently available are 7-year running mean ring-
widths taken from the original published set in Hall (1976). Moreover, this record is 
based on a single tree, which differs from the higher sample size typically used in 
dendrochronological reconstructions (Jones and Mann 2004). Hall, however, argued 
that its location on a hill-slope in a mild environment meant that annual precipitation 
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was the limiting factor for growth, and thus the ring-widths reflected past precipitation 
conditions. Further north, a 200-year chronology is available based on several samples 
from Pterocarpus angolensis trees in Mashonaland, northern Zimbabwe (Therrell et al. 
2006). This record is made up of samples from three trees, and is significantly 
correlated with twentieth century summer rainfall in this ITCZ-sensitive region 
(Therrell et al. 2006). More recently, unpublished carbon isotope ratios of Baobab 
(Adonsonia digitata) tree-rings from the Limpopo region in northern South Africa have 
been made available for analysis (Woodborne, unpublished manuscript). This sample 
is made-up of carbon isotope ratios from six Baobab trees that grew over the last 
thousand years, and represents the longest tree-ring record in the region. 
 
TABLE 3.1. Metadata of southern African SRZ proxy-documentary records. Resolution: ann. – 
annual, dec. – decadal, and cen. – centennial. 
Site Lat, Lon Start Res. Proxy Reference 
Tree       
Karkloof -29.3, 30.2 1142 7-yr. Ring-width Vogel et al. (2001) 
Mashonaland -18.5, 27 1796 Ann. Ring-width Therrell et al. (2006) 
Limpopo Several 
trees 
1036 Ann. Ring-width Woodborne et al. 
(unpublished manuscript) 
Speleothem       
Cold Air Cave T7 -24.1, 29.1 6k BP Ann. Isotope Holmgren et al. (1999) 
Cold Air Cave T7 -24.1, 29.1 6k BP Ann. Grey scale Holmgren et al. (1999) 
Cold Air Cave T7 -24.1, 29.1 1650 Ann. Isotope Sundqvist et al. (2013) 
Cold Air Cave T8 -24.1, 29.1 25k BP Dec. Isotope Holmgren et al. (2003) 
Cango Cave -33.6, 22.2 30k BP ~50 Isotope Talma and Vogel (1992) 
Dante Cave -19.4, 17.8 5k BP Dec. Isotope Sletten et al. (2013) 
Lake       
Sibaya -27.3, 32.6 800 Dec. Diatom Stager et al. (2013) 
Nhauhache -21.6, 35.2 2300 BP Dec. Diatom Holmgren et al. (2012) 
Nhaucati -22, 35.3 400 Dec. Diatom Ekblom and Stabell (2008) 
Documentary       
Lesotho - 1824 Ann. Missionary Nash and Grab (2010) 
Kalahari - 1815 Ann. Missionary Nash and Endfield (2008) 
Namaqualand - 1817 Ann. Missionary Kelso and Vogel (2007) 
Eastern Cape - 1821 Ann. Colonial Vogel (1989) 
Africa-wide 90 regions 1800 Ann. Multiple Nicholson et al. (2012) 
Other       
Multi-proxy SRZ - 1796 Ann. Multiple Neukom et al. (2014) 
Wonderkrater -24.4, 28.8 25k BP Cen. Pollen Scott (1982) 
Kuiseb River -23.4, 15.3 2.1k BP Cen. Midden Scott (1996) 
Spitzkoppe -21.8, 15.2 12k BP ~30 Midden Chase et al. (2009) 
 
3.1.1.2 Cave speleothems 
Cave speleothems, particularly stalagmites, constitute one of the few other natural 
archives in low or mid-latitude regions that offer the potential for a continuous climate 
record spanning a long period of time (Talma and Vogel 1992; Holmgren et al. 2001). 
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The interpretation of climatic variables from these data, however, is difficult. There is 
inherent complexity in understanding and determining climatic influences on stable 
isotope records in stalagmites, as multiple processes at different spatial and temporal 
scales affect their composition (Sundqvist et al. 2013). In southeast Africa, these data 
have provoked considerable discussion on both the nature and consequences of past 
climate variability, particularly the records of stable isotope (δ18O and δ13C) growth 
layers in two dated stalagmites (T7 and T8) from Cold Air Cave, Makapansgat Valley, 
30 km southwest of Polokwane in northern South Africa (Figure 3.1). 
 Records of δ18O from the T7 and T8 stalagmites were initially interpreted as 
representing more humid conditions, determined by cave temperature (reflective of 
annual temperatures outside), and the composition of the meteoric water from which it 
precipitated. δ18O composition in stalagmites has also been linked to moisture source, 
transport distance, amount of precipitation, and regional air temperatures, making its 
precise palaeoclimate signal highly difficult to determine (Stager et al. 2013). Stalagmite 
δ13C is related to the plants from which the CO2 in the soil is derived (Holmgren et al. 
1999). In most semi-arid parts of the southern African SRZ, barring high-altitude 
mountains, C4 grasses dominate (Vogel et al. 1978). More enriched δ13C values are 
therefore associated with a greater abundance of C4 grasses in vegetation, and thus 
warmer and wetter summer conditions. Diminished grass cover is more reflective of 
woody C3 vegetation, such as trees and shrubs, and thus of drier conditions (Holmgren 
et al. 1999; Lee-Thorp et al. 2001). Consequently, δ13C is often directly linked with past 
precipitation, as this is a prime determinant in the relative abundance of C4-C3 
vegetation. Still, enriched δ13C can also reflect seasonality, seepage rates, soil water 
degassing, grazing, and light regimes (Scott and Lee-Thorp 2004; Wang et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the hydrological significance of changes in the relative abundance of 
vegetation types is not clear, as human activity also influenced SRZ vegetation during 
the late Holocene (Neumann et al. 2008). 
 An additional indicator from the Cold Air Cave T7 stalagmite is the grey scale 
colour branding of growth layers. These annual colour variations represent changes in 
the concentration of humic matter in the drip water feeding the stalagmite (Tyson et al. 
2000). Darker branding is suggested to reflect increased temperatures and mobilisation 
of organic matter from the soil, associated with wetter summers and enhanced grass 
cover above the cave. By contrast, less colour branding is associated with drier periods 
and sparse grass (Stager et al. 2013). Holmgren et al. (2003) tested these assumptions, 
and found significant correlations with both area-averaged annual temperature (r = 
0.78, p <0.01) and rainfall anomalies (r = 0.69, p <0.01). Therefore, while Stager et al. 
(2013) state that this series provides clear indications of palaeoprecipitation, as it is less 
likely to represent a wide range of ecological factors, earlier analysis indicates strong 
relationships to temperature as well. These complexities relating to interpretation mean 
that it is difficult to tie stable isotope records to single climatic variables, despite these 
being among the longest, most reliably dated and most finely resolved proxies from 
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the SRZ. In addition, a subset of last 350 years of the T7 δ18O dataset was re-analysed 
by Sundqvist et al. (2013) using high-resolution sampling of stable isotopes and an 
improved age model. These data will also be considered in the analysis here. 
 Two other speleothem records exist in southern Africa. The first of these is 
taken from the Cango Caves, located in the transitional year-round rainfall zone in the 
south of South Africa (Talma and Vogel 1992). This speleothem record is the region’s 
oldest, and its stable isotope series has been used to infer both past temperature and 
precipitation. This record has been found to show limited correspondence with other 
SRZ records (Tyson et al. 2000), which is thought to be because of its location in the all-
seasons rainfall region, an area that is influenced by atmospheric circulation and 
weather processes affecting both rainfall regions. Consequently, the site is sensitive to 
even small shifts in the position of the boundary between the two zones (Tyson and 
Lindesay 1992). This means that at different times, variable or inverse relationships are 
found between the Cango Caves speleothem record and other SRZ records. No raw 
data are available for the Cango Cave speleothem, and it will be used as a reference 
dataset. A further speleothem record has been recently developed from the Dante 
Caves in Namibia (Sletten et al. 2013). This record spans the last 4600 years, and in 
addition to oxygen and carbon stable isotope records, it provides data on the relative 
proportions of aragonite and calcite in layers, which are apparently sensitive to 
changes between wetter and drier conditions (Sletten et al. 2013). Excluding the T7 
stalagmite, each of these records have a variable resolution of between 1-50 years. 
 
3.1.1.3 Lake sediments 
Data from lake sediments represent the other main source of palaeoclimate data in the 
southern African region. SRZ sediment records are taken from three lakes that are 
hydrologically ‘closed’, where there are no overland inlets or outlets. This means that 
inputs to their water budgets are entirely dependent on precipitation, which as a result 
of their location is mostly ITCZ-sensitive. The most recent of these lake records is a 
diatom record from Lake Sibaya (Stager et al. 2013), located in Maputaland, northern 
KwaZulu-Natal. This record represents hydrological fluctuations over the last 1800 
years with a variable sampling resolution of between 1-22 years, although these dates 
are at more consistent intervals than the Dante Cave speleothem. Two other lakes, 
Nhauhache (Holmgren et al. 2012) and Nhaucati (Ekblom and Stabell 2008), are located 
within 10 km of one another near the town of Vilanculos in coastal Mozambique. 
According to Holmgren et al. (2012), these dune lakes respond quickly to climate 
fluctuations, and may be more suitable for palaeoclimate inference than interior lake 
basins, as the hydrology of inland lakes may be complex and influenced by larger 
regional or local aquifers. Nonetheless, uncertainty from zones of rapid and/or 
discontinuous sedimentation is a factor in these cores (Ekblom and Stabell 2008). Raw 
data for these two lakes are unavailable, therefore their moisture inferences will be 
assessed qualitatively (Figure 3.2). 
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FIGURE 3.2. Summer Rainfall Zone proxies AD 800-2000. 
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3.1.1.4 Documentary reconstructions 
As well as natural proxy archives, a number of semi-quantitative documentary 
reconstructions of nineteenth century precipitation variability exist in different parts of 
the region. SRZ rainy season reconstructions are available for Lesotho (Nash and Grab 
2010), the Kalahari (Nash and Endfield 2008) and the Eastern Cape (Vogel 1989), and 
were produced from letters, journals and reports written by missionaries and colonial 
authorities, as well as newspapers, diaries and travelogues. Observations in each of the 
reconstructions were classified into five categories on a -2 to +2 scale, equating to very 
dry, relatively dry, normal, relatively wet, and very wet, dependent on the prevalent 
documented climatic conditions in each rainy season. A further annual nineteenth 
century semi-quantitative ‘wetness index’ was developed by Nicholson et al. (2012), 
covering 90 regions across the African continent. This index incorporates rainfall 
station records, documentary data (often secondary), and other natural proxies, which 
were analysed and combined to give a ‘wetness’ score on a seven-class scale of -3 to +3 
for each geographical region. Each region was determined on the basis of homogenous 
spatial patterns of inter-annual twentieth century rainfall variability. This record also 
relies on statistical inference for regions and periods with insufficient data based upon 
‘equivalent regions’ in the instrumental record. 
 
3.1.1.5 Other proxies 
Among the other sources of palaeoclimate data are the SRZ multi-proxy reconstruction 
for the last two centuries (Neukom et al. 2014). These records were statistically 
produced using ensemble-based principal component regression. The data used from 
across the SRZ include each of the documentary datasets (Vogel 1989; Kelso and Vogel 
2007; Nash and Endfield 2008; Nash and Grab 2010), the Pterocarpus angolensis tree-
rings from northern Zimbabwe (Therrell et al. 2006), the Ifaty Reef coral record (Zinke 
et al. 2004), and rainfall station datasets from across the region. Datasets used solely for 
reference include nitrogen isotope ratios from bone assemblages excavated at 
archaeological sites in the Limpopo Valley from AD 800 to 1800 (Smith 2005; Smith et 
al. 2007), and fossilised rock hyrax (Procavia capensis) middens from the margins of the 
Namib Desert, which offer stable carbon and nitrogen isotope records spanning the last 
12,000 years. These latter records have been developed at two sites: the first in the 
Kuiseb River Basin (Scott 1996), and the latter in the Spitzkoppe range (Chase et al. 
2009) (Figure 3.1), but will not be used at the forefront of the investigation into SRZ 
climate variability, as they are both near the SRZ-WRZ boundary and are located in a 
considerably drier part of Namibia than the Dante Cave speleothem records. Other 
natural proxies, such as pollen records from Wonderkrater (Scott 1982), Tate Vondo 
(Scott 1987) and Wonderwerk (Brook et al. 2010) are too low resolution, or are affected 
by late-Holocene human influence, and are not used at the front of the analysis. Coral 
records of SST variability (Zinke et al. 2004) will also not be used in this analysis, as the 
scope of the thesis rules out any thorough consideration of climate modes. 
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3.1.2 Supplementary written sources 
Sixteenth to nineteenth century European documents are available to supplement 
proxy-documentary records in the SRZ. These predominantly Portuguese records 
centre on the area of present-day Zimbabwe and Mozambique, with a particular 
focus along the coastal areas and Zambezi river (Figure 3.1). The sources are held 
within translated source compilations in the British Library (Theal 1898-1903; da 
Silva Rego and Baxter 1962-1975; Freeman-Grenville 1962), and the Department of 
History at the University of Zimbabwe (Beach and Noronha 1980), the former of 
which have been assessed for possible climate-related evidence by Ekblom (2004). 
Full details on these written source volumes are outlined in Chapter 5, Section 5.1. 
 Portuguese observers’ descriptions of the environment mostly relate to 
atmospheric factors, including rainfall, floods, dry and wet spells, storms, frost, 
snowfalls, climate-related events such as the presence of plague locusts, and 
frequent references to food scarcity and famines. It should be noted, however, that 
the data from the Portuguese documents are comparatively sporadic and scanty 
when compared to those used for the nineteenth century reconstructions in the 
region. Indeed, while northern Zimbabwe and the lower Zambezi were in contact 
with the Portuguese from the beginning of the sixteenth century, there is little 
meteorological information in contrast to references to economic aspects such as 
gold resources and ivory, the exploitation of which reflected the primary purpose 
of the Portuguese presence in the region (Beach 1980, 1994; Pikirayi 2003). 
 
3.1.3 Analysing regional precipitation variability 
The overriding aim of this analysis is to use the full and best available range of 
regional data to understand the evolution of SRZ precipitation variability over the 
last millennium. While assessment of southern Africa’s precipitation history is 
challenging, the comparison of state-of-the-art, high-resolution records means that 
dependence on individual records with inherent ambiguity is reduced. 
Nevertheless, a number of quantitative and qualitative methods must be applied to 
adequately assess the moisture inferences of complex palaeoclimate records. 
 
3.1.3.1 Comparison of proxy-documentary data 
To establish the general coherence between the records shown in Table 3.1, inter-
annual correlations will be conducted where possible. Where records are not of 
annual resolution, however, the inter-annual record will be degraded to match that 
of the lower-resolution proxy to facilitate statistical comparison. This means that 
inter-annual records can be correlated with non-inter-annual proxies, but non-
annually resolved proxies with varying sampling resolutions cannot be compared 
with each other. While degrading the inter-annual records to match the resolution of 
unevenly dated proxies may not be a precise measure of their correspondence, the 
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resultant r values give an idea of the general coherence between these records. 
Furthermore, inter-annual records will be smoothed to 30-year running means and 
correlated to determine the level of agreement with lower frequency variability. As 
the period common to the longest, highest-resolution proxies is 1036-1890, 
correlations will be calculated over this period. 
 The main line of investigation in this chapter concerns the general evolution 
of precipitation variability over the last millennium. As the relative lack of high-
resolution data rules out an integrated SRZ multi-proxy reconstruction, periods of 
coherence and reduced correspondence will primarily be qualitatively explored to 
reveal the dominant precipitation signals and periods of uncertainty. This will also 
show whether precipitation changes were coherent on a large spatial scale, or 
whether local variability was more prevalent at certain locations or time periods. 
This approach follows those of Tyson and Lindesay (1992); Holmgren et al. (1999); 
Tyson et al. (2000, 2002); Nicholson et al. (2013) and Stager et al. (2013), also in 
southern African contexts. Further statistical analysis, such as t-tests, will be 
conducted on individual inter-annual records to reveal if significant differences exist 
between centennial periods. The magnitude of centennial wet and dry conditions will 
also be revealed by examining the number of years ±1 standard deviation from the 
common mean of the period 1036-1890, while 30-year running standard deviations will 
be performed to analyse periods of high and low variability within and between the 
annual records. 
 The chapter will also examine evidence for, and analyse the temporal 
characteristics and magnitude of, the regional precipitation manifestations of the MCA 
and LIA, broadly defined in the literature as AD 900-1200 for the MCA, and either AD 
1300-1800 or AD 1500-1800 for the LIA. This is an important proposition to test, as the 
global extent of these eras are highly debated, while the variability within these 
periods is not fully understood (Nicholson et al. 2013). Although visual comparison of 
proxies is helpful in understanding periods of coherence between records, the 
implications of periods such as the MCA and LIA cannot be adequately compared by 
this technique alone. To enable a clearer, regional representation of the temporal 
characteristics and magnitude of the MCA and LIA, this study will analyse the signals 
of multiple proxies by assessing their temporal characteristics in relation to certain 
statistical thresholds, in part following the approach of Osborn and Briffa (2006). This 
first requires inter-annual proxies to be smoothed to remove variations on timescales 
shorter than 20 years, and then normalised to have zero mean and standard deviation. 
Thereafter, the dominant moisture inferences of the proxy records are analysed by 
plotting the proportion of records where data in any given year exceed ±1 or ±2 
standard deviations from the common period mean of 1036-1890, as well as the 
number of years above or below this mean itself. The proportion of records exceeding 
these thresholds over the 1200-year period will then enable consideration of the 
temporal extent and magnitude of the MCA and LIA to be considered. A major 
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restriction of this analysis, however, is that only four of the proxy records that extend 
back to AD 800 are inter-annual. For the purposes of incorporating the higher number 
of non-annually resolved proxies into this general assessment, and to understand their 
dominant signals for societal consideration, a modified variant of this method will also 
be applied insofar as the dates of the non-annually resolved proxies will here be 
assumed to be ‘mid-points’. This means that if the dated sample value is above the 
1036-1890 mean, an equal number of years either side of this date are also assumed to 
be above the mean, and it is thus plotted accordingly.  While there are uncertainties in 
these assumptions, there is no other method to integrate the high number of non-
annually resolved SRZ data into the analysis, and consequently their incorporation for 
consideration of society is favoured over their exclusion. Therefore, the results of this 
analysis for inter-annual records alone will be compared to the same assessment which 
incorporates the non-annually resolved proxies. 
 Nineteenth century climate variability will be introduced and compared in 
this chapter, congruent with the debates over the significance of rainfall variability 
in political centralisation and conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. To date, only sparse 
written reference to climatic conditions and the Karkloof tree-ring record have been 
considered in this debate. This chapter will introduce the range of natural, and 
particularly documentary data sources published since the last major analysis of 
climate-society interactions in this period (Eldredge 1992). Furthermore, the Africa-
wide precipitation database of Nicholson et al. (2012) will be compared to a range 
of proxy-documentary datasets to assess their coherence. This comparison will 
particularly focus on the first two decades of the nineteenth century, as they are not 
covered by most of the other documentary records. This introductory analysis will 
thereby allow identification of key knowledge gaps for Chapter 4, where early-
nineteenth century rainfall reconstructions are derived from ships’ logbook data. 
 
3.1.3.2 Independent comparison from written sources 
The main source of independent comparison for the palaeoclimate proxy data will 
be written observations of weather- and climate-related variables, or climatic stress, 
from the Zambezi-Limpopo area (Figure 3.1). Although relatively sparse, these 
documents represent a rare instance of written observations in the Sub-Saharan 
African interior prior to the nineteenth century, and thus provide a unique source 
of cross-comparison over a multi-centennial timescale. Initial consideration of these 
documents for weather- and climate-related variables was undertaken by Pikirayi 
(2003) and Ekblom (2004). These conclusions are re-assessed here, while this 
chapter will investigate the full range of translated documents available, making it 
the most comprehensive analysis of these sources for climatological investigation. 
 Additional documented observations will be added to the chronology of 
possible weather events and climatological observations compiled by Ekblom 
(2004) and Ekblom and Stabell (2008) between AD 1500-1900, while the suggested 
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representations of climatic stress will be re-analysed. The documented observations 
are recorded verbatim, and each will be subject to critical analysis regarding its 
context, meaning and significance. Confidence intervals are given for each 
documented observation following the methodology of Kelso and Vogel (2007). 
These ratings range from 1-3, where 1 means that the classification is questionable, 
because only the impacts of a climatic conditions were noted by the observers, 
rather than the specific climatic condition itself, while a rating of 3 is given where a 
number of observers referred to a climatic condition with specific dates and 
locations. The results table from this part of the investigation will be presented in 
this chapter to facilitate cross-comparison with palaeoclimate data. However, 
critical analysis, illustrative quotes and the rationale of judgement on possible 
climatic evidence is fully outlined in Chapter 5 and Appendix A. This is because 
most of these references overlap with the discussion on the human significance of 
climate variability, or derive from references to famine rather than drought itself. 
 Documented climatic stress will be compared to proxy reconstructions to 
test their coherence with major wet and dry periods. This will serve as a source of 
independent comparison for the palaeoclimate data analysed prior to this, and will 
provide broad insight into the relationship between the nature and recorded 
impacts of climate variability over a multi-centennial timeframe. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that the brief durations of drought, mostly on the order of a year or 
two, make exact comparisons with proxy records difficult. Moreover, an absence of 
observations on climate or extreme events may not mean that they did not occur, as 
the written records are also a reflection of the shifting focus, interest and expansion 
of the Portuguese presence in southeast Africa. Thus, while there are definite 
limitations to the extent of the documented observations on weather and climate, 
the historical documents that do exist contain valuable and highly unique 
information on the landscape and climate, which requires incorporation with 
palaeoclimate data in this period. 
 
3.1.3.3 Societal implications 
To conclude the chapter, a brief assessment of how its findings can be used to 
inform consideration of societal development will be made. Drawing on previous 
criticisms (Hannaford et al. 2014), this analysis will particularly focus on AD 1500-
1830, where the reliance upon coincidence and cognitive archaeology can be 
transformed into a deeper understanding of the interaction between climatic and 
societal spheres. For instance, although the MCA and LIA may clearly have been 
important events for society, they were not deterministic, and were characterised 
by considerable variability (Nicholson et al. 2013). It will therefore be asked how 
this enriched complexity of past precipitation dynamics can be used to inform the 
historical analysis chapters. Caution must be applied, however, not to direct the 
later lines of historical research based on analysis of climatic evidence alone. 
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3.2 Summer rainfall zone precipitation variability 
The key climatic events in the longest and highest-resolution proxies (Figure 3.2) will 
hereafter be discussed on a minimum of decadal timescales over the last 1200 years. 
First, however, results from the correlation analysis will be assessed to further establish 
the proxies that are most likely to represent palaeoprecipitation. 
 
3.2.1 Establishing proxy palaeoprecipitation 
To understand the general correspondence between records and their potential 
precipitation inferences, three sets of correlations were performed. The first, shown in 
Table 3.2, reveals the correlations of the inter-annual records over the common period 
of 1036-1890. As expected, the T7 stalagmite δ18O, δ13C and grey-scale records 
demonstrate relatively strong agreement, and alone give little indication of the 
differential precipitation-temperature signals of each variable. It is potentially 
significant, however, that the T7 δ18O shows an increase in isotopic values in the latter 
half of the twentieth century (Figure 3.2), which is consistent with the nature of global 
temperature change since 1950. This direction of change is also observed in the T8 δ18O 
record, but not in the other T7/T8 variables, and may reaffirm previous studies that 
link stalagmite δ18O mainly to temperature but caution its use as a precipitation proxy.  
 
TABLE 3.2 Inter-annual correlation values between proxy records over the common period of 
1036-1890. Shaded values are significant at p <0.01. Note that the T7 grey scale record has an 
inverted scale, thus negative correlations represent co-variance. The Karkloof record is 
correlated from 1310-1890 and the Mashonaland record is correlated from 1796-1996. 
 T7 δ18O T7 δ13C T7 grey-scale Baobab Karkloof Mashonaland 
T7 δ18O -      
T7 δ13C 0.45 -     
T7 grey-scale -0.43 -0.35 -    
Baobab 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -   
Karkloof 0.00 -0.05 0.10 -0.39 -  
Mashonaland 0.07 0.05 -0.16 -0.05 0.19 - 
 
 No significant correlations are present between the T7 records and the Baobab 
record. 30-year running correlations (Figure 3.3) demonstrate that precipitation in 
certain periods does significantly co-vary between these records, but this is limited to 
multi-decadal periods such as in the early 1600s, and never for more than a century. 
This may indicate that the Limpopo Baobab record is generally more illustrative of 
local precipitation variability, or could relate to either dating disparities or the 
influence of other climatic (or non-climatic) variables or processes on the stalagmite 
isotopes. To enable statistical comparison with the Karkloof record, the other four 
records were reduced to 7-year running means and correlated over the period 1320-
1890. Where results are significant, they show inverse relationships between the 
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Baobab record (r = -0.39, p <0.01) and inferred precipitation in the grey-scale record (r 
= 0.1, p <0.01, note the inverted scale) (Table 3.2). These inverse correlations, 
particularly between the Baobab and Karkloof record, are noteworthy, as one might 
expect a positive relationship between SRZ tree-ring records. It is therefore possible 
that as the Karkloof record has no supporting data from the same location, and because 
of the age of the dataset (Hall 1976), dating errors strongly influence the series (Tyson 
1986). However, significant positive correlations are present between the Mashonaland 
tree-ring and the Karkloof record over their common 200-year correlation period, as 
well as between the Mashonaland tree-rings and the T7 grey scale record (Table 3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3. Running (30-year) correlations between the Limpopo Baobab record and the T7 
stalagmite proxies. Dashed lines indicate significance thresholds. 
 
 The second set of correlations, given in Table 3.3, assess lower-frequency 
coherence between the 30-year running means of these inter-annual records. Slightly 
stronger relationships are observed between the T7 records, yet no statistically 
significant correlations are present with the Limpopo Baobab record, which may again 
suggest that local variability is more important in this record.	  
 
TABLE 3.3 Correlation of 30-year running means of inter-annual proxy records over the 
common period of 1036-1890. Shaded values are significant at p <0.01. Note that the T7 grey 
scale record has an inverted scale, thus negative correlations represent co-variance. 
 T7 δ18O T7 δ13C T7 grey-scale Baobab 
T7 δ18O - 0.47 -0.49 0.05 
T7 δ13C 0.47 - -0.45 0.02 
T7 grey -0.49 -0.45 - -0.02 
Baobab 0.05 0.02 -0.02 - 
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 The final correlations test the relationships between the non-annually resolved 
proxies and the degraded annually-resolved records, as well as the association between 
the different non-annually resolved proxies from the same sites (Table 3.4). Most 
proxies from the same sites show significant and relatively strong correlations, the only 
exception being the T7 and T8 stalagmite records, where no significant correlations are 
found between T7 δ18O and T8 δ13C, T7 δ13C and T8 δ13C, and T7 grey-scale and T8 δ13C, 
the latter of which is marginally insignificant. The varying strength and significance of 
correlations of proxies from the same site reinforces the complexities of understanding 
precipitation signals in isotope records from speleothems, and restricts conclusions on 
the relative importance of each record for consideration of precipitation. Nevertheless, 
that the T7 grey-scale record demonstrates coherence with a number of other records 
further suggests that it is representative of regional precipitation. While each of the 
other T7/T8 records may be of use in establishing local and regional precipitation 
signals, caution will be applied due to the ambiguity of their signals. This is 
particularly relevant for the δ18O records, which have been suggested to be more 
representative of temperature in the literature (Stager et al. 2013; Sundqvist et al. 2013). 
Correlations between the two Sibaya diatom records and the two Dante Cave 
speleothem isotope records are strong (r = -0.45 and r = 0.64, p <0.01 respectively). 
 
TABLE 3.4 Correlations of non-annually resolved records with degraded inter-annual records 
over the common mean period of 1036-1890. Shaded values are significant at p <0.01. Note that 
the T7 grey scale and Sibaya conductivity records have inverted scales, thus negative 
correlations represent co-variance. The Mashonaland record is correlated from 1796-1996. 
 
 Table 3.4 also reveals two significant correlations between sites, including 
between the T7 grey-scale and Lake Sibaya conductivity record (r = 0.36, p <0.01), and 
the Limpopo Baobab and Dante Cave stalagmite δ18O record (r = 0.42, p <0.01) (Figure 
3.4). This positive correlation of proxies from distant sites may signify that they are 
representative of wider precipitation variability across the SRZ. Nevertheless, the 
apparent high co-variance between the degraded Baobab record with Dante Cave δ18O 
may be a result of the uneven distribution of dating in the Dante Cave stalagmite, 
which has 50-year gaps in some places, and the resultant masking of important lower 
frequency variability in the Baobab record. This is particularly evident in the 1500s, 
where high inter-annual variability is observed in the Baobab record, yet only three 
dates are available in the Dante Cave stalagmites. This is reflected in the limited visual 
 T8 δ18O T8 δ13C Sibaya 
conductivity 
Sibaya % 
planktonic 
Dante 
Cave δ18O 
Dante 
Cave δ13C   
Intra-site T8 records: 0.30  Sibaya records: -0.45 Dante records: 0.64 
T7  δ18O 0.4 0.19 0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.11 
T7  δ13C 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.09 
T7 grey-scale -0.26 -0.17 0.36 -0.13 0.05 0.09 
Baobab 0.13 0.13 0.08 -0.18 0.42 0.1 
Mashonaland -0.02 -0.01 -0.32 0.34 -0.26 -0.34 
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correspondence in panel (b) in Figure 3.4. While the dating of the Lake Sibaya diatom 
variables is also uneven, this is to a far lesser extent than the Dante Cave speleothem 
record, and hence its co-variance with the T7 grey-scale record is more reliable and 
visually clear (Panel (a), Figure 3.4). Limited statistical correspondence could also 
relate to the relative importance of local precipitation variability and the various rain-
producing processes that operate in different parts of the region such as the ITCZ and 
the strength of the Indian Ocean winds. For instance, the Mashonaland tree-rings may 
lack significant correlations with other records due to the primary influence of the 
ITCZ in this area’s precipitation. This is reinforced in the positive but insignificant 
correlations with the ITCZ-sensitive Lake Sibaya record (r = 0.34). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.4. Significant inter-site correlations between inter-annual and non-annually resolved 
proxy records. 
 
 Considering the literature and this initial analysis, the records to be used with 
higher confidence as palaeoprecipitation indicators are the T7 grey-scale series, the 
Baobab tree-rings, the Lake Sibaya conductivity and % planktonic records, and the 
Mashonaland tree-rings. Stalagmite δ18O is usually associated with temperature, and 
while stalagmite δ13C is conceptually linked to precipitation, poor inter-site 
correspondence suggests that a number of climatic or non-climatic variables influence 
both of these proxies. Caution will thus be applied when relating these proxies to 
rainfall. Similarly, caution will be used when considering the Karkloof record, as 
uncertainty arises from the reliance on a single specimen. With these concerns kept in 
mind, the next section analyses precipitation variability since AD 800. 
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3.2.2 Precipitation variability since AD 800 
Visual examination of multi-decadal scale variability between southern African proxy 
records over the last 1200 years reveals periods of general correspondence (Figure 3.5). 
The direction of overall change in inferred precipitation conditions is negative, and is 
particularly strong in the Limpopo Baobab’s and both of the Cold Air Cave stalagmite 
δ13C records. This is in contrast to the Cold Air Cave δ18O records, which show either 
an increase in inferred warm-wet conditions or no overall change. At the beginning of 
the analysis period, relatively warmer and wetter conditions (relative to the 1036-1890 
mean) appear to predominate in several records from c. AD 800-1200, possibly 
suggestive of a region-wide MCA, although considerable variability is found within 
this timeframe. The ninth century, the first in the period under consideration, is shown 
to be relatively wet in most records, particularly in the T7 δ13C and grey scale records, 
where 87 and 71 years exceed +1 standard deviations from 1036-1890 mean 
respectively. Between c. AD 800-830, each of the available Cold Air Cave records show 
warmer and wetter conditions relative to the 1036-1890 mean, with wetter conditions 
also shown at Lake Nhauhache. At c. AD 830, an abrupt shift to relatively cool-dry 
conditions took place in the T7 isotope and grey scale values, and the Dante Cave 
isotopes, prevailing until c. AD 850. An abrupt increase in δ18O and δ13C in the T7 and 
Dante Cave speleothem records was thereafter sustained until c. AD 900. The T7 grey 
scale and T8 δ13C timeseries shift to wetter conditions slightly earlier (c. AD 880). 
Decreased diatom conductivity at Lake Sibaya further indicates that the SRZ was 
wetter than average, and Lakes Nhauhache and Nhaucati corroborate this. This period 
of relative wetness, reflected in each of the proxies, persisted until around AD 970. 
 From c. AD 970-1020, the most depleted δ13C values occur in the T7 stalagmite, 
while T7 δ18O values were only marginally below average. Although T7 grey intensity 
and Dante Cave isotope values in this 50-year period appear to suggest wetter 
conditions, the T8 δ18O and δ13C variables reflect the cool-dry conditions suggested in 
the T7 isotope values. A period of above average conductivity, suggestive of drier 
conditions, is also shown in the Lake Sibaya conductivity record. No coherent signal is 
present between records in the decadal period between c. AD 1020-1030. In the two 
decades after, normal conditions relative to the 1036-1890 mean predominate in the T7 
isotope and T8 δ13C records, although T7 grey intensity trends towards drier conditions 
in the same timeframe. Markedly drier conditions at around AD 1050 are inferred from 
the Lake Sibaya conductivity record, the Dante Cave speleothem isotopes, and lake 
levels at Nhauhache and Nhaucati, suggesting generally drier regional conditions. 
Similarly, the latter part of this period marks the driest conditions in the entire Baobab 
record, which commences in AD 1036. These dry conditions extended to c. AD 1070 in 
the Baobab record, and c. AD 1110 in the Lake Sibaya conductivity and T7 grey scale 
records. In the T7 isotopes and T8 δ13C chronologies, values remained above average 
until c. AD 1090, while the Dante Cave speleothem isotopes began to trend towards 
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wetter conditions around c. AD 1050, indicating a degree of regional incoherence over 
the extent of this possible dry spell (Figure 3.5). 
 Regional correspondence in inferred precipitation is relatively poor at the 
beginning of the twelfth century, with a number of ambiguities between records. From 
c. AD 1100-1140, dry conditions are observed in each of the Cold Air Cave speleothem 
datasets. Over the same timeframe, markedly wetter conditions are present in the 
Baobab record, while the Lake Sibaya conductivity record abruptly shifts from very 
dry to very wet, with a similar but less abrupt trend at Lake Nhaucati from c. AD 1100. 
The sediment core from Lake Nhauhache, on the other hand, indicates variable but 
trending towards drier conditions. The Dante Cave speleothem isotopic values peak at 
c. AD 1100, and although conditions trend towards cool-dry, they mostly remain above 
the 1036-1890 mean until c. AD 1200. The period from c. AD 1140-1180 shows conditions 
in the T7 isotope records trending towards wetter conditions. Similarly, the T7 grey 
scale record suggests wetter conditions, as does the T8 δ13C record, while the T8 δ18O 
values are trending towards inferred warmer conditions. The Baobab record continues 
to show wetter conditions in this period, as does the Lake Nhaucati record. The diatom 
conductivity record from Lake Sibaya infers the second-highest stand in wet conditions 
over the 1200-year period at c. AD 1150, before an abrupt decline to very dry conditions 
at c. AD 1180. These later dry conditions are also inferred from the Lake Nhauhache 
core, and from c. AD 1170-1190 in the T7 isotopes. An overall variable agreement in 
palaeoprecipitation is observed in the twelfth century. In the Baobab record, for 
instance, 25 years exceed +1 standard deviation from the 1036-1890, while no years 
exceed these thresholds in the T7 variables. 
 A higher degree of correspondence in wet and dry conditions is present 
between nearly all records throughout the thirteenth century. Drier conditions persist 
into the first two decades of the century in most records excluding the Limpopo 
Baobab’s and T8 δ13C, which show a relatively low variability and sustained wet 
conditions throughout the century. At c. AD 1220, the T7 grey scale, T8 isotope and 
Lake Sibaya records show an abrupt increase in inferred precipitation, with this 
occurring two decades earlier in the T7 isotopes. Wetter conditions were sustained in 
the Lake Sibaya diatom until around AD 1300, but in the T8 δ13C record, a decline set in 
at around AD 1280. In the T7 records, this began at c. AD 1270 and persisted until at 
least c. AD 1300. The isotopic records from Dante Cave in Namibia show less coherence 
with the other SRZ records in this century. Here, an abrupt decline in isotopic values 
onset at about AD 1200, and was punctuated only by short periods of warm-wet 
conditions until a recovery in c. AD 1320. The wetter nature of the 1200s is reflected in 
that 34 and 31 years exceed +1 standard deviations of the 1036-1890 in the T7 δ13C and 
Baobab records respectively. 
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FIGURE 3.5 Main coherence of wet and dry periods, blue shading indicates correspondence of 
wet periods, and red shading dry periods. Mean lines represent 1036-1890 means. 
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 Reasonable regional coherence in dry conditions is observed in the early 
decades of the fourteenth century, yet it is unclear from simple observation of Figure 
3.5 and the previous palaeoclimate literature whether this constitutes the onset of a 
sustained reduction in precipitation associated with the regional LIA. At the beginning 
of the fourteenth century, conditions trended towards drier at Sibaya and in the 
Limpopo Baobab record, with very dry conditions observed at Sibaya from around AD 
1310-1330. Although the Baobab values are still above the 1036-1890 mean at this time, 
they show their lowest values since c. AD 1080. Both the T7 and T8 δ13C records infer 
drier conditions until c. AD 1330, as does the T7 grey scale series. The δ18O records for 
both Cold Air Cave stalagmites, however, show increased values suggestive of warmer 
conditions. Drier conditions are also observed at Lake Nhauhache, though Lake 
Nhaucati continued to show wetter conditions until around AD 1400 before drying out 
completely (Ekblom and Stabell 2008). The Dante Cave speleothem isotopes suggest 
relatively warm-wet conditions until c. AD 1400, while isotopic data of faunal remains 
from the Shashe-Limpopo basin (Smith 2005) show that rainfall remained steady until 
at least c. AD 1415. In most other records, relatively drier conditions prevailed until at 
least c. AD 1380. In the last two decades of this century, though, the records are 
characterised by a high degree of ambiguity, with an equal split between proxies 
inferring warm-wet and cool-dry conditions. 
 Ambiguity between records continues into the fifteenth century. No dominant 
signal is shown until c. AD 1430, where generally dry conditions are observed through 
to c. AD 1450. Particularly abrupt shifts towards cool-dry conditions are shown in the 
T7 isotopes and towards dry conditions the Lake Sibaya conductivity record, while a 
less severe but equally abrupt drop is observed in T8 δ13C. Generally drier conditions 
are present in the T7 grey scale record, and narrow ring-widths predominate in the 
Karkloof record. The only proxies with relatively warm-wet conditions here are the T8 
δ18O and the Baobab. At around AD 1450, a recovery towards markedly wetter 
conditions began in numerous records. The strongest and most abrupt of these are 
witnessed in the T7 isotope and grey scale records, T8 δ13C, the Dante Cave isotopes, 
and conductivity at Lake Sibaya. These conditions appear to last until c. AD 1480 in 
these records, and thereafter undergo a decline through to the end of the fifteenth 
century. The T7 isotopes undergo a decline from the inferred very warm-wet 
conditions to relatively warm-wet, and this is also the case in the T7 grey scale record. 
T8 δ18O experienced a decline to below average conditions, followed by a recovery to 
the highest values in the series at c. AD 1500. T8 δ13C trends towards wetter conditions 
in this 20-year timeframe, as does the Sibaya conductivity record, albeit more abruptly. 
By contrast, the Baobab record trends towards drier conditions, with the lowest rainfall 
observed since the eleventh century at c. AD 1480. As will be illustrated later, a high 
degree of variability is present in the Karkloof record in these two decades, with an 
abrupt shift from very dry to very wet conditions. 
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 At c. AD 1500, conditions were wet or trending towards wet in most records, the 
exception being the Karkloof tree-ring, where an abrupt decline in ring-width is 
followed by an abrupt return to normal conditions. The Baobab record also shows an 
increase in precipitation, but this is only slight and reflects a return to normal 
conditions relative to the mean. At around AD 1520, each of the Cold Air Cave 
speleothem variables, Dante Cave speleothem δ13C, and the Karkloof tree-ring undergo 
an abrupt decline in inferred precipitation and/or temperature, with the T7 grey scale 
series showing the greatest proportional abrupt shift to dry conditions out of any 
record over the 1200-year period. This decline is also reflected in the Sibaya diatom at c. 
AD 1530. Average conditions relative to the 1036-1890 mean, however, remain 
dominant in the Baobab. Recovery towards normal or slightly wetter than mean 
conditions did not begin until c. AD 1570 in most records excluding the Baobab, where 
an abrupt increase to the wettest conditions of the entire record lasted until c. AD 1560, 
after which conditions remained wet, but trended towards drier until c. AD 1600. These 
wetter conditions followed after c. AD 1570 in most other records, excluding the T7 δ13C 
and grey-scale records, where inferred-precipitation remained below average. In this 
century, the Baobab and T7 δ13C records show 22 and 28 years respectively exceeding 
+1 standard deviation from the common mean, while the T7 δ13C record also shows 22 
years exceeding -1 standard deviation from the common mean. 
 Dry conditions prevailed from c. AD 1600-1640 in nearly all records, the only 
exceptions being slightly earlier recoveries in the T8 isotopes, and a period of increased 
ring growth in the Karkloof tree at c. AD 1620. This period also shows the highest grey 
intensity value of the entire record, inferring the lowest precipitation. A slight recovery 
in precipitation occurs in all records from c. AD 1640-1670, excluding the T7 grey scale 
record, conditions then trend towards very cool-dry in all records apart from T7 δ18O. 
This period, lasting until around AD 1720, is the coolest and driest period in the T8 
speleothem and Sibaya conductivity records, the second driest in the Limpopo Baobab 
record, and the joint driest in the T7 grey scale record. This appears to unambiguously 
indicate that this period was the driest part of the LIA in the region. It is not until c. AD 
1710, though, that this abrupt decline starts in the T7 isotope records, where conditions 
do not begin to fully recover until c. AD 1790. The extent of cool-dry conditions across 
the region in the eighteenth century is particularly widespread, with persistent dry 
conditions observed in each record, punctuated only by a short period of wetter 
conditions in the Sibaya record at around AD 1730. Other records not shown here, such 
as the Cango Caves speleothem (Talma and Vogel 1992), also correspond to these 
suggestions. Recovery to near-normal conditions begins in most records at c. AD 1790, 
although the Sibaya record shows an earlier recovery at c. AD 1750. The severity of 
these seventeenth century drier conditions is evidenced in that 38 and 36 years in the 
T7 grey scale and Baobab records respectively exceed -1 standard deviations from the 
1036-1890 mean. In the eighteenth century, the number of years exceeding this 
threshold remains high at 34 in the Baobab record, but is higher in the T7 δ13C series at 
49 years. 
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3.2.2.1 The nineteenth century: proxy-documentary variability 
The availability of documentary records from the second and third decades of the 
nineteenth century onwards strongly increases the resolution of palaeoprecipitation 
variability reconstructions (Figure 3.6). Prior to this, in most proxy records, markedly 
wetter conditions are suggested between c. AD 1790-1820. At Sibaya, in the T7 and T8 
δ13C records, the Dante Cave isotopes, and in the Karkloof tree-ring, this was 
punctuated by a short dry spell of varying severity in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century, possibly representative of the dry spell linked to the mahlatule famine in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Of the documentary reconstructions, only the Kalahari chronology 
commences before 1820, and also shows normal or wetter conditions in the late-1810s. 
The Baobab reconstruction, however, shows sustained and stable dry conditions after a 
slight recovery in the last decade of the eighteenth century (Figure 3.6). Relatively drier 
conditions are also evident in the first two decades of the nineteenth century in the 
Mashonaland tree-ring series from northern Zimbabwe (Therrell et al. 2006) (Figure 
3.6). In the 1820s, relatively dry conditions dominate in the documentary 
reconstructions from the Kalahari and the Eastern Cape, though no evidence of drier 
conditions was found from Lesotho in this decade. In the same decade, most proxy 
records remain relatively wet but are trending towards drier conditions. 
 In the year 1830, the Karkloof and Mashonaland tree-ring records show a very 
wet year, which is also picked up in the Kalahari reconstruction and the multi-proxy 
reconstruction of Neukom et al. (2014) (Figure 3.6). In the few years following this, 
though, an abrupt decline in precipitation occurs in every proxy record except for the 
Baobab and the multi-proxy reconstruction, where in the latter, relatively wet 
conditions lasted until c. AD 1850. Dry years were more frequent than wet years in the 
Kalahari and Eastern Cape records in the 1830s, but not in Lesotho. The 1840s, by 
contrast, were wet in the Eastern Cape, but generally dry in the Kalahari and Lesotho. 
A slight recovery in precipitation occurred in the proxy records at c. AD 1850, though 
this was brief, with a return to drier conditions observed until c. AD 1880. This is in 
sharp contrast to the Baobab record, which shows the opposite pattern. Although the 
1850s were generally wet in the Eastern Cape, the other two documentary records, 
particularly the Kalahari reconstruction, show drier conditions dominating until the 
mid-1880s. Thereafter, wet conditions prevail until the early-1890s, followed by a 
return to generally drier conditions, while the multi-proxy reconstruction shows 
sustained wetter conditions after 1870, which form the wettest part of this record. 
 The other available annually-resolved nineteenth century records are the 
Nicholson et al. (2012) wetness indices for 90 African regions. Chronologies for six of 
these regions are shown in Figure 3.7, including the Eastern Cape, Lesotho, KwaZulu-
Natal, southern Zimbabwe, south-central Mozambique, and northern Zimbabwe. 
These records each show relatively similar trends between 1800-1850, with dry 
conditions dominating the first two decades in each region. Generally dry conditions 
continue through to 1835 except for in the Eastern Cape, while wet years are observed 
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from 1837-1842 in most regions, and conditions remained wet for most of the rest of the 
century in the Eastern Cape, with more variable conditions in Lesotho and southern 
Zimbabwe. However, in south-central Mozambique and northern Zimbabwe, drier 
conditions dominate until 1900. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.6 Summer Rainfall Zone documentary wetness indices: Index values: +2 very wet, +1 
relatively wet, 0 normal, -1 relatively dry, -2 very dry, Mashonaland tree-ring record (Therrell et 
al. 2006), and multi-proxy reconstruction (Neukom et al. 2014). 
 
 Although a degree of correspondence is present between the Nicholson et al. 
(2012) datasets and the other proxy-documentary records in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, clear and widespread discrepancies are present in the first two 
decades. These years are uniformly classified as dry for all southern African regions in 
the Nicholson et al. (2012) reconstructions, which bear little resemblance to the 
corresponding years in the proxy records. Notwithstanding the lack of data for this 
period in the Nicholson et al. database, the wider range of proxy sources suggest that 
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this period was not uniformly dry. This early-nineteenth century period, key for 
societal investigations in Chapter 6, constitutes an area for further investigation for the 
ships’ logbook precipitation reconstructions in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.7 Wetness indices for six southern African regions from the Nicholson et al. (2012) 
nineteenth century Africa-wide precipitation dataset. 
 
 Towards the end of the 1200-year analysis period, δ13C in both of the Cold Air 
Cave stalagmites remains below the 1036-1890 means for nearly all of the period up to 
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AD 1996 (Figure 3.5). The grey scale record makes a recovery at AD 1950, but stays 
relatively dry compared to the mean. T7 and T8 δ18O declines to AD 1950, though 
increases rapidly through to the end of the record at AD 1996, possibly reflective of 
global temperature change. The Baobab shows a progressive decline in precipitation 
from AD 1880 to 2000, with only nine of these individual years exceeding the mean 
annual rainfall of the record. The tree-rings from northern Zimbabwe indicate above 
average rainfall for the first three decades of the twentieth century, followed by three 
decades of below average rainfall, and after AD 1960, conditions are normal to 
relatively wet. Both of the Mozambique lakes suggest that wetter conditions prevailed 
from c. AD 1700-2000. 
 This assessment of proxy-inferred SRZ precipitation variability has revealed 
periods of coherence and disagreement in wet and dry conditions. These include: 
• General regional agreement of warm-wet conditions between c. AD 800-970 
• Variable agreement in inferred precipitation between c. AD 970-1200 
• Generally wetter conditions in the thirteenth century 
• Variable agreement in fourteenth century inferred precipitation 
• Drier conditions between c. AD 1420-1450, followed by an abrupt transition to 
wetter conditions 
• Further abrupt shifts in precipitation variability in the sixteenth century, first 
towards drier conditions and then wetter conditions in the last three decades 
• Generally drier conditions in the early-seventeenth century 
• Widespread dry conditions in the late-seventeenth to early-eighteenth century, 
suggestive of regional cool-dry LIA 
• General trend towards wetter conditions in the late-eighteenth century 
• Variable correspondence in precipitation between proxy records and Nicholson 
et al. (2012) datasets at the beginning of the nineteenth century, reinforcing the 
uncertainties in these two decades. 
 
3.2.3 The Medieval Climate Anomaly and Little Ice Age 
The above analysis has demonstrated that multi-decadal to centennial phases of 
predominantly warm-wet and cool-dry conditions were features of the last 1200-years 
in the SRZ. As outlined in Section 2.1.1, these periods are thought to be synonymous 
with a regional MCA and LIA, yet there exists disagreement over their timing and 
magnitude, as well as the variability within these periods. To further understanding of 
these uncertainties, Figure 3.8 presents an assessment of the extent to which the proxy 
precipitation inferences were anomalous in the context of the common mean period of 
1036-1890. Panel (a) shows the proportion of years above and below the 1036-1890 
means and ±1 or ±2 standard deviations in the 20-year smoothed Cold Air Cave T7 
stalagmite δ13C, T7 grey-scale, Limpopo Baobab, Karkloof and Mashonaland tree-ring 
series. Using the method outlined in Section 3.1.3.1, panel (b) reveals the same criteria 
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for both the annually and non-annually resolved records, which are the T7 stalagmite 
δ13C and grey-scale records, Lake Sibaya diatom conductivity and % planktonic taxa, 
T8 δ13C, the Karkloof and Mashonaland tree-ring records and Dante Cave δ13C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.8 Proportion of years above or below the 1036-1890 record means (blue and red 
lines), and ±1 or ±2 standard deviations (blue and red bars) of: A. 20-year smoothed inter-
annual proxy records and B. 20-year smoothed inter-annual records and non-annually resolved 
records. Blue lines: proportion of records above the 1036-1890 mean; red lines: proportion of 
records below the 1036-1890; light blue bars: +1 standard deviation; dark blue bars: +2 standard 
deviations; light red bars: -1 standard deviation; dark red bars: -2 standard deviations. 
 
 The inter-annual records plotted in panel (a) appear to capture the general 
evolution and variability of inferred precipitation from the wider range of proxies in 
panel (b). From both of the timeseries, it is clear that the period c. AD 800-1200, denotes 
a dominance, but not always a persistence, of wet conditions. The most extreme of 
these wet conditions (exceeding +2 standard deviations) were found in the ninth 
century. The eleventh century is less consistently wet, with occasional dry spells, while 
much of the twelfth century shows a dominance of wet conditions. The thirteenth 
century displays both wet and dry spells, and this variable picture continues into the 
fourteenth century, where in panel (b) a small number of records consistently display 
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either very wet or very dry conditions. In the fifteenth century, conditions generally 
trend from dry to wet with an increased proportion of records exceeding the mean 
towards the latter part of the century. In the early-sixteenth century, a marked increase 
in the number of records suggesting wet conditions occurs, with a peak of 50% or more 
records exceeding +1 standard deviations. In the early- to mid-seventeenth century, 
this abruptly switches to a dominance of dry conditions, with the most extreme of 
these found in the late-seventeenth century in panel (b). These dry conditions persist 
until around 1780, and constitute the most persistent and severe dry conditions over 
the last 1200 years, which appear to represent the driest part of the LIA. With the 
exception of wet years in some records at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
relatively dry conditions are persistent until the end of the twentieth century. 
 While it is not wise to define precise dates demarcating climatic episodes, these 
findings appear to suggest that wetter conditions associated with a regional MCA are 
relatively clearly defined between approximately AD 800-1200. Drier conditions 
associated with the broader extent of the LIA have a higher degree of ambiguity than 
the MCA, and are more difficult to clearly define. An increase in the presence of 
sustained drier periods appears to have begun around AD 1300, yet this is by no means 
permanent. The period between c. AD 1450-1550, for instance, shows wetter conditions 
prevailing, and is consistent with temperature and precipitation inferences from 
records not considered here such as the Wonderkrater pollen record and the Cango 
Cave speleothem (Scott 1982; Talma and Vogel 1992). Thereafter, until c. AD 1800, the 
analysis clearly indicates the dominance and persistence of drier periods congruent 
with those of suggested LIA cool-dry conditions (Holmgren et al. 1999; Stager et al. 
2013; Sundqvist et al. 2013). Therefore, while it remains possible that generally drier 
conditions associated with the LIA were present in their broadest form from c. AD 1300, 
their severity across the SRZ was mostly felt from c. AD 1600. 
 Considering the timeframes inferred from this analysis in comparison to earlier 
work, it is clear that newer datasets such as the Lake Sibaya diatom and the Limpopo 
Baobab record refine and enhance understanding of precipitation variability in these 
periods. Tyson et al. (2000) suggested that generally warmer and wetter conditions 
MCA prevailed between AD 880-1320, while other studies have suggested AD 900-1300 
as a timeframe (Tyson and Lindesay 1992). On more broader global or northern 
hemispheric scales, it has been suggested that the MCA is defined as spanning the 
period AD 950-1250 (Jones et al. 2001; Nicholson et al. 2013), or AD 950-1400 (Diaz et al. 
2011). While this study is broadly in line with these timeframes, the analysis of 
numerous proxies provides clear evidence of wetter conditions back to at least AD 800. 
 In the southern African palaeoclimate literature, the LIA has been most often 
defined as either AD 1300-1850 (Tyson and Lindesay 1992; Holmgren et al. 1999; 
Huffman 2008) or AD 1500-1800 (Tyson et al. 2000; Holmgren et al. 2001), while 
globally, a general definition of AD 1300-1850 exists (Jones et al. 2001; Matthews and 
Briffa 2005). Considering precipitation signals alone, one could argue for both 
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timeframes. What seems more likely, however, is that a ‘weak’ LIA was present from c. 
AD 1300-1500, which was punctuated by wetter conditions consistent with the warm-
wet pulse suggested by Huffman (1996) and noted by others (Tyson and Lindesay 
1992; Ekblom and Stabell 2008) between c. AD 1450-1550, and was followed by a 
‘strong’ LIA between c. AD 1600-1800, with an abrupt termination (Figure 3.8). Recent 
re-analysis of the T7 oxygen isotope record (Sundqvist et al. 2013) suggests that cooling 
reached its greatest severity around 1690-1740, where temperatures were depressed by 
0.9 °C on average relative to the 1961-1990 mean, with the coldest interval at 1720. This 
provides strong correspondence with the analysis of precipitation variability provided 
here, and is consistent with the warm-wet and cool-dry hypothesis (Tyson and 
Lindesay 1992). It should be borne in mind, however, that this analysis deals with 
precipitation alone, and temperature variability, while linked on multi-decadal to 
centennial scales, is not necessarily aligned with precipitation variability. 
 With the incorporation of more highly-resolved datasets into this analysis, it is 
also increasingly clear that these conveniently labelled periods were not uniform and 
contain within them considerable multi-decadal and centennial variability. On this 
latter point, Figure 3.9 shows the 30-year running mean standard deviations of the 
annually-resolved records, which displays the magnitude of precipitation variability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.9 30-year running standard deviation of annually-resolved proxies. Dark grey bars 
indicate coherence of higher variability, light grey bars indicate coherence of lower variability. 
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 Figure 3.9 reveals widespread periods of increased variability in most records 
from c. AD 820-890 and 1030-1100 in the MCA, and c. AD 1430-1570 and 1780-1830 
covering parts of the LIA. Reduced variability is shown between c. AD 890-980, 1140-
1200, 1310-1350, 1600-1780 and 1840-1960. This variability is reinforced by centennial 
comparisons of inferred precipitation in the T7 grey-scale, which show that three out of 
the four centuries in the MCA were significantly different to each other, including 800s 
and 900s, 900s and 1000s, and the 1100s and 1200s (students t-test, p <0.01). Similarly, 
significant differences were observed between the 1200s and 1300s in the T7 grey-scale 
and Baobab records, as well as in these records and the Karkloof tree-ring in the 1400s 
and 1500s, and 1500s and 1600s. The 1600s and 1700s and 1700s and 1800s were also 
significantly different in the T7 grey scale and Karkloof records. 
 
3.2.4 Independent comparison with written records 
To supplement analysis of the proxy datasets, sixteenth to nineteenth century 
Portuguese written sources relating to the area between the Zambezi and Maputo 
(Delagoa) Bay were critically scrutinised for independent evidence of climate-related 
variables, or the possible impacts of weather events and climate variability. Building 
on earlier analysis by Ekblom (2004), Table 3.5 displays the most comprehensive list of 
this evidence yet. This is given in chronological order, with reference to the type of 
event described or inferred, the locations described (Figure 3.10), a confidence rating 
(Section 3.1.3.2), and the reference. A higher number of documented events from the 
eighteenth century onwards are taken from secondary literature, as the original 
documents reside in Lisbon, Maputo or Goa and are not yet available as translations. 
While these events are listed here for the purposes of cross-comparison with proxy 
data, the specific evidence and confidence assessments is fully analysed in Chapter 5 
and Appendix A, as many of these events are derived from descriptions of famine 
rather than explicitly drought, which overlaps with the discussion on the societal 
significance of these climatic events. Indeed, these observations of possible climatic 
stress are key for the later chapters as they provide a direct link between data sources. 
 
TABLE 3.5 Written records of weather events, drought, environmental disasters, scarcity and 
famine between the Zambezi River and Maputo Bay. Conf. – confidence intervals. Secondary 
references are italicised are not given confidence intervals. Modified after Ekblom (2004). 
Year Event (inferred) Region Conf. Reference 
1450-1480 Drought Northern Zimbabwe 1 Abraham 1962 
June-August 
1506 
Scarce provisions Sofala 1 Coresma 1506 
September 
1511 
Scarce provisions 
(shortage of sorghum) 
Sofala 1 Perestrello 1511 
1515 Scarce provisions 
(shortage of sorghum) 
Sofala, adjacent 
interior region 
2 Fernandes 1515 
1516 Increased price of 
sorghum (drought?) 
Sofala 2 Almada 1516 
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February 1516 Tropical cyclone 
damage 
Sofala 3 Almada 1516 
September 
1518 
Rotten provisions (wet 
year?) 
Sofala 2 Almada 1518 
1530s Hunger Manyika 1 Barros 1552 
1554 Scarce provisions Maputo bay 1 Perestrello 1554 
1560 Heavy rain, flooding Botonga 2 Fernandes 1560 
1561 Drought, lack of food Inhambane 2 Fernandes 1562 
1561-3 Famine, drought, 
locusts 
Zambezi; 
Mukaranga, Sena 
2 Sousa 1697; 
Abraham 1962 
1563-5 Floods Zambezi; Mukaranga 1 Sousa 1697 
1570s Locusts Sena, Zambezi valley 3 Monclaro 1573 
1573 Lack of food Manyika 3 Carneiro 1573 
1589-1595 Famine, drought, 
locusts 
Zambezi valley, 
Mozambique Island 
area 
2 Santos 1609 
1593 Scarce provisions Tugela river basin 
(South of Maputo 
bay) 
3 Lavanha 1593 
1642-1647 Drought, locusts Maputo Bay 2 Feyo 1647 
1663 Drought Tete 2 Mascarenhas 1663 
1714 Drought Zimbabwe interior - Mudenge 1988 
1736-1745 Locusts Lower Zambezi 3 Miranda 1766 
1744-1745 Drought Zumbo - Nicholson 1996 
1758-1759 Famine, drought Zambezi area, Tete, 
Maravi 
2 Castro 1763 
1759-1768 Drought, locusts Middle Zambezi - Newitt 1995 
1777 Famine? Drought Maputo bay - Nicholson 1996 
1790-1791 Famine, drought Maputo bay and 
Inhambane 
- Nicholson 1996 
1795-1801 Drought Mozambique / 
southern Africa-wide 
- Newitt 1995 
1820s Famine, drought Zambezi valley, 
Mozambique coast 
- Newitt 1995 
Late-1820s Dry conditions KwaZulu-Natal 2 Isaacs 1836 
1830 Locusts KwaZulu-Natal coast 3 Isaacs 1836 
1836 Drought Zumbo - Newitt 1995 
1858-1863 Famine? Drought Sena, Tete, 
Quelimane 
- Nicholson 1996,  
1861 Famine (drought?) KwaZulu-Natal 2 Falaza 1898 
1870s Famine? Drought Sena, Tete, 
Quelimane, Limpopo 
- Nicholson 1996 
1875 Famine, drought Maputo bay, 
Bazaruto Island 
- Junod 1927 
1880 Famine, drought Mozambique 
lowlands and 
Mpumalanga 
- Ekblom 2004 
1895 Locusts Harare area - Beach 1977 
1896-1897 Drought Maputo bay - Nicholson 1996 
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FIGURE 3.10 Map of documented events in Table 3.5. 
 
3.2.4.1 Proxy-documentary correspondence 
The compilation of observations in Table 3.5 shows that particularly high numbers of 
possible climate-related descriptions were made in the sixteenth century, while just 
two observations reveal evidence for possible climatic stress in the seventeenth 
century. A higher number of descriptions were found in eighteenth century documents 
and secondary literature, and many of these also refer to sustained periods of climatic 
stress. Aside from the varying significance of climate variability itself, this variable 
number of observations could relate to the changing sphere of Portuguese influence 
and observation. Yet as Figure 2.13 shows, this influence was at its height in the 
seventeenth century, where climate-related observations are at their minimum. One 
could also argue that the purpose for which these observations were recorded changed 
over time, though as references to climatic stress increase again in the eighteenth 
century, both of these explanations are problematic. This means that the nature and 
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magnitude of climate variability itself and the vulnerability of societies must be 
considered as prime reasons for the variation in recorded frequency. To assess the 
former of these explanations, these possible references to climatic stress are compared 
to the proxy reconstructions. The brief durations of most recorded events and 
uncertainties in the dating of palaeoclimate records make close comparisons with 
proxy records difficult, nevertheless, it is possible to observe some correspondence. 
Figure 3.11 compares the recorded events from AD 1500-1900 with the Limpopo Baobab 
tree-ring, T7 grey-scale and T7 δ13C sequences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.11 Comparison of documentary evidence for Summer Rainfall Zone climate variability 
and the Limpopo Baobab, T7 grey-scale and T8 δ13C records. Only confidence levels 2-3 shown. 
 
 Records of food scarcity in the early-sixteenth century show variable 
correspondence with proxy precipitation inferences, though as will be shown later, 
there exists doubt over whether these records are indicative of drought. It is, however, 
worth noting that the inferred tropical cyclone in 1516 closely matches with an extreme 
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year of rainfall in the Baobab record in 1514. Woodborne (pers. comm.) relates these 
extreme rainfall events to tropical cyclones, with a dating precision of ±4 years. It is 
therefore possible that this extreme year reconstructed from the tree-rings represents 
the tropical cyclone described by Almada in 1516. The grey scale record also shows the 
tropical cyclone occurring at an abrupt decrease in grey intensity (note the inverted 
scale), suggestive of wetter conditions. Similarly, some of the later sixteenth century 
events display good correspondence with these records. Indeed, the cluster of drought 
events, famine and locust outbreaks from the 1560s to 1590s occur at a time of high 
rainfall variability in most records (Figure 3.9). Locust plagues, for instance, are 
predominantly determined by precipitation. This is manifest in that during periods of 
drought, locust predators are reduced, yet lack of rainfall also limits locust rates of 
increase (Walker 1991). Upon drought-breaking rains, however, the rates of increase in 
locusts rise rapidly, and thus high inter-annual variability can lead to more locust 
plagues (Ballard 1983; Walker 1991). This appears to have been the case in the late-
sixteenth century, particularly in the Zambezi valley (Figure 3.10), when variability 
between wet and dry conditions was high in most records (Figures 3.9 and 3.11). The 
1589-1595 episode of drought, famine and locusts also appears to have occurred within 
an abrupt drought period in the Baobab and T8 δ13C series in Figure 3.11. The cluster of 
drought events in the eighteenth century also show good correspondence with drier 
years, while coherence between the proxy-documentary chronologies continues into 
the nineteenth century for the Baobab, and to an extent in the other two records. 
 While this analysis is relatively limited in scope due to the sparse nature of 
documentary records of climatic stress in this region and period, some findings are key 
for independent comparison of both the proxy and documentary data. In particular, it 
is clear from the previous section that the eighteenth century was the most severe part 
of the LIA, and is also the period in the written sources where incidence and extent of 
drought and famine is most pronounced. It is also possible to speculate that a greater 
number of impacts were recorded when climate variability was high, as well as 
severely dry in the mean. This may help explain why recorded events and impacts 
were greater in the sixteenth century, where overall conditions were wetter than the 
seventeenth century, but fewer recordings of climatic stress are found. This coherence, 
from radically different sources, is important when assessing the nature of past climate 
variability where debate over the reliability of proxy sources is profound. 
 
3.3 Summarising proxy-documentary precipitation variability 
From the above overview, it is possible to characterise the predominant multi-decadal 
signals of the widely separated records in most periods, allowing some conclusions to 
be drawn. A summary of general precipitation fluctuations from the records 
considered is shown in Table 3.6, along with a classification of the agreement across the 
SRZ. Strong agreement indicates that nearly all records agree, good infers that a 
majority show correspondence, variable suggests that some records agree but a 
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majority do not, while weak refers to a lack of agreement between proxies. On present 
available evidence, this summary is considered likely to apply to most of the SRZ. 
However, these multi-decadal scale fluctuations mask considerable inter-annual 
variability, while intra-regional differences are also present. The overall agreement of 
this table with the most recent similar undertaking by Stager et al. (2013) (Table 2.1; 
Figure 2.15) is very good, despite the incorporation of several other widely dispersed 
datasets in this thesis. 
 
TABLE 3.6 Multi-decadal SRZ proxy precipitation fluctuations over the last 1200 years. 
Year AD Precipitation Agreement 
800-830 Very wet Strong 
830-850 Relatively dry Strong 
850-970 Relatively wet, trending towards drier Variable 
970-1020 Relatively dry Good 
1020-1030 Variable, trending towards drier Weak 
1030-1070 Very dry Good 
1070-1110 Relatively dry, trending towards wetter Good 
1100-1140 Very wet Variable 
1140-1180 Relatively wet Good 
1180-1220 Relatively dry Good 
1220-1270 Relatively wet Strong 
1270-1330 Relatively dry Variable 
1330-1420 Variable, little agreement Weak 
1420-1450 Relatively dry Variable 
1450-1480 Relatively wet Strong 
1480-1500 Very wet Good 
1500-1520 Relatively wet, trending towards drier Strong 
1520-1570 Variable, mostly drier Good 
1570-1600 Variable, trending towards drier Variable 
1600-1640 Relatively dry Strong 
1640-1670 Variable, trending towards wetter Strong 
1670-1720 Very dry Strong 
1720-1770 Relatively dry Strong 
1770-1800 Variable, trending towards wetter Good 
1800-1820 Relatively wet Good 
1820-1880 Relatively dry Good 
1880-1900 Variable, trending towards wetter Good 
1900-2000 Variable, trending towards drier Good 
 
 Analysis of this wide range of proxy sources has enhanced insight and 
understanding of precipitation variability over the last 1200-years, allowing greater 
confidence and reducing ambiguity for historical investigation. The general pattern of 
this variability is fairly clear, though it is also problematic to draw conclusions beyond 
a general level, particularly regarding spatial differences in SRZ palaeoprecipitation, as 
well as the precise (inter-annual) timing of variability. This is mainly a result of 
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limitations in age models, complex interactions between local- and regional-scale 
climate patterns and processes, and uncertainties relating to the multiple processes that 
affect proxy data (Holmgren et al. 2012). With these constraints in mind, though, it is 
now possible to use this updated review of regional palaeoprecipitation in conjunction 
with analysis of societal development over the same timeframe in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 The major advancement and contribution of this chapter to the existing 
literature is the incorporation of all available high-resolution palaeoprecipitation 
datasets into a comparative analysis of precipitation variability over the last 1200 years, 
thus reducing reliance on individual proxies. A range of qualitative and quantitative 
analysis techniques, several of which have not been previously performed in this 
region over this timespan, have enabled this variability to be assessed in a 
comprehensive manner. Importantly, the general correspondence of this variability 
across the SRZ found in earlier work remains prominent, even with the inclusion of 
more widely separated datasets. Relatively clear evidence for a MCA between c. AD 
800-1200 was found by assessing multiple proxies using certain thresholds as 
indicators of wet and dry periods. The same analysis also provided clear evidence for 
the driest part of the LIA occurring between c. AD 1600-1800, yet ambiguities remain 
over its onset. Questions over the nature of early-nineteenth century variability were 
raised, particularly regarding the accuracy of the Nicholson et al. (2012) dataset, and 
will be examined further in Chapter 4. Independent comparison from written sources 
showed some coherence with proxy data, but should be treated with caution due to 
caveats concerning the sparse and temporally variable nature of the written sources. 
Therefore, while problems remain in establishing precise detail over the timing and 
extent of climate variability, the use of a range of data and inclusion of independent 
written sources has reduced uncertainties in prescribing the timing and magnitude of 
cool-dry and warm-wet periods. 
 
3.3.1 Palaeoclimate and society: towards scales of relevance 
Societal investigations regarding the significance of climate variability can now be 
informed with greater confidence by the conclusions reached in this chapter. Key 
points will hereafter be summarised for the two main areas and timescales subject to 
investigation, with an added summary of how this research impacts upon previous 
climate-related hypotheses for state formation in the Shashe-Limpopo basin. These 
particularly concern the timing of precipitation variability and its coincidence with 
societal development, and how this impacts upon the investigations on the interaction 
between climate variability and societal change in the later chapters. 
 
3.3.1.1 Shashe-Limpopo basin c. AD 900-1350 
The Limpopo Baobab record suggests that the overall trend in the Shashe-Limpopo 
basin was towards drier conditions, and is reinforced in the analysis of faunal remains 
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by Smith (2005). Caution must be applied when relating other palaeoclimate data to the 
Shashe-Limpopo basin, as local environmental factors, such as the rain shadow effect 
from the Soutspansberg range, play a strong role (Smith 2005). Nonetheless, that 
conditions were warmer and wetter when trajectories towards state formation began in 
the Shashe-Limpopo basin is a point of little contention. From the analysis in this 
chapter, it is clear that the climate was generally wetter through to c. AD 1200, with 
generally wetter conditions observed in some records up to the late thirteenth century. 
Despite the dominance of wet conditions, it is also apparent that a number of dry spells 
occurred in this area in the MCA. The most severe of these, picked up by the Limpopo 
Baobab tree-rings, lasted between c. AD 1030-1070, though the other local record of 
precipitation variability is not of a sufficient resolution to record this dry spell (Smith 
2005). Smith also notes a dry spell sometime between c. AD 1200 and 1260, but this is 
not reflected in the Baobab, where conditions remained relatively wet. 
 A similar divergence occurs regarding the suggested drier conditions in the 
basin at c. AD 1300 (Huffman 2008). The Baobab record does show a decline at this 
time, but the isotope record of Smith (2005) suggests wetter conditions remained until 
at least c. AD 1415. Other records from further afield, including the Lake Sibaya 
conductivity record, the T7 and T8 δ13C series, and the T7 grey scale records also 
indicate a dry spell at this point, and therefore Smith’s relatively low resolution 
evidence alone is insufficient to rule out the link between the decline of Mapungubwe 
and a trend towards drier conditions in the basin. Whether this trend represents the 
onset of the regional LIA, though, is not of prime importance for societal investigation. 
The uncertainties associated with linking climate variability and societal change in this 
period are particularly high for reasons of data availability, and thus will not form a 
significant component of the later analysis. 
 
3.3.1.2 Zambezi-Limpopo region c. AD 1400-1830 
Multi-centennial records from present-day Zimbabwe are unavailable prior to the late-
eighteenth century, and thus inference from a wider range of proxies is required. The 
moisture inferences from the range of proxies suggest that it is too simplistic to assert 
that Great Zimbabwe was abandoned in a warm-wet period, and therefore that climate 
could not have played any role in state dynamics in the period running up to its 
decline. For instance, the early-fifteenth century was relatively dry in numerous 
records (Figure 3.5), and although conditions trended towards wetter from around AD 
1450, this argument only allows for an abrupt collapse explanation, and rules out the 
possibility of persistent drier conditions eroding the resilience of the state. 
 Although the early-sixteenth century was generally wetter, there are a number 
of possible written references to climatic stress from the Mozambique coast, and these 
will be further investigated in Chapter 5. There are also a high number of written 
references to climatic stress in the Zambezi valley and Mutapa area in the mid- to late-
sixteenth century, where agreement between proxies mostly suggests a trend towards 
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drier conditions. Importantly, this period was characterised by high variability in 
precipitation (Figure 3.9), which may have been equally as significant for society as 
consistently drier conditions. The seventeenth century marked the beginning of the 
LIA and was generally dry, yet there are fewer references to climatic stress in the 
Zambezi-Limpopo area. In the eighteenth century, however, written references 
increase markedly in the Zambezi valley, Mutapa state and Mozambique coast. 
Although spatial differences in palaeoprecipitation were present in the LIA, it appears 
that the LIA imposed a general signal on patterns of local variability across the SRZ, 
thus providing a relatively consistent picture of climate variability. This either suggests 
that the severity of eighteenth century dry conditions translated into greater societal 
impacts, or that the differential vulnerability of societies over time was more 
important. These questions constitute key lines of investigation for Chapters 5 and 7. 
 
3.3.1.3 KwaZulu-Natal area c. AD 1750-1830 
The late-eighteenth century has been linked with the end of the regional LIA. Figure 
3.8 does not suggest that this is the case, with only marginally improved conditions 
evident in the latter half of this century. The KwaZulu-Natal proxy records from Lake 
Sibaya and Karkloof, however, indicate that an earlier recovery of precipitation began 
from at least c. AD 1770, which does not rule out hypotheses suggesting that this 
facilitated higher crop yields. Both of these records also infer an extended dry spell in 
the 1790s, which may relate to the mahlatule famine. That the early-nineteenth century 
was a period of highly variability precipitation is relatively clear, and as previously 
suggested, this may well be as important as the severity of dry or wet conditions. Yet 
further investigation is needed into the early part of the nineteenth century, where 
there exists considerable disagreement between proxy sources and the precipitation 
dataset of Nicholson et al. (2012). Indeed, it is critical to establish the climatic 
conditions in the early-nineteenth century if the significance of climate variability is to 
be understood alongside conflict and political centralisation. This will be investigated 
using ships’ logbooks in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Early-nineteenth century precipitation reconstructions 
from ships’ logbooks 
The previous two chapters have drawn attention to the limited knowledge of inter-
annual rainfall variability in the southern African SRZ before 1850, and particularly 
before 1820, where sparse written reference to and oral testimonies of drought 
currently remain the only utilised sources alongside palaeoclimate proxy data. Despite 
oral knowledge of the apparently drought-induced mahlatule famine at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, there exists almost no documentary coverage of climate variability 
in KwaZulu-Natal prior to the arrival of European traders in 1824, whose descriptions 
and observations on climate were generally thin. In addition to the caution expressed 
over the use of the Nicholson et al. (2012) precipitation indices, this lack of data means 
that new sources must be sought. One such source of historical climate data with an 
extensive spatial coverage (Figure 4.1) and high temporal resolution are the 
meteorological observations held within the ships’ logbooks of the European former 
colonial powers, which have received growing attention in recent years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1 Distribution of digitised English East India Company logbook observations (1789-
1834). Each black dot represents one observation. 
 
 Since the release of CLIWOC, these marine data have been used to reconstruct a 
range of climatological phenomena. Specifically, wind observations have been used in 
reconstructions of the North Atlantic Oscillation (Jones and Salmon 2005), North 
Atlantic sea-level pressure fields (Küttel et al. 2010), and atmospheric circulation in the 
English Channel (Wheeler et al. 2010). In the Southern Hemisphere, Neukom et al. 
(2014) used gridded CLIWOC-ICOADS (International Comprehensive Ocean-
Atmosphere Dataset) wind data (Küttel et al. 2010) from 1834 onwards to provide an 
independent verification for their 200-year SRZ and WRZ multi-proxy precipitation 
reconstructions. This chapter will incorporate wind observations from the EEIC 
(Brohan et al. 2012) and CLIWOC datasets in order to statistically reconstruct seasonal 
station precipitation in southern Africa from 1796-1854. 
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 Section 2.1.1.1 explained how wetter or drier seasonal conditions in both the 
SRZ and WRZ are strongly influenced by changes in the frequency, intensity and 
persistence of rainfall-producing weather systems (Mason and Jury 1997; Todd et al. 
2004; Williams et al. 2007). As regional rainfall-producing systems are in turn related to 
changes in atmospheric circulation around southern Africa, the marine observational 
data held within ships’ logbooks provide a unique means of statistically reconstructing 
past precipitation variability. By providing direct measurements, logbooks possess a 
significant advantage over proxy-based sources. They also differ from other 
documentary sources as they recorded information on airflow and circulation 
variations over a wide spatial area, factors important in any explanation of changes in 
past precipitation patterns (Wheeler et al. 2010). As there is no overlap of the early-
nineteenth century logbook data with the instrumental station measurements, 
however, this investigation will first use reanalysis data to determine the statistical 
relationship between wind and precipitation in the area. 
 
4.1 Data and methods 
4.1.1 Reanalysis data 
The wind data that will be used to assess the relationships between wind and 
precipitation are taken from the NCEP-DOE Reanalysis 2 dataset (Kanamitsu et al. 
2002). The reanalysis assimilates available observations, including pressure, 
temperature, and humidity using model forecasts, providing a physical picture of the 
climate at consistent time-steps from 1979 onwards. The climatological variables used 
from the reanalysis are the u- (west-east) and v- (south-north) components of the wind. 
These are selected as the most common weather observations in the logbooks are wind 
direction and force. The u- and v-wind components are first re-gridded to an 8° x 8° 
latitude-longitude grid in accordance with previous studies (Gallego et al. 2005; Jones 
and Salmon 2005; Küttel et al. 2010), as this resolution gives a balance between 
incorporating as high a data density as possible in the corresponding logbook data, 
without obscuring or oversimplifying the spatial relationships between marine wind 
and continental rainfall. Both a 2° x 2° and 5° x 5° resolution were also tested in a 
sensitivity study (not shown), and while the spatial extent of significantly correlated 
grid boxes was slightly wider, the coverage of the logbook data in each grid box was 
inadequate to produce seasonal aggregations. As well as the relationships between 
wind and precipitation, the spatial domain will also be determined by the availability 
of digitised logbook data in the historical period, which is discussed in Section 4.1.3. 
 
4.1.2 Station data 
The station precipitation records were obtained from both the South African Weather 
Service and the Global Historical Climatology Network, though only stations which 
have complete precipitation records for the period 1979-2008 are used (Figure 4.2; 
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Table 4.1). This period is chosen as many station records have significant gaps in the 
preceding decades. This applies to much of KwaZulu-Natal and the portion of the 
Eastern Cape that falls within the SRZ, areas which are particularly sensitive to 
variability in atmospheric circulation over the oceans (Mason and Jury 1997; Tyson and 
Preston-Whyte 2000). Additionally, given that this recent period marks the beginning 
of satellite data entering the reanalysis, and a higher input of observational data, it is 
likely that the data are of a superior quality to those prior to this period. To select the 
stations where marine wind influences are significant, the 8° x 8° seasonally resolved 
NCEP-DOE wind vectors within the study domain are correlated with the station data. 
Both datasets are detrended before correlation. Of the total 19 stations with significant 
correlations at p <0.05 (Figure 4.2), 15 are located within the South African portion of 
the SRZ, with two stations in the WRZ. This gives a relatively wide spatial coverage of 
areas most influenced by tropical-temperate systems and the westerly storm tracks, 
with several stations located in most of the South African provinces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2 Map of southern African station precipitation records used in the study. 
 
4.1.3 Ships’ logbook wind data 
The keeping of logbooks by ship officers was an important duty. All matters relating to 
the navigation of the ship were recorded at daily or sub-daily intervals, helping to 
ensure that the ships could transport goods as quickly and safely as possible (Ward 
and Wheeler 2012). Few such matters were more critical than the wind, weather and 
state of the sea, which played a large part in determining the speed and direction of the 
ship. Recently, digitisation of this climatic information in the thousands of logbooks 
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held in archives in the UK, Spain, Netherlands and France resulted in the development 
of the CLIWOC project (García-Herrera et al. 2005a; Können and Koek, 2005). The 
current version 2.1 of this database holds 281,920 records between 1662-1855, with 
99.6% of available data falling between 1750-1855. In addition to CLIWOC, the later 
digitisation of 891 EEIC logbooks provided a further 273,000 records of a similar spatial 
extent between the years 1789-1834. 
 
TABLE 4.1 Reconstruction statistics for each station significantly correlated with NCEP-DOE u-
wind (1979-2008). 
Station Mean annual 
precipitation (mm) 
Grid 
boxes 
Explained 
variance 
r (first 
PC) 
RE r (validation 
time series) 
Bethlehem 698.43 4 85, 12, 2, 1 -0.5108 0.27 0.5262 
Bloemfontein 551.94 3 36, 33, 30, 0 0.5791 0.22 0.4852 
Calvinia 201.99 2 90, 10, 0, 0 0.5370 0.21 0.4872 
Cape Town 541.61 5 53, 32, 9, 5 0.6703 0.40 0.6338 
Cedara 839.23 4 73, 18, 7, 2 -0.5473 0.22 0.4802 
De Aar 332.05 2 95, 5, 0, 0 -0.4481 0.12 0.3624 
Frankfort 664.27 5 70, 21, 6, 0.2 -0.6279 0.2 0.4725 
Harare 690.01 3 64, 33, 0.2, 0 -0.4627 0.08 0.3177 
Johannesburg 745.78 2 64, 36, 0, 0 -0.4902 0.13 0.3853 
Kimberley 412.81 1 100, 0, 0, 0 -0.3685 0.09 0.3117 
Mount 
Edgecombe 
962.84 5 78, 17, 4, 1 -0.5824 0.26 0.5107 
Mthatha 657.01 5 73, 15, 1, 0 -0.8125 0.61 0.7801 
Noupoort 380.65 2 95, 5, 0, 0 -0.5440 0.23 0.4807 
Pretoria 657.87 4 68, 18, 10, 4 -0.5501 0.1 0.3588 
Royal National 
Park 
1223.11 4 85, 12, 2, 1 -0.6763 0.43 0.6556 
Rustenburg 575.84 2 72, 28, 0, 0 0.5177 0.22 0.4744 
Skukuza 586.55 1 100, 0, 0, 0 -0.3813 0.05 0.2772 
Upington  3 66, 19, 13, 2 -0.4690 0.1 0.3502 
Windhoek 342.79 1 100, 0, 0, 0 -0.3910 -0.04 0.1661 
 
 Similarly to the distribution of modern marine data, observations from these 
digitisation projects cluster predominantly along established strategic routes, leaving 
certain areas, such as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans densely covered with data points, 
and others, like the Pacific, data deficient. One route covered in both datasets was the 
voyage from England to India and China, which generally took around two years. 
Before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, sailing ships travelling between England 
and the Indies had to follow a route constrained by the global wind fields. This meant 
sailing southwest through to the Southern Hemisphere westerlies, rounding the Cape 
of Good Hope, and then using either the Mozambique Channel or the westerly winds 
between 35-40°S before sailing north to India or China (Figure 4.3). The return voyage 
was a direct route round the Cape using the easterly trades, north west into the mid-
Atlantic and then to England with the westerlies (Brohan et al. 2012). The oceans 
surrounding South Africa are consequently among the global areas with the highest 
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data density, while the fact that the routes necessarily followed circulation systems 
makes the data suitable for reconstructing circulation-related variables, offering a 
previously unprecedented insight into the weather and climate of the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3 A. Distribution of English East India Company observations (1789-1834). B. 
Distribution of CLIWOC observations (1750-1854), the solid line indicates the gridded 8° x 8° 
domain of the study and C. Annual frequency of logbook observations within the domain, 
showing all records (grey) and records with complete wind vector information (black). 
 
 The spatial domain is partially determined by the availability of logbook 
observations. Following the methodology of Gallego et al. (2005), Jones and Salmon 
(2005), Küttel et al. (2010), and Neukom et al. (2014) the logbook observations are 
averaged and aggregated to seasonally resolved 8° x 8° grid boxes to ensure that 
meaningful wind information of a high enough density are present, and are thereafter 
transformed into the u- and v-components of the wind. The domain thus covers the 
oceanic areas between 25-41°S and 4-52°E. A total of 56,042 records were obtained in 
this area between 1750-1854 from the combined datasets. Only records with complete 
information on date, coordinates, wind direction and wind speed were used, lessening 
the total to 31,367. This high number of missing wind direction and/or speed records 
(Figure 4.3) is only present in the EEIC data, where budget constraints meant that 
digitisation priority was given to the pressure and temperature data in the logbooks 
(Brohan et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the wind vector data incorporated from the EEIC 
collection provides a significant amount of data for the early-nineteenth century where 
data density was previously insufficient (Neukom et al. 2014). 
 The observations recorded in logbooks were generally taken at the local noon. 
Three categories common to all observations are wind direction, wind speed and 
general descriptions of the state of the weather, the first two of which are of particular 
interest. These records were converted to the International Marine Meteorological 
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Archive format (Woodruff 2007), requiring several corrections which were made prior 
to release of the data. 
 Each of the observations are spatially and temporally referenced by date and 
coordinates. Longitudes, typically determined by dead-reckoning, were corrected to 
present-day coordinates. Wind direction was usually recorded on a 32-point magnetic 
compass, using expressions such as north-west-by-west. As instrumental data these 
contain little ambiguity, but were converted from the magnetic north to the true north 
(see Brohan et al. 2012; Wheeler et al. 2010). Wind speed observations are prone to a 
higher degree of subjectivity in their recording as they were estimated by reference to 
the state of the sea. Standardised vocabulary for assessing wind force was not in place 
until the adoption of the Beaufort Scale in the 1830s, yet even prior to this sailors were 
consistent in their description of the winds (Ward and Wheeler, 2013; Wheeler, 2005). 
This meant that wind force terms could be quantitatively re-expressed in modern 
Beaufort force equivalents using the multilingual CLIWOC wind force dictionary, and 
then to 10-m winds in ms-1 (see Wheeler 2005; Wheeler and Wilkinson, 2005). Of the 
descriptive wind speed terms in the CLIWOC database, 99% could be converted to 
Beaufort Scale equivalents, while this figure was around 80% for the EEIC data. 
Statistical investigation into the quality of these data by comparing observations from 
vessels sailing in convoy was performed by Wheeler (2005), the data were found to be 
highly reliable. For further details on wind direction and speed measurements and 
their corrections and conversions, the reader is referred to García-Herrera et al. (2005b); 
Wheeler and Wilkinson (2005) and Brohan et al. (2012). The digitised data from the 
EEIC do also provide some instrumental records, including thermometer and 
barometer observations. These data will not be considered here, however, as the 
pressure data, which may be used to infer precipitation, are generally too sparse to be 
used in a reconstruction. 
 
4.1.4 Logbook data pre-processing 
As previously stated, the oceans adjacent to southern Africa are relatively well-covered 
with logbook observations in comparison to oceanic areas surrounding most other 
landmasses. Nevertheless, using spatially and temporally variable data requires careful 
data pre-processing. Figure 4.3 displays the inter-annual variability in the number of 
CLIWOC-EEIC records. From 1796 onwards the available wind vector records in the 
study domain mostly exceed 300 annual observations, with peaks of well over 500 
records around the turn of the nineteenth century and in the late 1840s. Minimum 
availability is observed in the 1830s, though most of this is accounted for by less austral 
winter voyages, meaning observations in the austral summer months remain generally 
consistent throughout the period. Intra-annual availability of observations is also 
variable. October has consistently low numbers of records, and is therefore omitted 
from the SRZ reconstructions, which consist of the austral summer months of 
November-March. This does not significantly alter summer rainfall totals as there is 
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generally less rainfall in October than all other months in the SRZ rainy season. Six 
months (April-September) were used for the WRZ. 
 Given the inter-annual variability in the quantity of observations, it is 
important that a compromise is reached between maximising the number of 
seasonally-resolved grid boxes, and increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of the wind 
data (Küttel et al. 2010). This means that the true wind conditions are assumed to be 
well-captured by the available records at a specific grid box during a particular year. 
To reduce the noise component due to undersampling, Küttel et al. (2010) and Neukom 
et al. (2014) used a threshold where only seasons with at least three records in each 8° x 
8° grid box were used. In this case, owing to the increased data coverage with the 
additional EEIC data (Figure 4.4), grid boxes are only included where an absolute 
minimum of one-tenth of seasonal days have observations. Where this was not the 
case, grid boxes are longitudinally interpolated from adjacent grid boxes exceeding this 
threshold based on the difference between their corresponding 1979-2008 mean in the 
NCEP-DOE reanalysis data. Higher thresholds were tested, but these did not improve 
the resolved variance in the reconstructions (not shown). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.4 A. Average number of NDJFM records in each 8° x 8° grid box between 1796-1854 
and B. average number of AMJJAS records in each 8° x 8° grid box. 
 
4.1.5 Reconstructing precipitation 
To establish regression models between wind and precipitation at various southern 
African stations, reanalysis wind data are used. The wind data are tested for suitability 
as precipitation predictors by correlating the gridded NCEP-DOE wind vectors against 
each of the station records obtained (Figure 4.2) over the period 1979-2008. Both of 
these datasets are first detrended to avoid potential spurious correlations due to 
timeseries having unrelated trends. The four stations with the highest r values from the 
correlation for u-wind are shown in Figure 4.5, while v-wind gave less significant 
results for the majority of stations and was consequently omitted (not shown). The 
plots are consistent with the discussion in the first section, and show that strengthened 
easterliness (lower u-wind) in the southwest Indian and southeast Atlantic Oceans is 
correlated with increased precipitation in the ‘rain-year’ months of November-March 
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at SRZ stations. By contrast, strengthened westerliness (higher u-wind) in the southeast 
Atlantic is significantly correlated with higher precipitation in the WRZ rainy season 
months of April-September. These results show an influence of large-scale atmospheric 
circulation on precipitation in these regions, and link to wind speed and direction over 
adjacent oceanic areas. Importantly, these grid cells correspond with those in the path 
of the major shipping routes, and are thus suitable predictor variables to allow for 
statistical reconstructions. 
 For each station, the grid boxes significantly correlated at p <0.05 were selected 
for the reconstructions. Principal Component (PC) analysis is performed over these 
areas, meaning the variables are reduced to a dataset containing fewer variables which 
separated the dominant patterns of spatial variability from unnecessary noise, and 
importantly are not correlated. Non-detrended seasonal mean u-wind data are used to 
perform the PC analysis in the domain, as the statistical relationships derived here are 
later applied to the seasonally aggregated logbook wind data. The first PC explains 
most of the variance in the significantly correlated areas of the u-wind data for each 
station record at 73% for Mthatha, 85% for Royal National Park, 78% for Mount 
Edgecombe, and 53% for Cape Town (Table 4.1). It also gives the highest correlation 
values with station precipitation. Principal Component Regression (PCR) is then used 
to reconstruct precipitation (see Luterbacher et al. 2002 for a full outline of this 
technique). The calibration with the predictand is performed over the period 1979-2008, 
where the greatest number of stations with complete records is available. For 
independent verification of the reconstruction, cross-validation is used (Wilks 2005), as 
the 30-year period would be inadequate if a substantial portion of it is reserved for a 
validation sample. This technique repeatedly divides the data into calibration and 
short validation data subsets, meaning the PCR is performed 30 times, each time 
estimating a different year not included in the calibration data. Two years on either 
side of the validation year are left out, meaning that the reconstructed time step is 
uncorrelated with all time steps used for model calibration. The final model for the 
reconstructions is therefore calibrated using data for each of the 30 years, which are 
then concatenated to produce a validation record. The performance of the statistical 
reconstruction is first assessed by calculating Reduction of Error (RE) skill scores (Cook 
et al. 1994) (Table 4.1; Figure 4.6). RE scores range from -∞ to +1, where 1 indicates 
perfect agreement with the predictand, the station data, 0 means that the 
reconstruction is as good as the climatology, and negative RE scores indicate that the 
reconstruction contains no meaningful information. Second, the reconstructed 
timeseries from the wind data are correlated with the observed precipitation. 
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FIGURE 4.5 Correlation of the detrended NCEP-DOE Reanalysis 8° x 8° u-wind and detrended 
station precipitation 1979-2008. Only squares with statistically significant correlations (p <0.05) 
are shown. Note that Cape Town uses winter rainfall months (AMJJAS). 
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Reconstruction skill 
The reconstruction skill of u-wind is spatially variable. The highest RE scores are 
observed for those stations with the greatest number of significantly correlated grid 
boxes included as predictors, with Cape Town and Royal National Park each having 
values ≥0.4, and Mthatha >0.6 (Figures 4.6 and 4.7). While Royal National Park is 
considerably further inland than Cape Town or Mthatha, the data recorded in the 
logbooks capture not only maritime climate, but the regional atmospheric circulation 
which is important for precipitation at this station (Mason and Jury 1997; Reason and 
Jagadeesha 2005). Weaker, though positive RE values are observed further inland, with 
only Windhoek displaying no reconstruction skill. This is most likely due to the greater 
influence of the strength of the southeasterly trades in the eastern South Atlantic on 
precipitation at Windhoek, an area which was excluded from the analysis domain. 
Reduced reconstruction skill is likely to be a consequence of other forcing mechanisms 
and local effects explaining precipitation variability which the PCs do not capture, 
while most of the inland stations are much drier than those in the coastal and southeast 
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areas of South Africa. Similarly to the RE, the highest correlation coefficients are 
observed at Mthatha (r = 0.78), Cape Town (r = 0.63) and Royal National Park (r = 
0.67). These stations were chosen to be reconstructed, but nine other stations also have 
significantly correlated timeseries’ at p <0 .05 (Table S1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.6 A. Calibration period-derived Reduction of Error skill scores and B. correlation 
coefficients for selected stations across the Summer and Winter Rainfall Zones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.7 Reconstructed (red line) and observed precipitation (black line) from NCEP-DOE 
u-wind 1979-2008 at four stations with the highest RE values. 
 
4.2.2 Precipitation reconstructions 
The summer season precipitation reconstructions for Mthatha and Royal National 
Park, derived from applying the statistical relationships established in the calibration 
period to the logbook data, are shown in Figure 4.8. The axis years are dated by the 
November and December months but refer to the entire SRZ ‘rain-year’. The thin black 
line shows the inter-annual values, while the thicker black line is the 7-year running 
mean. The grey error bars are confidence intervals, which cover the true value with a 
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probability of 95%. They are defined as ±1.96 standard deviations of the residuals from 
the model calibration as during the calibration period about 95% of the true 
precipitation values lay inside an interval of this size. As just one 8° x 8° grid box was 
the difference between the predictor networks for the two SRZ stations in Figure 4.8, 
the reconstructed inter-annual values are very similar, while the reconstruction for 
Mount Edgecombe displayed an identical curve to Mthatha as the predictor network 
was the same and is therefore not shown. 
 Although all decadal anomalies for the SRZ stations are within the error bars 
relative to the 1979-2008 mean (±147.6 mm), t-tests are conducted to test whether the 
difference in mean decadal conditions is significant. For the SRZ stations, the decades 
beginning in 1810 and 1820 are statistically significantly different (p <0.02), with the 
1810s being wetter than the 1820s, while no significant difference is observed between 
the other decades. The most severe dry conditions of the reconstructions (exceeding -1 
standard deviations from the 1979-2008 mean) are 1796-97, 1805-06, 1820-21, 1826-28, 
1829-30, 1831-32 and 1841-42. The wettest years (exceeding +1 standard deviations 
from the 1979-2008 mean) were 1812-13, 1818-20, 1830-31, 1835-36, and 1845-46.  
 At Cape Town (Figure 4.8), in the WRZ, conducting t-tests on the decadal 
differences reveals that the 1820s and 1830s are significantly different (p <0.025); the 
1820s being wetter than the 1830s, although three years in the 1830s had too few wind 
observations to reconstruct precipitation. No significant difference is found between 
the other decades in the period. Pronounced dry conditions (below -1 standard 
deviations from the calibration period mean) are reconstructed in the WRZ rain season 
in 1806, 1808, 1812, 1818, 1820, 1832, 1836, 1840 and 1847. Wetter conditions (exceeding 
+1 standard deviations from the calibration period mean) are observed in 1801, 1804, 
1813, 1824, 1827, and 1849 and 1850. 
 Examination of the changing variability in the reconstruction period is 
conducted by calculating the 7-year running standard deviation. For the Mthatha 
reconstruction (Figure 4.9), f-tests revealed 1820-21 to 1836-37 as a period with 
consistently high rainfall variability, being significantly different at p <0.01 from 
periods between 1803-04 to 1819-20 and 1837-38 to 1853-54, where reduced rainfall 
variability is observed. For Cape Town, variability is fairly constant throughout the 
reconstruction period (Figure 4.10). 
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FIGURE 4.8 Reconstructed 1796-1853 November-March precipitation for A. Mthatha, B. Royal 
National Park and C. reconstructed April-September precipitation for Cape Town. The thin 
black line indicates the inter-annual precipitation given as the difference from the 1979-2008 
mean (note the difference between the three y axes). The thicker black line is the 7-year running 
mean. The thin grey lines show the 95% confidence intervals. The SRZ station years are dated 
by the Nov/Dec. 
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4.2.3 Atmospheric circulation 
In order to further examine the wind patterns associated with the reconstructed 
precipitation variability, summer and winter indices of atmospheric circulation are 
produced (Figures 4.9 and 4.10). These are calculated by aggregating the wind 
direction observations to the four cardinal compass points, as demonstrated by 
Wheeler and Suarez-Dominguez (2006), which combine to produce measures of the 
proportional frequency of days with winds blowing from the east and west, giving 
further insight into the circulation dynamics influencing precipitation. This technique 
also yields some extra wind information from the EEIC data, as some of those data 
with only wind direction or wind speed records could be utilised where this was not 
possible in the reconstructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.9 A. Proportional frequency of November-March zonal winds in the leading 
Principal Component for the Mthatha grid boxes, B. 7-year running standard deviation for 
precipitation at Mthatha (middle panel), and C. El Niño events identified by Quinn and Neal 
(1995) (top) and Ortlieb (2000): M – moderate, S – strong, VS – very strong; and Garcia-Herrera 
(2008): 1 – probably El Niño, 2 – possible El Niño (lower panel). 
 
 Figure 4.9 reveals the proportional frequency of winds from the east and west 
in the area of the leading PC for Mthatha (shown in Figure 4.5). As previously outlined, 
when the easterly component of the wind is stronger, precipitation at Mthatha is 
higher, while increased westerliness is associated with reduced precipitation. From the 
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beginning of the reconstruction period to 1810-11, westerliness exceeds easterliness in 
all except three years. This situation reverses in the period 1810-11 to 1824-25, where 10 
out of 15 years are characterised by a higher proportion of winds from the east. 
Following this, easterliness exceeds westerliness in only six of the years to 1853-54. The 
period of increased reconstructed precipitation variability between 1818-19 to 1836-37, 
identified in the running standard deviation, can therefore be linked to highly variable 
shifts in the zonal wind. In comparison, the winter season wind direction index (Figure 
4.10) shows a relatively consistent proportional frequency of westerly and easterly 
winds throughout the period. These findings are now discussed in comparison with 
other regional rainfall reconstructions and possible ENSO forcing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.10 A. Proportional frequency of April-September zonal winds in the leading 
Principal Component for the Cape Town grid boxes and B. 7-year running standard deviation 
for precipitation at Cape Town. 
 
4.3 Assessing early-nineteenth century precipitation variability 
4.3.1 Comparison with other regional records 
The precipitation reconstructions can be directly compared with other southern 
African records of early-nineteenth century rainfall variability with inter-annual 
resolution. The records selected for comparison are the multi-proxy records for the SRZ 
and WRZ (Neukom et al. 2014), which are made up of various documentary, 
instrumental and natural proxy records, the semi-quantitative documentary-derived 
rainfall records for Lesotho (Nash and Grab, 2010), the Eastern and Southern Cape 
(Vogel, 1989), and the Western Cape proxy-documentary wetness index produced by 
Nicholson et al. (2012). Those for the SRZ are compared with the Mthatha 
reconstruction in Figure 4.11. 
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FIGURE 4.11 Comparison of the Mthatha reconstruction and other Summer Rainfall Zone 
reconstructions. The Summer Rainfall Zone multi-proxy is from Neukom et al. (2014), the 
Eastern Cape and Lesotho records are reconstructed from documentary evidence by Vogel 
(1989) and Nash and Grab (2010) respectively. The scale of the documentary reconstructions 
ranges from 2 (wet) to -2 (dry). The darker shaded bars extending across the plots indicate inter-
annual correspondence of wetter conditions in the records, and the lighter bars correspondence 
of drier conditions. Note the difference in reference mean periods of the logbook and multi-
proxy reconstructions. 
 
 Though correlation between SRZ records is statistically insignificant, the 
comparison of records reveals some correspondence on both inter-annual and decadal 
scales. The period to 1810 had two major dry spells, the summers of 1796-97 and 1805-
06, which are picked up by both records. The generally drier years at the end of the 
eighteenth century may correspond to the mahlatule famine, while the latter drought is 
also noted by Eldredge (1992). Although wetter conditions are observed in both the 
logbook and multi-proxy records between 1810-20, little inter-annual correspondence 
is present excluding the normal conditions in 1811-12 and the wet summer of 1818-19. 
The 1820s was the driest decade in the period in both the logbook reconstruction and 
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the SRZ multi-proxy record, although the latter still received slightly above average 
precipitation. The drier years in the Mthatha record are towards the late 1820s, which 
agrees with the Eastern Cape record (Vogel 1989), as well as references to drought in 
Mozambique (Newitt 1988) and the reference to drier conditions in KwaZulu-Natal by 
Isaacs (1836), which are assessed in Chapters 5 and 6. The drier years in the multi-
proxy reconstruction, however, are shown to be at the beginning of the 1820s, while 
very little correspondence is observed with the Lesotho chronology beginning in 1824. 
Improved coherence between records is observed in the 1830s, particularly with the 
multi-proxy and Lesotho records. The summer of 1830-31 was wet at Mthatha and in 
the multi-proxy reconstruction, while wet summers were observed in these records in 
1832-34 and 1835-36. In the late 1830s, normal to relatively dry conditions prevailed at 
Mthatha and in the multi-proxy record. Agreement with the Lesotho record is shown 
in the relatively dry summer of 1837-38, while the documentary Eastern Cape 
chronology gives very dry conditions for these years. The 1840s showed reasonable 
correspondence between records, with the drier summer of 1842-43 reflected in all four 
records being followed by three wetter summers (1842-46), each of which are picked 
up by the multi-proxy record, two by the Eastern Cape record, though only one by the 
Lesotho chronology. Relatively drier conditions are registered in each record except for 
the Eastern Cape at the beginning of the 1850s. In addition, two of the three southern 
Africa-wide droughts identified by Kelso and Vogel (2007) in this period were reflected 
in the SRZ logbook reconstructions, those in 1820-21 and 1825-27. 
 The regional comparison of records for the WRZ is shown in Figure 4.12. Again, 
a statistically insignificant correlation is present between the Cape Town and multi-
proxy record, which for the overlapping period is comprised of the Die Bos tree-ring 
record (Dunwiddie and LaMarche 1980) and two documentary datasets (Kelso and 
Vogel 2007; Vogel 1989). Lower frequency variability indicated by the 7-year running 
mean shows slightly better correspondence, with both records showing a decrease in 
precipitation in the 1830s, and increasing precipitation towards the end of the record. 
The longest other contemporaneous inter-annual record from the WRZ is the proxy-
documentary record marked as region 84 in the wetness index by Nicholson et al. 
(2012). Correlating the wetness values with the logbook reconstructed precipitation 
record gives a weakly significant value of r = 0.23 (p <0.10). 
 Relatively normal precipitation relative to the 1979-2008 mean prevailed at 
Cape Town until 1812, with two anomalously wet years (1801 and 1804) and one very 
dry winter (1806), two of which are picked up by the Western Cape proxy-
documentary record (Nicholson et al. 2012). Relatively dry conditions were present 
until 1821, with notably drier conditions occurring in the available WRZ records at this 
time shown in Figure 4.12 in the winters of 1819 and 1820. Conditions were relatively 
wet until 1824, with coherence between the Cape Town and multi-proxy records 
observed in 1822 and 1824. The multi-proxy and documentary reconstructions then 
show a three-year dry period, in which two of these years are not reflected in the 
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logbook reconstruction. Little agreement is present between records from 1829-1832, 
however, the mid- and late-1830s show the greatest correspondence between records, 
with very dry conditions occurring in most years. Unfortunately, some winters were 
unable to be reconstructed from the logbook data as the data density was poor, though 
those that were reconstructed were consistently lower than the 1979-2008 mean. 
Conditions were relatively variable towards the end of the reconstruction, with some 
dry years, notably 1846, reflected across each of the records. 1850, a very wet year in 
the WRZ, was also reflected across each of the four records shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.12 Comparison of the Cape Town reconstruction and other Winter Rainfall Zone 
reconstructions. The Winter Rainfall Zone multi-proxy is from Neukom et al. (2014), the 
Western Cape and Southern Cape records are reconstructed from documentary evidence by 
Nicholson et al. (2012) and Vogel (1989) respectively. Note that the scale of the documentary 
reconstruction for the Nicholson et al. (2012) reconstruction ranges from 3 (very wet) to -3 (very 
dry), while that of Vogel (1989) ranges from 2 (wet) to -2 (dry). The darker shaded bars indicate 
inter-annual correspondence of wetter conditions in the records, and the lighter bars drier 
conditions. Note the difference in reference mean periods of the logbook and multi-proxy 
reconstructions. 
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 Although some correspondence is found between the records, inter-annual 
variability often differs, with occasional notable differences between certain 
reconstructions. A major reason for this may be that the multi-proxy data are 
composed of very different sources influenced by various forcing mechanisms across a 
wide spatial area, each of which may have a local bias. For instance, in the SRZ, the 
tree-ring chronology from Zimbabwe by Therrell et al. (2006), representative of ITCZ-
forced precipitation levels, and the Ifaty Reef Indian Ocean coral record by Zinke et al. 
(2004), sensitive to changes in sea-surface temperatures, were combined with 
documentary records from Lesotho, the Eastern Cape, and the Kalahari. Although a 
general coherence of summer rainfall totals across the SRZ exists, inter-annual 
variability between areas is present. While the WRZ is considerably smaller than the 
SRZ, inter-annual variability between documentary records still exists. Despite the 
relatively high RE values and correlation coefficients in the calibration period, a 
limitation of this approach is that there may also be other mechanisms of precipitation 
variability reflected in the other records that are not captured by the regression 
relationships with the wind data, such as intensified anticyclonic circulation over 
southern Africa (Mason and Jury 1997). Moreover, the logbook reconstruction itself is 
based upon spatially and temporally variable data incorporated according to pre-
processing criteria, it is therefore also possible that changes in wind speed may be 
more rapid than that captured by the sample, although by using seasonal means it is 
hoped that this may be minimised. Certainly, the potential to increase the data density 
by incorporating the yet to be digitised EEIC logbook observations would further 
improve the reconstructions. 
 
4.3.2 Droughts and ENSO events in the Summer Rainfall Zone 
ENSO warm events, or El Niño events, are associated with drought over areas of 
southern Africa, with a strong response in the southeast (Rocha and Simmonds 1997; 
Nash and Grab, 2010). This is particularly evident in the summer immediately after an 
El Niño event, with the greatest rainfall reductions occurring between January and 
March (Nicholson 2000). According to Mason and Jury (1997) and Tyson and Preston-
Whyte (2000), El Niño events are followed by a northward shift of the westerlies in the 
southern African sector, leading to a diminution of moisture convergence and a 
dominance of dry conditions. 
 Relating patterns in summer atmospheric circulation to the semi-quantitative 
documentary reconstructions of ENSO warm events by Quinn and Neal (1995) and 
Ortlieb (2000) (Figure 4.9), some potentially noteworthy patterns emerge. Although not 
attempting to over-attribute cause, 14 of the 18 El Niño years identified by Quinn and 
Neal (1995) in the period of the logbook reconstruction coincided with an increase in or 
above average westerliness the following summer, while this number is 11 out of 15 for 
the revised chronology by Ortlieb (2000). Furthermore, the only El Niño event in the 
time period identified as ‘very strong’ in both records, in 1828, coincides with the 
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highest proportional frequency of westerliness and the second driest year in the record. 
Given the high concentration of El Niño events reported in both documentary records 
between 1814 and 1832, it may also be possible that this is linked to the increased inter-
annual rainfall variability calculated in the 7-year running standard deviation (Figure 
4.19), and also the high variability in this period shown in Figure 3.9. Despite this 
association with the two chronologies listed above, less correspondence is observed 
with El Niño events reconstructed in the most recent documentary chronology by 
García-Herrera et al. (2008), with only four out of 14 summers following El Niño events 
having increased or above average westerliness. As inferred by the difference in 
correspondence, discrepancies exist between El Niño events in the records, including a 
suggested overestimation of events by Quinn and Neal (1995) due to both 
inappropriate interpretation of documents and the inclusion of reports from areas 
where ENSO teleconnections are uncertain (García-Herrera et al. 2008). The level of 
correspondence between El Niño events and summer westerliness, therefore, is 
dependent on the record used for comparison. 
 In addition to discrepancies between records, it is important to note that while 
most El Niño events recorded in Quinn and Neal (1995) and Ortlieb (2000) appear to 
coincide with increased westerliness, they do not always result in reduced rainfall at 
Mthatha or Royal National Park. A total of 11 out of the 18 years following El Niño 
events in the Quinn and Neal (1995) record are marked by a decrease in precipitation, 
while this figure is eight out of 15 for the years identified by Ortlieb (2000). 
Furthermore, in both records, only three out of the seven severely dry years noted in 
the results section - 1805-06, 1820-21, and 1829-30 - are in years following El Niño 
events in both records. That two out of these three events, however, are rated as 
‘strong’ and ‘very strong’ perhaps suggests that the incidence of stronger ENSO warm 
events is more likely to result in such severe decreases in precipitation in southeast 
southern Africa, while a weaker atmospheric response and consequently weaker 
precipitation anomaly is generally present in events of a moderate strength. This also 
suggests that whilst El Niño events appear to have an important influence on 
atmospheric circulation according to two of the chronologies, the precise nature of the 
relationship is more complex, and that they are not the only cause of drier conditions 
in southern Africa (Nicholson 2000; Nash and Grab 2010). Furthermore, as the 
Southern Hemisphere westerlies shift poleward in La Niña events (L’Heureux and 
Thompson 2006; Seager et al. 2007), it is possible that the consequences of La Niña 
conditions are captured in the wind data in years with increased easterliness (Figure 
4.9). However, the resultant wetter conditions may be under-recorded in the 
documentary records, which is a common issue in reconstructions from written sources 
(Kelso and Vogel 2007; Nash and Grab 2010), as is reaffirmed by those compiled in 
Table 3.5. 
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4.4 Summary 
By establishing statistical relationships between wind and precipitation using 
reanalysis data, this chapter has presented precipitation reconstructions at selected 
southern African weather stations for the period 1796-1854. Results for the SRZ stations 
showed that the 1810s was the wettest decade of the period, while the 1820s was the 
driest. At Cape Town in the WRZ, the reconstruction revealed the 1820s to be the 
wettest decade, while the 1830s, although having some missing years, was shown to be 
the driest decade of the time period. A degree of correspondence was registered 
between the logbook reconstruction and other records, although frequent differences in 
inter-annual observations were registered. Moreover, potentially important 
correspondence was observed between the dry years in the late-1820s in the SRZ 
reconstructions and the more sparse written reference to drought shown in Table 3.5. 
Discrepancies in correspondence may be due to the spatial extent of certain records, or 
their sensitivity to alternative or local forcing factors. Nevertheless, the SRZ 
reconstruction did pick up two of the three southern Africa-wide drought episodes 
identified by Kelso and Vogel (2007) in 1820-21 and 1825-27. 
 Identification of causation in past rainfall variability should be treated with 
caution. However, comparison of the El Niño records by Quinn and Neal (1995) and 
Ortlieb (2000) revealed that in all but four of the El Niño years identified by each 
record respectively, westerliness in the following summer increased or was above 
average for the period. Despite this, the strength of atmospheric response following El 
Niño events differed, and not all events were followed by markedly dry summers. 
Reduced correspondence was present with the independent chronology of García-
Herrera et al. (2008). This therefore cautions against strong causal linkages with 
documentary-reconstructed El Niño events in this period without further investigation. 
 By providing highly-resolved and reliable observations for the oceans 
surrounding southern Africa, the logbooks have offered new and independent insight 
into the past atmospheric circulation and precipitation patterns in the region. That the 
logbook data are not proxy-based but are the result of direct observations, recorded to 
a common standard, is a significant advantage, the value of which has been 
demonstrated in this study. Importantly for this thesis, the SRZ records can now be 
used for consideration of climate-society interaction in Chapters 5 and 6, where inter-
annual knowledge of precipitation variability prior to 1820 was previously sparse. 
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Chapter 5. Vulnerability and response to climate variability in 
the Zambezi-Limpopo region (c. AD 1450-1830) 
The impacts of climate variability have been suggested as an important contributory 
factor in historical societal development in the Zambezi-Limpopo area (Newitt 1995; 
Tyson et al. 2002; Pikirayi 2003; Holmgren and Öberg 2006; Huffman 2008), yet there 
remains a lack of detailed consideration of the interaction between climate and society 
in this region, particularly after written sources become available in the early-sixteenth 
century. The nature and uncertainties of climate variability over this period have, to an 
extent, been clarified in Chapter 3. The mediating human context upon which this 
impacted, however, is poorly understood, with high vulnerability and the ‘dislocation’ 
of society in times of climatic stress often assumed as a matter of course. This chapter 
will investigate the dynamics of interaction between climate variability and society and 
its significance in societal change in southeast Africa between c. 1450-1830. This begins 
with the decline of Great Zimbabwe, spans the growth and diminution of the Mutapa 
state and the Manyika and Teve polities, as well Portuguese influence, and ends with 
the arrival of Nguni-speaking communities in the 1820s and 1830s. 
 As this thesis has already recognised, in reality climate variability takes its place 
with other stressors, meaning a wider range of economic, social and political factors 
must be assessed in relation to the contextual vulnerability of societies. This premise, 
and the limited direct information on climate-society interaction, necessitates a much 
wider scope of analysis than the nature of climatic change and its recorded impacts 
alone. Consequently, in addition to qualitative consideration of a broader range of 
factors, this chapter develops a new, semi-quantitative methodology to assess the 
vulnerability context of polities and populations to climate variability at certain points 
in time from written sources. Along with geographical differences such as resource 
abundance outlined in Section 2.2.1, this means that particular focus will be lent to the 
identification of temporal differences in factors which influenced the livelihood base, 
political stability, health, and effectiveness of social networks in communities across 
the region. These range from relatively short-term conditions like conflict, epidemic 
disease and commodity prices to more gradual changes such as the working out of 
gold deposits, protracted civil war, and external political influence. It is the changes in 
these factors that influenced vulnerability and efficacy of response to the precipitation 
variability documented in Chapter 3, and consequently its human significance. 
 
5.1 Sources and methods 
In 1552, João de Barros told his audience of Da Asia that the inhabitants of southern Africa: 
“Can neither read nor write, have no books, and all ancient history and other things 
which they know they learn by tradition from their ancestors” (Barros 1552, 201). 
 The main source of data for this investigation is thus written information from 
the hundreds of documents recorded by Portuguese officials, traders and missionaries 
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since Pero d’Anhaia established a fort at Sofala in 1505, and to a limited extent, oral 
traditions. This reliance on a history told by the Portuguese brings with it numerous 
caveats, but, as the next section will show, certain advantages for the task in hand. This 
is because the Portuguese were primarily interested in the exploitation of the region’s 
resources, which occasioned an economic and livelihood-related focus in the 
documents. The next sections will overview the recording, content, and coverage of the 
documents, before discussing how an evaluation of vulnerability will be undertaken. 
 
5.1.1 Written sources 
In contrast to much of the Sub-Saharan African interior in the pre-colonial period, the 
area falling within the borders of present-day Zimbabwe, Mozambique and southern 
Malawi offers a comparatively vast range of written source material relating to African 
society (Axelson 1960; Beach 1980). This began in earnest with Portuguese contact on 
the Mozambique coast at the end of the fifteenth century, and spanned four centuries 
to the imposition of colonial rule at the close of the nineteenth century. It is therefore 
possible to read either first- or good second-hand accounts of most aspects of human 
activity in the region, supplemented by descriptions of the environment, climate, 
vegetation and fauna (Beach 1987). The principal factor that accounts for this relatively 
high availability of information inland was the gold of the Zimbabwe plateau, which 
meant that while this area received attention from an early date, the interior between 
the Shire River and Ethiopia, and the Save River and the Cape was largely ignored. 
 The accumulation of these documents was a product of the administration of 
the Portuguese state, church and mercantile capital across its Estado da Índia. The bulk 
of the documents examined here are held within three translated source compilations 
(Table 5.1): the nine-volume Records of South-Eastern Africa (RSEA) (Theal 1898-1903), 
the nine-volume Documents on the Portuguese in Mozambique and Central Africa 1497-1840 
(DPMCA) (da Silva Rego and Baxter 1962-1975), and the two-volume The Shona and the 
Portuguese (Beach and Noronha 1980). The primary sources within each of these source 
compilations (see bibliography for details of individual sources) were consulted and 
related evidence was recorded verbatim. 
 
TABLE 5.1 Source compilations consulted. Beach and Noronha (1980) documents kindly 
provided electronically by T. N. Huffman and W. V. Work. 
Source Location Timeframe Information 
Theal (1898-1903) (9 
vols.) (RSEA) 
British Library, 
London 
1497-1890 Translated Portuguese documents, 
book extracts in English 
da Silva Rego and 
Baxter (1962-1975) (9 
vols.) (DPMCA) 
British Library, 
London 
1497-1890 Translated Portuguese documents 
and administrative records 
Beach and Noronha 
(1980) (2 vols.) 
University of 
Harare, Zimbabwe 
1585-1890 73 translated Portuguese 
documents not in RSEA or DPMCA 
Freeman-Grenville 
(1962) 
British Library, 
London 
900-1890 Translated Portuguese and Arabic 
documents 
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 In addition to Portuguese documents, some Arabic texts exist which allude to 
the Zambezi-Limpopo region. However, Beach (1987) notes it is unlikely that any 
literate Arab or Swahili observed the plateau itself first-hand, as the documents show 
little knowledge of the region except excluding the presence and trade of gold and 
ivory with interior states (Burke 1962). The first non-Portuguese writers in the area 
only began in the 1830s relating to the Ndebele and Gaza states. Outside these two 
Nguni-speaking polities, though, the coverage of non-Portuguese source material was 
very uneven. Moreover, diarists described a narrow trail across the region, and were 
not in a position to obtain as much information as the Portuguese, who settled for long 
periods at their towns, feiras and prazos (Beach 1980). Beach (1987) adds that the 
Portuguese traders, priests and officials who wrote these documents had to submit 
them to a bureaucratic chain that led to Lisbon or the Vatican, while other observers 
wrote with the purpose to reinforce their memories or to collect material for a book. 
Therefore, though useful supplements, diaries will not be used extensively. 
 
5.1.1.1 Recording and content of Portuguese documents 
The documents consulted possess a high degree of homogeneity in both their manner 
of recording and content. Generally, written descriptions depict the situation in a 
certain area over a period of time, although in some cases the writer had not seen the 
things described. Yet this did not mean that the information was inaccurate, as most 
Portuguese resided at trading centres, to which African traders related first-hand 
information (Newitt 1995). This means that the Portuguese writer, often a speaker of 
Shona or Tonga, knew the situation in a distant territory over a number of years with a 
degree of accuracy. Beach (1980), however, cautions that some writers plagiarised the 
work of others, and so what may appear as an independent verification of an earlier 
statement could well be a copy. Indeed, the Portuguese had a tendency to repeat 
obsolete information (Phimister 1976). Beach (1987) classified documents into ‘first-
hand’ and ‘second-hand’ (Figure 5.1), where first-hand documents refer to those where 
the writer had visited the region in question, whereas second-hand writers had not. 
While important, this is not a definitive assessment of their quality, and many second-
hand documents provide reliable information (Beach 1987). 
 The Portuguese were mainly concerned with the wealth of the region, and this 
in turn influenced what was recorded and to whom it related (Pikirayi 2003). In the 
first two centuries, almost all descriptions of African society related in some way to the 
exploitation of the land, as well as to convince the crown that its money would be 
better spent in southeast Africa than in Brazil or Asia (Beach 1987; Newitt 1995). 
Exaggeration and bias is thus an issue that frequently creeps in. That a high proportion 
of the earlier documents were written from a strongly utilitarian standpoint, however, 
is not necessarily a limitation to their use in this thesis, as livelihood aspects such as 
mining, trade, hunting, crop cultivation and cattle are at the core of the examination of 
differential societal vulnerability to climate variability. Other factors, such as African 
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religion, were also described but in usually disparaging terms, a major reason for this 
being that the Portuguese aimed to supplant it with Christianity. All of these factors 
mean that the documents must be read with a critical eye. Regardless of these caveats, 
the documents provide relatively homogenous and detailed information on mining, 
local trade, crops, religion, war, tribute, diplomacy and village life over a sustained 
time period, all of which are central to an examination of the research questions here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1 First- and second-hand Portuguese documents relating to African society in the 
Zambezi-Limpopo area, c. 1505-1830. 
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5.1.1.2 Spatial and temporal coverage 
The earliest first-hand evidence in the interior plateau region is from 1512 in an account 
written by Gaspar Veloso, while documents were written in the same area from 1561. 
Generally at this time, however, the Portuguese relied upon second-hand evidence 
from the interior from African or Muslim traders, the quality of which varied (for 
example Barbosa 1518; Barros 1552). First-hand evidence from the Mutapa state 
commenced from 1560 (Silveira 1560), with further information gathered from the 
Zambezi Valley and Manyika in the attempted conquest in the decades that followed 
(Monclaro 1573; Homem 1576). The comprehensive account of Santos (1609) also gives 
detailed information on Teve in 1586-90 and 1594, and, according to Beach (1987), is 
perhaps the first document to move away from the utilitarian approach predominant 
in all accounts preceding it. 
 First-hand information increased in quantity and geographical extent in the 
early-seventeenth century due to the weakening of the Mutapa state (for instance 
Bocarro 1631-49; Rezende 1634; Gomes 1648). Knowledge on areas such as Manyika 
and Teve increased substantially after the conquests of 1628-32, yet knowledge was still 
very scanty in the Torwa area, and remained limited to second-hand accounts. While 
information on the north-central plateau was reduced after the Portuguese abandoned 
their feiras in 1693, this was not the case elsewhere (Beach 1987; Pikirayi 1993; Newitt 
2009). Manyika, Teve and Barwe remained covered by first-hand observers, the 
Zambezi valley underwent an increase in knowledge, and the new feira of Zumbo 
resulted in second-hand information further west around the Dande area. Similarly, 
the Mozambique coast remained covered from the early-sixteenth century onwards, 
particularly in the areas around Sofala and Quelimane. In addition, the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries also saw an increase in interest in African society for its own sake 
(Beach 1987). The major decline in knowledge came with the significant weakening in 
Portuguese power in the region in the 1850s. The end of the permanent occupation of 
the Manyika feiras in 1835 reduced first-hand information from this area, although the 
Zambezi valley upstream of Tete remained an area which was well-observed. 
 
5.1.2 Investigating differential vulnerability using written sources 
The archival sources introduced above will be used to evaluate societal vulnerability 
and response to climate variability. Key to this assessment is identifying the 
sensitivities of the socio-ecological system associated with the enhancement or 
impediment of an effective response to climatic stress, and their differences over space 
and time. Qualitative critical analysis will form the backbone of the text, but in order to 
produce a comparative assessment of vulnerability across a wide spatial and temporal 
domain, an indicator-based approach is also adopted. This approach draws from the 
contemporary literature around future climate impacts, yet has recently been applied 
to the past in assessing the impacts of famine (Engler 2012; Engler et al. 2013).  
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 A vulnerability indicator is “an operational representation of a characteristic or 
quality of a system able to provide information regarding the susceptibility, coping 
capacity and resilience of a system to an impact of a disaster” (Birkmann 2006, 57). 
These indicators are thus essentially a measure of possible harm, or a value judgement 
on the ‘badness’ of a state (Hinkel 2011), but are also strongly tied to adaptive capacity 
and resilience (Endfield 2012). This analytical framework is represented in the 
schematic in Figure 5.2, where climate variability is shown as the external stressor that 
impacts upon the socio-ecological vulnerability context. Crucially, this vulnerability 
context is the starting-point of the analysis, as it assesses the living conditions of an 
affected group or society before the potential ‘driver’ is considered (Bohle 2001; Turner 
II et al. 2003; Birkmann 2006; Füssel 2007). Past climate variability itself, including its 
magnitude, spatial range, duration, speed of onset and timing is not included as an 
indicator, as it is here considered as a potential driver (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2 Vulnerability and climate impacts in the socio-ecological system. 
 
 The indicator-based approach basically involves selecting factors associated 
with vulnerability to climate variability, and assigning scores based upon the inferred 
situation in a given political unit or area at a particular point or period in time. In this 
case, a ‘deductive’ approach is partially followed, whereby a limited number of 
variables are adapted from those used in the literature in order to create an index 
supported by extant theory and examples (Yoon 2012; see Hahn et al. 2009; Gbetibouo 
et al. 2010 for examples). Assessing vulnerability using such a method, however, must 
give particular attention to the place- and time-specific context of pre-colonial 
southeast Africa. This means that the wider vulnerability literature is only of general 
assistance in selecting the precise variables used. In other words, the meaning of harm 
must be explicitly defined and reasoned for the context under consideration (Hinkel 
2011). Similarly, it is also important to remember that vulnerability, and its constituents 
of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity, are a dynamic phenomena, often in a 
continuous state of flux, and are scale-dependent (Adger 2006). 
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5.1.2.1 Assessing vulnerability indicators 
Box 5.1 displays the 20 indicators selected for the analysis, which consist of food 
system, livelihoods and trade, socio-political and biophysical components. Although 
the indicators included here are based upon hypothesised links, the southeast African 
case context and the availability of information in the Portuguese documents mean that 
a number of subjective decisions and assumptions are unavoidably embodied in the 
methodology. As Adger and Vincent (2005) state, this uncertainty is a product of being 
unable to validate the effectiveness of indicators in representing determinants of 
vulnerability, as their objective is to capture intangible processes. Where possible, the 
literature was used to identify a common list of food system, livelihood, social and 
biophysical indicators (for example Yohe and Tol 2002; Füssel 2007; Engler et al. 2013), 
which were then adapted to the space-time context. Furthermore, indicators were 
chosen which are applicable to the multi-centennial analysis period. 
 Most of these variables simplify a number of important properties, and are 
based upon well-established links (Table 5.2). For example, it is commonly asserted 
that diversity in cultivated crops and livelihoods decreases vulnerability to climate 
impacts (Kandji et al. 2006). Similarly, it is well attested that political stability, robust 
social networks and functional relief structures improve adaptive capacity and 
therefore reduce vulnerability (Ford et al. 2006). Some indicators, however, are more 
subjective and open to interpretation, a prime case being control of gold resources and 
access to the inter-continental trade network. On the one hand, gold was an important 
resource to pre-colonial polities, and the imports traded via the Indian Ocean network 
in turn provided a source of wealth which aided the maintenance of political authority. 
On the other hand, possession of these resources subjected polities to the potentially 
destructive influence of mercantile capitalism, while the risks of the mining process 
itself presented another danger (Phimister 1976). In this case, the position adopted is 
that mining provided a source of livelihood diversification, the production from which 
could also be traded for grain in times of scarcity, and thus decreased vulnerability. In 
each of the four components in Box 5.1, a number of ‘other determinants’ also exist, 
which are either not conducive for quantification or the information is simply 
insufficient to do so. These determinants will be qualitatively assessed where possible. 
 Each of the 20 indicators in Box 5.1 are classified with a simple numerical index 
with equal weighting assigned to all sub-components (following Hahn et al. 2009). A 
value of ‘0’ is assigned when the indicator is considered to have neither a positive nor 
negative influence, ‘-1’ when it is thought to decrease vulnerability or has mitigating 
impacts, and ‘1’ for when it is adjudged to increase it. Where evidence is too sparse to 
allow an unambiguous assessment of an indicator, the indicator is marked with the 
sign ‘-’, and is not counted in the index evaluation. This process is also followed where 
indicators do not apply to the respective context of the population or period. 
Secondary data (for instance conflict data in Beach 1980; Mudenge 1988; Newitt 1995 
and data on gold and ivory prices in Alpers 1975; Phimister 1976; Mudenge 1988) are 
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used where primary data is limited (see Appendix B for full indicator assessment 
values and sources). The evaluation is further supplemented by illustrative quotes 
recorded verbatim from the written sources throughout the text. In spite of the equal 
weighting of the indicators in the assessment, particular attention in the text will be 
devoted to food systems, and their diversity, production and security. This is because 
these are both climate-sensitive livelihoods (Barnett and Adger 2007), and as Section 
2.2.2.1 outlines, formed the economic basis of most southeast African communities. 
 
BOX 5.1 Vulnerability indicators for assessment, other determinants, key sensitivities and 
source coverage of each indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food system        Source coverage 
1. Crop diversity       High 
2. Domestic animals      High 
3. Animals hunted       High 
4. Wild resources       Moderate 
5. Cultivatable territory      High 
Other determinants: labour, gender, cultivation techniques, storage, food distribution, 
traditional ecological knowledge 
Key sensitivities: food resource dependence, food security, dietary diversity 
Livelihoods and trade 
6. Quantity of minerals controlled and mined   Very high 
7. Prices of and demand for minerals    Moderate 
8. Quantity of ivory hunted      High 
9. Prices of and demand for ivory     Moderate 
10. Alternative livelihood options     Moderate 
11. Access to and participation in inter-continental trade network Very high 
12. Access to local trade network     Moderate 
Other determinants: labour, gender, goods traded, external political events 
Key sensitivities: resource dependence, exposure to external shocks, terms of trade 
Socio-political 
13. Leadership contention and stability    High 
14. Sovereignty       High 
15. Presence of local conflict or raiding    High 
16. External conflict presence      Very high 
17. Presence of slavery      Moderate 
Other determinants: population, migration (voluntary or forced), urban-rural dynamics, 
social stratification, succession system, colonialism, religion, territorial control, 
worldview, perception of weather anomalies 
Key sensitivities: political stability, exposure to conflict, nature of relations 
Biophysical 
18. Inferred fertility of land      High 
19. Hazard prevalence      Moderate 
20. Occurrence of epidemic, disease, plague or pests   Moderate 
Other determinants: vegetation, climate regime 
Key sensitivities: hazard exposure, state of health 
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TABLE 5.2 Vulnerability indicators, criteria and rationale.  
Indicator High vulnerability 
(+1) 
Neutral (0) Low vulnerability 
(-1) 
Food system    
1. Crop diversity Dependence on one 
or two crops 
Some crop diversity Diverse cultivation 
strategy 
Rationale: Crop diversification is widely recognised as an effective strategy for managing 
risk (O’Brien et al. 2004; Gbetibouo et al. 2010). Different crops also respond differently to 
climatic variables and have varying storage capabilities, thus greater diversity can decrease 
the vulnerability of the food system (Kandji et al. 2006; Reidsma and Ewert 2008). 
2. Domestic 
animals 
Very few domestic 
animals 
Some domestic 
animals 
High quantity and 
range of domestic 
animals 
Rationale: A high stock of domestic animals, such as cattle, sheep and goats, provide an 
important supplement to cultivated crops, and as they outlast the agricultural cycle they 
can act as a buffer in times of drought and poor harvests (Beach 1977; Pikirayi 2003). 
3. Animals hunted Few to no animals 
hunted 
Some animals 
hunted 
Range of animals 
hunted 
Rationale: Hunting provides an important source of food, particularly when other food 
resources are scarce (Beach 1994). The wider the diversity and higher the volume of 
hunting options, the lower the vulnerability of the population to climate variability. 
4. Wild resources Little to no gathering Gathering practised Gathering practised 
extensively 
Rationale: The availability and use of wild food resources, such as fish, fruit or roots 
provides another source of food in times of scarcity or poor harvests. Where gathering was 
reported as a component of the food system, vulnerability is scored as lower. 
5. Cultivatable 
territory 
Small or marginal 
territory, food 
imports required 
Territory not 
extensive but no 
imports required 
Extensive 
cultivatable 
territory 
Rationale: Polities or people-groups that controlled a higher area of cultivatable territory 
could draw upon this if land was lost in conflict, annexed by the Portuguese or affected by 
environmental degradation or disaster. 
Livelihoods and trade   
6. Quantity of 
minerals controlled 
and mined 
Little to no mineral 
resources controlled 
and mined 
Some mineral 
resource controlled 
and mined 
Extensive mineral 
resources controlled 
and mined 
Rationale: The availability and access to mineral resources, particularly gold for trade 
purposes, can result in a greater diversity of non-farming livelihood options that can 
spread risk (Paavola 2008). This means that societies can respond to decreasing or 
seasonally varying returns in agriculture by means of trade. This can, however, lead to 
lower economic returns for greater security, and a poverty trap because productivity gains 
from specialisation are not realised (Barrett and Swallow 2004). New vulnerabilities may 
also be raised here, such as increased attention from European powers, susceptibility to 
global economic fluctuations, and risk of injury or death from dangerous mining methods. 
7. Prices of and 
demand for 
minerals 
Low prices and 
demand 
Moderate prices and 
demand 
High prices and 
demand 
Rationale: Lower prices and demand for minerals amounts to a decrease in returns, 
including cloth, beads and occasionally food, for their export. 
8. Quantity of ivory 
hunted 
No or minimal ivory Some ivory Plentiful ivory 
Rationale: This scale follows the rationale of indicator 6. 
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9. Prices of and 
demand for ivory 
Low prices and 
demand 
Moderate prices and 
demand 
High prices and 
demand 
Rationale: This scale follows the rationale of indicator 7. 
10. Alternative 
livelihoods 
Few to no alternative 
livelihoods practised 
Some alternative 
livelihoods 
practised 
Range of alternative 
livelihoods 
practised 
Rationale: This scale follows the rationale of indicator 6. 
11. Access to and 
participation in 
inter-continental 
trade network 
Inaccessible, 
disrupted or very 
limited access 
Accessible and 
practised 
Accessible and 
widely practised 
Rationale: Experiences of integration into the contemporary Indian Ocean or global trade 
network are inevitably diverse. It is possible to argue that this leads to the exploitation of 
particular sectors of the economy, and in turn reinforce existing inequalities in the society. 
This indicator, however, adopts the position that greater participation in the trade network 
created opportunities for economic diversification (Adger and Vincent 2005). Where ‘trade’ 
turned to extortion or forced labour, a rating of ‘1’ is given. 
12. Access to and 
participation in 
local trade network 
Inaccessible, 
disrupted or very 
limited access 
Accessible and 
practised 
Accessible and 
widely practised 
Rationale: This scale follows the rationale of indicator 11, but integration into the local 
trade network in times of peace carries less risk of exploitation, as the trade was often 
focussed on food resources, acting as more of a social network which helped manage risk. 
This is also a proxy for isolation, where more isolated polities are viewed as vulnerable. 
Socio-political    
13. Leadership 
contention and 
stability 
Power or leadership 
struggle and 
instability 
Minor instability 
but no power 
struggle 
Stable leadership 
Rationale: Power or leadership struggles reduce political stability and governance 
effectiveness. This may disable the ability of social networks to respond to crises. 
14. Sovereignty Under direct rule of 
another polity 
Under distant rule 
of another polity 
Sovereign polity 
Rationale: Any loss of sovereignty can result in an accompanying loss in decision-making, 
which may reduce the likelihood of effective governance of the polity or people-group 
concerned. 
15. Presence of local 
conflict or raiding 
Civil war or 
widespread conflict 
Limited conflict or 
violence 
No conflict or 
violence 
Rationale: The presence of conflict and violent events in most cases creates new 
vulnerabilities to climate variability (Barnett 2006). An example is the paralysis of 
governments and social networks in post-conflict situations, reducing ability to address 
impacts of environmental change. 
16. Presence of 
external conflict 
Widespread conflict 
and violence 
Some conflict and 
violence 
Little to no conflict 
and violence 
Rationale: This scale follows the rationale of indicator 15. 
17. Presence of 
‘slavery’ 
Slavery operating Slavery in vicinity 
but no evidence that 
polity subjected 
Slavery not 
operating 
Rationale: The operation of ‘slavery’ (whether the clientship described by Portuguese 
writers or the forced expropriation of people) was oriented towards short-term profit and 
weakened socio-political structures. The presence of slavery is also proxy for local stress, 
as is later evidenced in the reasons people sold themselves as slaves for protection. 
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Biophysical    
18. Inferred fertility 
of land 
Infertile Fertile Very fertile 
Rationale: While perceptions of land fertility may be heavily influenced by Portuguese 
biases, these aspects are well-documented and provide a simple, if coarse, classification of 
the state of the landscape where detailed information on vegetation is not available. 
19. Environmental 
hazard exposure 
Location in drought 
or hazard-prone area 
Location in area 
where hazards can 
occur 
Location in well-
watered (less 
drought-prone) area 
Rationale: The location of polities or populations in hazard-prone areas (to environmental 
hazards such as cyclones, drought, floods and wildfires) increases their vulnerability. 
20. Occurrence of 
epidemic disease, 
plague or pests 
Incidence of 
epidemic, plague, 
disease or pests 
No incidence Land described as 
healthy 
Rationale: The health status of a polity or population can influence or be influenced by 
climate variability. Infectious diseases, locust plagues or pests can also directly exacerbate 
risk of malnourishment, malnourished individuals (possibly as a result of drought and 
poor harvests) are more susceptible to diseases (Hammond and Dube 2012). 
 
 Before considering the application of this approach to southeast Africa, it is 
important to further clarify its explanatory scope and the assumptions of its outcomes. 
As each indicator carries equal weight in the overall index, an unavoidable by-product 
is the assumption that a low value in one variable can be compensated by a high value 
in another, though clearly some components may have disproportionate impacts on 
the overall vulnerability context. In cases where this is judged to be obvious, such as 
the instance of ‘total war’ or the outbreak of a severe epidemic disease, the relevant 
constituent of vulnerability will be highlighted as a potential system-undermining 
determinant. It should be stressed, therefore, that the sum total from the index does not 
represent an exact quantification of vulnerability, but is designed to give an approximate 
measure. These results will take the form of ‘vulnerability radars’, which will provide a 
snapshot in time of a potential state that is dynamic and multidimensional. These 
diagrams are points of departure rather than end-states of analysis, and are useful to 
prompt further conversation and research. Indeed, as these indices simplify a complex 
reality and require narratives to interpret them, the findings will be more fully 
discussed in the text, which will provide a more nuanced representation of the 
situation rather than a rigid quantitative assessment. Despite these constraints, and by 
considering the nature of uncertainty, the method and interpretable outputs of the 
index offer considerable advantages over the previous approaches outlined in Section 
2.2 for a comparative study of vulnerability to climate variability, and overall, the 
outcomes of this approach far outweigh their acknowledged risks. 
 
5.1.2.2 Periodisation and attribution 
The above section has outlined what will be assessed, but has not yet addressed in 
detail when, where, and for whom. Chapter 2 outlined critical perspectives on the 
existing focus on narrow space-time contexts for suggested climate-related socio-
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political change, such as the conceptualisation of the decline of Mapungubwe on only a 
decadal timescale. By contrast, this chapter will attempt to address multiple scales, 
including both the possible climate-related causal dynamics and implications of 
shorter-term developments, like the decline of Great Zimbabwe, and changes in the 
vulnerability of socio-ecological systems over the long-term. This approach and 
timespan partially stems from the limitations of the sources, particularly the limited 
inter-annual understanding of precipitation variability prior to 1800, but also has a 
number of advantages. Indeed, the real value of the long-term comparative scale of this 
chapter is the testing of the premise that in order to understand the underlying causes 
of and impacts of climate variability, one must also consider periods when climate did 
not appear to be a significant stressor and the reasons behind this. 
 Beginning with the decline of Great Zimbabwe, a number of periods are 
defined to enable the consideration of the significance of climate variability in key 
periods of socio-political change and over the long-term (Table 5.3). These periods are 
centred around events which adjusted the configuration of southeast African society, 
such as the decline of one state and the rise of others, the arrival of the Portuguese, the 
expansion of Portuguese jurisdiction over African populations, the expulsion of the 
Portuguese from the Zimbabwe plateau, and the migrations of Nguni-speaking 
communities north of the Limpopo. Variants of these periods have been used by other 
scholars of pre-colonial history in southeast Africa (Bhila 1982; Mudenge 1988; Pikirayi 
2001, 2003), and are outlined in Table 5.3. Despite the delimitation of periods for the 
purposes of the vulnerability index, this does not mean that finer-scale socio-political 
events will be ignored. Rather, the background to these events in Section 2.2 and in 
other secondary sources will borne in mind throughout the analysis of historical 
vulnerability and climate-society interactions. 
 
TABLE 5.3 Periods, key events and polities. 
Years (AD) Key events Vulnerability index 
1450-1504 Decline of Great Zimbabwe, shift in trade to the 
Zambezi, Mutapa-Torwa succession, civil wars 
Not applicable - insufficient 
written records 
1505-1560 Portuguese arrival and settlement at Sofala, 
Mutapa-Manyika-Danda civil war, early 
Mutapa-Portuguese contact, founding of 
Zambezi towns and Quelimane 
Mutapa, Manyika, Sofala 
1561-1624 Portuguese penetration of the Mutapa state and 
Manyika and Teve polities, establishment of 
feiras Maravi attacks south of the Zambezi 
Mutapa, Manyika, Teve, 
Zambezi Tonga, 
Inhambane, Sofala, Sena, 
Quelimane 
1625-1693 Mutapa, Manyika, Teve and Tonga under the 
Portuguese, establishment of Zambezi prazos 
Mutapa, Manyika, Teve, 
Sofala, Sena, Quelimane 
1694-1760 Rise of the Rozvi, expulsion of Portuguese from 
the interior, Mutapa shift to the Zambezi 
(Chidima), founding of Zumbo 
Mutapa, Manyika, Teve, 
Sofala, Sena, Quelimane 
1760-1830 Mutapa civil wars, Nguni migrations, African 
socio-political breakdown, decline of Sena 
Mutapa, Manyika, Zambezi 
Tonga, Sena, Quelimane 
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 Six of the seven periods outlined in Table 5.3 permit the construction of 
vulnerability indices for the polities and places shown. The first period, however, has 
insufficient written source material to undertake this exercise, yet as it was an 
important period precursor to all of the socio-political events that followed it, some 
consideration is desirable. Here, existing archaeological analysis will be combined with 
‘retrogressive’ analysis from documents relating to later Zimbabwe culture society and 
political units, oral traditions and palaeoclimate data. Several authors have performed 
a similar kind of analysis in the region (Beach 1998; Murimbika 2006; Manyanga 2007) 
on the strict basis that later historical situations and practices provide pointers and 
clues to ‘pre-historic’ situations, rather than advocating the false assumption of a static 
landscape over long periods. In the rest of the periods in Table 5.3, vulnerability 
indices will be constructed for a number of polities and populations. The spatial extent 
and influence of these varied over time, but are outlined to a general extent in Figure 
5.3, and include the Mutapa state, the Manyika and Teve kingdoms, the small-scale 
Tonga-speaking chiefdoms of the Zambezi valley, the Inhambane polity and the Afro-
Portuguese towns and hinterlands of Sofala, Sena and Quelimane. By considering both 
African polities and populations under the influence or jurisdiction of the Portuguese, 
further comparative perspectives on historical vulnerability will also be gained. This 
chapter will now examine the changes in these factors that influenced societal 
vulnerability and response to climate variability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3 Approximate extent of polities and populations analysed in vulnerability indices. 
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5.2 Great Zimbabwe, successor states and civil wars (c. 1450-1504) 
The first period of re-examination covers the decline of Great Zimbabwe, the rise of its 
successor states, and ends prior to Portuguese contact with the interior. Any attempt to 
analyse the first of these events is frustrated by lack of evidence, and this section will 
draw only tentative conclusions by critical analysis of primary written and oral 
sources, and expanding upon scenarios posited by archaeologists and historians. 
 
5.2.1 Chronology: the process of state decline 
The chronology of the decline of Great Zimbabwe and its surrounding state structure is 
critical to the interpretation of the causal factors that underlie it. Huffman and Vogel 
(1991) provide the most comprehensive chronology of the site through radiocarbon 
dating, and argue for its abandonment in the mid-fifteenth century. One unavoidable 
shortcoming of this dating was that early archaeological investigations (Bent 1896) 
significantly damaged the later top levels of the site, which has restricted dating of the 
terminal periods of the site (Pikirayi 2013a). In what Pikirayi terms the ‘proto-
historical’ period, however, the very limited availability of written sources does permit 
some consideration of this when combined with archaeological data. Key here is a 
document compiled by Barros in the 1530s, probably making references to events three 
decades earlier (Pikirayi 2013a), which refers to continued occupation at the capital: 
 “There are other mines in a district called Toroa [Torwa], which by another name is 
known as the kingdom of Butua, which is ruled by a prince called Burrom, a vassal of 
Benomotapa [Mutapa], which land adjoins the aforesaid consisting of vast plains, and 
these mines are the most ancient in the country, and they are all in the plain, in the 
midst of which there is a square fortress of masonry, built of stones of marvellous size, 
and there appears to be no mortar adjoining them… This edifice is almost surrounded 
by hills, upon which are others resembling it in the fashioning of the stone and the 
absence of mortar, and one of them is a tower more than twelve fathoms high. 
 The natives of the country call these edifices Symbaoe [zimbabwe], which according 
to their language signifies court… It is guarded by a nobleman, who has charge of it 
after the manner of a chief alcaide, and they call this officer Symbacáyo, as we should 
say keeper of the Symbaoe, and there are always some of Benomotapa’s wives therein, 
of whom Symbacáyo takes care. When, and by whom, these edifices were raised, as 
the people of the land are ignorant of the art of writing, there is no record, but they 
say they are the work of the devil… In the opinion of the Moors who saw it, it is very 
ancient, and was built there to keep possession of the mines, which are very old, and 
no gold has been extracted from them for years, because of the wars. Considering the 
facts of the matter, it would seem that some prince who had possession of the mines 
ordered it to be built as a sign thereof, which he afterwards lost in course of time, and 
through being so remote from his kingdom” (Barros 1552, 267). 
 Huffman (2007) plays down the significance of this document, stating that “By 
the mid-fifteenth century, Great Zimbabwe had lost its power, and most people had 
moved away… a few people stayed or returned for another 50 years or so, but the 
capital never regained its former importance” (Huffman 2007, 421). Huffman is indeed 
correct that the combined historical-archaeological evidence indicates that Great 
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Zimbabwe was not the important centre it once was, but as Pikirayi (2005, 2013a) 
asserts, this viewpoint fails to account for the protracted process of leaving Great 
Zimbabwe. This is a particularly important point as the “few people” referred to in the 
document appear to be Zimbabwe elites, or one of the sons or vassals of the Mutapa 
ruler (Pikirayi and Chirikure 2011). Furthermore, although this account was heavily 
derived from Muslim traders, the precise descriptions of the buildings and ancient 
inscriptions clearly show that the site was still known in some depth at this time. These 
points considered, Barros’s account certainly raises the possibility of a longer 
occupation than the c. 1300-1450 timeframe professed by Huffman and Vogel. 
Crucially, this draws the end of Great Zimbabwe considerably further into the picture 
of the rising and competing Torwa and Mutapa polities, and in light of this important 
difference in interpretation, a number of hypotheses require further re-examination. 
 
5.2.2 Gold, trade and successor states 
One of the main explanations relating to the decline of the Zimbabwe state, the rise of 
its successors and the outbreak of Mutapa-Torwa conflict stems from a loss of control 
over the gold resources distant from the site (Figure 5.4). It is here important to 
remember that the generally accepted viewpoint of trade supporting the wealth and 
complexity of Great Zimbabwe and its elite is not the same as the heavily criticised 
idea of the ‘trade stimulus’, where external factors are viewed as sole actants in the 
development and transformation of state structures. Accepting this premise, it is clear 
that several contemporary factors were against the Zimbabwe state in its hold over 
gold mining and trade, and consequently the maintenance and stability of its rulers. 
 The first of these was the geographical location of the capital. Although ideally 
situated to partake in trade with the Indian Ocean coast, it is reasonable to assume that 
over a minimum 150-year timeframe of state growth, the highly limited quantity of 
gold in the hinterland of the site would have been worked out (Phimister 1976), a 
factor which may have contributed to the decrease in production hypothesised in 
Figure 5.5. This would undoubtedly have meant that the leadership had to rely upon 
gold resources considerably further away from the core of the state (Figure 5.4). As it is 
known that the Mutapa and Torwa states were expanding during the late-fifteenth 
century or earlier, this would have provoked competition with Great Zimbabwe, which 
although still occupied, would have increasingly had to go to great lengths to control 
its wider resource base. Khami and the Torwa state are particularly key here, as the 
most important gold resources lay in this area (Huffman 2007). While the origins of 
Khami are still relatively unknown, there exists a real possibility that the growth of this 
state, aided by the control of abundant local gold deposits, increased the economic and 
political vulnerability of the Zimbabwe state, and was of high importance in its decline. 
 This overlap between the three polities is similarly suggestive of competition 
when shifting trade routes are considered. Paucity of evidence limits examination of 
the suggestion that the Save River fell out of use as a trade route due to climate change 
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(Summers 1960), yet it is clear that sometime before the decline of the Zimbabwe state, 
the northern Zambezi route to Angoche superseded the central route linking the 
interior to Sofala (Huffman 2007) (Figure 5.4). Furthermore, archaeological data have 
been interpreted to suggest that Khami may have either continued or reinstated the 
southern route, as Khami ceramics dominate at Manyikeni, a Zimbabwe culture site 
near Chibuene (Huffman 2007). This may have meant that Khami bypassed Great 
Zimbabwe and the central route to access whatever trade remained at this part of the 
coast, and thus undermined the supporting role of the gold trade in political status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.4 The maximum extent of the Zimbabwe state (after Huffman 2007), gold-producing 
areas, successor states, trade dynamics and conflict. 
 
 The Mutapa state, situated amongst the northern goldfields, was well-placed 
for access to the prime northern trade route. Economic factors are widely credited to 
have played some role in the growth of the state following its formation, perhaps by a 
Great Zimbabwe dynasty, but it is not certain whether gold was a major factor. Pikirayi 
(2013a) is of the opinion that gold provides a strong explanation for the northward 
expansion of the Zimbabwe culture, stating that “Karanga expansion northwards must 
have been triggered by the discovery of more lucrative goldfields… [which] may have 
affected Great Zimbabwe in terms of population depletion” (Pikirayi 2013a, 32). Yet a 
problem with this interpretation is that its evidence is based upon oral traditions which 
bizarrely mention salt but not gold (Abraham 1962). On the contrary, Phimister (1976) 
argues that gold was a comparatively minor factor in the state’s economy, as early to 
mid sixteenth century documents attest to the increasingly unfavourable ‘terms of 
trade’ stemming from declining gold prices and the arrival of the Portuguese. While 
this may be true of the sixteenth century onwards, cause must precede effect, and these 
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factors do not rule out the possibility that the growth of the Mutapa state may have 
been aided by its leaders exerting control over the northern goldfields. Whatever the 
reasons for the rise of the Mutapa and Torwa states, though, it seems clear that these 
polities were undercutting Great Zimbabwe’s economic dominance of commercial 
links with the coast. Indeed, by the time of Portuguese arrival in 1505, the Mutapa state 
in particular was integrated into the global trade network, and the site of Great 
Zimbabwe was concluding its gradual process of decline. 
 While it is known from early Portuguese documents that late-fifteenth century 
civil wars in the Mutapa state were a result of a succession dispute (Alcáçova 1506; 
Section 2.2.3.3), it is appropriate to consider the combination of these factors in respect 
of the dynamics of ongoing Mutapa-Torwa conflict at this time. One possibility is that 
conflict erupted over disputed gold deposits between the expanding Mutapa and 
Torwa states and control of the northern trade route. Certainly, two new polities 
emerging within ±30 years of each other, and found to be at war upon the first written 
observations from the interior, suggests that such a scenario is possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.5 Revised distribution of Summers (1960) hypothetical distribution of pre-colonial 
gold production (after Phimister 1976). 
 
5.2.3 Environment, climate and urban food security 
Although gold mining, trade and elite control over these activities have been dealt with 
above, the later documents reveal that subsistence agriculture and pastoralism were 
the most important livelihood activities for the majority of the population. 
Accordingly, the other main hypothesis for the decline of Great Zimbabwe is 
environmental degradation in the locality of the site, coupled with problems such as 
overcrowding and sanitation, contributing to the emigration of people from the core of 
the state. Again, evidence relating to this potential pathway is almost non-existent, 
with one perhaps notable exception being the absence of Brachystegia speciformis, an 
important source of fuel, from the site’s immediate surroundings (Pikirayi 2013b). This 
means that one can only hypothesise about the response to potential environmental 
problems from what is known of later Zimbabwe culture polities. If it is accepted that 
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150 years of fairly intensive land-use by a sizeable population at the site degraded the 
biophysical sustainability of local food systems, that is, cultivatable land, pastureland 
and hunting grounds, then the key factor to consider is the range of coping strategies 
and adaptation options to maintain normal functioning of the capital and state. One 
such option was tribute and centralised food and social security. It is known from later 
Zimbabwe culture polities that the system of tribute and service meant that in theory, 
elites could draw upon the support of the hinterland for grain supplies, and Huffman 
(2007) has used this evidence to insist that environmental degradation was of limited 
significance in the decline of Great Zimbabwe. Yet uncritical and universal acceptance 
of this adaptive mechanism in theory overlooks its potential problems in practice, 
particularly where large settlements are concerned. Re-examining later primary 
evidence, Barros (1552) claimed that the interior political units: 
“Have a system of service instead of tribute, which is that all the officers and servants 
of his court, and the captains of the soldiers, each with his men, must serve him in the 
cultivation of his fields or other work seven days in every thirty. And the lords to 
whom he gives land receive the same service for them” (Barros 1552, 271). 
 And on a wider scale, referring to the Teve area, Santos (1609) stated that: 
“The Kaffirs, vassals of Quiteve, also pay him tribute in the following manner: In all 
the villages and kraals in the kingdom of Quiteve there is a large crop of millet for the 
king, and all the inhabitants of the place are obliged to work upon it certain days in 
the year, which are fixed upon. In this way the Kaffirs each kraal weed, dig, sow, and 
gather this crop reserved in their village for the king, which the king orders to be 
collected by his agents appointed in each village for the purpose” (Santos 1609, 222). 
 Considering these two statements, Barros’s account seems only to relate to local 
land in the capital hinterland, which presumably would have been most affected by 
intensive land use in the environmental degradation scenario at Great Zimbabwe. 
Santos’s account, however, alludes to this practice occurring across the entire territory 
of the polity. Clearly, this would strengthen the resilience of the capital population as it 
could draw upon a vast area for its supplies. While such a scenario may have been 
possible in a smaller polity like Teve, it is hard to imagine that this system could have 
operated across the Zimbabwe state, as its sheer size would have meant serious 
problems in the transportation of grain. True, cattle could be utilised to carry grain, but 
no evidence exists to suggest that this practice took place in later centuries. The only 
alternative to this was for women to carry the grain, which was both slow and could 
move only small quantities, while this would have removed women and their labour 
from villages, having a knock-on effect on the agricultural cycle (Beach 1980). A later 
account on the tribute system gives more detail on the extent of land cultivated to 
support the Mutapa rulers. Conceição (1696, 207) related that: 
“All of them sow their fields and the king also has one cultivated by his Kaffirs which 
stretches where the eyes cannot see. He eventually collects so much food that usually 
he and his wives live in plenty and even in luxury” 
 But referring to the wider state territory, he follows on to stress that: 
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
	  166 
 “He also has the contributions sent to him by the chiefs and other important Kaffirs to 
whom he has given some parts his empire. They pay the tribute to him according to 
what the land produces but it is always very little” (Conceição 1696, 207). 
 Here, it is again told that the immediate hinterland was extensively utilised for 
tribute cultivation, however, supply problems emerged when considering the tribute 
from lands further away. The assertion that the tribute was always rather little could 
strictly refer to contemporary food shortages, or simply to changes over space and 
time, but perhaps relates to the aforesaid difficulties of supply networks over the wider 
landscape. Whatever grain was available, however, could then be re-distributed to 
commoners in times of scarcity (Beach 1980; Mudenge 1988). Available evidence allows 
for little speculation on a wider range of adaptive mechanisms, particularly in the 
Zimbabwe state, but it is likely that the inflow of food to the capital constituted a major 
buffer to the impacts of local environmental problems. In assessing this, clear 
differences begin to appear in the adaptive capacity of states in theory and practice. 
 As a further and related critique to this explanation, Huffman (2007) also notes 
that as Great Zimbabwe lay in a high rainfall district, agriculture would have been 
viable most of the time, and that if environmental degradation was a factor, the site 
would probably have been abandoned much earlier. Yet perhaps considering 
environmental problems as the chief cause of its abandonment is misleading, as this 
was one of several factors amongst a complex interplay of population dynamics, terms 
of trade, conflict and other events, of which very little is known about how these 
changed over the minimum 150-year occupation of the site. Indeed, the population 
may have reached 18,000 at its height, but this must have fluctuated. Similarly, civil 
wars like those in the late-fifteenth century Mutapa state were significant, but left little 
archaeological trace (Beach 1998), and so any conclusions are confined to speculation. 
 One point, however, is that a drought, or a series of droughts at a point when 
the population of the site reached a high level may have severely impacted upon the 
ability of the local area to support it (Beach 1980). From this suggestion it is possible to 
speculate how the limitations in adaptive capacity relating to food supply difficulties 
may have affected several levels of society. For instance, if rulers could not provide 
grain to distribute to the general population in times of climatic stress, it may have 
encouraged emigration and the weakening of the political structure. Both Huffman 
(2007) and Pikirayi (2013b) dismiss such a scenario, however, as they interpret 
palaeoclimate data in this period to infer wetter conditions. Re-examining precipitation 
signals from SRZ palaeoclimate data either ITCZ-sensitive or relatively proximate to 
the Zimbabwe plateau area at this time, that is the T7 grey scale, T7/T8 δ13C, Lake 
Sibaya conductivity and Limpopo Baobab tree-rings, this does not seem to be 
completely reflective of available data (Figure 3.5). Although it is true that conditions 
were trending towards wetter in three of the four records, precipitation conditions only 
appear to have reached a level greater than the 1036-1890 mean after c. 1450. Rejecting 
an abrupt ‘collapse’ scenario, then, more attention should be placed on climatic 
conditions leading up to the earliest abandonment date of c. 1450. In this period, the T7 
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grey scale and Lake Sibaya conductivity records clearly show an extended period of 
below average precipitation from at least c. 1420, while two clusters of consecutive 
drought years are observed in the Limpopo Baobab record between 1422-1426, and 
1448-1450 (Figure 5.6), which are atypical of precipitation conditions over the span of 
Great Zimbabwe’s fluorescence. Tentative though it may be, this high-resolution 
evidence means that a scenario involving climate can no longer be dismissed on the 
grounds that available datasets all show warmer and wetter conditions. Oral traditions 
also make note of a 30-year drought between 1450-1480 (Abraham 1962) (Table 3.5), yet 
the reliability of these traditions have been put into question by Beach (1994), while it is 
improbable that a drought event could last three decades, particularly in the relatively 
unambiguously wet period of the late-fifteenth century (Figure 5.6; Table 3.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.6 Precipitation inferred from the T7 grey scale record, Limpopo Baobab tree-ring 
record and Lake Sibaya diatom conductivity record 1250-1600. 
 
 A re-examination of primary evidence and existing hypotheses leaves open the 
reasons for Great Zimbabwe’s decline. The major problem, as with most cases of state 
transformation prior to the period of the written record, is that minimal ‘ground-truth’ 
information is available to corroborate any possible inferences from data such as 
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precipitation proxies. Therefore, while remaining a possible scenario, any firmer link 
between climate and the decline of the state certainly goes some way beyond available 
evidence. Gold exports were of importance to the prestige, maintenance and stability of 
the leadership, and multiple factors elsewhere on the plateau show emerging 
competition for the state’s supremacy. Yet these factors do not account for why the 
state, powerful as it was, could not assert its authority over its rivals, and probably 
suggest that internal factors restricted its ability to do so. It is here that there is merit in 
imagining Great Zimbabwe as a living, urban environment (Manyanga et al. 2011), and 
more pertinently the view that the site itself was an ‘experiment’ (Beach 1994), atypical 
in scale and structure to any other previous or contemporaneous settlement in the 
region. Problems such as sanitation and resource depletion probably had some impact 
on the internal workings of the capital, but placing too much weight on this theory 
does not leave much room for human agency and adaptation options. 
 Perhaps, however, the reasons for the decline of the site and state rest on a 
combination of the factors discussed above. Considering these together, a multi-causal 
scenario would first involve the gradual exhaustion of local gold resources, meaning 
that state expansion and the control of resources further away from the site was 
necessary to maintain its hold over trade. The growth of polities elsewhere and the 
shift in trade routes presented challenges to this, while internal problems at Great 
Zimbabwe itself were on the rise, and restricted the ability of an effective response to 
growing competition. Inferred years of successive drought in the early-mid fifteenth 
century could have meant that the food system at the capital became more reliant upon 
supplies from its hinterland, which put further strain on the leadership. This reliance 
gradually eroded the resilience of the state and contributed to the periodic emigration 
of commoners, whether voluntarily or through expulsion, from the site and state core. 
As Beach (1998, 60) hypothesises, this final process may have been ‘implosive’, 
meaning the city became smaller and smaller until the last inhabitant “expired next to 
the grave of the second-last inhabitant”, or ‘explosive’, with the eventual leaving of the 
main dynasty following repeated emigrations. Ultimately, however, paucity of 
evidence means that this remains the subject of informed guesswork. 
 
5.3 Food systems, trade and Portuguese contact (1505-1560) 
The socio-political situation when the first written sources become available had 
changed considerably since the decline of Great Zimbabwe. The Mutapa civil war had 
drawn to a close, while the three breakaway polities of Manyika, Teve and Danda were 
already virtually independent from the Mutapa state (Figure 5.3). The availability of 
written sources from 1505 enables a deeper consideration of societal vulnerability 
contexts, although only for the Mutapa state, the Manyika polity and the hinterland of 
Sofala (Figure 5.7). Nevertheless, this provides sufficient scope for a comparative 
assessment of vulnerability in these areas where key events took place, including the 
arrival and settlement of the Portuguese, and the Mutapa-Danda civil war. This section 
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investigates knowledge of contemporary food systems, livelihood changes, conflict and 
the possible impacts of climate variability in this period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.7 Vulnerability radars for the Mutapa state, Manyika polity and the Sofala hinterland 
1505-1560. Incomplete polygons indicate where data are insufficient to categorise the indicator. 
 
5.3.1 Food system vulnerability in the early- to mid-sixteenth century 
Only basic information is provided on the food system of the three areas in Figure 5.7 
at the beginning of this period, primarily because Portuguese interest lay firmly in the 
potential of the region’s gold resources. Barbosa (1518), however, notes that in addition 
to the ‘traditional’ grains of sorghum and the two millets, rice was grown, though was 
cultivated to a greater extent around Sofala. At first glance, the translated records in 
DPMCA also suggest that maize (the English translation of milho) was cultivated 
widely around Sofala and was the prime grain that supplied the Portuguese garrison 
(Figueroa 1511; Fernandes 1515; Almada 1516). Nevertheless, careful reanalyses have 
cast doubt on whether maize was introduced to southeast Africa at this early date, as 
‘milho’ only came to mean maize after its widespread introduction in Portugal (Hair 
1977). Thus it is generally accepted that the milho in the early documents was actually 
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sorghum, which was the principal staple at this time in the Sofala area (Tavares 1965; 
Hair 1977; Newitt 1995). This is reflected in Figueroa’s statement, which noted that 
Sofala yielded a lot of rice and milho but that there was an absence of ‘corn’ (Figueroa 
1511). Similarly, ‘meixoeira’ in the early-sixteenth century Portuguese documents was 
incorrectly translated to ‘Kafir corn’, which usually refers to sorghum. In this case, 
meixoeira represents pearl millet, as it did later in the century and remains so today. 
 Towards the middle of the century, more detailed accounts point to the high 
fertility of the region excluding the Mozambique coastal plains (Barros 1552; Fernandes 
1560). In the Mutapa state, Goes wrote sometime in this period that there was an 
abundance of all food sources in Mukaranga, suggesting low vulnerability (Figure 5.7): 
“All this kingdom of Benomotapa [Mutapa] is most abundant in provisions, fruits, 
and cattle and there are such great herds of wild elephants there that not a year passes 
in which the number killed does not amount to four or five thousand, by which means 
a large quantity of ivory is sent to India” (Goes, unknown year, 129). 
 This richness in foodstuffs apparently supported a large population in the area, 
as both Barros (1552, 266) and Frois (1561, 34) reported with considerable exaggeration: 
“The other part of the country, along the river Cuama [Zambezi]… is mostly 
mountainous, covered with trees, watered by rivers, and pleasantly situated, and is 
therefore more thickly populated; and Benomotapa generally resides there. As it is so 
thickly populated, the elephants avoid it and seek the other part where there are the 
plains aforesaid, where they go about in droves almost like a herd of cows.” 
“There are so many people that it is said that within the compass of eight days the 
king, whenever he wishes, can bring on the field three hundred thousand warriors.” 
 Little evidence of comparable quality is available on the Manyika polity other 
than the cultivation of the traditional mix of grains and the ownership of cattle. One 
key statement, however, suggests that gold was bartered for food in times of hunger: 
“If the people were covetous a great quantity [of gold] would be obtained, but they 
are so lazy in seeking it, or rather covet it so little, that one of these negroes must be 
very hungry before he will dig for it” (Barros 1552, 267). 
 The precise implications of this statement are open to interpretation, but it is 
likely that in times of food scarcity, a coping strategy at the household level was to 
intensify mining of gold to exchange for cloth and beads with Muslim traders at their 
bazaars, and then to barter this merchandise for grain with a neighbouring area such as 
Barwe, as is later evidenced in Section 5.4. As Barros’s account was derived from 
information collected by Vicente de Pegado in the 1530s (Beach 1987), it is possible that 
food shortages were felt in Manyika around this time, but low confidence is ascribed to 
the possibility that this statement infers contemporary drought (Table 3.5). Indeed, 
although precipitation conditions in this period were trending towards drier (Table 
3.6), it is difficult to assess whether climatic stress was the cause of hunger due to the 
limited knowledge of the Manyika polity prior to the 1560s. Still, this interpretation of 
Barros’s statement suggests that local trade and inter-polity social networks were 
present over a relatively wide area, and could be employed to buffer climatic stress. 
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 Written evidence on domestic animals at this time is similarly patchy, though it 
is widely acknowledged that the Mutapa were owners of many cattle from the early 
growth of the state (Beach 1980, 1994; Ogot 1999; Pikirayi 2001). This is reinforced by 
one of the earliest documents dealing with the Mutapa area, which avers that 4000 
hornless cows were offered to the Mutapa ruler as a bribe (Alcáçova 1506). Allowing 
for exaggeration in this report, and drawing on the report of Goes, it is probable that 
the state was rich in cattle at this time, and that this provided both an important socio-
cultural ‘resource’ and a buffer to crop failure (Figure 5.7). Around Sofala, Figueroa 
(1511) wrote of sheep, and Barbosa (1518, 375) described the presence of “sea-horses” 
(hippopotamuses), lions, deer and many other wild beasts, as well as fish, which 
offered numerous hunting and gathering options. In the Mutapa area, the quotes 
provided on the previous page also suggest that hunting and gathering options were 
plentiful. In particular, the high figures attributed to elephant hunting quoted by Goes 
imply that this was practised to a great extent, and later accounts suggest that elephant 
meat was a prime constituent of hunting-based food sources (Santos 1609). 
 With the exception of rice cultivation, which appears to have been relatively 
small-scale, this sketch of the Mutapa and Manyika food systems is fairly consistent 
with the basic outline provided in Section 2.2.2.1, and more than likely that of the 
Zimbabwe state. Thus, while the limited evidence of food system stress in the Mutapa 
area is perhaps due to the limited Portuguese coverage prior to the 1560s, it is possible 
to speculate that the Mutapa food system was relatively resilient at this stage, as 
suggested by the continued use of a small but drought-resistant mix of crops, 
ownership of high numbers of cattle, and the exploitation of wild food resources. The 
key shift in food system vulnerability in southeast Africa at this time occurred at Sofala 
with the growing presence of Portuguese, both those garrisoned at the fort and from 
the crews of increasing merchant traffic, with ships harboured there for weeks or even 
months at a time. This meant that grain rations had to be provided for both the quasi-
permanent garrison, the slave population and the more temporary inhabitants from 
ships’ crews, and these rations are accordingly well-documented for the first decade of 
Portuguese occupation. The extent of this new demand for foodstuffs was reflected in 
evidence that Sofala purchased 287,000 litres of sorghum during 1513-14 (Newitt 1995; 
Ekblom 2004), some of which was bought locally, but much was also imported from 
further up the coast or inland (Barbosa 1518). If this new demand for food provided 
opportunities for local populations to trade surpluses, it also put strain on local food 
systems to supply Sofala’s fluctuating but increased population, and shortages of 
sorghum were recorded in 1505, 1506, 1511, 1515 and 1516. The latter of these shortages 
has been speculatively linked to drought, the impacts of which have in turn been 
linked with the outbreak of the Mutapa-Danda civil war in 1516 (Bhila 1982). It is 
therefore important to scrutinise this link and investigate the impact of climate 
variability on the changing nature of food systems in the Sofala area. 
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5.3.1.1 Drought, food scarcity and conflict in Mozambique 
References to food shortages at Sofala begin soon after Portuguese settlement. In 1506, 
Quaresma wrote that the fort was “laid waste”, leaving “Pero d’Anhaia [the governor] 
and seventy-six men without supplies” (Quaresma 1506, 55). Shortages of sorghum 
were then reported in September 1511 by Perestrello, who noted the use of ‘Kafir corn’ 
(in this case pearl millet) and rice as supplements. In 1515, Antonio Fernandes 
provided further information on the nature of food scarcity, and revealed that sorghum 
was “brought inland and far away”, though that the sale was controlled by African 
chiefs, “there being little of it in the land and not wanting to sell it” (Fernandes 1515, 
187). This difficulty in obtaining grain was corroborated the following year by Almada 
(1516), who reported that the price of a bag of milho doubled from one to two meticals. 
 The possible causes behind these food shortages are numerous. Population-
consumption dynamics offer a direct association with shortages of provisions, and 
were explicitly linked by Almada (1516, 275) who described how food scarcity was 
often a result of ships docked at Sofala for extended periods of time “wasting the 
supplies the fortress have for their maintenance, especially at a time when the alqueire 
is worth two miticals”. This situation probably also applied to the early years of 
settlement at Sofala, when the organisation of local food supply may not yet have been 
capable of providing sufficient foodstuffs for a sudden increase in demand associated 
with the frequent or extended visits of Portuguese ships. Nevertheless, that higher 
sorghum prices were present in 1516 and that there was a reluctance of chiefs to sell it, 
regardless of fluctuating demand at Sofala, indicates that stressors on the production 
side were also significant, one of which may have been climate. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties of close comparison between the seasonally dated food shortages with the 
proxy records in Figure 3.11, this may be corroborated as each of these palaeoclimate 
records suggest a short-term decline in precipitation after several very wet years at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, which is reflective of a more general period of high 
variability in precipitation (Figure 3.9). The potential impact of environmental stress 
was reinforced by the exposure of Sofala to hazards (Figure 5.7). In particular, Almada 
(1516) described what appears to represent the impacts of a high magnitude tropical 
cyclone, which may have been equally responsible for the increase in grain prices: 
 “The last day of February, 1516, a Friday, the morning dawned with a storm so strong 
from the south that it seemed to me that it would carry away the castle, and it lasted 
some four or five hours during which it threw down forthwith the wooden hut of the 
fortress… And it belaboured the palm groves so that a Moor who had five hundred 
palm trees was left with no more than thirty and twenty and the same happened to 
the other houses which were nearly all razed by the palm trees; in this way they 
suffered great loss, whilst we lost what we got from the palm groves, the oil and the 
coconuts and the vinegar, so that we now have a shortage of everything… in the 
factory there was not a tile left on the roof, and there were heavy rains that damaged 
all the merchandise… And we have here some eighty or ninety cows, some Your 
Highness’s and some mine, and the wind brought such confusion among them that 
thirty-nine of them were flung into the river and drowned” (Almada 1516, 279). 
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 What is most clear from the evidence of food scarcity is that the arrival of the 
Portuguese imposed new vulnerabilities on the local population, which were mirrored 
by the dependence of the Portuguese garrison on imports and its resultant high 
exposure to shocks. It is therefore possible to view the role of climate and population 
interactively, so that when dry years or extreme events coalesced with a swelling of the 
population, it exposed Sofala’s fragile food security and created shortages. 
 Frequent food scarcity combined with other factors to undermine the viability 
of Sofala as the chief Portuguese settlement in southeast Africa. One of these was 
meddling in African politics, which was a new vulnerability that would reach chronic 
proportions the coming centuries. The decision by some Portuguese to supply chief 
Nyamunda of the Danda polity with gunpowder in about 1516 had profound 
consequences for the settlement, imposing a blockade on trade, and to an extent, food 
imports, as the local population could only draw upon a small cultivatable territory 
and wild resources such as fish in the immediate hinterland of the fort (Figure 5.7). 
Bhila (1982) suggests that drought-induced food shortages across the wider area of 
east-central Mozambique could have enforced Nyamunda to extract more tribute out 
of the Portuguese, yet there is no evidence of a clear link between climatic and food 
system stress on a wider scale and civil war between the Danda polity and the Mutapa 
state, which rather appears to have been the result of a dispute over the control of new 
trade opportunities (Mudenge 1988; Newitt 1995). The disruption to the trade caused 
by this, as well as the success of Muslim traders at Angoche and in the interior at 
outmanoeuvring Portuguese economic activity, compounded earlier problems at 
Sofala. Moreover, while dry conditions appear to have ameliorated after 1515, Almada 
(1518, 593) reported that in September of that year, the milho, chick-peas and pearl 
millet “was like mud” as it had rotted in the storage bins, and had to be thrown out to 
sea, possibly inferring very wet conditions, and certainly loss of food. This coalescence 
of environmental and economic vulnerabilities degraded the viability of Sofala as a 
commercial centre, contributing to the Portuguese shift in policy towards the Zambezi. 
 The limited evidence that exists on the nature of the aforementioned conflict 
between these distant polities may well suggest that it was relatively limited, and after 
1528, a period of relative peace began. The reduction of Nyamunda’s power gave way 
to the growth of the Teve polity, and by 1531, the Portuguese had settled at Quelimane, 
the main entry point to the Zambezi, and Sena and Tete along the river itself (Figure 
5.3). This marked the beginning of over 400 years of continuous Portuguese occupation 
of the triangle of territory between Sena, Sofala and the Zambezi delta, and cemented 
the decline in the strategic importance of Sofala (Newitt 1995). However, few first-hand 
accounts are available from these areas until the 1560s, and thus unlike Sofala it is only 
possible to speculate on the impact of the Portuguese on local food systems and 
security. The Mutapa state experienced a period of political stability at this time, with 
Neshangwe Munembire on the throne for two decades (Figure 5.7), and although there 
remained a protracted conflict between the Mutapa and Teve polities, Mudenge (1988) 
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points out that the disruption and mortality from this distant conflict, which lasted 
until around 1542, was highly limited. Further conflict was noted near Sofala in 1573, 
while a revolt of Tonga-speaking communities in the Zambezi valley began against the 
Mutapa state in about 1550 (Beach 1994), yet relative to other periods, the early- to mid-
sixteenth century was a time of comparative peace, interrupted only by relatively 
sporadic and small-scale conflict (Figure 5.7). 
 
5.3.2 Livelihoods and trade 
Unlike food systems in the centralised African polities, changes in livelihood strategies 
do appear to have taken place in the early part of the century. In particular, gold 
production further declined at this time (Alcáçova 1506; Phimister 1976). This appears 
to have been influenced by wider economic changes, such as the declining profit 
margins in the international trade in precious metals (Phimister 1976), which reduced 
the exchange potential of mining-based livelihoods. Indeed, the fact that markets or 
fairs existed in the interior perhaps reflected a situation where it was no longer worth 
the while of African traders to bring their small quantities of gold to the coast. These 
unfavourable ‘terms of trade’ may well account for the strict policy over the mining of 
gold deposits in the Mutapa area, where Alcáçova (1506, 63-64) reported that “no man 
can take it [gold] without leave from the king, under penalty of death”. Phimister 
(1976) made the plausible suggestion that such a policy may have been implemented in 
the hope that a deliberate restriction of gold mining output would increase the price 
and profit margins of the trade. This therefore implies that while gold could no longer 
provide the export power it once had, the inflow of material wealth into centralised 
polities still held disproportionate importance in the maintenance of state leadership. 
The decline in the profitability of gold was further impacted by the arrival of the 
Portuguese, who paid little attention to the market, and sought to extract high profits 
from European cloth which was not in demand (Newitt 1995). Moreover, conflict at 
Angoche in 1512 and the civil wars between the Mutapa and Danda polities further 
disrupted the trade (Figure 5.7). For the wider population of the Mutapa state, these 
instabilities, combined with internal policy, must have led to a decline in the degree of 
concentration on trade-based livelihoods, and accordingly a loss of a coping strategy in 
times of climatic stress. Thus, agricultural and pastoral pursuits continued to represent 
the most crucial livelihoods for the majority of people, perhaps with less distraction 
than was the case previously. 
 Although gold exports declined in the Mutapa state, evidence suggests that the 
1530s and 1540s was a time of prosperity for trade-based livelihoods elsewhere. This 
mostly stemmed from strength of the ivory trade, which appears to have been restored 
by the captains of Mozambique and Sofala to form the principal trade in southeast 
Africa at the time. The increasing importance of ivory is evidenced in export figures 
from the factories, where in 1545, 26,000 kg of ivory was exported from Sofala, up from 
a figure of 8,820 kg in 1519 (Newitt 1995). Much of the ivory that reached Sofala was 
C apter 5: Vuln rability and response to climate variability in the Zambezi-Limpopo region
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
 175 
obtained from the Teve polity, where later evidence suggests that tusks were initially a 
by-product of extensive hunting rather than a separate livelihood (Santos 1609). This 
extensive trade with Sofala at this time must have increased the material wealth of the 
Teve leadership, which may well have increased its capability to both advance its level 
of socio-political organisation and support a defence force to assert its independence in 
the face of external threats. Towards the late-1540s, however, the ivory trade began to 
decline markedly, which was in part due to the self-interest of some Portuguese traders 
exchanging cloth at cheap prices to increase their personal wealth (Velho 1547). In the 
early-1550s, Botelho (1552, 274) lamented that “already no ivory comes from Sofala or 
Mozambique, when there was wont to come one hundred and twenty to one hundred 
and fifty bahars. This year there came only twenty bahars”. Still, given later suggestions 
that elephant hunting was of greater relative importance to the food system than the 
trade (Santos 1609), the instability of the ivory trade may not have been of been of high 
significance to the Teve polity. This temporary boom in the ivory trade also acted to 
conceal the activities of sertanejos (backwoodsmen) on the Zambezi, who from about 
the late-1530s operated a trade from Sena to the gold mining areas of Manyika (Bhila 
1982; Beach 1994), where later evidence also implies that the degree of concentration on 
mining-based livelihoods increased at this time (Carneiro 1573, see Section 5.4.1.1). The 
restrictions of death imposed by the Mutapa ruler on the free extraction of gold are 
said to have remained in place until the late-sixteenth century, and it was thus the 
Manyika kingdom that formed the focus of the gold trade at this time (Figure 5.7). 
 Available evidence throughout this period, though particularly biased towards 
trade and Portuguese activity, would suggest that the fundamental changes evidenced 
in these factors were of importance across southeast Africa. In addition to food system 
and biophysical vulnerability, socio-political changes emerging from the arrival of the 
Portuguese meant that the populations in the Sofala area were moderately vulnerable 
to climate variability (Figure 5.7). A small cultivatable territory around Sofala was 
offset by the generally high availability of wild resources, such as fish and fruits, yet 
the increased demand for foodstuffs resulting from the new Portuguese presence, and 
perhaps climatic stress, meant that local populations became reluctant to sell grain in 
times of stress. These increased pressures on food production by the new overlords of 
the Portuguese are reflected in the reduction in sovereignty and presence of ‘slavery’ in 
Figure 5.7. For the Portuguese at the fort of Sofala itself, recurrent food shortages were 
reflective of an insecure, import-based food system, and they were thus vulnerable to 
shocks such as drought and temporary population increase from growing Indian 
Ocean merchant traffic. While food systems in the Mutapa and Manyika areas were 
less vulnerable (Figure 5.7), livelihood changes enforced by the increasingly 
unfavourable terms of trade in gold, and reinforced by the disruption to trade at both 
Sofala and Angoche, meant that export-based livelihoods became unstable, reflected in 
the strict policy on the mining of gold (Alcáçova 1506). The weight of importance of 
these activities lay with the elites and their maintenance of power, although freer 
access to gold provided a coping strategy to the wider population in Manyika in times 
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of stress. The internal conflict in the civil war and changing political relations between 
the Mutapa and its ‘vassal’ polities, particularly Danda, may have been a result of such 
economic changes, and added to political instability. Still, much of the region was only 
marked by limited and/or sporadic conflict, while further livelihood opportunities 
opened up in the ivory trade with Sofala. This means that overall vulnerability in the 
autonomous African communities was low (Figure 5.7). Key factors emerging from this 
initial comparative assessment of vulnerability therefore include: 
• The maintenance of the ‘traditional’ crop mix with the addition of rice, and the 
possession and utilisation of other sources of food, equalling low to moderate 
food system vulnerability in the centralised African polities 
• Increased demand for food in the wider Sofala area to supply a fluctuating 
population, which heightened exposure to climatic stress 
o The possible impact of environmental stress, including drought and a 
tropical cyclone, on this increased vulnerability context 
• Decline in the importance of gold mining as an individual livelihood option in 
the Mutapa area and implementation of strict policy regarding mining, though 
gold mining formed a coping strategy to hunger in the Manyika area 
• The first evidence of Portuguese meddling in African political affairs and its 
compounding impact on conflict, but the general stable nature of the period, 
with an increase in ivory-based livelihood and trade opportunities 
• Overall limited reference to, and perhaps impacts of, climate variability in the 
interior due to the lack of detailed accounts and low vulnerability. 
 
5.4 Climatic stress and the weakening of political structure (1561-1624) 
In 1560, Father Dom Gonçalo da Silveira led a Jesuit mission to the Mutapa zimbabwe to 
convert the ruler, Negomo. As outlined in Section 2.2.3.5, suspicion of Silveira’s 
intentions soon grew, and a plot was hatched by traditional Shona leaders and Muslim 
traders to kill him (Mudenge 1988; Beach 1994; Newitt 1995). Silveira’s murder marked 
the beginning of a period of socio-political instability in Mukaranga and the Zambezi 
valley, as indicated by the considerable heightening of socio-political vulnerability over 
this wider period (Figure 5.8), which saw the transformation of independent African 
polities into essentially Portuguese subordinates. These decades were also a time of 
vastly increased written recording of climatic stress in the area (Table 3.5), commencing 
with an outbreak of plague locusts in 1561. The next sections investigate the impacts 
and relative importance of climate variability in this period. 
 
5.4.1 Responses to climatic stress in the 1560s-1570s 
5.4.1.1 Drought, locusts, and famine 
The most detailed account of climatic conditions in the aftermath of Silveira’s murder 
was written by Francisco de Sousa over a hundred years after the event, in what he 
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described as a “story told by the people of Mocaranga as was handed down to them by 
their ancestors”: 
“Heaven was not long in punishing the spillage of the blood of the good Abel. 
Immediately after it happened [the killing of Silveira], an innumerable and almost 
endless swarm of locusts came down that stopped the light of the sun at mid-day and 
ravaged the fields destroying the crops, the fruit, and the leaves of the trees, 
devouring with insatiable hunger all that the land produced to feed the miserable 
people. A terrible plague followed with terrible results never before seen in the 
Cafraria. The famine and the loss of life lasted for two years and the Emperor realised 
that God was punishing him for the killing of the saint” (Sousa 1697, 260-261). 
 This account, primarily concerned with the death of a missionary, appears to be 
riddled with biblical myths. Yet as others have suggested, it is plausible that a drought 
occurred at the time Silveira was attempting to convert people to Christianity, causing 
traditionalists to use him as a scapegoat (Pikirayi 2003), and that sometime after his 
murder, drought-breaking rains arrived and led to a plague of locusts. This scenario 
may well be corroborated by contemporaneous or slightly earlier drought at 
Inhambane, where Silveira had baptised the ruler in 1560. This is reported by 
Fernandes (1562) in a description of his residence at Inhambane, which also infers high 
food system vulnerability and the limited adaptive capacity of local communities: 
“Some years none of the crops grew, on account of drought, and then they live upon 
meat which they procure by hunting, especially elephants, and upon wild fruits, 
which some years are very plentiful and sometimes very bad. Otherwise their 
provisions are only beans and millet… Where there is rain millet is abundant, but 
where there is less rain it is very scarce... They are great eaters of meat and other 
things, but especially meat, ten of them can eat a whole cow. 
 But to come to the point, I almost died of hunger, for though other hardships were 
felt, hunger was the worst, especially for six months or more, during which I wanted 
for everything… if I felt very weak at night I ate a few mouthfuls not of bread or meat 
but a sort of caterpillar or of vegetables of this country, the worst thing possible to my 
taste, and though I wished it I could not have had more than a little, having only a 
small cake of it every day. Sometimes they brought me gourds and other fruits of the 
thicket, for the season yielded nothing else, and the king, who might have lent me 
something, refused to do so; but I consoled myself, having confidence that though the 
king of the earth failed me, the king of glory would sustain me” (Fernandes 1562, 151). 
 In the Mutapa area, oral traditions (Abraham 1962) state that the pestilence and 
ensuing famine killed thousands, but this suggested mortality is unverifiable. Oral 
traditions also note that Negomo moved his zimbabwe to a stone fort near the eastern 
bank of the Musengezi river to escape the “pollution brought by the murder of Father 
Silveira and the subsequent famine and pestilence” (Abraham 1962, 65). By 1563, 
however, Sousa claimed conditions were very wet and accompanied by floods: 
“It seems that God was appeased with this repentance of the Monomotapa… and after 
two years the sky opened up with such a deluge of water that the rivers flooded the 
fields for many leagues, fertilised the land, the famines ended as well as the plague. It 
was at the time of this flood that the body of Father Gonçalo da Silveira came up from 
the bottom of the lagoon” (Sousa 1697, 260-261). 
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FIGURE 5.8 Vulnerability radars for the Mutapa state, Manyika and Teve polities, Zambezi 
Tonga, Inhambane, and the Sofala, Sena and Quelimane hinterlands 1561-1624. Biophysical 
indices are given in Appendix B.  
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 Although the reasoning for these extreme weather events is clearly infused with 
myth, their occurrence may reflect the high precipitation variability shown by almost 
all proxy records at this time (Figure 3.9). Indeed, references to climatic stress were 
frequent hereafter in a period of high variability to the end of the century (Figure 5.9). 
Significantly, Fernandes also wrote of direct attempts by the Portuguese to interfere in 
African politics and denigrate traditional beliefs relating to rainmaking. In 1560, when 
the ruler of Inhambane became the first in southern Africa to be baptised, the Jesuits: 
“Made him own that he did not give the rain that causes the crops to prosper… almost 
the only cause of such respect as they had for him was that they thought he had 
power to give them water and could deprive them of it at his will, and when he 
wishes to threaten them he says he will give them no water” (Fernandes 1562, 148). 
 This reference almost certainly relates to rainmaking practices at Inhambane, 
where it is implied that the ruler was believed to have the power to bring rain, as 
Huffman posits in his model of Zimbabwe Pattern rainmaking (Huffman 2008). The 
murder of Silveira, however, probably helped prevent this from becoming a reality in 
the Mutapa state, as Santos later wrote of the continued political and cultural 
importance of rainmaking in the Shona-speaking polities: 
 “When they suffer necessity or scarcity they have recourse to the king, firmly 
believing that he can give them all that they desire or have need of, and can obtain 
anything from his dead predecessors, with whom they believe that he holds converse. 
For this reason they ask the king to give them rain when it is required, and other 
favourable weather for their harvest, and in coming to ask for any of these things they 
bring him valuable presents… They are such barbarians that though they see how 
often the king does not give them what they ask for, they are not undeceived, but still 
make him greater offerings, and many days are spent in these comings and goings, 
until the weather turns to rain, and the Kaffirs are satisfied, believing that the king did 
not grant their request until he had been well bribed, as he himself affirms, in order to 
maintain them in their error” (Santos 1609, 199). 
 The murder of Silveira contributed to the formulation of the expansionist 
policies pursued by the Portuguese over the next two decades (Newitt 1973). This 
resulted in the formation of an expeditionary force tasked with the subordination of 
the Tonga communities in the Zambezi valley, the expulsion of Muslims from the area, 
and ultimately, the subordination of the Mutapa state. Prior to this, though, food 
shortages became increasingly commonplace towards the late-1560s and early-1570s. 
At this time, the Mutapa state and the Tonga-speaking communities in the Zambezi 
valley were still in a state of conflict, which led Monclaro to describe the lack of food in 
the Zambezi valley in the late 1560s: 
“Their [Mutapa] sieges of any place are of short duration, three days at the most, it is 
said, because the land is so lacking in food that, even if they resort to the filthiest food, 
no body of people, however small, may be provided in any part thereof for longer 
than these three days” (Monclaro 1573, 205). 
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FIGURE 5.9 References to climatic stress, disease and its impacts in the 1560s-1590s. 
 
 Nevertheless, in an account clearly influenced by early-colonial ideology, 
Monclaro bemoans other hindrances, such as a lack of long-term planning, to food 
production on the southern banks of the Zambezi. Still, the latter part of this statement 
also appears to reflect drought-induced food shortages in the area, reaffirmed by the 
statement that the journey from Sena to the Mutapa state consisted of “more than 200 
leagues of very dry and deserted land, devoid of provisions” (Monclaro 1573, 246). 
“Their trade with our people along this river [Zambezi] consists of some little ivory, 
the rest being food… the river itself having fisheries with nets for the purpose. The 
land is mostly barren, though such barrenness is also due to their being lazy… they 
sow but little, and if it so happens that one of them is more diligent and active, thus 
gathering more produce, they straightway resort to falsity to take and eat what he has; 
saying why should he have more millet than the others, without ascribing this to 
greater industry; and oft-times for such blame they kill him and eat what is his, and 
the same goes for cattle, this being the cause of the barrenness. They take no thought 
for the morrow… and quickly exhaust the produce. 
 In my opinion the yield would be better if they hoed deeper into the soil, the 
reason I found [preventing this] was that the earth is very dry down below, wherefore 
if the seed is sown deep it withers and dies, the one sown nearer the surface being 
more easily penetrated by the dew, which is thick. The moisture reaches the grain 
which is closer and profits by it, inasmuch as the rain lasts but little there and the dry 
weather is of very long duration. This will show the manner of the land and climate, 
and how dry it is as we ourselves experienced” (Monclaro 1573, 231). 
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 Although these references may have been strongly influenced by the first 
impressions of the area by the Portuguese, when compared to numerous earlier and 
later accounts that describe the high fertility and abundant provisions of the lands 
proximate to the Zambezi river, it appears that these references do allude to dry 
conditions in this time period. The dry spell again appears to have been followed by 
locusts, which Monclaro described as having considerable impacts on food production: 
“Of those of our people who died, not all died of poison, but also of illness and poor 
food, it being scanty because the land only yields millet, and but little, and meixoeira 
[pearl millet], and some few vegetables. There is another food which they call 
nachenim [finger millet], which looks like mustard, and therewith they make their 
wine… Millet is scanty because of the locusts, the Moors, Kaffirs and Portuguese who 
have long stayed here commonly holding that locusts only appeared in this land after 
Father Dom Gonçalo’s death, which I have heard all of them say and openly confess” 
(Monclaro 1573, 224-225). 
 Similarly, an anonymous account written in 1573 notes that “the climate [of 
Mukaranga and the Zambezi valley] is unwholesome, and the air is pestilential” 
(Anonymous, 1573, 220), from which it can be inferred that the locust plagues had not 
yet dissipated. Apart from learning of food shortages and an increased reliance on wild 
foods, it is clear millet and rice were the dominant staple crops for subsistence in the 
Zambezi valley, indicating the limited diversity of grains (Figure 5.8). 
 If climatic stress was experienced across northern Zimbabwe in the 1560s and 
early-1570s, the differential vulnerability of the Mutapa state and the decentralised 
chiefdoms of the Zambezi valley conditioned its impacts. The Mutapa food system 
remained characterised by low vulnerability in this period (Figure 5.8), while the 
stability of leadership and functioning of state structures meant that mechanisms of 
grain redistribution operated from the centre of the state. On the other hand, the food 
systems in the Zambezi valley were more vulnerable (Figure 5.8), with a smaller 
diversity of crops and domestic animals, less centralised social networks, as well as an 
increasing proportion of produced food being traded with the Portuguese in some 
communities. Moreover, the relative impacts of ongoing conflict between the Mutapa 
state and the Zambezi valley chiefdoms, limited though they were, were greater on the 
small-scale chiefdoms, as at this time the Mutapa state was still at the height of its 
military power. Barreto’s expedition from 1571-72 intensified the impacts of food 
system stress and conflict in the Zambezi valley. In addition to attacking Muslim 
traders residing in the area, Barreto’s army attacked the Tonga chiefdoms whose revolt 
against the Mutapa were a disruptive influence to Portuguese activities (Beach 1980). 
The Tonga filled wells and hid their already depleted food supplies from the invading 
force, and scant provisions of small meat rations were all that was available to feed 
Barreto’s army. On the one hand, this weakness of Barreto’s force led to high casualties, 
and prevented it from the conquest of the Mutapa state, which was its main objective. 
Yet on the other, the Portuguese force limited their gains to incorporating the Tonga-
speaking communities into their jurisdiction at Sena and Tete, bringing new lands, 
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agricultural resources, and crucially, people, under its control, all of which could be 
used to increase the military capacity of the Portuguese. 
 Barreto was succeeded as leader of the expedition by Fernando Vasco Homem 
in 1573, who then led a force of 412 men to the Manyika kingdom. Homem’s force 
went by way of the Teve area, where conflict broke out with the Teve army over right 
of passage. The ruling Quiteve apparently hid the food in the area to induce hunger on 
Homem’s force, though was defeated soon after and abandoned his zimbabwe. 
Monclaro (1573, 228) thereafter noted that there was a “great lack of food” in Manyika, 
and this was re-affirmed by the traders interviewed by Carneiro, who had resided in 
the Manyika kingdom: 
“The witness also said that the land of Manica [Manyika] has little sustenance, not 
being enough for the people of the land even in a plentiful year. And the witness 
further stated that the land of Manica is dry and infertile” (Carneiro 1573, 229). 
 Beach (1987) claims that this ‘sulky’ account describing dry conditions in the 
relatively well-watered area of Manyika was coloured and exaggerated by the personal 
biases of the Portuguese, possibly to avoid increased competition in trade in the event 
of a successful conquest. Yet given the multitude of records describing the severity of 
contemporary dry conditions elsewhere (Table 3.5), this account perhaps reaffirms 
other evidence presented that climatic stress was experienced across a wide area in the 
late-1560s and early-1570s. According to Carneiro’s evidence, one factor that may have 
made the Manyika population more vulnerable to climatic stress was the increased 
degree of concentration on mining-based livelihoods and trade: 
“The witness also said that most of the year they eat supplies from outside which they 
fetch and cause to be bought... having, however, to travel but little to do so and being 
much more given to trading than to farming” (Carneiro 1573, 229). 
 This increase in the livelihood focus on trading, most likely in gold, suggests 
that increased penetration of the interior by private traders and sertanejos affected food 
production strategies, and indicates a difference to the previous period when mining 
was undertaken in times of food scarcity. Despite Couto (1616, 389) later describing 
mining as a “poor and miserable business” for the population, Santos wrote that “such 
is their desire and covetousness for cloth, that they brave every danger in order to 
extract it from the bowels of the earth” (Santos 1609, 218). Nevertheless, it is doubtful 
that the focus on mineral export-based trade was a complete distraction to agricultural 
and pastoral livelihoods (Bhila 1982), and it is more likely that the high magnitude of 
climate variability at this time was as important in inducing food scarcity in Manyika. 
Mining-based livelihoods retained importance in Manyika after Homem signed a 
friendship treaty which gave the Portuguese free access to the mines and to barter for 
gold. This marked the beginning of the Portuguese feira system, which formed a 
dominant part of trade relations in both the Mukaranga and Manyika areas from this 
point onwards. On his way back through the Teve area, Homem established peaceful 
relations, and in 1575, his force withdrew, leading to a brief period of peace. 
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5.4.1.2 Portuguese penetration and the changing nature of food systems 
By the early-1580s, the evidence of Azevedo and Santos suggests that the Mutapa and 
Manyika areas had recovered from the impacts of several years of climatic and food 
system stress, with no mention of locusts, and ample food supplies of millet and rice 
reported. It is tempting to link this recovery with the apparent partial recovery in 
precipitation in some palaeoclimate records in the early-1580s (Figure 3.5), though this 
may also have been aided by the interlude in conflict in the decade between 1575 and 
1585. Santos (1609, 354) also provides the first detailed insight into the food system of 
the Teve area, stating that “[Quiteve] sent us presents of fowls, yams, and bread of 
millet, which is their ordinary food”. Crop diversity appears to have been rather low, 
and significantly, cattle are not mentioned (Figure 5.8). This possible lack of cattle 
perhaps stems from the uneasy breakaway from the Mutapa state in the late-fifteenth 
century, and it is reasonable to assume that this, along with the proximity of the ivory 
trade at Sofala, explains the seemingly amplified importance of hunting as a food 
source and in centralised political authority: 
 “[There are] all kinds of animals, which they catch in the forests and marshes; they 
spare no kind of flesh… Quiteve is accustomed to hold certain royal hunting parties, 
taking with him all the men of the city in which he dwells, who are three or four 
thousand. Tigers, panthers, lions, elephants, buffaloes, stags, wild boars, and many 
other wild animals are collected. They cut the flesh into many strips and dry it, both 
for the king and for each one of them. All eat of these spoils at the place of slaughter 
with greater rejoicing and merriment, and they carry the remainder of the meat to 
their homes” (Santos 1609, 208, 251). 
“The principal reason why the Kaffirs hunt elephants is to obtain the flesh for food, 
and secondly to sell the tusks… when the hunters have killed an elephant they call all 
their family, relations, and friends [and] eat its flesh boiled and roasted, doing nothing 
else all the time, and although after three days the stench becomes intolerable, this 
does not prevent them from eating it until nothing remains” (Santos 1609, 322). 
 This increased reliance on highly organised, intense hunting provided a coping 
strategy in times of drought and an export-based livelihood opportunity in the 
mineral-poor Teve area, though is perhaps more an indicator of a vulnerable food 
system, which necessitated a greater dependence on hunting in periods of prolonged 
environmental stress (Ekblom 2004). 
 Although there were differences in the organisation of food production in the 
centralised polities, a much clearer differentiation existed between these and the 
communities in the hinterland of the Afro-Portuguese towns of Sofala, Quelimane, 
Sena and Tete, who now focussed on the production of a surplus. This growing 
production and sale in increasingly diverse foodstuffs was detailed extensively by 
Santos (Box 5.2), and formed a prominent part of the commercial activity in the region 
(Figure 5.10). This may have operated on a smaller scale when Muslim traders ran the 
Zambezi route from Angoche, yet with the founding of Sena and Tete, where Santos 
estimated the population at 800 and 600 in the 1580s respectively, and Quelimane, the 
decentralised communities around these settlements went to significantly greater 
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lengths to respond to these new commercial and diversification opportunities. The 
situation was different at Mozambique Island, however, where cattle, fruit and rice 
were imported from Madagascar and the Comoro Islands (Figure 5.10). 
 
BOX 5.2 From subsistence to surplus: changing food systems around Portuguese settlements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sena and Tete localities: 
“Opposite Sena on the other side of the river, there is a very grand and lofty 
mountain called Chiri, from it come nearly all the provisions consumed in 
Sena, such as rice, millet, sweet potatoes, figs, and fowls. In Sena and Tete all 
year round there is an abundance of Portuguese and Indian figs, there are 
many pomegranate trees, vines, lemon trees, and palm trees, and an 
abundance of wild fruit. There are many kitchen gardens where good 
vegetables are grown. There is an abundance of yams, sweet potatoes, 
pineapples, and very good melons, gourds, cucumbers, rice, millet and many 
other vegetables. 
 There are many cows, goats, and sheep, from (whose milk) they make as 
good cheese as that of Alemtejo, swine, and a greater number of fowls. All 
these things are very cheap, but those coming from India to these rivers are 
sold at a very high rate, especially wine, wheaten flour, boots, clothing and all 
necessary goods sent from abroad” (Santos 1609, 268). 
Sofala locality: 
“In the lands of Sofala there are many gardens in which vegetables grow like 
those of Portugal, and many fruit trees. The meat is generally hens, which are 
innumerable. The Kaffirs breed them to sell to the Portuguese, and in Sofala 
they give twelve for a black cotton cloth… There are also many domesticated 
pigs which are bred among the houses, many goats and cows, wild pigs, and 
other wild animals” (Santos 1609, 186). 
Quelimane locality: 
“There are very few cattle, as these Kaffirs are not fond of work, and are more 
given to dancing and feasting than to husbandry, contenting themselves with 
the usual food, which consists of rice or millet and vegetables. They also eat 
rats, snakes, and lizards, and jeer at those who do not. In this land there are 
numerous tigers, panthers, lions, elephants, buffaloes, gnus, deer, antelopes, 
and an infinite number of apes and baboons, and the Kaffirs hunt all these 
animals and eat their flesh… their commerce with the Portuguese is 
principally in ivory, rice, millet, panicle, yams, and many other kinds of 
vegetables which the country produces in great abundance. The Portuguese 
supply them with cloth, tin, and earthenware beads… The men roam about, 
converse with each other, fish, and hunt, and live merrily” (Santos 1609, 306). 
Zambezi valley area: 
“When boats are proceeding along the river the Kaffirs who inhabit the many 
villages on its banks approach in their little canoes laden with fruits of the 
land, rice, millet, vegetables, fresh and dried fish, and numerous fowls, which 
things they sell cheap to the passengers, as these lands are very fertile and 
abundant, and fowls are very plentiful, which they do not eat, but breed to 
sell to those who navigate this river” (Santos 1609, 255). 
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 Production of a food surplus thus provided a useful supplement to the import 
commodities derived from the ivory trade, diversified the food system, and may have 
encouraged a build-up of population near these towns from adjacent small-scale 
chieftaincies. Despite opening up livelihood opportunities, Newitt (1995) argues that 
this new source of income was not on a scale to constitute an economic revolution, and 
that the surplus produced for trade had its limitations. Moreover, with the increasing 
quantity of food-oriented exports must have come some reduction in the available food 
for the food-producing population, which exposed the populations of these poorer and 
decentralised communities to new vulnerabilities. One obvious way in which this 
manifested was through food shortages, which, as Section 5.3.1.1 noted, could be 
brought on by either drought-aggravated harvest failure or a sudden influx of people 
into an area. Population and food demand is not quantified in the vulnerability indices, 
but is partially accounted for in the presence of ‘slavery’, and is also tied to the lack of 
sovereignty in the hinterlands of these towns (Figure 5.8). Overall, however, food 
system vulnerability in each of the Afro-Portuguese communities was low to moderate, 
on the one hand reduced by the growing diversity of food production, but limited by 
the relatively small cultivatable territories, limited cattle, and aside from Quelimane, 
limited hunting practices. Importantly, though, these accounts demonstrate the 
growing differentiation in the constitution and organisation of food systems in 
southeast Africa, which increasingly acted to condition contrasting responses to 
climatic stress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.10 Southeast African trade in the sixteenth century. Based on Santos (1609). 
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5.4.2 The weakening of African socio-political structure 
In the mid- to late-1580s, food shortages returned with similar if not greater magnitude 
to the Zambezi valley and Mukaranga, despite the low food system vulnerability of the 
latter. Santos, writing of ‘four chastisements’ to affect southeast Africa at this time, 
reported locust plagues and famine around 1589: 
“The second chastisement was a cruel plague of very large locusts that passed through 
them in such numbers that they covered the ground, and when they rose in the air 
they formed so dense a cloud that the land was darkened. During this time there was 
great sterility and famine, of which numbers died. The damage caused by them [the 
locusts] was great, as they devoured all the crops, gardens, and palm groves through 
which they passed, leaving them dried and burnt up as though consumed by fire, so 
that for the next two years they produced no fruits. 
 This famine was the third chastisement of this Ethiopia, because there was so great 
a scarcity of provisions that the Kaffirs came to sell themselves as slaves merely to 
obtain food, and exchanged their children for an alqueire of millet, and those who 
could not avail themselves of this remedy perished of hunger, so that at this time a 
great number of the inhabitants of these lands died” (Santos 1609, 319). 
 The evidence relating to a growing segment of society around the Afro-
Portuguese towns translated as ‘slaves’ appears to demonstrate the response of poorer 
individuals with little protection from a chief or centralised polity in times of climatic 
stress, meaning these people sought the ‘security’ of the inhabitants of Afro-Portuguese 
towns in order to obtain food. This shows contrasting responses to climatic stress of 
centralised communities, often with mineral wealth, organised coping strategies and 
higher adaptive capacity on the one hand, and on the other, smaller-scale communities 
with a much smaller range of livelihoods to intensify in times of food scarcity, and thus 
a lower adaptive capacity. This system of ‘slavery’ was in existence prior to Portuguese 
arrival, and referred to a segment of the population that were effectively economic 
chattels tied to Portuguese, Muslims or other Africans (Newitt 1973), though food 
scarcity was not the only cause of this practice at this time: 
“The slaves of these countries, or the greater number of them, are not natives thereof, 
but these Kaffirs are such great thieves that they steal children and lure adults into 
coming to these shores, where they sell them to the Portuguese, or to the Moors, or to 
other Kaffir traders who carry on this traffic, saying that they are their captives. 
Others of these slaves are sold by their fathers in times of necessity and famine; others 
are made prisoners by the kings for the crimes they have committed; others again are 
taken prisoners in wars” (Santos 1609, 332). 
 Combined with the suggested, although unverifiable mortality by Santos, the 
effects of this practice must, to some extent, have further weakened the smaller-scale 
communities and chiefdoms in this area, while their allegiance to the Portuguese 
increased the local resource base of the latter. In the coastal areas, an outbreak of 
smallpox also caused mortality, which appears to have destabilised the populations 
around Portuguese settlements: 
“The fourth affliction and trouble that overtook this Kaffraria was a severe outbreak of 
smallpox, of which a great number of people died. This disease along the whole of the 
C apter 5: Vuln rability and response to climate variability in the Zambezi-Limpopo region
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
 187 
coast is like a subtle pestilence, as it kills everyone in a house where it appears, men, 
women, and children alike, and very few escape who are attacked by it. 
 From all these parts of the East [coastal Mozambique] the plague [locusts] is 
absent, nor is it known that it ever has appeared at any time. The cause of this must be 
that the climate is very hot, and consumes the vapours and bad air from which this 
pestilence is usually engendered. However, in its place there is the smallpox, which is 
very common and as contagious as the plague” (Santos 1609, 319). 
 The climatic conditions on the better-watered coastal areas at this time are less 
well-known than in the Zambezi valley and Mukaranga, yet if the extent of these 
variable but mostly dry years were of regional extent, as the proxy records suggest 
(Figure 3.8), then the impacts of the smallpox outbreak may have been exacerbated by 
pre-existing food scarcity and malnourishment. This has been suggested to be the case 
elsewhere (Kovats et al. 2003; Endfield 2007), and it may therefore be no coincidence 
that a severe smallpox outbreak occurred at a time of general climatic stress. 
 This weakening of smaller-scale socio-political structure on the southern banks 
of the Zambezi and along the coast was compounded by the ‘Zimba’, part of the 
Maravi population whose purported cannibalistic pursuits are usually written off as 
European myth-making (Allina 2011): 
“This tribe [the Zimba] in the year 1589 traversed a great part of these lands, killing 
and eating all that they came across, both human beings and animals, without sparing 
a living thing, so that one may say these barbarians were a fire burning and 
consuming Central Ethiopia” (Santos 1609, 318). 
 Interpretation of this account is set against a backdrop of broader scholarly 
scepticism over European reports of cannibalism in the era of early modern encounters 
(Casale 2007; Allina 2011). Newitt (1995, 61), while stating that such graphic tales could 
be a product of the heated imagination of Friar João dos Santos to excite his European 
audience of Ethiopia Oriental, is reluctant to write this account off as “figments of a 
superstitious and ignorant Lusitanian credulity”. Although not being drawn on the 
truth of the stories, Newitt professes that they hold importance for contemporary 
developments north of the Zambezi, possibly linked to the general phase of ‘climatic 
instability’ at the time. Pikirayi (2003, 2009) also proposes the possibility that the 
actions of the Zimba were a response to local ‘environmental catastrophes’, and 
similarly resists temptation to write-off the events as fabrication. Allina (2011) adopts a 
more sceptical stance, and instead suggests that ideas of the Zimba as cannibals were 
transmitted to Santos through African voices. Where Allina, Newitt and Pikirayi agree, 
though, is that descriptions of cannibalism were reflective of and heavily tied to the 
social, political and environmental insecurity in the greater Zambezi area in the 
sixteenth century. This point is further reflected in the tying of this suggested 
cannibalism with the interpretation and impact of climate variables. For instance, 
Santos added that the Zimba ruler took responsibility for climatic conditions: 
“The said king says of himself that he alone is the God of the earth, for which reason if 
it rains when he does not wish it to do so, or is too hot, he shoots arrows at the sky for 
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not obeying him; and although all these people eat human flesh, the king does not, to 
seem different from his vassals” (Santos 1609, 295).  
 Key here, then, is that Santos mentions the occurrence of cannibalism directly in 
tandem with famine, slavery and instability in decentralised communities. In this 
context, the inevitably exaggerated reports of cannibalism can be seen as symbolic of a 
more widespread breakdown in the availability of food, and therefore cannot be so 
easily dismissed as mere myth-making. 
 The return of climatic stress at this time and in the 1590s appears to be reflective 
of the shift to the consistently dry conditions of the LIA from c. 1600. Food scarcity 
reappeared in the Zambezi valley and Mukaranga, yet this time it was combined with 
a more severe short-term threat than the relatively small Portuguese force that had 
caused instability in the 1570s. This involved the incursions of Maravi armies on 
Mukaranga, who initiated instability in the Mutapa state. The encroachment of Maravi 
warriors on the Mutapa state led Gatsi Rusere to call upon the Portuguese to help drive 
them back, a recurrence of which led to increasing concessions of land, the relaxation 
of firearms laws and the ceding of all the mines in Mukaranga to the Portuguese. 
Although there is little doubt that these events occurred, it is important to consider why 
Rusere immediately called on the small Portuguese population and their Tonga 
warriors to assist in the defence of the state, particularly when considering the 
apparent size of the Mutapa forces. Suggestions in the mid-sixteenth century of the 
Mutapa ruler being able to immediately bring 100,000-300,000 warriors to the field of 
combat (Frois 1561, Homem 1576) are clearly highly exaggerated, yet there is general 
acceptance of Homem’s (1576, 460) claim that the Mutapa state had “considerable 
might”. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the cumulative impacts of the 
occurrence of drought, locusts and food shortages in the area weakened the capability 
of the Mutapa state to combat an invasion of this scale (Figure 5.11). Whatever the case, 
the outcome of Rusere’s decisions to ensure the defence of the state was substantially 
diminished prestige, economic power and sovereignty, as indicated by the heightened 
socio-political vulnerability context in Figure 5.8. The state continued to be affected by 
civil war and conflict with other polities through to Rusere’s death in 1624, while the 
Portuguese now had considerable influence in state affairs. 
 In addition to climatic stress, the widespread nature of conflict in this period 
may have also had significant detrimental impacts upon food-producing societies. 
Although Beach (1980, 1998) has written of the limited mortality in pre-colonial 
conflict, the ‘total war’ scenario in the Mutapa state and Zambezi valley from the late-
1580s involved multiple actants, spilled over into wide territory and involved large 
numbers (Mudenge 1988). This may have meant that disruption of the ‘little society’ 
through violence, destruction of food and population movements may have 
jeopardised the true economic base of the state, its food system. Nevertheless, an 
anonymous account in 1608 refers to the “infinite” quantity of cattle in the state. 
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Castelbranco, however, notes the impacts of population decline on food production in 
the Zambezi valley area after half a century of instability: 
“For want of population they are mostly uncultivated, so that when a larger number 
than usual enter them, there is great scarcity, and the soldiers die of hunger, the 
provisions imported being sold at an exorbitant price” (Castelbranco 1619, 161). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.11 Areas affected by climatic stress and conflict 1560s-1630s. 
 
 The magnitude of climate variability in this period played an important part in 
the general spread of economic and political insecurity in southeast Africa. The high 
variability and decreasing quantity of precipitation that marked the 1560s-1590s 
reflected the transition towards the severest part of the LIA from c. 1600. The resultant 
climate-aggravated food shortages of the 1560s-1590s had considerable impacts on 
socio-politically vulnerable Zambezi Tonga communities in particular (Figure 5.9), yet 
also affected the Mutapa and Manyika areas. In addition to other factors, such as a lack 
of long-term agricultural planning and limited internal social networks, the Tonga 
groups seem to have been exposed to a number of system-dislocating determinants, 
including recurrent and severe outbreaks of plague locusts, and conflict with both the 
Portuguese and Mutapa, which undermined their capacity to respond to external stress 
(Figure 5.8). The less vulnerable Mutapa state recovered from the impacts of late-1560s 
and early-1570s climatic stress, but when an outbreak of plague locusts and food 
scarcity coincided with the attacks of Maravi warriors on the state, it undermined the 
ability to respond effectively to crises, meaning an enforced reliance on Portuguese aid. 
The Portuguese resource base in southeast Africa was further strengthened by their 
expanded jurisdiction over populations around Quelimane, Sena and Tete, some of 
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whom sought protection against food scarcity and the Maravi and Zimba raiders. 
Indeed, it becomes increasingly apparent in this period that the vulnerabilities and 
responses of the more centralised African polities were fundamentally different to 
those of the less centralised groups in the vicinity of Portuguese settlements, whose 
socio-political vulnerabilities became entrenched as the Portuguese presence became 
fixed. The Portuguese, with their strengthened foothold in the Zambezi valley, came to 
the assistance of the Mutapa state, but at a high cost, leading to the decline in prestige, 
population and power, aided by the decision-making of Gatsi Rusere. This decline was 
matched in a much more rapid way in the Teve kingdom, whose army was routed by 
Homem’s forces, and returned the society to a focus on agriculture, hunting and a 
localised system of exchange (Newitt 1995). It can therefore be concluded that the 
weakening of African socio-political structure was not simply a result of the impacts of 
climatic stress or Portuguese exploitation. Rather, a convergence of multiple stressors 
that differed between societies led to system breakdown and socio-political decline, 
including violence, governance, food system vulnerability and climatic stress. 
 Key points relating to vulnerability and response to climate variability across 
this wide spectrum of African and Afro-Portuguese society in this period thus include: 
• High magnitude of climatic stress in the late-1560s, early-1570s, late-1580s and 
1590s coincident with high variability in proxy precipitation in the late-
sixteenth century, with drought, locust plagues and flooding all reported 
• Increased food commerce opportunities at Quelimane, Sena, Tete and in the 
Zambezi valley arising from Portuguese expansion, and the opening up of new 
vulnerabilities arising from this 
• Food scarcity and famine in the Zambezi valley, Mukaranga and Manyika, with 
particularly strong impacts in the Zambezi valley due to the differential 
vulnerability of these areas 
• High mortality from smallpox in the coastal areas, possibly exacerbated by pre-
existing food scarcity 
• Differences in responses and coping strategies to food scarcity between 
centralised polities with hunting- and mining-based livelihood opportunities 
(Teve and Manyika areas) and decentralised communities (Zambezi valley), 
where evidence of people selling themselves as slaves for protection emerges 
• Increased conflict north and south of the Zambezi, which combined with food 
shortages to undermine the capacity for effective response in the Zambezi 
valley communities and the Mutapa state 
• The expansion of Portuguese jurisdiction over the Zambezi valley communities, 
acquisition of Mutapa territory, and increased influence in the Mutapa state, 
each degrading the sovereignty of African political units 
• Attempts by the Portuguese to undermine traditional institutions and beliefs in 
rainmaking, and the establishment of feiras in Mukaranga and Manyika. 
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5.5 Livelihoods and vulnerability under the Portuguese (1625-1692) 
The period between the death of Gatsi Rusere and the rise of Changamire in 1684 
marked the highpoint of Portuguese dominance in the region. Until this point, the 
Portuguese had influenced African political structures while officially remaining on the 
side-lines, but upon the instalment of Mavura, the first of the ‘puppet’ Mutapa rulers, 
they expanded their colonisation and exploitation by asserting influence on the upper 
levels of the Mutapa state. The treaty of vassalage signed by Mavura in 1629 effectively 
made the ruler a Portuguese client. The conditions of this clientship included free 
access to the gold mines in Mukaranga, the payment of tribute to the Portuguese, who 
now had the final say in political succession in the state, and the annexation of lands 
surrounding Tete, which were turned into prazos (Figure 2.14). Although a brief period 
of conflict arose in response to these new conditions in 1631, with 6-7000 fatalities 
(Mudenge 1988), the Portuguese quelled the rebellion in mid-1632, leaving the Mutapa 
state with diminished sovereignty and autonomy (Figure 5.12). Similar, if less 
pronounced processes occurred in the other African political units, and this section 
examines the varying importance of Portuguese dominance for vulnerability, resilience 
and adaptive capacity to climate variability. 
 
5.5.1 The impacts of Portuguese dominance in the interior 
5.5.1.1 Changing governance structures and resilience 
The signing of the treaty of vassalage by Mavura had severe consequences on the 
upper structure of the Mutapa state, a situation which was aided by internal political 
fractures after years of civil wars. The removal of the curva (tribute) payment and other 
tariffs and tolls cut an important source of income for the Mutapa leadership, and 
undermined the reciprocal relationships with its wards and villages on which the state 
depended. The leadership also lost control over some sectors of the economy. Gold 
mining, for instance, could no longer be controlled or taxed (Figure 5.12), the loss of 
income from which further reduced leadership prestige. Less can be said about the 
specific impact of Portuguese dominance on the coordination of social networks. 
Nevertheless, Conceição noted that the system of service mentioned in Section 5.2 was 
still in place in the Mutapa state at the end of the century, suggesting that food-related 
social networks did not completely break down. As was the case in the political role in 
rainmaking in the Inhambane polity in the early-1560s, the Portuguese probably tried 
to dismiss traditional beliefs and sought to impose their own. Indeed, in contrast to 
other Mutapa rulers, Mavura took his conversion to Christianity seriously, which 
alienated traditional Mutapa leaders and forced the ruler into a position of dependence 
on the Portuguese at the expense of his own people (Mudenge 1988). This must have 
altered the nature and perception of the upper levels of the state, possibly reinforcing 
contemporary internal unrest, but over the long-term this appears to have posed only a 
minor threat to Shona beliefs (Beach 1980), evidenced by continued references to the 
political importance of rainmaking. 
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FIGURE 5.12 Vulnerability radars for the Mutapa state, Manyika and Teve polities, Zambezi 
Tonga, and the population of the Sofala and Sena hinterlands 1625-1692. Biophysical indices are 
given in Appendix B. 
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 This loss of sovereignty was also reflected in Teve, and to a lesser extent in 
Manyika (Figure 5.12). For instance, in return for securing Quiteve Peranhe’s 
leadership in 1640, his Teve polity ceded the whole northern part of its territory to the 
Sisnando Dias Bãyao, which led to the further expansion of prazos in the area. Rapid 
loss of territory radically reduced its prestige and cultivatable territory (Figure 5.12) 
and diminished its resource base and labour force. Bãyao is also well-known for his 
expedition into the Torwa state, and meant that by 1644 the Portuguese had now 
interfered in the political structure of each of the main centralised polities in the region. 
 To look upon the penetration of the Portuguese as a sole product of mercantile 
capitalism and possession of gunpowder, however, is only a small part of the story. 
Perhaps as important were the internal political vulnerabilities of the Mutapa state and 
other polities, both in their succession systems and the frequency of leadership 
contention, which led to the seemingly irrational decision-making of seventeenth 
century rulers in particular. Indeed, Mudenge rightly states that the fact the Mutapa 
state survived at all shows remarkable resilience. Protracted civil war, external political 
and economic pressures and climatic stress (Section 5.4) were all important factors that 
weakened the state, yet its resilience may relate more to its ‘little society’, or the wider 
population involved in agropastoral livelihoods, in the face of political instability. This 
point is well illustrated to the end that even the capture or destruction of the state’s 
zimbabwe appeared to do little to directly affect these food system livelihoods. Newitt 
(1995, 59) echoes this point in stating that “had there had been a great empire of 
Mutapa, then a ruthless Portuguese conquistadore might have overthrown the monarch 
and seized control of the country, but the small-scale, segmentary nature of Karanga 
political organisation proved far more resilient than the great military monarchies of 
South America”. The resilience of the population was also aided by the weaknesses of 
the Portuguese themselves, specifically their lack of effective central command, 
shortage of manpower and individualistic style of life (Newitt 1973, 1995). 
Nonetheless, while the most well-known changes to African political units relate to the 
upper levels of society, this is not to say that the broader population were not affected 
by the heightened socio-political vulnerability context, and two of these impacts were 
depopulation and changes in livelihood focus. 
 
5.5.1.2 Depopulation and livelihood security 
The resilience of food producing livelihoods did much to aid the sustainability of the 
Mutapa state, but the instability stemming from the climatic stress, famine and locust 
plagues of the late-sixteenth century, followed by the mortality from years of civil war 
and external conflict, appears to have caused devastation in parts of Mukaranga and 
the Zambezi valley. In addition to loss of population through mortality, a number of 
people and chiefs emigrated to the southwest of the plateau (Beach 1994). Moreover, 
women, cattle and food were seized by the Portuguese throughout the Zambezi valley 
and Mukaranga to reward their followers, and African labour was forcibly recruited to 
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work in the now Portuguese-controlled Mukaranga gold mines (Beach 1994). This 
general depopulation of Mukaranga is reflected in accounts of the time. Bocarro (1633-
49) wrote of several factors responsible for this, including the locust plagues of the late-
sixteenth century, and for his part, he recognised the impact of Portuguese conduct: 
“The want of population, which is great throughout Kaffraria, because few children 
are born, and many plagues of locusts, wars, and carrying off of captives diminish 
their number. Above all the barbarous custom of taking the mavi (killing of suspected 
wizards) kills an infinite number and destroys countless families… But the principal 
cause of the want of population is the bad conduct of the Portuguese, from whose 
violence the Kaffirs flee to other lands” (Bocarro 1633-49, 491). 
 If Bocarro’s evidence is reliable, then it is reasonable to assume that the 
recurrent outbreak of plague locusts, associated with the increased climate variability 
in the late-sixteenth century, were a factor which may have encouraged migration to 
the southwest. Still, Bocarro placed particular emphasis on the conduct of the 
Portuguese, who had particularly profound impacts on populations living near the 
gold mines and feiras in the heart of Mukaranga and Manyika (Figure 2.14). Portuguese 
traders and sertanejos operating out of self-interest now favoured the forced 
recruitment of labour and the extortion of tribute to make quick profits, meaning the 
“poor and miserable” business of mining became unviable as a secure livelihood 
option for the Mutapa population. According to an anonymous account written in 
1683, the impacts of this included the policy of the resettlement of communities away 
from the gold-producing plateau area, which was initiated by Mutapa Mukombwe. 
Responses to the convergence of multiple stressors thus contributed to a reversal of 
Barros’s earlier claim that elephants avoided Mukaranga due to its high population to 
the exaggerated but significant claim that wild animals now roamed around villages: 
“Mocaranga [Mukaranga] has very rich mines. But the little government, and great 
domination of the Portuguese with whom the natives used to live together, has 
brought it to such an end, that it is depopulated today and consequently without 
mines. Its residents ran away, and the king appointed them other lands for them to 
live as it pleased him. The larger part of this kingdom remained without more people 
than the Portuguese and their dependents and slaves. It now looks the same that 
Lisbon will look with three men, but not to look completely deserted: the wild animals 
came in instead of the residents, and it has so many, and so free; that even inside the 
houses the lions come to eat people” (Anonymous 1683, 161). 
 Although the mining areas in Mukaranga were forcibly depopulated, the ruling 
Chikanga of Manyika at an earlier date had the authority to enforce a change in policy: 
“The reason why big pieces of gold from these extremely rich mines of Manica do not 
come nowadays is that the Kaffirs are afraid of taking it from the mines when it is in 
great quantity because the king is immediately informed... [and] gives orders for him 
to be attacked and have all his property, wife and children taken from him, and 
sometimes to kill him. And thus, when they strike a big mine, they generally inform 
the king immediately and the king orders all digging in to stop” (Macedo 1633, 14). 
  Antonio Gomes, explaining the reasoning for this, related that: 
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“[The king] ordered his people not to extract any gold and to till the land and grow 
food in order to become richer and have more peace and quiet” (Gomes 1648, 78). 
 This change in livelihood focus also marks a reversal of Carneiro’s earlier claim 
that the inhabitants of Manyika were more given to trading than farming. In reality, 
subsistence requirements necessitated that food production was always the most 
important livelihood that involved the greatest number of people, but the impact of 
conflict led to a change in policy on the degree of importance attached to mining and 
agriculture by the leadership. Further adverse shifts in the terms of trade towards 
extortion and forced labour meant that the relative importance of mining and trade to 
both the economy and leadership continued to decline. That this reinforced the focus 
on food production is reflected in encounter between Gomes and a Manyika villager, 
and an observation that infers the decline in the importance attached to trade imports: 
“All this time, at the villages where we stopped, I would talk to the Kaffirs about the 
things of God, that they should think of their obligations, etc., and one day one of 
them said ‘muzungo, you speak well but… here we are born, here we grow old 
without any worries except looking for food’” (Gomes 1648, 79). 
“Beads and cloth are merchandise for the Kaffirs, in the old days they used to come 
for it at the fairs but covetousness and greed has brought the cloth to their door and 
this is brought overland in bundles wrapped in palm-tree mats…” (Gomes 1648, 77). 
 While less significance was attached to export-based livelihoods, contemporary 
accounts of food systems once again refer to productivity rather than shortages. 
Bocarro (1633-49) spoke of the region abounding in provisions, including millet, rice, 
vegetables, cattle and many hens, while Rezende (1634, 412) observed that Manyika 
was “productive in all kinds of provisions”. The Portuguese must have had some 
influence on surplus-based agriculture in Mukaranga and Manyika, but this was 
probably limited to a trade with the low number of Portuguese settled at feiras, around 
which emigration had taken place. More significant was that Gomes (1648) reported 
the spread of wheat, and milho - possibly maize - to the interior, which was already in 
the Zambezi valley by this time, and added to food system diversification (Figure 5.12). 
Gomes also noted that cattle and sheep remained in high number at this time: 
“In Mocaranga, there are many cattle and five legged sheep, apart from the usual four, 
they have another in place of a tail that it makes them five legged” (Gomes 1648, 73). 
 Despite the increase in detailed, first-hand accounts of Mukaranga, Manyika 
and Teve, it is noteworthy that the generally dry seventeenth century is marked by a 
dearth of references to climatic-induced stress in these areas (Table 3.5). Only two 
reports from elsewhere in the region at this time make reference to climate-related 
events, such as the shipwrecked Bento Teyxeyra Feyo, writing in 1647 around Delagoa 
Bay, who described famine caused by five years of low rainfall across southeast Africa: 
“And so we went on without millet or sesame, for it was not yet harvest time, and in 
this place and throughout nearly the whole of Kaffraria it had not rained for five 
years, causing great famine and a plague of locusts which left not a blade of grass 
where they passed” (Feyo 1647, 352). 
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 Further north, at Sena, Mascarenhas (1663, 141) provided another direct 
reference to lack of rainfall, and related that “the fort is now very well provided with 
water because this place needs it very badly, for the only source here is the rains; this 
year we were already very short of it because it has not rained”. That these are the only 
two references to climatic conditions in this period appears to represent a stark contrast 
to the assumption that extended drier conditions may result in increased hardship for 
communities. Two points in particular stand as out as possibilities for this. The first is 
that the magnitude of climate variability itself was greater in the late-sixteenth century 
(Figure 3.9), which may have led to more frequent outbreaks of locust plagues in 
contrast to the relatively low variability of the extended LIA drier conditions of the 
seventeenth century. Secondly, this may relate to the nature of conflict. Despite the 
expropriation of some cattle by the small Portuguese population and the reduction in 
the labour force, there is little evidence that civil war alone had a dislocating impact on 
food systems. Indeed, Rezende wrote of the importance of food production in times of 
conflict: 
“No one can restrain them from dispersing and going in search of a living. Even if 
they are victorious in a battle, it needs much to induce them to fight another, for they 
say they have finished the war, and if in the meanwhile the time for their harvests 
arrives, they care for nothing but to go and attend to them” (Rezende 1634, 419). 
 This may have been different in times of ‘total war’, of which the Mutapa-
Tonga-Maravi-Portuguese conflict in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century 
is a prime example, but was perhaps less the case in the civil war that persisted in the 
period under consideration here. Thus, despite the increased vulnerability context of 
the Mutapa state as a whole (Figure 5.12), the vulnerability of the food systems 
remained low, and probably enabled an effective response to the generally drier 
conditions at the time. Moreover, unlike the Zambezi valley, there was no successful 
peopling of Mukaranga or Manyika (Newitt 1995). Instead, the focus on and partial 
relocation of small-scale, garden-based subsistence agriculture, aided by a reduction in 
conflict towards the middle of the century and the internal divisions in Portuguese 
society (Newitt 1995), meant that the vulnerability of the wider population remained 
moderate. This maintenance of the state’s wider structure in the face of external stress 
was crucial in the shifting balance of power in the second half of the century. 
 In terms of prestige and size, the decline of the state to this point was profound, 
involving the gradual loss of Mukaranga, its well-watered arable and grazing lands, 
and the gold resources that remained. This policy was probably partly a forced 
migration away from the lawless exploitation of labour around the feiras and gold 
mining regions in the Mukaranga heartland, and partly a policy of Mukombwe to 
stabilise the population (Pikirayi 2003). A more independent stance was adopted in 
Mukombwe’s rule, and internal political stability certainly aided the reconstruction of 
the state structure. Yet this was always underlain by the weaknesses in the Portuguese 
occupation. In the early 1680s, for instance, the Portuguese population in the centre of 
the state was just five people, with a further 26 at Tete. Mukombwe may have also been 
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helped by the outbreak of smallpox around the Portuguese settlements on the Zambezi 
in 1670, which have reduced the numbers of the Tonga population and accordingly the 
military threat to the state (Mudenge 1988; Pikirayi 2003). Key changes in governance 
and livelihoods also affected the Afro-Portuguese towns and their hinterlands, whose 
populations were under the more direct rule of the Portuguese jurisdiction. 
 
5.5.2 Portuguese rule on the Zambezi and Mozambique coast 
The Portuguese established a firmer hold over the majority of the Tonga, Makua and 
Maravi populations in the Zambezi valley, and in the hinterlands of Sena, Tete and 
Quelimane. Their social relations with these people through intermarriage resulted in 
an emerging class of Afro-Portuguese, and in turn, changes to socio-political and 
economic systems, which influenced vulnerability in these areas (Figure 5.12). 
 
5.5.2.1 Food production and security in the Zambezi towns and prazos 
Although the Portuguese population on the Zambezi in the seventeenth century was in 
the low hundreds, estimates in 1634 put the number of warriors that the Portuguese 
could draw upon at Sena and Tete at 30,000 and 8000 respectively (Rezende 1634), 
while documents made it clear that some Portuguese recognised that their existence 
depended on “keeping the natives” in these areas: 
“To explore the Rivers 70 and 80 men are needed on each farm… Progress does not 
depend on bringing in Portuguese but in keeping the natives. And the more there are 
of those (Portuguese) the more complaints the natives have and the more they run 
away… The natives are needed in those lands; and that is enough to make the 
example of Brasil not applicable to the rivers” (Anonymous 1683, 167). 
 These lands, as well as the much less important Sofala, were turned into prazos 
(Figure 2.14). Portuguese settlers and prazo-holders thus acquired jurisdiction over the 
people living on these lands, which effectively elevated them to the traditional political 
positions of chiefs, or senhors, over much of the Zambezi valley area. While Portuguese 
senhors collected tribute from colonos, or free Africans, and controlled certain economic 
activities and ritual functions, the major difference was that the prazo system was 
driven by short-term profit, meaning that the intensification of exploitation by short-
term occupants of the prazos was commonplace (Newitt 1973). The other part of the 
population living under the Portuguese were the ‘slaves’, who often sought protection 
from conflict or famine. Although the prazo-holder may have initially offered food and 
protection, the upkeep of a robust food supply was essential if slave groups were to be 
held together. Failure to do this could lead to the desertion of a prazo or a state of 
rebellion which could quickly spread to other groups as well as the colonos, 
heightening the vulnerability of the area to further stress (Newitt 1995; Pikirayi 2009). 
Food security, and therefore climate were key in the dynamics of the prazo-system and 
its population. 
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 Afro-Portuguese society on the Zambezi and the Mozambique coast by this 
stage appears to have been underpinned by an organised and resilient agricultural 
base, particularly when compared to previous periods (Figure 5.12). This was in part 
because the production requirements for the taxable surpluses needed to support the 
prazos increased markedly compared to the surpluses produced to support the town 
garrisons of Sena, Tete, Quelimane and Sofala in the sixteenth century, and failure to 
produce adequate food in a drought year could have significant impacts on the social 
and economic operation of prazo society (Newitt 1973; Pikirayi 2009). Consequently, a 
high number of reports become available on food systems in the Zambezi valley. 
Firstly, important dietary changes are noted with the introduction of wheat in the Sena 
hinterland, which appears to have increased the self-sufficiency of the Zambezi towns: 
“In the old days these lands were unhealthier to strangers but nowadays owing to 
agriculture and the abundance of wheat, everything looks much better… flour used to 
come from Goa almost deteriorated by the sea and the bread was not so healthy as it is 
nowadays, made from the wheat cultivated in this land” (Pereira 1663, 137). 
 By the late decades of the century, food production on the Zambezi seems to 
have been largely self-sufficient, with a wide diversity of crops, vegetables, fruits and 
domestic animals forming the staple diet (Table 5.4). Indeed, one account stated that: 
“The rivers of Cuama are the richest provinces the universe has, in my opinion… they 
have innumerable cattle, wheat and countless provisions, because one thing and the 
other cost nothing” (Anonymous 1683, 159). 
 Other key accounts from this period offer detail on the diversity and quantity of 
and adaptive mechanisms involved in food production. Significantly, Gomes’s account 
notes that long-term planning had become embedded in the agricultural cycle: 
“The vegetable gardens of the Portuguese and people of India who live in those lands 
have all kinds of vegetables, cabbage, garlic, onions, etc., for all these things grow well 
and better so in the bush because it is cooler; the land is fertile in everything one puts 
in, everything grows well. And the Kaffirs around here away from the Zambezi also 
have plenty of food and cattle. 
 All these lands produce rice and wheat but the Kaffirs are more interested in other 
foods, they say these are very light and only the others touch their hearts, apart from 
wheat they have a silo for all the others, which they call a quitura and they keep each 
kind separately and consider it lucky never to see the bottom of it and to have some 
excess from one season to the next” (Gomes 1648, 109). 
“The higher lands yield as much wheat as desired. In the month of July, up the river, I 
saw some which was as high as a very tall man. In Sena they make very good and 
delicious bread, and the Kaffirs are already beginning to prefer it to their millet. They 
cultivate it, not only in Botonga, but also in Maravi” (Barreto 1667, 506). 
“These people [of Quelimane] are not agriculturally minded, some times they live on 
wild fruit and some other times plenty of fish which can be caught at enormous 
lagoons and is dried during the summer and there is so much of it that it can be 
caught in basketful. When the hunt ends they divide it so fairly that nobody makes 
any complaints and in this they are very fair and equal” (Gomes 1648, 48). 
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TABLE 5.4 Documented food production in seventeenth century Portuguese jurisdiction. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Apart from the increased level of food system diversity, each account notes the 
high fertility and productivity of the area at this time. Similarly, evidence of food 
shortages and drought is minimal throughout much of the seventeenth century, 
despite an increased number and depth of accounts from the Zambezi area. This is not 
to say that years of drought did not occur, for the seventeenth century overall was the 
second driest of the last millennium in the southern African SRZ (Figure 3.8), but that 
its impacts were not worth recording. Perhaps, then, this in part relates directly to food 
system diversity, and the reduced vulnerabilities from conflict in this period. However, 
the diversity of the food system was not a completely recent occurrence, despite the 
introduction of wheat and maize at this time. Similarly, the system of tribute and re-
 Sena-Tete Quelimane Sofala 
C
ro
p
s 
Wheat x x  
Rice x x x 
Maize x x x 
Pearl millet x x x 
Finger millet x x x 
Sorghum x x x 
Sugar cane x x x 
V
eg
et
ab
le
s 
Pumpkins x x  
Beans x   
Cabbage x   
Onions x   
Peas x x x 
Potatoes x x  
Yams x x x 
Fr
u
it
s 
Watermelons x x  
Lemons x x  
Limes  x x 
Coconuts  x  
Tamarind x   
Figs x x x 
Oranges  x x 
Grapes  x x 
Pineapples x  x 
Papaya  x  
Pomegranate x   
Mangoes  x  
Bananas  x  
D
om
es
ti
c 
an
im
al
s 
Cattle x   
Fowls x x x 
Sheep x x x 
Goats x x x 
Pigs x x x 
Dogs x   
W
il
d
 
an
im
al
s Game x x x 
Elephant  x x 
Deer x x x 
Fish x x x 
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distribution of grain was clearly operated prior to the assumption of Portuguese as 
chiefs. Probably more important is the finding from Chapter 3 that the seventeenth 
century, although dry, was one of the least variable in terms of inter-annual and multi-
decadal precipitation variability (Figure 3.9). This means that although precipitation 
was on average lower than the previous century, it appears to have been less variable, 
with fewer abrupt shifts, possibly indicative of more benign climatic conditions for the 
inhabitants of northern Zimbabwe. Rather than climate, the more obvious threat to the 
inhabitants of the Zambezi valley at this time was that indiscipline and short-term 
profit-seeking of the very small number of Portuguese individuals that occupied the 
area. This lack of authority ultimately set the conditions for the weakening of 
Portuguese hold on northern Zimbabwe and the Zambezi in general. Portuguese 
dominance in the Zambezi-Limpopo area had varying impacts upon the vulnerability 
of political structures and livelihoods. Key changes included: 
• The loss of sovereignty, territory and economic control in African political 
units, which undermined the reciprocal relationships on which authority 
depended, and is illustrative of the destructive influence of the Portuguese on 
complex African political systems 
• A reduction in population due to multiple causes, including climatic stress in 
the late-sixteenth century, but the resilience of the population at the village 
level involved in agropastoral livelihoods who continued to underlie socio-
political organisation in the in the face of multiple threats 
• The maintenance or re-establishment of sufficient authority by Mukombwe to 
initiate resettlement away from the gold-producing areas in Mukaranga, and 
the Manyika ruler to reduce the livelihood focus on mining and trade 
• Portuguese senhors and prazo-holders replacing African chiefs, opening up new 
vulnerabilities by the driving force of short-term profit 
• The increase in the diversity of food systems in the Zambezi area, reducing 
vulnerability to climate variability 
• The lack of reference to climatic stress, despite generally drier conditions, 
suggesting that the reduced variability in precipitation was significant.  
 
5.6 The rise of the Rozvi and climatic stress on the Zambezi (1693-1760) 
The era of Portuguese supremacy in northern Zimbabwe and Manyika was brought to 
an abrupt end by the rise of Changamire and the Rozvi state. Changamire’s army 
destroyed the feira of Dambarare in 1693, causing the Portuguese in Mukaranga to flee 
to the Zambezi towns, while the Rozvi also destroyed the feiras in Manyika in 1695. 
Changamire’s policy of the total expulsion of the Portuguese from the interior was 
largely successful, and meant that the southern shore of the Zambezi, the delta, and the 
land between Sena and Sofala now formed the extent of Portuguese settlement in the 
area (Figure 2.13). Although contact was reduced with the interior plateau areas, 
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source material is sufficient to investigate vulnerability and response to climate 
variability in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century (Figure 5.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.13 Vulnerability radars for the Mutapa state, Manyika and Teve polities, Zambezi 
Tonga, and the population of the Sofala, Sena and Quelimane hinterlands 1693-1760. 
Biophysical indices are given in Appendix B. 
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5.6.1 Mutapa, Manyika and Teve in the early-eighteenth century 
Despite the decline in the Portuguese presence in Mukaranga, the distance of the Rozvi 
meant that the Portuguese still exercised a degree of influence over Mutapa political 
dynamics. Rival political groups backed by either the Rozvi or the Portuguese vied for 
power in civil wars throughout the early-eighteenth century, with frequent changes of 
leadership, and it was not until around 1720 that a level of independence from either 
power was re-established (Mudenge 1988). Manyika and Teve were also subject to 
Rozvi and Portuguese authority respectively until well into the eighteenth century, and 
meant that the socio-political vulnerability context remained high (Figure 5.13). 
 Nevertheless, one could argue that the destruction of the feiras in Mukaranga 
and the related reduction in the state’s subjection to extortion, slavery and exploitation 
(Figure 5.13) would have reduced its vulnerability. This suggests that the internal 
situation, rather than external factors alone, played a part in keeping the state weak but 
intact for another century and a half. One key internal change was the shift of the 
Mutapa capital and state core from Mukaranga to Chidima in the Zambezi lowlands in 
the second decade of the eighteenth century. It is unclear why this move took place, 
but this may have been a policy to avert insecurity in Mukaranga, as was the case with 
the earlier migration away from the feiras in the mid-seventeenth century. Indeed, gold 
production was by this time negligible (Figures 5.4 and 5.13), and the resettlement 
away from the formerly gold-rich areas to the Zambezi may simply have completed a 
process begun by Mukombwe at this earlier stage. This move had major implications 
for the exposure of the state to climate variability. The Zambezi valley is a dryland, 
tsetse-infested area which makes cattle-keeping difficult. Although the banks of the 
river can harness agriculture, the area around Chidima receives an unreliable seasonal 
rain, making it vulnerable to the extremes of both drought and flood. In this new 
heartland of the state, it was scarcely possible to occupy one site with the usual 
concentration of people at Mutapa capitals for more than a few years, meaning the 
rulers often moved their zimbabwe, a practice interpreted as superstition by Xavier: 
“Zimboae [zimbabwe] means the same as court and as the palaces of other buildings 
of which it is formed are made of timber, they can be moved easily from one place to 
another as they do when they feel like it, which generally happens because of some 
superstition, which those people have on account of anything” (Xavier 1758, 50): 
 Another partial reason for this shift may have been climatic stress in the early-
eighteenth century. This possible pathway dates back to earlier shifts in vulnerability. 
In the last decade of the occupation of Mukaranga, the land was described as very rich 
in food and animals (Sousa 1697), yet accounts of the Mutapa polity in Chidima, 
although less detailed, neglect to mention cattle (Xavier 1758), and this perhaps attests 
to a shift in the livelihood base of the state due to the difficulties of keeping cattle in the 
dry, tsetse-infested valley. Moreover, it was noted both before and after the shift 
towards the Zambezi that milho, possibly maize, had grown in importance as a 
cultivated grain: 
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“They dedicate themselves to raising cattle and cultivating the land, this is what their 
wealth consists of. They will eat any animal, the more rotten the better… They 
produce a lot of big grain and small grain maize, fine and scented rice, nachenim, and 
excellent wheat. They had no wheat for a long time and the Portuguese thought that 
was because in these meridional countries one could not see the north star as if there 
were not any other stars favourable for bread” (Sousa 1697, 236-241). 
 Maize, as has already been stated, has relatively high yields compared to millet 
and sorghum, and has a shorter growing period, though requires higher rainfall and is 
sensitive to dry conditions in its early growing period (McCann 2001). While its shorter 
growing period may have offered advantages, even in the dry LIA, the risk of growing 
maize was that years of moisture stress may have resulted in harvest failure. Perhaps 
these livelihood changes can be linked in someway to the severe impacts of the 1714 
drought in the Zambezi valley. Although primary evidence for this drought is held in 
Goa and therefore was not consulted, Mudenge (1988) reported that this drought had 
the worst impact of those recorded by Portuguese writers. This is evidenced in a letter 
dated 3 January 1715 from the viceroy of Goa to the king of Portugal, where it is stated 
that more than 200,000 people died from a smallpox epidemic and an extreme drought. 
This figure, though undoubtedly exaggerated, is unprecedented for loss of life from 
any event in southeast Africa, but the viceroy accepted it, and proxy precipitation 
evidence suggests that this period marked the severest dry conditions of the LIA, with 
a slight increase in the variability of the T7 stalagmite variables in Figure 3.9. Evidence 
is therefore insufficient to rule out that such climatic stress influenced the decision to 
relocate to Chidima. Persistent civil wars and political instability may have also 
influenced vulnerability to climate variability at this time, yet evidence is insufficient to 
support the possibility that the limited scale of civil wars had a dislocating impact on 
social networks or the re-distribution of grain. 
 One connection with this move, and probably after the drought, was that a 
number of people sought the protection of wealthier Mutapa people and became 
bondsmen, or ‘slaves’ (Beach 1980). This has been linked to the emergence of vanyai, a 
military class which in itself helped sustain the state in the face civil disturbances and 
Portuguese desire for a return to the seventeenth century situation. In addition to 
renewed military power, the state seems to have retained its religious practices, which 
again appears to refute the idea that the Portuguese nullified ideological beliefs and the 
political importance of rainmaking: 
“They do not worship any idols and all their practices consist of venerating their 
mozimos. The mozimos are their saints and their saints are their dead in whose 
impersonations the devils come to them in dreams to ask them for rice, meat, pombe, 
and other things of which they leave offerings on the graves of their ancestors… when 
he wants rain, he sends these marombes to a certain place with their little bags to wake 
up the mozimos so they will turn the clouds into water; and by means of this prayer he 
contradicts himself for he boasts of presiding over the stars” (Sousa 1697, 240). 
 For all its internal power struggles, the Mutapa state underwent a period of 
reconstitution in the late-seventeenth and early- to mid-eighteenth century. Traditional 
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institutions such as rainmaking appear to have been maintained, and the Portuguese 
were driven back. Yet if the Portuguese were now less of a threat, severe drought 
appears to have impacted upon a heightened vulnerability context, resulting in high 
mortality evidenced in the 1714 drought. Moreover, an intensified risk came from their 
new, dry, lowland environment. There is no corresponding evidence of climatic stress 
in Manyika or Teve over this period, where food culture appears to have been based on 
a similar mix of crops to previous periods. For instance, in 1758, Xavier reported that 
“there is no rice or wheat in this territory [Teve], not because the country is not fertile, 
but owing to the carelessness on the part of its inhabitants who are quite content with 
the abundance of meixoeira and other vegetables” (Xavier 1758, 38). Despite low 
diversity of cultivated crops, both Teve and Manyika are better-watered than Chidima, 
while coping strategies such as the intensification of hunting were long-established. 
Vulnerability in these polities was therefore marginally lower than in the Mutapa state, 
but the lack of reference to climatic stress may simply reflect limited source coverage. 
 
5.6.2 Climate variability and the state of the Portuguese jurisdiction 
Despite their setbacks, the Portuguese still retained control of the routes where imports 
could reach the interior, and thus a degree of economic and political power. Military 
threat to Sena seems to have been averted upon the death of Changamire, and the 
settlement remained important, though troubled, in the eighteenth century. Enough 
trade remained with Manyika to maintain the upkeep of the town, though a major 
issue seems to have been health problems from stagnant water (Newitt 1995). Tete, on 
the other hand, was more reliant upon the seventeenth century wealth from the 
Mukaranga feiras, whose rapid destruction severely damaged its prosperity and led the 
Portuguese to consider abandoning it (Newitt 1995). An additional development in the 
early-eighteenth century was the founding of Zumbo, where professional African 
traders conducted a trade with the south-western goldfields and the mineral resources 
of the Maravi area. Trade, however, was only one aspect which affected the prosperity 
of the Afro-Portuguese Zambezi settlements and the populations in their hinterlands 
and prazos. In 1698, Ribeiro wrote of food shortages at the Sena prazos, though these 
were at first aggravated by reasons other climate variability: 
“[Sena] is practically all in ruins not only in the material sense of the houses whose 
majority are falling down but also as regards the residents who, having already spent 
all they used to possess, do not have enough to eat anymore and even less to support 
their families and slaves. This ruin was and is brought about because for some years 
they have had their hands tied either by Generals and Governors of the fort… The 
rivers of Sena are also very diminished because of Changamira” (Ribeiro 1698, 278). 
 The disordered state of the food system and the slaves who underpinned it may 
have given rise to the severe and widespread impacts of locust plagues, which 
Miranda reported between 1736-45: 
“There has also been at times grasshopper plagues that have resembled those that 
afflicted the obstinate Pharaoh. The closest was in [17]36 and lasted until [17]45 (so say 
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the people of those days), although it decreased in intensity; however, there were 
some small ones [locusts] left and when the first rains come in November they come 
out and dig again at the end of January drowned by the winter rains’ they still cause 
damage to the meixoeira (pearl millet) when it is starting to come out, but it is not too 
terrible. A bigger damage was made by the others during the years I have mentioned 
as neither the crops nor cultivated or wild trees were left alone, that being one of the 
reasons why many natives died of hunger. Others gave themselves up voluntarily as 
slaves to the Goanese or to some other rich countrymen in exchange for a small 
portion of grain, enough to last one only day… I know that the great numbers of 
slaves that many people have are a result of the great poverty of these regions 
suffered in these years [1736-45]” (Miranda 1766, 93). 
 If there were already problems in slaves obtaining food, famine and plagues 
made this worse by compelling more people to seek protection from Afro-Portuguese 
families. When Santos wrote of slavery in the 1580s, he claimed that food shortages 
were one of a number of reasons forcing people into this system, yet here Miranda 
claimed that the majority of slaves were victims of food scarcity and plagues: 
“Most of them become slaves at a time of famine or grasshopper plague for want 
forced them to give themselves up as slaves not only to the Europeans, but also to 
some powerful natives. Some sell their own children to meet the tributes on the land 
and if they want to release them later on they must give slaves in exchange for each of 
his children he wants to release. What bigger cruelty! What misery! The poor 
mucensses subject to follow to the letter the custom of the land whether they have a 
good agricultural year or not and if they do not do it, they are made captive by their 
landlord. What a cruel law! What barbarian custom!” (Miranda 1766, 106). 
 This eye-opening account explains how much the system of slavery operated on 
the Zambezi had changed since the sixteenth century. African chiefs, too, adopted the 
practice of owning slaves, while prazo-holders extorted family members from colonos 
and African communities if lack of food meant they could not meet their tribute 
payments. This lack of food seems to have been widespread throughout the mid-
eighteenth century, and as Miranda again observed, a high proportion of the year was 
spent subsisting on wild food resources, although this was put down to reasons 
heavily influenced by colonial ideology: 
“They eat such rotten and filthy things that referring to them makes one shy and sick.  
Finally, they engage in eating, drinking and sensuality at all times and in excess. That 
is why their harvests do not last longer than six months and for the rest of the year 
they have wild roots and fruits” (Miranda 1766, 94). 
 While Miranda does not explicitly refer to drought, Nicholson (1996) reports a 
later drought between 1744-1745 at Zumbo, while Castro (1763, 63) states that in the 
year 1758, mines in the Maravi area were abandoned “because of a great drought that 
was followed by great famine, which forced the residents of Tete to withdraw all their 
personnel”. On the Zambezi, climatic stress (Figure 5.14) resulted in famine, and the 
general disorder in the Zambezi valley food system, appears to have set-in a cycle of 
food system dislocation. Numbers of the existing slave population were already 
subsisting upon wild resources for a substantial part of the year, which was worsened 
by locust plagues and drought, and led to tributary chiefs and colonos selling family 
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members to make up for their shortfall in tribute. People living in small-scale, 
decentralised African polities such as Barwe thereafter sought protection from the 
prazo-holders as their food supply was hit, meaning even less food was available for 
the prazo-holder to provide for the overall population. One result of this system of land 
ownership was rebellion, banditry and violence, which in turn affected trade through 
increased raiding of caravans and the plundering of the prazos. This, too, further 
disrupted the food system, and could also spread amongst other slave groups and to 
the colonos, which led to increased migration to either other prazos or local chiefs. The 
exact numbers of slaves involved in these processes are hard to discern, but the best 
estimate comes from Miranda, from which Newitt (1995) totalled up 33,500 slaves at 
the Zambezi settlements and prazos. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.14 Accounts of climatic stress and disease in the early- to mid-eighteenth century. 
 
 According to Xavier’s (1758, 42) account, Sena seems to have returned to a 
steady state. The town was reportedly “rich in all fresh foods”, although he remarked 
that the place is “not very pleasant”. The captaincy of Quelimane and its sixteen prazos 
seem to have fared much better in the eighteenth century. Its agriculture was based 
upon producing a surplus in the gardens and fruit tree plantations along the coast and 
in the gardens on the residences of the prazos, which was supported by the generally 
wetter conditions around the Zambezi delta. Quelimane’s productivity seems to have 
resulted in the abandonment of the old system of importing food from Madagascar 
and the Comoro Islands to Mozambique Island, meaning that this area supported both 
itself and the gradual rise in shipping traffic for slaves at the time. Xavier also noted 
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that Luabo, the Zambezi delta area proximate to Quelimane, now had sugar mills, 
which further added to food-related livelihood opportunities. The Sofala area 
maintained its agricultural production, but the Portuguese town itself was always very 
sparsely populated, and in the middle of the century Xavier reported that the fort was 
inundated by the sea due to poor upkeep. Trade continued with Teve and Manyika 
(Figure 5.13), but was limited to small amounts of ivory and gold. 
 In the late-seventeenth and early- to mid-eighteenth century, then, a 
reconfiguration of power and sovereignty took place in southeast Africa. The African 
polities were once again able to assert their independence, while the Portuguese were 
pushed back to their towns and prazos. As with changes of this magnitude in the 
previous centuries, some vulnerabilities were reduced, while others were opened up. 
The most significant of these involved the movement of the Mutapa state to the dry 
lowlands on in the Zambezi valley, which enforced a more scattered settlement pattern 
and the loss of cattle, serving to weaken the centre but strengthen the periphery of the 
state (Pikirayi 2009). There was also growing poverty in the Zambezi towns and 
hinterlands of Sena and Tete. Internal problems at Sena, aggravated by locust plagues 
and famine, helped to restrain Portuguese influence, while the reconstitution of society 
in the Mutapa state, albeit of a lower population, size and prestige, enabled it to remain 
independent in spite of its ongoing political problems. Significant climate-society 
interactions in this period consequently include: 
• Severe climatic stress in 1714 and the 1730s in Mukaranga and the Zambezi 
valley  
• The shift of the Mutapa state to the Zambezi lowlands at Chidima and the loss 
of cattle, resulting in an increase in food system vulnerability 
• The primacy of climatic stress as a factor in people seeking protection from 
hunger, yet increasing difficulties in ensuring food supplies on the prazos due to 
internal instabilities and climatic stress 
• High capacity for reorganisation in the Mutapa state in the face of climatic 
stress, external and internal conflict, political instability, livelihood and food 
system changes, population decline and the movement of the state core itself. 
 
5.7 Climate and socio-political breakdown in Zambezia (1761-1830) 
The reassertion of independence in African political units loosened the grip of the 
Portuguese and pushed them back to the Zambezi and coastal areas, where trade once 
again formed the mainstay of relations. Nevertheless, the decline in the power, prestige 
and prosperity of these polities had already set-in. This section examines the role of 
climate variability in reinforcing this decline and impoverishment from the mid-
eighteenth century to the years before Nguni-speaking groups arrived north of the 
Limpopo. 
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5.7.1 The Mutapa state to 1830 
Political stability, civil war and leadership change was frequent in the Mutapa state to 
around 1769 (Figure 5.15), and the state thereafter fragmented into the Chidima and 
Dande areas (Figure 5.3). The 1760s were also a time of drought and locust swarms in 
the middle Zambezi (Newitt 1995). The results of this breakdown in political authority 
and climatic stress, according to Beach (1994) and Newitt (1995), were acute problems 
of banditry, robbery, and the disruption of trade. That banditry only became a serious 
problem in the eighteenth century, though, relates to underlying shifts in vulnerability. 
For instance, the lack of cattle in the tsetse-infested heartland of Chidima, and the 
reduction in other livelihood opportunities such as gold mining, may have encouraged 
other short-term responses to crop failure, such as raiding for women, food and slaves. 
The Portuguese withdrew their garrison of the Mutapa capital at this time, but what 
remained of their lands around Tete was constantly threatened as disorder in the 
Mutapa state spilled over into the prazo lands. In 1769, when Changara commenced his 
leadership, there was a reduction in civil war. Changara granted the Portuguese free 
access to the state, as well as permission for the re-opening of the Mukaranga feiras 
deserted 75 years previously. As the trade at Zumbo declined, Pereira sent out African 
agents to explore the old feiras in 1769, but reports came back noting that they had been 
deserted because “the plagues, wars and famine have wiped out their inhabitants”, 
while in the places people were living, they “lived almost the whole year on fruits, 
herbs, roots, honey and meat of wild animals” (Pereira 1769, cited in Mudenge, 317). 
Civil wars between the rival factions returned soon after, and lasted for much of the 
rest of the century, when knowledge on the state become increasingly scanty. 
 The Manyika kingdom seems to have remained more stable in the eighteenth 
century. Its rulers continued to impose strict control of gold extraction, while copper, 
rubber, cattle, quartz, iron hoes and ivory were traded at the feira of Masekesa. An 
anonymous account in 1780 attested to this: 
“The word of the king is the most inviolable degree and his laws are observed with all 
respect and, under them is enforced everything concerning the economy and law and 
order of the republic… he knows how to keep peace in his kingdom by never starting 
a war unless it is really necessary and avoiding quarrels” (Anonymous 1780, 11). 
 Towards the end of the century and the beginning of the next, internal divisions 
weakened Manyika political authority, and upon the death of a ruler the kingdom was 
thrown into a state of anarchy while succession was settled (Bhila 1982). The end of the 
eighteenth century, however, appears to mark drought across much of the SRZ in most 
proxy precipitation records (Figure 3.5), which is also partially reflected in the ships’ 
logbook reconstructions from further south (Chapter 4), known as the mahlatule in the 
KwaZulu-Natal area. Mudenge links this to the beginning of the end for the Rozvi state 
in the southwest, while in the Chidima area, the drought was reported to have 
impoverished traders (Newitt 1995). At the time, a chief in the area attacked Zumbo 
which led to its abandonment. As a result, trade, and consequently the flow of goods 
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into the Mutapa polity declined, while the Portuguese that did maintain contact with 
the state became more interested in the slave trade than gold or ivory, leading to 
another pressure on the state (Figure 5.15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.15 Vulnerability radars for the Mutapa state, Manyika and Teve polities, Zambezi 
Tonga, and the population of the Sofala and Quelimane hinterlands 1761-1830. 
 
 In an examination of sources held within the Lisbon and Maputo archives, 
Newitt (1995) argued this late-eighteenth century moisture stress represented a ‘great 
cycle of drought’ that lasted until 1830, with extended clusters of dry years between 
1794-1802 and 1823-1830. The drought in the 1820s is better-documented in the 
Portuguese sources, and appears to have affected a wide part of the region (Figure 
5.16). Notwithstanding the dearth of sources on the Mutapa state in the early-
nineteenth century, the Zambezi valley downstream of Tete was affected by extended 
drought and famine, with locust plagues arriving in 1828 (Newitt 1988). It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the adjacent lowland area of Chidima was also affected by 
the apparently regional climatic stress of the late-1820s, which impacted upon an 
already fragmented and politically unstable state. This meant that in the decade prior 
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to the arrival of Nguni-speaking communities, the state, though alive, was 
characterised by a high number of problems across all levels of society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.16 Reports of climatic stress in the Zambezi valley and Mozambique coast in the 
1820s based upon Newitt (1988). Years labelled indicate first mentions at each location. 
 
 If the Mutapa at Chidima were highly vulnerable to climatic stress, its limited 
quality for cattle-keeping meant that no Nguni communities settled in the area itself 
(Beach 1994). By contrast, the areas of Butua, where the Rozvi were based, and Teve 
and Manyika experienced considerable pressures of conflict and raiding from groups 
led by Zwangendaba and Nxaba, which brought about the end of the Rozvi state in the 
1820s. According to Mudenge (1988), the early-nineteenth century droughts weakened 
the Rozvi to these pressures. In the Teve area, Silva (1830) also reported that the 
combination of violence and banditry caused hunger at the feira of Bandire: 
 “They spoke of the same shortage of food and people dying [at Bandire] as we have 
here to a great extent caused by the devastation made by some barbarians designated 
as Machites who went through there destroying everything” (Silva 1830, 147). 
 A reference the following year, however, may suggest that successive years of 
drought were responsible for such hunger, which ameliorated in 1830-1831: 
“The soil of Bandire has changed for it now produces without difficulty maize, big 
potatoes, Iugo, peanuts, etc.” (Silva 1831, 4). 
 The 1820s marked the breakdown of inter-continental trade with Manyika and 
Teve, a situation which was forced by multiple factors, including conflict, persistent 
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political instability and succession disputes, the decline of gold mining to negligible 
levels, and climate variability. The migration and raiding activities of Nguni-speaking 
communities did cause insecurity, but this was of variable significance, and by its very 
nature focussed on areas where cattle populations were high like the Rozvi in Butua. 
Indeed, the desolation reported by later nineteenth century diarists such as Pacheco, 
Baines and Sealous reflected a process of gradual impoverishment, at times 
exacerbated and accelerated by increased vulnerability to and magnitude of climatic 
stress, that begun two centuries before the arrival of Nguni groups. 
 
5.7.2 The decline of Sena and growth of the slave trade 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, the importance of Sena appears to have 
declined, and the seat of government on the Zambezi was transferred to Tete. This 
probably reflected the situation of the diminished gold trade with Manyika and the 
increasing importance of the Portuguese-Maravi trade in minerals at Zumbo. At Sena, 
Miranda (1766) reported the increasing occurrence of elephants and hippopotamuses 
causing great damage to the crops on the prazos, and by the early-nineteenth century, 
the town itself was in ruins, with its inhabitants in poor health and high rates of infant 
mortality (Newitt 1995). Around 1810, Ferrão alluded to a general breakdown in food 
production and social relations on the prazos: 
“I cannot ascertain what quantity of grain is collected annually from the plantations, 
because few of the inhabitants have any idea themselves of what their ground 
produces, for, as soon as the grain springs up, they are continually making use of it, 
which causes a great waste, and many in consequence are driven to the necessity of 
subsisting one-third of the year on wild herbs. The slaves have no certain allowance, 
but live as they can, which is often by robbing their masters” (Ferrão, 1810, 372). 
 It was not until the 1820s, however, that this breakdown became complete. 
According to Newitt (1995, 252), “the severest drought ever recorded” was followed by 
famine around Sena from 1823 or 1824, which lasted with little interruption until 1829, 
and smallpox in 1828. Plague locusts also arrived in 1827 and 1829 (Figure 5.16), when 
Vasconcellos e Cirne wrote that: 
“Day after day the sun was covered by the passage of clouds of these insects and they 
destroyed the most extensive fields and the interior for league upon league so that 
even the herds of animals died for lack of food” (Cirne, 1827, cited in Newitt 1988, 21). 
 Such sustained drought in mid- to late-1820s is found in the ships’ logbook 
reconstructions and in the Nicholson et al. (2012) chronologies for Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, although is perhaps surprisingly not reflected in the tree-ring records from 
northern Zimbabwe (Therrell et al. 2006). The quantity and weight of evidence for 
climatic stress and famine in the Zambezi valley provided by Newitt (1988) (Figure 
5.16), though, is convincing, and appears to have had significant implications for the 
agricultural economy. As Ferrão’s evidence suggests, the labour requirements for 
agricultural production on the prazos had already begun to break down at the 
beginning of the century, and so the prolonged nature of this drought impacted upon 
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an already vulnerable society. Further disruption to agricultural production meant that 
the protection and support of the slave populations was undermined, while colonos, 
who struggled to pay tribute, may have deserted the prazos altogether, leaving them 
subject to invasion by bandits (Newitt 1973, 1995). Indeed, in 1829, Cunha wrote to the 
governor general and described the “deplorable state of decay” in Sena “because of the 
great famine which has reigned there for four successive years… there are no hands to 
do the cultivating since all the slaves are scattered through the various lands” (Cunha 
1829, cited in Newitt 1988, 34). Drier conditions were also reflected in that parts of the 
river beds in the delta dried up, preventing the access of canoes carrying trade goods to 
Sena (Figure 5.16). Thus, evidence suggests that the decline of Sena and its prazos to 
1830 was highly related to drought and locusts on an agriculturally-dependent society, 
the growing irrelevance of the town for trade, and to a certain extent, the limitations 
imposed on this by climatic conditions. 
 By the coast, the town of Quelimane and its hinterland were less vulnerable to 
severe shortages due to successive years of crop failure as it could be supplied by the 
sea, while it also receives more reliable rainfall than the Zambezi valley. Moreover, the 
economic viability of Quelimane was not solely dependent on agriculture, for this was 
the period when the international slave trade grew out of Mozambique. Towards the 
end of the century, large supplies of slaves began to reach the Mozambique coast, 
including from the Zambezi (Figure 5.17), when demand for labour increased from 
French sugar producers in the Indian Ocean islands. The Portuguese made 
involvement with the French slave trade legal in 1785, causing a marked increase in 
slave exports from the coast, and at the same time, ivory prices rose (Alpers 1975), 
returning the Mozambique coast to commercial prosperity. The slave trade grew in 
importance in the two decades between 1790-1810 as dealers in Brazil increasingly 
turned to Mozambique, while agreements signed with the British in 1815 and 1817 led 
to the slave trade being limited to southern hemisphere ports, which effectively 
legalised and bolstered the Mozambique-American trade (Alpers 1975; Newitt 1995). 
One of the terms of this agreement was that Brazil could no longer import slaves after 
1830, which led to a short-term increase in exports from Mozambique, to above 30,000 
in 1828 and 1829, in the years immediately prior to the treaty coming into effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.17 Slave exports from Mozambique 1781-1830. After Newitt (1995). 
C apter 5: Vuln rability and response to climate variability in the Zambezi-Limpopo region
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
 213 
 One source of increasing prominence to meet the demand was the Zambezi, 
where slaves were transported to Quelimane and Mozambique, and this may have 
accounted for some of the depopulation reported by Cunha in the late 1820s. The 
growing threat of free men being captured and sold abroad in the early part of the 
century made it easier for prazo-holders to maintain their slave populations, while at 
the same time, existing slave bands were used to conduct slaving expeditions (Newitt 
1995; Pikirayi 2003). Newly captured slaves and colonos could thereby easily be sold 
and sent to the Mozambique coast and then shipped to Brazil for quick profits. 
Although the slave trade at this time was partially demand-driven, this eventual 
happening also had its roots in the form of clientship that had developed before the 
Portuguese came to southeast Africa, and became the vehicle for the shipment of slave 
populations to the coast. With the combination of the breakdown in wealth derived 
from the gold trade at the Zambezi towns, social instability on the prazos and periods of 
sustained drought, prazo-owners may have increasingly sought to make a quick profit 
by selling their labour force to the coastal towns. Indeed, taking into consideration that 
famine, aggravated by drought and locust plagues, led people to seek the protection of 
prazo-holders, climatic variability and stress played its part in the multi-causal events 
that fostered the Zambezi’s implication in the slave trade. Key climate-society 
interaction in this period therefore relates to: 
• Recurrent climatic stress in the Zambezi valley, which was a significant factor 
in the instability, banditry and decline in the lowland Mutapa state at Chidima 
• The interaction of climate variability and conflict in the Manyika and Teve 
polities, leading to their weakening 
• The decline and depopulation of Sena due to the interaction a breakdown in 
social relations on the prazos, drought, locust plagues and famine in the 1820s, 
the slave trade, and pressures of conflict 
• The overall breakdown of socio-political order in the Zambezi valley. 
 
5.8 Summary: trajectories of vulnerability (1505-1830) 
This comparative analysis of vulnerability and response to climate variability over a 
wide spatial and temporal scale has revealed a general trajectory towards increased 
vulnerability in the Zambezi-Limpopo area (Figure 5.18). When combined with the 
magnitude, direction and frequency of precipitation variability analysed in Chapter 3, 
this reflects an increase in the recorded impacts and response to climate variability. 
This situation is most striking for the Mutapa state, whose vulnerability context 
worsened in almost every period, primarily due to socio-political and livelihood-
related factors, and later due to increased food system vulnerability in its new lowland 
location. The combination of these factors led to a general increase in the significance of 
drought-related impacts, leaving the state in an irreversible state of decline by the 
eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the Mutapa state did show high resilience in the face 
of multiple stressors, and even when central polity authority broke down, the evidence 
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presented here suggests that food production was not dislocated as has been proposed 
previously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.18 Trajectories of vulnerability. 
 
 This increase in vulnerability was reflected to a lesser extent in Manyika and 
Teve, where these constituents of vulnerability were not undermined to the extent of 
the Mutapa state, which in part relates to differences in the degree of Portuguese 
interest and exploitation in these polities. Although source coverage is slightly lower in 
these areas, vulnerability seems to have stabilised as early as the late-sixteenth century. 
A key reason for this appears to have been the alternative livelihoods available to these 
polities and the degree of control retained over these sectors of the economy, including 
the ivory and gold trade, despite the decline in political and economic importance of 
the latter. This is in contrast to the Mutapa state, where the Portuguese concentrated 
their most exploitative activities, and ultimately contributed to migration away from 
Mukaranga. Although the lack of cattle in the Teve area increased food system 
vulnerability on the one hand, the extensive use of hunting and the availability of 
marine food resources meant that alternative sources of food could be utilised. 
Therefore, while the lack of reference to climatic stress in these polities is in part due to 
reduced source coverage, both of these polities were less vulnerable than the Mutapa 
state by the eighteenth century. 
 The Zambezi towns and the decentralised Tonga-speaking communities were 
generally characterised by high vulnerability, and in parallel, frequent occurrences of 
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climatic stress. Although much of the Zambezi area underwent a diversification in food 
systems, the populations in these areas were exposed to socio-political vulnerabilities 
stemming from the short-term profit driven prazo system, and the at times unstable 
relationships between Portuguese senhors and slaves. Severe climatic stress was present 
in a number of periods in the above analysis, with locust plagues also prevalent. This is 
partially related to the drier environment of the Zambezi valley, but it is clear that the 
occurrence of climate-related stress both occurred in times of high precipitation 
variability and tended to overlap with other stressors, such as widespread ‘total war’ 
scenario conflict or a breakdown in trade. On the other hand, the vulnerability of 
populations in the Quelimane area remained stable over the periods where sufficient 
information was available. This relates to a number of factors, including its distance 
from conflict and the diversity of the food system, while its well-watered situation 
meant that drought was less frequent. Thus, while the ultimate survival of these 
political units until well into the nineteenth century demonstrates resilience, the 
fragility of the political system and the economy was often exposed by external 
stressors, two of which were periods of high precipitation variability and successive 
years of severe drought. 
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Chapter 6. Climate, conflict and food security: the origins and events 
of socio-political transformation in KwaZulu-Natal (c. AD 1760-1828) 
Historical studies on the KwaZulu-Natal area in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
century have done much to aid understanding of the processes of change that spread 
across a wide region south of the Limpopo. Few recent studies, however, have used the 
increasing availability of source material to investigate the dynamic of interaction 
between climate variability, conflict, and, above all, food security, that were once, if 
simplistically, placed at the heart of explanations for socio-political transformation in 
this region (see Section 2.3). Although a recent volume by Eldredge (2014) critically and 
effectively uses European written records and African oral sources to trace the socio-
political history of the Zulu kingdom during Shaka’s reign, this volume gives only 
negligible attention to climate or the environment in contrast to earlier work on the 
origins of state formation in the area (Eldredge 1992). The present assessment seeks to 
fill this gap by first re-examining the importance of climate variability in socio-political 
transformation in KwaZulu-Natal between c. 1760-1817, and chiefly by investigating 
the interaction between climate, conflict and food security in the Zulu kingdom as it 
established political dominance over KwaZulu-Natal in the late-1810s and 1820s. 
 The first research area will consider the hypothesis that climate variability and 
the mahlatule famine were part of a dynamic that contributed to political centralisation 
in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, which led to the growth of 
polities like the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe. However, this section will draw more 
speculative conclusions, as in the case of Great Zimbabwe, because the reliance upon 
oral traditions and lesser availability of inter-annual climate records means that climate 
variability and human activity can only be loosely tied. The approach will become less 
hypothetical in the re-analysis of the consolidation of the composite Zulu kingdom and 
the events in adjacent areas throughout Shaka’s reign in the 1820s, as dated written 
sources can be used in conjunction with oral evidence, allowing the significance of 
climate variability in these processes to be interrogated. The focus on the Zulu 
kingdom is not to assume that this was the only polity of significance in this part of 
Africa, or that they were the chief instigators of regional events, but rather that the 
superior quantity of source material gives greater scope to examine climate-society 
interactions and for the application of the conceptual frameworks outlined in Section 
2.4. As in the previous chapter, specific attention is given to the vulnerability of food 
systems and the socio-political dynamics that influenced this, which in turn 
conditioned the resilience and response of communities to climate variability. 
Conversely, this analysis will not attempt to quantify vulnerability. This is because the 
research questions asked and sources utilised are not of sufficient breadth to require or 
generate comparative spatial and temporal perspectives from a range of indicators. 
Before commencing this evaluation, the sources, methods, and source criticism are 
discussed. 
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6.1 Sources and methods 
One problem common to many studies of KwaZulu-Natal in this period is that they 
only make partial use of the range of primary oral and written sources available, or fail 
to critically analyse the biases and exaggeration that stem from European involvement. 
This chapter will use both European sources, in the form of written diaries, books or 
journals published by traders and missionaries, and African sources, in the form of oral 
traditions collected in KwaZulu-Natal in the early-twentieth century. These sources are 
of very different origin and style to those utilised in Chapter 5, and are outlined below. 
 
6.1.1 Written sources 
The earliest eyewitness records of KwaZulu-Natal are from the observations of 
Europeans (Table 6.1). The first of these to pass through the region were shipwrecked 
Portuguese, who left patchy accounts of a relatively narrow trail across the area. These 
accounts provide some information on the economic and socio-political situation of the 
people they encountered on their journey to Delagoa Bay or the Cape of Good Hope in 
the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, yet it was not until the 1820s that written accounts 
become sufficiently detailed to use in detailed historical studies. 
 The permanent installation of British colonial rule at the Cape in 1806 and the 
exploration of the southeast African coast by the Admiralty had brought it to the 
attention of British traders. As a result, Francis Farewell and Henry Francis Fynn, along 
with a group of Afrikaners, Englishmen and African servants set out on an exploratory 
voyage to the area in 1824, where they landed at Port Natal, now modern Durban. 
Although Farewell published some letters in the Graham’s Town Journal in the late-
1820s, it was Fynn who provided the most detailed account of his time in KwaZulu-
Natal. By this time, the Zulu kingdom was firmly established under Shaka, and Fynn’s 
diary includes accounts of his frequent contact with the Zulu ruler. Fynn lent his 
original notes to his brother, which are said to have been buried with him on his death 
sometime before 1830. While he rewrote them a few years later, it was not until 1951 
that the diary was eventually edited and published. Fynn (1836, 15-16) wrote that his 
objective was to offer “an insight into the revolutions the various tribes have 
undergone and the rise and progress of the Zulu nation”, however, some controversy 
over the diary as a source on the Zulu kingdom emerged after the discovery of a letter 
received from Nathanial Isaacs, a fellow trader in KwaZulu-Natal, in 1832, which read: 
“I am most anxious, my dear fellow, to see your work out – when do you intend to 
publish? – the sooner the better, and endeavour to exhibit the Zooloo policy in 
governing their tribe, I mean show their Chiefs both Chaka and Dingaans treachery, 
and intrigues. Make them out as blood thirsty as you can, and endeavour to give an 
estimation of the number of people that they have murdered during their reigns, and 
describe the frivolous crimes people lose their lives for. Introduce as many anecdotes 
relative to Chaka as you can, it all tends to swell up the work and makes it 
interesting” (Fynn letters 1835-1860, 10). 
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 Despite the apparent suggestions of this letter, much of Fynn’s diary was 
written while he was at Port Natal, before the letter was received (Eldredge 2014). 
Moreover, notwithstanding references condemning Shaka, Eldredge (2014) notes that 
Fynn’s narrative is equally reflective of his attachment to the local communities into 
whom he informally married and regarded as victims of repressive leadership. While 
such biases are crucial in analyses of Shaka’s leadership and the scale of violence, then, 
these debates should not obstruct the critical use of this source to investigate food 
system vulnerability and evidence of climatic stress. Nonetheless, related observations 
on culture, governance and conflict must be treated carefully, not least as Fynn’s diary 
was one of a number of sources which fostered the notion of the ‘mfecane’. On a similar 
note, Wylie (1995) has also shown that Fynn’s tendency to exaggerate, although in 
many cases overt, frequently permeates his statements. Perhaps also relevant here is 
that Fynn had to rewrite part of the original material, meaning detail on weather- and 
climate-related factors may be either missing or unreliable. 
 The other major source on KwaZulu-Natal at this time is Nathanial Isaacs’ two 
volume Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa, published in 1836. The book contains 
an account of Isaacs’ experiences as a trader based at Port Natal, where he arrived with 
Captain James King in 1825. Isaacs and King travelled with the objective of making 
contact with the party led by Farewell and Fynn, and to “open an intercourse with the 
natives” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. I, xviii). However, King’s boat was wrecked upon arrival, so 
he and Isaacs remained there until a replacement could be made. Isaacs resided 
intermittently in KwaZulu-Natal until 1832, travelling extensively and partaking in the 
ivory trade. The letter from Isaacs to Fynn in 1832 and his hopes to excite the European 
audience of his book certainly suggests that his accounts contain distortions and 
exaggerations, especially concerning Shaka’s rule (Etherington 2001). Thus, as with 
Fynn’s diary, particular caution will be used when analysing evidence on governance, 
as well as the nature and causes of conflict, but it is accepted that critical analysis of 
economic, livelihood and food system aspects can contribute to this investigation. 
 
TABLE 6.1 European sources consulted relating to early-nineteenth century KwaZulu-Natal. 
Source Location Timeframe Information 
Stuart and 
Malcolm (1969) 
British Library, 
London 
1824-1830s Diary of Henry Francis Fynn (Fynn 1836), 
first-hand accounts of KwaZulu-Natal 
Fynn collection KCAL, Durban 1835-1860 Fynn letters 
Maclean papers KCAL, Durban 1826-1828 First-hand account of the Zulu kingdom 
Garden 
collection 
KCAL, Durban 1851-1853 Two volume diary of time spent travelling 
in KwaZulu-Natal with Fynn 
Theal (1898-
1903) (9 vols.) 
British Library, 
London 
1552-1830s Records from shipwrecked travellers and 
British Admiralty 
Bird (1888) (2 
vols.) 
Online 1495-1845 Annals of Natal, compiled evidence of 
Fynn, Shepstone and others. 
Gardiner (1836) Online 1835 First-hand account of KwaZulu-Natal 
Isaacs (1836) (2 
vols.) 
Online 1825-1830s First-hand account of KwaZulu-Natal 
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 A number of other eyewitness accounts were written on KwaZulu-Natal from 
the 1820s and 1830s. The first of these was by a young teenage boy named Charles 
Rawden Maclean, referred to as “John Ross” by Fynn, who had lied about his age and 
ended up stranded with the Natal traders in 1826. Maclean met Shaka that same year, 
and arguably got a closer insight into the internal workings of society in Shaka’s then 
capital, Bulawayo, than any other European (Eldredge 2014). Maclean stayed in 
KwaZulu-Natal for three years, but only wrote of his experiences in his later life, which 
he spent on trade vessels in the Atlantic. Missionary Allen Gardiner travelled in 
KwaZulu-Natal in 1834-1836, and published his observations on Zulu customs, while 
an additional account from the early-1850s comes from Captain Robert Garden, who 
kept a diary of his travels with Fynn in KwaZulu-Natal, and this reveals additional 
material to that found in Fynn’s diary. These accounts therefore supplement the two 
more well-known eyewitness accounts of KwaZulu-Natal in the 1820s. The reports, 
though of variable reliability, represent unique, first-hand accounts of the Zulu 
kingdom and its neighbours at this time. Furthermore, in contrast to the strongly 
utilitarian focus of the Portuguese documents considered in Chapter 5, each of the 
observers frequently turned their attention outwards from the wagon camp of 
European society, and offer considerable information about African society itself. 
Despite their potential value, though, these sources must be supplemented by oral 
histories and traditions where possible to be used confidently and robustly. 
 
6.1.2 Oral histories and traditions 
Late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century history was also told by African 
communities in the form of oral histories (eyewitness accounts) and traditions (passed 
down through one or more generations). To date, only limited use has been made of 
the body of oral sources that exist, while according to Eldredge (2014), many studies 
that have considered these are flawed by unintentional misunderstanding or uncritical 
acceptance. The major body of oral evidence was obtained through recorded 
interviews conducted by James Stuart, a Zulu interpreter and clerk to the Resident 
Commissioner and Chief Magistrate in Pietermaritzburg in the 1890s. Stuart’s role led 
him to an interest in the history of the Zulu communities he administered, and 
between the 1890s and 1920s, he interviewed over 150 men and a handful of women at 
his home. Stuart’s informants were primarily the children and grandchildren of those 
who had lived in Shaka’s reign, though a number of those interviewed had lived in this 
period. Stuart left behind an extensive collection of assiduously recorded interview 
notes, which have since been published and translated by Wright and Webb in an 
ongoing six-volume series. Owing to his meticulous recording, these sources are 
explicit in their origins and points of transmission, yet this evidence has been criticised 
as ‘tainted’ by some as it was recorded by a colonial official with biases typical of men 
of European descent born into nineteenth century colonial Natal (Cobbing 1988b). 
Despite such claims, the volumes make it clear that Stuart challenged the informants to 
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provide detail and questioned inconsistency where it was present (Eldredge 2014). 
Much like the written sources, the traditions contain exaggeration and fictional 
elements, but these were documented as emphasis rather than fact. To write all of this 
evidence off, therefore, is to ignore the care and precision applied by Stuart in its 
recording. Indeed, this evidence is paramount to an understanding of the role of 
climatic stress and food security in socio-political transformation in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 One further source of oral evidence frequently used is the published work of 
the missionary A.T. Bryant, the most famous of which is his 1929 Olden Times in 
Zululand and Natal. However, several issues make use of this source problematic 
(Wright and Hamilton 1989; Eldredge 2014). While Bryant did publish oral evidence, 
inbuilt in his writings are his own fictional inventions and exaggerations which he 
wrote as an amateur historian with the aim to entertain a European readership. This 
was admitted by Bryant himself, who in a letter to James Stuart in 1929 spoke of the 
“dearth of solid historical stuff” and “frequent presentations of obvious trifles and 
historical inessentials” (Bryant 1929, cited in Eldredge 2014, 15). Bryant’s work is 
therefore of very limited value as a primary historical source, and has been widely 
discredited as such (Wilson and Thompson 1969; Wright and Hamilton 1989; Wright 
2010; Eldredge 2014). Its mistaken assumptions and distortions about the emergence of 
the Zulu kingdom, however, persisted in the work of some scholars (Hall 1976; Ballard 
1986). As a secondary source, Bryant’s work is in keeping with its historiographical 
contemporaries in that emphasis is placed on the military and political organisation of 
‘tribal’ society (Wright and Hamilton 1989). 
 Oral histories and traditions must also be critically consulted, for they contain 
ideological content reflecting both the interests of rulers and the products of political 
struggles that take place between the rulers and the ruled (Wright and Hamilton 1989). 
Traditions therefore express worldviews that where possible must be unpacked and 
cross-checked against other testimonies and independent primary evidence to be used 
with confidence. Another advantage of the James Stuart Archive (JSA), however, is that 
interviews were conducted with people from a number of geographic areas, family 
lines and political affiliations, which means that the voices within the traditions were 
both opposed to, and supportive of, Shaka’s rule (Eldredge 2014). 
 
6.1.3 Investigating food security, climate and conflict 
Utilising and combining the source material introduced above presents a number of 
challenges, primarily relating to bias and reliability. These issues can be addressed by 
appropriate source criticism, and the approach adopted by Eldredge (2014) is broadly 
followed here. Essentially, this means that the reliability of information held within 
independent sources will be evaluated by its presence or absence in others, thereby 
allowing confidence and reliability to be assessed. Thus, if evidence appears in 
multiple, independent sources, that is, oral and European evidence, then it is regarded 
as more reliable even though the sources may disagree in their details. By contrast, if 
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evidence appears in only one source, it will be treated as less reliable. 
 While this scrutiny can aid the removal of bias and fabrications in the oral and 
European sources, this method will only be rigidly followed where the evidence 
concerns historical events, practices or customs. On the other hand, the varying foci of 
the source content necessitates that where evidence relates to aspects such as climate 
variability, or even food system dynamics, the European sources will be drawn upon 
more extensively. This is because the fully dated records kept by Fynn, Isaacs and 
Gardiner were written at the time and thus sometimes recorded weather and climatic 
phenomenon, crop failure, famine and disease with a much higher degree of spatial 
and temporal accuracy. The oral evidence, by contrast, was mostly recorded over half a 
century after such events took place, and primarily draws attention to renowned 
famines such as the mahlatule and mbete rather than the specifics of the rainy season 
and food production in single seasons. This means that in some cases, where there 
appears to have been no motives for Europeans to alter the evidence for their own 
interests, one type of source material will be drawn on more than the other. 
 Using these methods, the sources will be analysed according to the frameworks 
outlined in Section 2.4. Analysis of the period c. 1760-1817 (Section 6.2) will rely upon a 
broader range of sparse evidence to re-assess suggestions that climate variability, 
combined with food system changes such as the adoption of maize cultivation, played 
a part in political centralisation. Climatic reconstructions such as proxies from 
KwaZulu-Natal and the logbook reconstructions (Chapters 3 and 4) provide context for 
questioning this. Contemporary or later oral and written evidence will then be used to 
examine changes to the vulnerability context of the region. Specifically, this will focus 
on how the processes of centralisation observed in polities such as the Mthethwa 
influenced the impact of climatic changes and higher precipitation variability in this 
period. The later analysis of food security, conflict and climate variability in the Zulu 
kingdom in the 1820s (Section 6.3) is aided by a greater quantity of source material. 
Oral traditions give numerous accounts of life under Shaka’s reign, while European 
observers wrote extensively on food production, food system stress, internal socio-
political dynamics and conflict, yet only sparsely on climate variability itself. 
Therefore, Section 6.3 will primarily examine the vulnerability of the Zulu food system 
and that of its subordinate chiefdoms, analyse the extent of food system stress in 
KwaZulu-Natal in the 1820s, assess how much of this was borne out of heightened 
conflict, and then examine whether the precipitation variability was a significant factor 
in the events of these years. As previously stated, this will take the form of written 
analysis, with illustrative quotes being used where appropriate. As in Chapter 5, this 
investigation will be attentive to other causal factors, but will not discuss these at 
length as the superior quantity of source material, especially in the 1820s, means that 
the analysis will mostly focus on the dynamic of interaction between food system 
vulnerability, conflict and climate. Crucially, however, the analysis will be framed by 
the chronology of historical events within and beyond KwaZulu-Natal. 
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6.2 Climate and the origins of political transformation in KwaZulu-Natal 
The range of explanations for the development towards centralised political units in 
KwaZulu-Natal in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century are well-known. 
Trade, population growth, the formation of age-set groups (amabutho), the elaboration 
of politically important rituals, as well as strong leaders, all have general acceptance in 
the literature as key contributory factors. Some scholars also place climate variability 
and the adoption of maize in this group of dynamics, beginning with an apparent 
amelioration of LIA cool-dry conditions after c. 1750, and intensifying in the aftermath 
of the mahlatule famine at the turn of the nineteenth century. These factors, mostly due 
to lack of evidence, remain speculative, but through the incorporation of new historical 
climatic evidence, a re-interrogation of oral traditions, and cautious use of later 
European written records, this section re-examines these possible lines of explanation. 
 
6.2.1 Shifts in vulnerability: climate, maize and trade (c. 1760-1790) 
The last half of the eighteenth century was characterised by a number of major shifts in 
the vulnerability context of the populations and political units of KwaZulu-Natal, three 
of which relate directly or indirectly to the dynamics of interaction between climate 
and society. The first, and the backdrop to several other changes, was the apparent 
shift from severe LIA cool-dry conditions detected in almost all palaeoclimate proxy 
records (Figure 3.5), to the warmer and wetter conditions detected in the Karkloof tree-
ring record in the second half of the eighteenth century (Hall 1976). The reliance of this 
proposition on a single tree-ring sample, despite its location within KwaZulu-Natal, is 
problematic, and cannot alone demonstrate that either local precipitation did undergo 
an increase or that this was significant for human livelihoods. The recent development 
of diatom records from Lake Sibaya, KwaZulu-Natal (Stager et al. 2013), although of a 
relatively low resolution, show good correspondence with the Karkloof record (Figure 
6.1). If these proxies are taken together, a recovery of precipitation is evident from at 
least c. 1750, which then exceeds the means of both proxies by about c. 1760. By c. 1770-
1780, inferred precipitation reached its highest levels in the entire tree-ring record, and 
since c. AD 800 in the Lake Sibaya diatom (Section 3.2). This trend towards wetter 
conditions is also observed in the proxy records from Lakes Nhauhache and Nhaucati 
in south-eastern Mozambique (Ekblom and Stabell 2008; Holmgren et al. 2012), and 
strongly indicate that this period was marked by predominantly wet conditions. 
 
6.2.1.1 Precipitation variability and the spread of maize 
While it is important to note that the aforementioned proxy records are the only long-
term, relatively high-resolution records available from KwaZulu-Natal, and are subject 
to limitations, their precipitation inferences give weight to, or at least do not rule out, 
the hypothesis that generally wetter conditions facilitated the production of higher 
crop yields from about c. 1760 (Hall 1976). According to Hall, a key impact of this shift 
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in precipitation conditions was to increase the production potential of marginal 
agricultural land (Figure 6.2), which mostly consisted of hill-slopes with low moisture 
retention and highland areas with agriculturally poor soils. In the early-eighteenth 
century, Hall states that this land was only suitable for agricultural production in 
anomalously wet years in the context of reduced mean annual rainfall during the LIA, 
and thus could not be continually exploited. That wetter conditions after c. 1760 
followed around two centuries of persistent and intense drier spells (Figures 3.6 and 
6.1), certainly could have increased the proportion of annually cultivatable land. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that the climatically enhanced 
agricultural potential of these marginal lands alone led to widespread cultivation or 
population growth in these areas in the late-eighteenth century. Rather, a more 
significant shift in climate-society interaction came with the spread and cultivation of 
maize by some groups in KwaZulu-Natal from approximately the early- to mid-
eighteenth century. While evidence here is also sparse, there exists enough to suggest 
that maize was part of a multi-causal pathway that contributed to socio-political 
change in parts of the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.1 KwaZulu-Natal palaeoclimate proxy-documentary records. 
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 Evidence for maize cultivation in the eighteenth century is patchy and thus it is 
difficult to assess its relative importance across KwaZulu-Natal. In the absence of 
archaeobotanical remains, Maggs (1982, 1989) has shown that the presence of large 
grindstones, associated with the preparation of maize, were predominant in the early-
eighteenth century at two sites in the KwaZulu-Natal interior grasslands including 
Mgoduyanuka (Figure 6.2). As no such evidence is available for the Phongolo-Thukela 
area of KwaZulu-Natal at this time, this may indicate that maize first spread across the 
well-watered parts of the highlands, perhaps indirectly by way of the ‘trade 
convergence zone’ on the South African highveld. As Section 2.3.2.2 explained, maize 
has a relatively short growing period, has higher yields per unit of land and labour 
than any other grain, yet is more water-demanding than sorghum, and is highly 
sensitive to drought in its early growing period (McCann 2001). Cultivation of maize 
was therefore a calculated risk, but its ability to withstand a shorter growing season 
over slow-maturing sorghum may have offered advantages and aided its expansion, 
even in the drier early-eighteenth century. It is therefore possible that maize was an 
‘emergency crop’ in parts of the KwaZulu-Natal highlands, as suggested in other areas 
of southeast Africa such as the Limpopo and Eastern Cape (Crais 2003; Ekblom et al. 
2012). As wetter climatic conditions occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, maize cultivation may have become less of a risk in these areas, and could 
have produced multiple crops in an extended growing season. This was later 
evidenced by Isaacs (1836), where three maize harvests were reaped in some years. The 
increased food production and reduced risks of moisture stress may therefore have 
aided population growth in the interior. 
 The importance of maize in the crop mix in the coastal lowlands and Phongolo-
Thukela area in the eighteenth century is less clear, and the best evidence comes from 
John Gama, one of Stuart’s interviewees, who stated in 1898 that: 
“Originally there was no maize; only sorghum was known, and the people were 
dependent on it. It was sorghum that was greatly prized. I am of this opinion because 
often when I was a boy I saw them cultivating maize in small plots only, to provide a 
little food for the autumn. It is clear that sorghum was the first crop, for I and others 
used to ask why little maize was cultivated. The old people would reply that maize 
had been unknown before and had been introduced only recently. They thought that 
maize seed had come from the small settlement of whites at Ndinisa (Delagoa Bay). 
That is all they said. The old people who told me this were deceased long ago” (John 
Gama, 142). 
 As Gama was born in 1841, it is reasonable to assume that the elders he refers to 
were born in the latter decades of the eighteenth century, and that maize was a 
“recent” introduction at that time, probably as a result of increased trade connections 
with Delagoa Bay. Perhaps of more interest, though, is that Gama’s testimony notes 
that maize was only cultivated in small plots in his youth in the mid-nineteenth 
century. This evidence appears to be corroborated for the 1820s-1830s in Fynn’s diary, 
which states that maize was not a dominant staple among the Zulu but formed part of 
a mix of sorghum and millet. The reasons for this are unclear, as it would be expected 
C apter 6: Climate, conflict and food security in KwaZulu-N tal 
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
 225 
that maize had greater suitability for the soil and land in well-watered lowland areas 
(Figure 6.2). Yet simple application of the premise of ‘favourable’ climatic conditions is 
problematic, and conversely, it may be the case that when maize reached these areas in 
the late-eighteenth century, the much wetter climatic conditions hindered the 
establishment of maize cultivation. Indeed, unlike sorghum, maize is highly sensitive 
to waterlogging in its early growing period, and an increased occurrence of very wet 
years could have exposed local agriculture to a different kind of moisture stress. Such 
conditions occurred in some years in the apparently drier early-nineteenth century, as 
Fynn wrote that excess rainfall was among a list of factors that inyangas (rain doctors) 
were charged with preventing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.2 Soil and land suitability for maize. Data source: Soil Atlas of Africa (2013). 
Highlighted area: Phongolo-Thukela area, KwaZulu-Natal. Note that these indices do not 
consider rainfall, of which the highlighted area receives a relatively high amount. 
 
 One other line of evidence further complicates this picture. This is found in the 
oral testimony of Baleka ka Mpitikazi which alludes to the birth of Shaka in 1787. Here, 
Baleka stated that Shaka’s mother, Nandi, became pregnant at a time of disease: 
“Before the name Tshaka [Shaka] became current there was a disease which called 
people’s stomachs to swell out; the name of that disease was ‘itshaka’. So when Nandi 
[Shaka’s mother] was pregnant, people were constantly saying that she was sick, 
suffering from itshaka, and she was continually being given medicine” (Baleka ka 
Mpitikazi, 5). 
 The significance of this statement is that the disease in question appears to be 
kwashiorkor, a nutritional condition that causes swelling of the belly, and is associated 
with dependence on a maize diet, lack of protein, or general famine (Williams 1933; 
McCann 2001). Eldredge (2014) overlooks this tradition, and points to another which 
claims that itshaka was a word used to cover for the pregnancy of an unmarried girl. 
However, the other informant, Jantshi, also notes that itshaka referred to a disease, 
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which may have been prevalent in the late 1780s, and as such means that the extensive 
cultivation of maize in the Mthethwa-Zulu area at this time cannot be ruled out. 
 The evidence on maize cultivation in KwaZulu-Natal at this time is highly 
fragmentary, and the extent to which it was cultivated is therefore uncertain. While 
maize does not appear to have been the dominant crop cultivated across all parts of 
KwaZulu-Natal at this time, it was probably a significant constituent in the crop mix in 
certain areas in the late-eighteenth century. In parts of the interior grasslands, where 
maize appears to have been a staple, its high yields, encouraged by contemporaneous 
wetter conditions, could have contributed to population growth (Maggs 1982, 1989; 
Ballard 1986; Huffman 2004, 2006, 2007; Wright 2010). Although this pathway remains 
a possibility, it is questionable as to how population growth in these marginal and 
highland areas provided stimulus for socio-political centralisation. Indeed, research 
has shown that the important development of amabutho-based social and military 
organisation originated in the coastal polities such as the Mthethwa, where the extent 
of maize cultivation is unclear. On the contrary, similar processes elsewhere may have 
owed more to a defensive response to Mthethwa growth or simply as an imitation of 
this new organisation (Wright 2010; Eldredge 2014). Such a response may itself have 
been a factor in the increase in stone-built structures in the interior, often used as a 
proxy for population increase. Thus, if wetter conditions were important in these areas, 
then this may have only aided, rather than promoted, the move towards more 
centralised and stratified chiefdoms.  
 
6.2.1.2 Trade, cattle and amabutho 
A number of economic, social and political changes also reframed the vulnerability 
context of KwaZulu-Natal to climate variability in the last third of the eighteenth 
century. Along with Zwide’s Ndwandwe chiefdom, the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo 
had consolidated authority over neighbouring chiefdoms. This was made possible by 
the introduction of amabutho, the system of social organisation based on the 
recruitment of age-based groups, sometimes referred to as regiments, by Dingiswayo, 
and later adopted by Senzangakona’s Zulu chiefdom. The introduction of amabutho in 
part demonstrated a rapid response to competition over new trade opportunities. 
Specifically, after 1750, the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay increased markedly, offering its 
exporters access to metals such as copper and brass, as well as prestige goods like 
beads, which could increase a chief’s wealth and coercive power. The changes in trade 
were therefore accompanied by those in social organisation, and youths were now 
incorporated into amabutho, where they received training for hunting and warfare 
(Hedges 1978; Wright 2010). To these ends, the ‘productive forces’ of agriculture, 
through maize cultivation, and hunting, through changes in social organisation, were 
transformed in different areas in KwaZulu-Natal. This dynamic was further changed 
by the fall in demand for ivory from around c. 1780, and its replacement by demand for 
cattle to supply American whaling ships. This shift was of deeper significance in 
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KwaZulu-Natal than the ivory trade, for cattle were of much higher social value, as 
they formed the basis of exchange and investment, while they were also a vital 
component of the food system. As Mbovu ka Mtshumayeli, one of Stuart’s informants 
put it, “our great bank is cattle” (Mtshumayeli, 28). Fynn (1836, 48) later claimed that it 
was the Mthethwa that “monopolised” this trade with Delagoa Bay through the 
intermediaries of the Mabhudu or Thembe chiefdoms, and described its scale: 
“In the first year of his [Dingiswayo’s] chieftainship he opened a trade with Delagoa 
Bay by sending 100 oxen and a quantity of elephant tusks to exchange for brass and 
beads. Prior to this, a supply of these articles was brought to that country from 
Delagoa Bay by the natives. The trade thus opened by Dingiswayo was henceforth 
carried on an extensive scale, though the Portuguese never in person entered the 
country. The encouragement held out to ingenuity brought numbers round him, 
liberal reward in cattle being given to any of his followers who devised anything new 
or ornamental. Milk dishes, pillows, ladles of wood, ivory earrings, or snuff spoons 
were produced… A brass manufactory was also established; generally a hundred men 
being employed in that work” (Fynn 1836, 10). 
 According to Hall (1976) and Ballard (1986), this export of cattle was made 
possible as wetter conditions allowed livestock populations to grow substantially in 
the late-nineteenth century. This would seem to be reflected in the increased 
importance and quantity of cattle in bridewealth (lobola) exchange for wives. According 
to oral evidence, lobola for the general population grew from one to 10 heads of cattle: 
“The ordinary people’s lobola consisted of the payment of cattle, at first one or two 
head, then three. Afterwards this was raised to five, with an additional beast called 
the lugege. Later on 10 heads were claimed” (Mabola, 7). 
 However, rather than climatic conditions, this seeming increase in cattle was 
perhaps equally due to the centralisation and accumulation of herds through increased 
tribute demands in certain polities, like Dingiswayo’s Mthethwa, than through natural 
increase enhanced by wetter conditions across the whole of KwaZulu-Natal. The 
accumulation of herds was achieved through raiding and the capture of booty by the 
centrally controlled amabutho. Although this was a frequent occurrence before the mid-
eighteenth century, raiding and counter-raiding were amplified in the late-eighteenth 
century due to both increased external demand through Delagoa Bay, and increased 
internal demand to replace the exported cattle and reward the amabutho. These new 
dynamics may therefore have allowed Dingiswayo to enforce the submission of 
neighbouring political units to his overlordship. Although this was often referred to in 
oral testimonies as the ‘killing of nations’, Dingiswayo established his dominance 
throughout the region by a process of incorporation and subordination, which 
involved little violence (Eldredge 1992, 2014). Fynn (1836, 10) stated that Dingiswayo 
re-distributed a proportion of the defeated group’s oxen to his amabutho, while cows 
were generally returned to their owners in order to facilitate continuum in local 
reproduction, to ensure “amicable union” and that their submission was at least in part 
on a voluntary basis. Similarly, through encounters with Zulu informants, including 
Shaka himself, Fynn claimed that Dingiswayo gave strict orders that such raids should 
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not involve the plunder of all property and the destruction of all the people, and gave 
an example of one instance to the contrary: 
“In one instance they had attacked a tribe not willing easily to submit and during the 
contest, the Mthethwa destroyed their cooking utensils and broke the stones used for 
grinding corn which so exasperated Dingiswayo that, on their return they were 
denied admission into his presence, and he went crying about his kraal: ‘Why have 
the people broken the pots of the Khondlo?’ By such mild means he conciliated his 
enemies and several tribes voluntarily became tributary to him and joining him in 
battle he so extended his army as to make himself respected by his friends and feared 
by his enemies” (Fynn 1836, 10). 
 According to Wright (2010), similar processes of centralisation and growth took 
place on a more aggressive level in the Ndwandwe polity. Subsequently, the expansion 
of other chiefdoms, such as the Dlamini, Hlubi, Qwabe, Cele and Thuli (Figure 6.3), 
were possibly a defensive response to the relatively rapid rise in power of the 
Mthethwa and Ndwandwe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3 Political units in KwaZulu-Natal c. 1780-1816 and c. 1817-1819. 
 
 Thus, changes in economic and livelihood opportunities and activities were 
harnessed, directly or indirectly, into changes in social and political organisation and 
promoted inequalities both between and within polities in KwaZulu-Natal. Internal 
class distinction was manifest in greater power exercised by the aristocracy over 
commoners, who were subject to the chief’s ritual and managerial authority, as well as 
his growing coercive power (Etherington 2001; Wright 2010). While the predominantly 
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wetter climate of the period reduced the exposure of the population to drought, and 
possibly increased exposure to waterlogging in the coastal areas, it was the innovation 
of certain groups and their leaders that transformed new opportunities and 
competition into centralised political power. However, this transformation brought 
with it a number of comparatively novel, or intensified vulnerabilities to those that 
preceded it. Dependence on maize may have been high in some areas, while cattle 
were being exported in significant numbers to Delagoa Bay, a large number of which 
were obtained or had to be replaced by raiding. Together, these new conditions meant 
that when drought struck in the last decade of the eighteenth century, the impact on a 
population with increased exposure and sensitivity to climatic stress was exacerbated. 
 
6.2.2 The mahlatule famine: causes and consequences (c. 1790s-1816) 
In addition to the palaeoclimate proxy records shown in Figure 6.1, the ships’ logbook-
based precipitation reconstructions for Royal National Park and Mthatha provide 
evidence for drought at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
century. It is unfortunate that there are currently insufficient digitised logbook 
observations to extend these inter-annual reconstructions further back to explore the 
length of the drought that spanned the mahlatule famine, yet the rain-years 
commencing in 1796, 1797, 1798 and 1801 show negative departures from the mean, 
with 1796, 1797 and 1801 exceeding -1 standard deviations. These results suggest that 
the drought was a physical event of significant magnitude and formed part of the 
mechanism that caused famine. The mahlatule famine was known vividly by some 
informants. In 1909, over a hundred years after the event, Lunguza told Stuart that: 
“I know of the Madhlantule famine, when we were obliged to eat grass. Grass was 
pounded up and cooked. Also, the ingcengce plant, also uboqo, like sweet potato, black 
roots. It was cut into pieces with a sharp-edged stone, put in the sun to dry, then was 
mixed with curds and made a porridge of. It was not bitter. Ingoni grass was beaten, 
like upoko millet, ground up and kneaded into a dough. This grass was cut with an 
assegai and then threshed, the seeds beaten out and ground. This was good food. 
Dogs were also killed and eaten” (Lunguza ka Mpukane, 342). 
 Moreover, further oral evidence from Stuart’s assistant, Ndukwana, has been 
interpreted to by Hedges (1978), Ballard (1986) and Ó’Gráda (2009) to represent the 
mahlatule famine, despite the claim that this occurred in Shaka’s time. This famine was 
noted to be of greater severity than the mbete famine of 1861: 
“Ndukwana says there was a great famine in Tshaka’s [Shaka’s] days which caused 
people to go and buy among Magonondo’s people near the Mkondo river and 
Mhlongamvula hill. This famine was a general one, and far greater than the Mbete 
famine in Mpande’s time, which only affected part of the country. People had to 
protect their gardens against human beings. For starving people would make their 
way into a garden and eat raw the green mealies [grain] growing there” (Jantshi, 201). 
 Suggestions in the literature that the above evidence relates to the mahlatule 
rather than a famine during Shaka’s rule seem accurate, for he describes the famine as 
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a “general” one of wide extent. If the mahlatule famine was of greater severity than the 
mbete famine, it might be expected that its impacts also included cattle mortality, the 
drying up of rivers, and the employment of rain doctors from elsewhere in the region, 
all of which were said to have occurred by Mtshayankomo ka Magolwana (108-111) in 
the mbete famine. Documentary evidence of the mahlatule famine also comes from 
Barrow (1801), who wrote of numbers of cattle that had perished on the highveld, 
indicating the regional extent of the drought. 
 
6.2.2.1 Subsistence crises in KwaZulu-Natal 
The human significance of the drought was not simply a result of its physical 
magnitude, as the exposure and sensitivity of subsistence agriculture and climate-
sensitive livelihoods was high at this time. Maize, of recent introduction, was highly 
sensitive to water-deprivation, a factor that led environmental historian James McCann 
to note that “when they plant maize, farmers walk a slender tightrope of risk” 
(McCann 2001, 249). Maize also has limitations in its storage potential, for which early-
nineteenth century evidence from KwaZulu-Natal shows that it could be stored and 
sealed underground in cattle enclosures for a maximum of one to two years (Isaacs 
1836). Sorghum, on the other hand, can withstand greater moisture stress and could be 
stored for two to three years (Hedges 1978). Unfortunately, evidence is insufficient to 
map the dependence on different grains across KwaZulu-Natal when the drought hit 
with any confidence, which would aid consideration of its differential impacts. 
However, if the archaeological evidence of maize as a staple in parts of the interior 
grasslands is extrapolated more widely, it is reasonable to expect that any severe 
reduction in rainfall quantity or a delay of the rainy season would have been important 
to drought-sensitive maize. Similarly, if later written evidence of Zulu dependence on 
sorghum as part of a mix of crops is cautiously backdated, this may suggest a less 
vulnerable food system. The sustained nature of the drought, however, must have 
reduced the efficacy of stored grains across KwaZulu-Natal, while there is no evidence 
of trade networks in foodstuffs on a significant scale at this time or in the early-
nineteenth century. Together, these circumstances mean that the shift from very wet to 
relatively sustained dry conditions must have had substantial impacts on both maize 
and sorghum cultivation and the increased population that depended on it. 
 Climatic stress would have also impacted the livestock population, which, as 
Section 6.2.1.2 discussed, had already undergone changes in its distribution, demand 
and use in the previous two decades. The cumulative impacts of consecutive years of 
drought would have reduced the productivity of grasslands and consequently year-
round nutrient supply, meaning those in the highland areas would have to keep their 
cattle in the lowland winter grazing areas for longer periods (Hall 1981). Still, the 
general decline in grassland productivity must have been accompanied by a decline in 
the quantity of dairy products produced, and possibly led to the slaughtering of herds 
for meat consumption. By contrast, cattle in the lower river valleys, which supported 
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year-round grazing, could be moved nearby to the humid coastal grasslands. The 
overall impacts of sustained drought on an exposed food system meant that wild plant 
resources, as noted by Lunguza and later by Fynn (Appendix C) were relied on, and 
imply that subsistence crises of varying severity had developed across KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
6.2.2.2 Drought, food scarcity and political centralisation 
The societal consequences of food system dislocation in KwaZulu-Natal have been 
conceptualised as a trigger for the amplified political centralisation, raiding and 
violence of the early-nineteenth century in that they were attempts to cope with 
environmental change (Hall 1976; Guy 1980; Ballard 1986; Eldredge 1992). This has 
been conceived in two ways. The first centred around the notion of ‘over-population’ 
of either livestock or humans, a situation that would have apparently been solved by 
extending control over more arable or pastoral land, necessitating the use of violent 
conflict and giving rise to political centralisation (Guy 1980). There is little support for 
this suggestion, and it has been dismissed on a number of grounds (see Section 2.3.3.2; 
Hall 1981; Eldredge 2014). The other hypothesis, which has been advanced in different 
ways by Ballard (1986) and Eldredge (1992), is that increased social inequalities and 
unequal access to productive resources in the late-eighteenth century led to the 
breakdown of traditional responses to famine (Eldredge 1992), and so the mahlatule 
provoked expansion and political revolution among the Mthethwa, Zulu and 
Ndwandwe polities who sought “security from starving marauders” (Ballard 1986, 
369). This hypothesis has been given little scrutiny in the literature and will be 
reanalysed here. 
 It is first important to point out the inadequacies of this pathway as it has been 
previously postulated. Ballard, for instance, claimed that the mahlatule famine “set 
entire families, tribes, and perhaps whole chiefdoms into restless, desperate motion” 
and that these droughts “produced famine of such magnitude that it led to a serious 
breakdown of social, political, and economic institutions”, which then led to the 
political re-alignment of chiefdoms (Ballard 1986, 369). Moreover, Eldredge (1992, 28) 
discussed the suggestion of the possibility that the proportion of “habitable lands” 
decreased, which led to conflict over cattle, grain and water. The problem with these 
particular claims is that they are supported by little or no evidence, and certainly not to 
the length that Ballard suggests. Beyond these exaggerated points, however, more 
subtle ideas may underlie the general suggestion of the importance of food scarcity in 
political centralisation and conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. 
 Contrary to Ballard (1986), and as Eldredge (1992) recognised, inequalities and 
political re-organisation had already been generated within political units in the late-
eighteenth century. In the more centralised polities like the Mthethwa, the aristocracy 
and ruling families had increased their wealth and power, and were supported by the 
commoner families in the heartland of the kingdom, from where the amabutho were 
drawn. The food security of both of these tiers was mutually reinforced through the 
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provision of agricultural and grazing lands, the acquisition of cattle and the payment 
of tribute. Moreover, in later years, Isaacs (1836, 291) observed that in the Zulu 
kingdom the amabutho from all parts of the kingdom met twice a year to plant two 
“immense fields” for the king. Although this evidence refers to a later period, it is 
probable that such processes took hold with the centralisation of chiefdoms in the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, and as Isaacs notes, that these harvests were 
shared. Rather than the breakdown of social institutions and robust response to famine, 
this model of socio-political organisation would suggest the development of new social 
networks and food redistribution in times of stress. Therefore, although drought did 
affect these polities, they may, as political units, have had a greater preparedness and 
were more resilient to climatic shocks. However, as Eldredge (1992) rightly points out, 
the growth of the upper two social classes through trade and changes in social 
organisation produced greater inequalities within these kingdoms. This promoted the 
growth of a much poorer segment of society, who often lived in the outer reaches of 
the political and fertile agricultural heartland, possessed few cattle, and were generally 
viewed as inferiors and outsiders. As these populations had less capacity to combat 
food shortages, and had only very limited access to the enhanced social networks 
within the kingdom, they may have been more reliant on wild food resources from an 
earlier stage of a prolonged drought, and would be drawn to the central areas of the 
polity. It is therefore possible that these populations represent the “starving people” 
that tried to consume crops raw in gardens noted by Ndukwana (Section 6.2.2). 
 Such a situation may have also arisen with the amplification of inequalities 
between chiefdoms in the late-eighteenth century, including the control of fertile 
agricultural and pastureland (Daniel 1973; Guy 1980, 1994). Small-scale, decentralised 
political authorities may have also had less advanced systems of food redistribution, 
which reduced their adaptive capacity. Furthermore, as Etherington (2001) suggests, 
small, famine-stricken groups lacked the capability to raid or expropriate food stores 
on any significant scale. Thus, as later historical and oral accounts observe, coping 
strategies may have been limited to subsisting off the wild foods listed in Appendix C 
and wild animals. A dependence on these resources in a prolonged drought, as seems 
to have been evident in the mahlatule famine, meant that a more desirable option was to 
offer allegiance to more centralised political units with more highly organised food 
systems, particularly those in well-watered, fertile lands proximate to the coast such as 
in the Mthethwa polity. Evidence for similar processes was later noted by one of 
Stuart’s informants, Dinya ka Zokozwayo, referring approximately to 1829. Dinya 
stated that when a chief distributed food among his kraal, people came to konza (offer 
allegiance to) him. Rather than the generation of “starving marauders” who initiated 
conflict, then, these fragments of evidence suggest that further processes of political 
centralisation may have been aided by both the low adaptive capacity of the poorest to 
cope with consecutive years of drought, and the growing potential of centralised 
polities to provide livelihood opportunities and security to those who submitted to 
their authority in times of stress. Further centralisation can therefore be viewed, as 
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Eldredge (1992) initially suggested, as a process of the incorporation of populations 
into already growing chiefdoms as opposed to reactionary political formation initiated 
by a need for greater security against bandits and raiders seeking food. 
 To further advance this pathway, however, requires additional evidence that 
centralised political units had a higher level of resilience to climatic shocks and food 
system dislocation. This is first evidenced in Ndukwana’s statement (Section 6.2.2), 
which mentions that the starving people attempted to eat the “green mealies” (grain) 
growing there. This implies that crops did not fail altogether in the Mthethwa-Zulu 
area, possibly due to the well-watered nature of the coastal lowlands or the cultivation 
of a greater mix of crops. The prime evidence for higher food system organisation, 
though, relates to the custom of the ‘first fruits festival’, or the ‘umkosi’, for which there 
exists considerable oral and written evidence. The most detailed of these are from the 
later accounts of Fynn, writing with regard to the Zulu kingdom from 1824, and Isaacs, 
writing of the late-1820s. According to these accounts the umkosi involved: 
“An annual feast observed when the chief eats the first fruit of the season, prior to 
which not even a fallen grain may be eaten under penalty of death” (Fynn 1836, 1). 
“Before eating the new year’s corn, the warriors all meet at the king’s; when his 
majesty, decorated with herbs and corn leaves, and bedizened with beads and 
bangles, surrounded by his warriors and attended by a great number of boys, 
performs a ludicrous ceremony, and announces his permission for them to eat of their 
new crop. Standing at the head of the kraal he runs backwards and forwards three 
times towards the warriors, followed by the boys, whistling as loud as they are able; 
each time throwing a calabash, as indicative of his command for them to garner and 
eat of their new food” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. I, 291). 
 On first glance, it seems plausible that this strict enforcement could have been 
implemented as an adaptation after the mahlatule famine to tightly control the 
consumption of food and to ensure a larger harvest. However, numerous statements 
rule out this possibility. Fynn (1826, 1) himself noted that the festival enabled “the year 
in which any remarkable event occurred to be traced with some probability of 
correctness”, and on that basis referred to events in the mid- to late-eighteenth century. 
Much further back than this, in 1593, the survivors of the wreck of the Santo Alberto 
described what may also be evidence of the umkosi, which would appear to reflect 
Robert Garden’s (1853, 123) suggestion that it was practised from “time immemorial”: 
“Coming in sight of some negroes’ houses, which were those of the guides who 
accompanied them, these, fearing our people would injure their crops of millet, which 
surrounded the houses, left the road, and guided them where there was no grain. The 
chief captain noticing this, inquired the cause, and on learning it ordered a halt and 
issued a proclamation that no one should touch anything belonging to these Kaffirs, 
under pain of death.” (Lavanha 1593, 299). 
 Although European writers complained of the unjust nature of this law, Isaacs 
wrote of its efficacy in preventing crop shortages and consumption of immature crops: 
“On the other hand there is something salutary in this decree; for were there not a 
preventative against cutting the green corn, the natives, who care not for the morrow, 
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but are satisfied with what the present produces, would consume the greater 
proportion of their produce in its growing state, and leave but little for that part of the 
year when they would mostly require it” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. I, 56). 
 According to Stuart’s informant, Mabonsa, the umkosi also seems to have been 
practised in other polities such as the Hlubi chiefdom, though was modified during the 
reign of Shaka when the chiefdom became tributary to the Zulu kingdom. This gives 
reason to believe that in a number of centralised polities, the custom aided the tight 
control of harvests, which in turn buffered or retarded the impacts of drought and 
reinforced food security. In later years, Garden (1853, 123) wrote that the umkosi 
probably “was never attended with more ceremony, nor its forms more rigidly 
enforced than during the reign of Chaka [Shaka]”. Yet if the potential late-sixteenth 
century evidence for the punishment of death is accepted, then it is clear that Shaka 
had little to do with this stringency. Rather than its stricter enforcement, however, the 
umkosi seems to have taken on a new role, possibly around the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth century, as it became the central occasion for bringing the amabutho 
together and for military planning. Fynn, for instance, related that: 
“When the king intends eating the first fruits of the season all the people and families 
attached to regiments are called to his residence where the men appear in their war 
dresses and a feast is given on the occasion and a national dance takes place at that 
time and no other when the names of their enemies are shouted in degradation. Any 
chief’s tributary not appearing is considered as an enemy and killed in consequence. 
This annual meeting lasts three or four days and defines kings from chiefs who dare 
not presume to such a privilege… The last and grand day, the king enters the circle of 
his soldiers with his seraglio grandly decorated… During the meeting the king 
informs them of his intending to attack some foreign power which takes place early in 
the winter months, the rivers being only passable at that time” (Fynn 1836, 304-305). 
 In addition to controls on food production and distribution, which became 
increasingly centrally controlled as the eighteenth century came to a close, the evolving 
function of the umkosi may demonstrate that food security increasingly became tied, 
although in part only ceremonially, to military expansion. Indeed, a major feature of 
the early-nineteenth century was territorial expansion by certain political units. A 
cause of this was probably that the incorporation of greater numbers of people, as well 
as the growth of amabutho, meant that additional fertile, well-watered land was needed 
(Eldredge 1992). Extending control over such lands was a way through which food 
security and the provision of arable land for a growing population could be achieved. 
The differential impacts of drought itself may have provided an opportunity for more 
resilient units to achieve this over weaker neighbours, and could therefore have been 
part of the stimulus for Mthethwa expansion under Dingiswayo, and Ndwandwe and 
Dlamini-Ngwane expansion under Zwide and Sobhuza, the latter two of which 
eventually led to the conflict between these polities. These changes also accord with 
changing gender identities through the growing employment and dominance of 
women in agriculture, leaving men free to accumulate booty through raiding (Eldredge 
1992; Etherington 2001). Although this change was often associated with the reign of 
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Shaka, as below in the oral testimony of Gedhle, it is clear that these processes started 
much earlier with the development of amabutho: 
“I may observe that, in the days that preceded the great upheaval identified with the 
reign of Shaka, men used to be in the habit of working in gardens, and not women 
only. They moreover devoted themselves to other industrial pursuits; they were more 
inclined to labour. When, however, Shaka turned his attention to war he, terrible 
tyrant that he was, diverted the natural inclinations of men by establishing what was 
practically the whole people into a standing army. This spirit of aggressiveness caused 
men, when they were not actually engaged in battle, to lead a more or less indolent 
experience, casting the duty of labour chiefly upon the women.” (Gedhle, 254-255). 
Considering the validity of Eldredge’s original hypothesis overall, then, there 
appears to be little evidence to argue against food security and drought as contributory 
factors to late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century socio-political change. 
Moreover the evidence considered here strengthens the link between these factors and 
highlights their importance in reinforcing and promoting political centralisation and 
territorial expansion. It is doubtful these changes were a direct response to drought 
and the impacts of the mahlatule famine, primarily because they had been initiated 
before the mahlatule famine occurred, yet drought may have been an accelerating or 
exacerbating factor in a society and economy already undergoing significant changes. 
There remain a number of speculative aspects to this discussion, primarily due to 
restricted climatic and historical evidence, though it is clear that this period was 
characterised by a number of unique stressors in KwaZulu-Natal. 
As political centralisation grew, rulers continued to use diplomacy and warfare 
to consolidate and expand their chiefdoms. Between about 1810 and 1815, Dingiswayo 
absorbed independent neighbouring chiefdoms into his Mthethwa polity, while similar 
processes occurred in other powerful chiefdoms like the Ndwandwe and Ngwane 
(Figure 6.3). By this time, all of these neighbouring chiefdoms in KwaZulu-Natal had 
also adopted the military system developed by the Mthethwa. In about 1815, Zwide 
forcefully drove the Ngwane north across the Phongolo, leaving the Ndwandwe and 
Mthethwa dominating the area south of the Phongolo. At this time, Shaka was serving 
in the military under Dingiswayo and had built up a power base, yet upon the death of 
Zulu chief Senzangakona in 1816, Dingiswayo installed Shaka as Zulu chief. Conflict 
between the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe intensified in the early-1810s. Dingiswayo’s 
forces captured and released Zwide more than once in these encounters (Eldredge 
2014), yet early in Shaka’s reign, in about 1817 or 1818, the Ndwandwe attacked the 
Mthethwa, which led to widespread disturbance, the capture of Dingiswayo and his 
death. These events were precedent to the emergence of the Zulu kingdom under 
Shaka, and the next section examines the interactions between food security, conflict 
and climate variability during his reign. 
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6.3 Food security, conflict and climate in the Zulu kingdom (1817-1828) 
After the death of Dingiswayo at the hands of the Zwide, Shaka’s Zulu chiefdom rose 
to prominence. This process involved an outward expansion from an inner core south 
of the White Mfolozi, with the diplomatic incorporation and military subordination of 
smaller chiefdoms into the overlordship of the Zulu kingdom. Most studies seeking to 
explain events in KwaZulu-Natal in this period, however, have either structured 
investigation around the framing of the ‘mfecane’, or have sought to refute this idea by 
focussing on the evident myths of the ‘wars of Shaka’ notion. Such investigation has 
done much to elucidate the chronology and attribution of events involving the Zulu 
kingdom during the reign of Shaka, yet as a consequence, knowledge of the other 
explanations for the process of expansion and later instability of the kingdom at this 
time has been suppressed. One area that has already been recognised as crucial for the 
maintenance of political authority, but has received little detailed attention during 
Shaka’s rule, is the ability to both feed the population and ensure the distribution of 
adequate cattle. As this section will further demonstrate, food security was a key factor 
that was inherently intertwined with conflict and precipitation variability. 
 There were numerous precedents in KwaZulu-Natal for the emergence of 
powerful political units and conflict before Shaka became Zulu chief in 1816. Amabutho 
were widely used in military encounters and food production by centralised 
chiefdoms, while the Thuli are said to have used stabbing spears, an innovation often 
credited to Shaka, two generations before they became used by the Zulu in 1815. These 
factors therefore cannot alone have been responsible for its expansion (Eldredge 2014). 
The Zulu chiefdom expanded quickly in the early part of Shaka’s rule with the 
voluntary or involuntary incorporation of neighbouring chiefdoms, as well as their 
manpower and cattle, into its authority. Immediately after this initial consolidation, 
Zwide attacked Shaka, but his army was driven back to the Mhlatuze river, after which 
the Ndwandwe retreated to reconsolidate, and subsequently fragmented (Wright 
2010). This left the Zulu kingdom as the dominant power in a large area of KwaZulu-
Natal, where Shaka consolidated between the Mkhuze and Thukela rivers.  
 The general processes involved in Zulu political consolidation are well known. 
Its dominance over other chiefdoms was chiefly connected to the control it could 
maintain over its large amabutho and a strict military system, and for its part, 
diplomatic, aggressive and innovative leadership. Yet for all its strengths, the Zulu 
kingdom was not a politically united one (Eldredge 2014). Shaka’s rule was despotic in 
character, but his power was not absolute, and subordinate chiefdoms retained 
hereditary chiefs and thus a degree of autonomy (Wright 2010). With the pressure of 
conflict, and as will later be shown, climatic stress, ensuring food security was key 
across the kingdom. Before assessing how conflict and climate variability impacted 
food security, the following section examines evidence for the vulnerability and 
resilience of the food system in the heart of the Zulu kingdom and its subordinate 
chiefdoms. 
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6.3.1 Food security in KwaZulu-Natal: Zulu consolidation (c. 1820-1826) 
The Zulu kingdom was considerably larger than its predecessor polities, but was also 
differently structured. Previous mechanisms of political control used by the Mthethwa 
were utilised to solidify the social classes and exact tribute from its subordinates 
(Wright 2010). The increased centralisation at the heart of the kingdom and the 
continuing amalgamation of other chiefdoms, though, gave rise to changes in the 
dynamics of the food system in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1820s. In order to analyse 
differential food security within these components of the Zulu kingdom, it is first 
necessary to investigate the state of the food system at the centre of the kingdom. 
 
6.3.1.1 The central Zulu kingdom 
For all the processes of centralisation in KwaZulu-Natal, political units ultimately 
continued to depend on their ability to provide subjects with opportunities to build up 
holdings of cattle, the provision of agricultural and grazing land, and adequate food 
production to feed their populations. The homestead, or village, remained the key unit 
of social and economic organisation, and provided the cattle surplus and labour power 
on which the aristocracy depended. The maintenance of this structure demanded a 
relatively high degree of organisation of the food system, a situation that becomes 
evident in the sources relating to the core of the Zulu kingdom in Shaka’s reign. 
 The earliest written observations of Zulu agriculture in the 1820s were recorded 
by Fynn, who noted the cultivation of a mix of crops (Table 6.2). According to Fynn, 
maize was only grown in small quantities in the central Zulu kingdom, which agrees 
with John Gama’s evidence that referred to the mid-nineteenth century. By contrast, 
sorghum, or ‘Guinea corn’ was said to be the principal crop as part of a mix of maize, 
the two millets and non-cereal crops. This may be due to the aforementioned versatility 
of sorghum and its root structure, as unlike maize, sorghum can remain dormant 
through dry spells and reverse the wilting process when the rains resume, while it can 
also tolerate waterlogging, facilitating its cultivation along river banks during the rainy 
season. Although sorghum takes longer to mature than the other grains at between at 
least four to over six months, maize demands higher soil fertility and precipitation to 
be advantageous over other crops. The limited importance of maize in the central Zulu 
kingdom was perhaps also reflected by the rejection of maize beer in favour of millet, 
the traditional beer-making grain, which according to Fynn was primarily grown for 
this purpose, and perhaps also demonstrates that maize remained cognitively marginal 
(Hall 1998). This cultivation of a mix of grains with various requirements was one of 
the most effective ways to ensure a consistent supply, and was further enhanced by the 
physical environment of the Zulu heartland, which provided well-watered land, good 
soils and hillside locations for the agriculturalist to choose the types of environment 
best suited to the requirements of each cereal (Guy 1980, 1994). 
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TABLE 6.2 ‘Crops grown by the Zulus’. Fynn (1836, 304-306). 
Name of crop Description 
Imbela, Indian 
corn (maize) 
Only grown in small quantities by the Zulus, but it is the principal food of the 
tributary tribes. It grows from six to 12 feet in height, producing sometimes 
five to six heads to a stalk. They commence planting in June and it is ripe in 
the beginning of September. By September they have a second crop and in 
March they have a third, some years having green corn all the year through. 
Ambela, Guinea 
corn (sorghum) 
The principal crop of the Zulus, requires longer time in coming to maturity 
than the former [maize], only one crop being produced during the season. 
Lupoco (finger 
millet) 
Grow about one feet in length, is six months coming to perfection, is grown 
principally for making beer which is a most pleasant beverage and it often 
intoxicates the drinker. 
Inquatola (pearl 
millet) 
A grain in length and appearance in stem and seed similar to the bulrush 
[pearl millet] and is very apt to be destroyed by birds. It is principally used for 
making beer which is stronger than the lupoco. It is frequently ground with 
water and eaten raw. A piece of this raw, the size of a penny roll will prevent 
the pain of hunger for several days during a journey. 
Massombann Grow underground, something of the flavour of a potato but a little bitter, the 
stem is 18 inches high from which a leaf like sage rises parallel from two sides, 
the stem being square. 
Amatuimbers A plant, the leaf and growth being similar to the water lily but the flower 
different in shape and of a pink blue colour. The food is like the potato 
underground and is something like that vegetable but has a glutinous matter 
on it. These are as large as the largest size potato. 
Beans Beans are of two kinds, the one imboombas are a running bean and are similar 
to the French beans. The other kind inteubues (inhlubu) is produced from 
underground with one bean in each pod, leaves similar to trefoil attached to 
the stem without stalks. 
Sugar cane There are four kinds of sugar cane. One is the West Indian kind and is planted 
in pieces underground in low damp soil and is very prolific. Only used to eat 
sometimes preserving a winter stock by burying underground. 
Pumpkins Pumpkins of a small and inferior kind were used the seloue (selwa) pumpkin 
introduced on our arrival are in more general use. 
Melons Melons, similar to water melons in appearance they use to make soup. Gourds 
are universally planted and while young and tender form a principal part of 
their diet till they become hard when they are scooped and used for beer, milk 
and water vessels. I have seen 3 which hold 18 gallons. 
 
 It may well have been this diversity of cultivated crops in the Zulu kingdom 
that led Fynn to write that: 
“The Kafir tribes may be almost exclusively considered a pastoral people as the 
quantity of grain produced by any part of them is barely sufficient for three months of 
the year. To this rule the Zulus are, however, an exception; they are entirely an 
agricultural and pastoral people” (Fynn 1836, 24). 
 While such differential aspects in the food system of KwaZulu-Natal as a whole 
will be examined in the following section, it is important to note that there also existed 
a relatively high level of organisation in agriculture in the Zulu kingdom. Isaacs wrote 
of the collection and burning of grain stalks for the replacement of soil nutrients 
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through ash distribution, and added that land was left fallow for one year after several 
years of tillage (Isaacs 1836). Similarly, Fynn and others wrote of storage practices: 
“When the corn is ripe, it is plucked and stacked into a reed basket work, some being 
six feet high and 15 feet in diameter, from whence it is threshed at the beginning of 
winter, some being put into baskets for immediate use, a few bunches of cobs are 
preserved for seeds. The remainder is put into cellars in the cattle kraals. These are 
dug into a conical shape, the entrance being only large enough to admit a young lad, 
round the sides and bottom. It is covered with the wild plantain leaves, the top being 
covered with stalks crossed, which is filled up with earth” (Fynn 1836, 303). 
“It is true that the air being shut out, the weevil, that scourge of Kaffraria, is less 
rapidly propagated, so that the Zulus can reckon on their store. The same precaution 
keeps out the rats, who require only a few weeks to demolish the harvest, for the 
Zulus obstinately refuse to admit the cat as a domestic animal” (Bird 1888, Vol. I, 463). 
 This organisation, as previously related, was accompanied by a high level of 
centralisation. The umkosi retained its strict penalties for non-compliance, while Fynn 
and Isaacs note that the amabutho were obligated to work in the king’s fields: 
“The king is supplied with corn by every regiment and their families planting every 
year, exclusive of what is planted by their own families” (Fynn 1836, 25). 
“The Zoolas have peculiar ceremonies with regard to the planting of corn. They meet 
twice a year, from all parts of the nation, at the residence of the king, to plant two 
immense fields for his majesty’s use. At harvest no one is exempt from working in the 
king’s fields and gardens, and the monarch personally appears at the head of his 
warriors to aid in gathering the corn” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. II, 291). 
 When combined, the maintenance of a mix of crops, advanced levels of storage, 
and politically important reinforcing rituals appears to resemble a resilient agricultural 
system at the heart of the kingdom. Though crops were crucially important, cattle were 
both a source of dairy and meat products, as well as high social value. Cattle could also 
be tightly controlled by the leadership, though at first do not seem to have been 
possessed in large numbers, possibly because of losses in conflict with the Ndwandwe 
(Hedges 1978). Oral evidence relating to Shaka’s early reign indicates that the increase 
in cattle quantities for lobola payments in Dingiswayo’s time was later reversed, while 
Fynn claimed that Shaka tightened the penalty for theft of cattle to death: 
“The lobola was only one beast to begin with, and afterwards a second beast, no more, 
for all the cattle belonged to the king. It was very hard indeed to get cattle, and if you 
should accumulate many you would be accused of making a chief of yourself, 
whereupon someone would report this to headquarters, and some pretext for killing 
would be found. It was therefore very hard to get cattle. Only notable warriors were 
presented with them by the king.” (Lunguza ka Mpukane, 317). 
“Those of the eastern tribes who have been restricted by the penalty of death from 
committing theft, have substituted, in its room open war on all who possess them. 
Thefts of cattle from one another were practised during the life of Dingiswayo, and 
until Chaka assumed the chieftainship of the several tribes in the surrounding 
country, when death alone became the penalty, which at once put a stop to that 
description of plunder, not a single instance of cattle stealing having occurred during 
the twelve years I was in the Zulu country.” (Fynn 1836, 24). 
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 While increasing restrictions on cattle, these measures helped reinforce the 
already growing rigidity of lines between the social classes. Coupled with the 
regulation of marriage (Wright 2010), this meant that the state could control the 
establishment of new homesteads or ‘production communities’. Yet both oral and 
written evidence suggest it was cattle raiding that grew the herds of the Zulu kingdom 
to the proportions that European traders witnessed in the mid-1820s. Oral accounts 
made frequent mention of cattle being ‘eaten up’ (expropriated) and brought to the 
Zulu heartland, some of which were then divided amongst the amabutho: 
“One had to fight for one’s food in the Zulu country. You would get nothing unless 
you did. This would take place when the beasts were killed; they would fight for the 
intestines, for these were not apportioned to anyone” (Mkando ka Dhlova, 160). 
“Tshaka [Shaka] used to award warriors who showed courage in fighting, ten, twenty, 
or thirty head of cattle for their bravery” (Melapi ka Magaye, 87). 
“The domestic animals of the Zulus consist of cattle, sheep and goats. Of the former 
they possess amazing numbers, the major part of which belong to the King, out of 
which the military are supplied with meat and small droves. A few compared to the 
immense numbers seen belonging to individuals. These cattle are of four kinds. The 
original stock is of the middle size and give from two to four quarts of milk at a time. 
A second sort are without horns having a thickset body and are considered better 
milkers than the former. A third kind they call Umsootu, having been taken in 
immense droves from the Bechuanas and other inland tribes. These are of the largest 
size weighing from 800 to 1000 lbs. and yield superior meat to any of the other kinds. 
Of these they have very large droves. Another sort are those taken east of Delagoa Bay 
called Sochangans, after the name of the king of the tribes from which they were 
captured. These are very small, but are considered superior milkers” (Fynn 1836, 327). 
 Although Fynn’s account refers to the end of Shaka’s reign, cattle numbers 
increased in the Zulu kingdom through its initial raids and the incorporation of 
neighbouring chiefdoms. Both oral and written reaffirm the earlier suggestion that this 
attracted the attention and sometimes voluntary submission of other communities: 
 “The Zulus had a characteristic of killing cattle, and the people of other communities, 
seeing the meat, went to konza them. The Zulus were wealthy in cattle and so were 
able to kill freely” (Baleni ka Silwana, 29). 
 Where surplus cattle could be accumulated on an individual basis, this gave the 
opportunity for the amabutho to form their own homesteads, which were then subjected 
to demands for tribute by political rulers in the form of grain, cattle, young women and 
the labour power of men. If the homestead retained adequate quantities of these 
resources, however, this also attracted the attention of poorer individuals, who would 
perform tasks such as cattle herding or clearing and hoeing gardens: 
 “Private kraals belong to individuals who, having sufficient cattle, are sure of getting 
sufficient people to establish a kraal either from the regiment or stragglers in distress” 
(Fynn 1836, 286). 
 This reciprocal system fostered a dependence on sources of food and social 
wealth, particularly cattle, which frequently needed to be replaced. Rather than a lust 
for territorial expansion, then, the process of Zulu consolidation was partly as a result 
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of a continuous need for the redistribution of cattle. As there was only a certain amount 
of tribute that could be demanded from the kingdom’s homesteads before the socio-
political system would be undermined, these cattle could only be acquired by raiding 
other chiefdoms (Etherington 2001). This process resumed after the breakup of Zwide’s 
polity as the Zulu kingdom extended their rule between the Black Mfolozi and the 
Mkhuze over the chiefdoms formerly subordinate to the Ndwandwe. 
 Among the other domestic animals in the Zulu kingdom were sheep and goats, 
which were possessed in much smaller quantities. Fowls were later introduced and 
were sometimes eaten by young people, but Fynn stated that other foods than beef, 
mutton and grain were only eaten out of necessity. Of the wild animals, Fynn added 
that buffaloes and elephants were hunted extensively, while monkeys were trapped for 
their skins. Wild plants, as listed in Appendix C, could also be resorted to, though this 
typically only took place in times of moisture stress, which does not seem to have been 
prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal at the time of early consolidation under Shaka. 
Examination of evidence on the Zulu food system in the 1820s thus gives the 
appearance of a resilient, highly centralised system. A mix of crops and high numbers 
of cattle formed the backbone of the Zulu kingdom, while social networks and the 
socio-political organisation of the kingdom suggest an overall low vulnerability to 
drought. This vulnerability, however, was not the same in the chiefdoms subordinate 
to the Zulu kingdom, which the next section studies. 
 
6.3.1.2 Subordinate chiefdoms 
By 1824, the Zulu kingdom had consolidated over a wider region in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Figure 6.4). In addition to the small chiefdoms in its immediate hinterland, larger 
chiefdoms such as the Qwabe became subordinate to Shaka. This brought a larger 
population, enriched cattle resources and a wider range of physical environments into 
its domain. Formerly independent chiefdoms were now subject to new systems 
regarding the distribution of cattle and land, and this gave rise to new power dynamics 
between rulers and the ruled. Moreover, between 1824-1827, Shaka further attempted 
to reinforce his authority internally and expand his influence to new chiefs and 
territories to the north, south and west, much of which was witnessed by European 
traders. However, the incorporation of chiefdoms and people was not always peaceful, 
or for that matter, successful. The breaking apart of formerly independent chiefdoms 
sometimes sent a number of its people and its chief into migration, while at other times 
they remained in their location and konza’d Shaka and the Zulu. Where chiefs gave 
allegiance to Shaka, they retained their chieftaincy as subordinates in a layered political 
hierarchy. Where resistance to Zulu rule was considerable, this sometimes resulted in 
violent confrontation and loss of life. The impacts of this political, structural and 
demographic change and conflict on food systems involved the amplification of 
imbalances in cattle ownership, the subjection of polities to new customs, and 
substantial impacts on vulnerability and food security, which are discussed next. 
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FIGURE 6.4 Political units in KwaZulu-Natal c. 1820-1826 and c. 1826-1828. 
 
 The chiefdoms incorporated into the Zulu kingdom early in Shaka’s reign were 
both proximate and also relatively weak. Indeed, this reflected the limited strength, 
manpower and expansive capability of the Shaka’s polity at this time. With the aid of 
the dethroned Mthethwa polity, however, Shaka incorporated these chiefdoms 
relatively peacefully and often through voluntary submission, giving the Zulu control 
of greater territory, manpower and resources. It is difficult to uncover evidence on 
these small subordinate chiefdoms, but crucially, despite being subject to tribute in the 
form of cattle, evidence does not suggest that droves of cattle were expropriated from 
these chiefdoms and taken to the Zulu heartland. For instance, Fynn’s earliest 
encounters revealed that the subordinate chiefs “possess large flocks” but were at the 
disposal of the king (Fynn 1836, 327). This observation in part led to Fynn’s assertion 
that “The tribes may be considered almost exclusively a pastoral people as the quantity 
of grain produced by any part of them is barely sufficient for three months of the year” 
(Fynn 1836, 24). Fynn also remarked that while maize was only grown in small 
quantities by the Zulus, it was the principal food of the “tributary tribes” (Table 6.2). 
 Differences in crop dependence were matched with changes to politically 
important rituals, such as the umkosi, which reinforced the authority of the chief. Chiefs 
who had performed the umkosi in their formerly independent polities could no longer 
do so, and as the Zulu kingdom expanded beyond its immediate neighbours, chiefs 
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sought to replace the umkosi with other ceremonies that would not be seen as imitating 
Shaka’s supreme authority. For instance, Mabonsa explained that: 
“We [Hlubi] had a custom similar to the umkosi in our tribe but called igagane, held 
every year. But it was a different affair. People used to go and beg permission of the 
king to eat pumpkins, on the ground that there was a famine at their kraal. People 
would, as it was called, ‘ask for the gourd’, i.e. pumpkins. The king would then wait 
till the igagane was called up. It was the igagane which afforded general information 
that all might partake of the new fruits as the king himself had partaken thereof. In 
Zululand this custom of first-fruits was much more stringently observed than with 
our kings. We held the igagane at the same time that the Zulus had their umkosi. 
 The word igagane only came into vogue after Tshaka began to reign, for it was 
forbidden to hold the umkosi ceremony. It used to be umkosi among our tribe 
previously to Tshaka. We were prohibited from practising the custom as it was 
intended our tribe should become extinguished in order that Tshaka’s nation should 
be augmented” (Mabonsa, 21). 
 However, available evidence does not suggest that a more devolved form of the 
umkosi was performed everywhere, and a number of observations by European traders 
suggest that the tying of rituals like the umkosi in the neighbouring subordinate 
chiefdoms to central Zulu authority became less sympathetic to local climatic, 
agricultural and nutritional needs. Both Isaacs and Fynn, for example, observed that: 
“On crossing some corn fields, [we] gathered a head or two, which one of the natives 
perceiving, he ran towards us with his spear and forbade our plucking any more. We 
afterwards ascertained that the poor fellow was impelled to remonstrate with us from 
a sense of duty, the laws of Chaka being severe against any one gathering corn 
without the king’s permission, or until he himself had commenced cutting. This is a 
severe law, and injustrious to the natives, who are deprived of the gratification which 
the green corn affords them, and in consequence of its being obliged to stand too long 
before it is cut, a great deal is often completely destroyed by rot” (Isaacs, Vol. II, 87). 
“In some parts of his territories the natives are in a state approaching to starvation; 
although they have a bountiful supply of corn in the ear in almost a condition of 
decay, they are not permitted to touch it until a general order to garner it is 
promulgated… From this want of providently securing for their future subsistence 
they are, in the interim of seed-time and harvest, at times greatly straitened for 
vegetable diet, and obliged, for weeks, to subsist solely on milk and such animal food 
as chance may furnish” (Isaacs, Vol. II, 291). 
“The non-observance of the custom never fails of being punished with death to the 
whole kraal of people to which the culprit belongs and their cattle go to the king who 
generally defers it till late in the season and the early crops are spoilt on the field. 
Picking a fallen corn is as bad as eating it” (Fynn 1836, 304). 
 While the purpose of expanding central ritual practice was aimed at winning 
wider acceptance that Zulu ancestors were the ultimate sources of welfare across its 
territory (Wright 2010; Eldredge 2014), the dependence on maize as opposed to 
sorghum, varying harvest dates and differences in climatic conditions such as the 
quantity and timing of rainfall gave rise to problems of crop decay, and in turn, 
hunger. Indeed, even in the relatively limited extent of Zulu territory, considerable 
differences exist in these climatic variables, as well as in the fertility and agricultural 
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
	  244 
potential of soils. Thus, attempts to achieve ideological hegemony over a large area 
were countered by the overall inefficiency of centralised ritual and food system 
practices. On the one hand, the expansion and amalgamation of the amabutho of these 
formerly independent chiefdoms both increased their potential to obtain cattle through 
aggressive means, secured their agricultural and grazing land and incorporated their 
population into a bigger social network. Yet on the other, subordinate polities were 
subjected to increased demands for tribute and centralised rituals like the umkosi, both 
of which may not have been sensitive to local needs. The integration of neighbouring 
chiefdoms into the political overlordship of the Zulu kingdom was therefore achieved 
with varying degrees of success. While the resilience of the composite Zulu kingdom as 
a political structure may have been increased, at least in the short-term, the 
vulnerability of the subordinate polities to climate variability was also increased. 
 
6.3.2 Food system stress: conflict, drought and instability 
As the Zulu kingdom began to expand considerably further outwards in the early- to 
mid-1820s, its increasing ranks of amabutho were often employed in conflict to raid or 
enforce the submission of the more distant independent chiefdoms. Where allegiance 
was not voluntary, this could involve the expropriation of significant numbers of cattle, 
human mortality in the hundreds, or occasionally the thousands, and, according to 
some, the destruction of crops (Ballard 1986; Eldredge 2014). The Zulu were certainly 
not the only party in KwaZulu-Natal involved in conflict at this time, and other 
sizeable polities such as the Ngwane, Hlubi, Thembu and Chunu chiefdoms formed 
part of a wider zone of instability on the fringes of the somewhat more stable Zulu 
kingdom (Wright 2010). Indeed, critical examination of European sources has done 
much to reveal the gross exaggeration insofar as Zulu culpability in the amplification 
and extent of violence is concerned. Fynn and Isaacs, for instance, believed that: 
“It may be here necessary to state that on Chaka becoming chief of the Zulus he 
determined to exterminate every tribe he was at that time acquainted with which he 
so far succeeded in doing as to leave swept bare the surrounding country. He 
succeeded in his conquests the whole country from Delagoa Bay to St John’s… The 
number of souls whose death he occasioned I have been asked to conjecture exceeds a 
million” (Fynn 1836, 20). 
“This African Mars ultimately depopulated the whole line of coast from the 
Amapoota River to the Ootogale” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. I, 325). 
 Although such exaggerations remain uncritically accepted by some parts of the 
literature, Eldredge (2014) estimated that the total mortality from Shaka’s major 
military encounters may have been no more than 10,000, many of which were Zulu 
warriors, and no more than around 20,000 when earlier campaigns and civilian 
mortality are included. Despite this important re-framing of the sources and extent of 
conflict in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1820s, its consequences, particularly on food systems, 
have often been generally overlooked. This is recognised by Eldredge (2014, 283) who 
adds that “many more people died from the aftermath of the battle, whether from 
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displacement or loss of food resources that resulted in hunger and famine”. The extent 
to which such tactics or destruction was employed, however, is uncertain, and can only 
be verified where both oral and European sources agree. 
 The earliest mention of the destruction of food in the oral and European sources 
relates to Shaka’s retreat against Zwide’s approaching army in 1818. According to two 
of Stuart’s informants, Shaka was advised to hide all the food in his territory as Zwide 
depended on mealie bread and so would starve and there should be a famine (Baleni 
ka Silwana, 9, Mmemi ka Nguluzane, 271), whereas Fynn claimed that Shaka 
destroyed grain and cooking utensils on a wide scale. While the accounts disagree in 
their detail, they indicate the manipulation of food supply to put another polity at a 
disadvantage. More generally, European traders frequently spoke of the destruction of 
crops as part of a range of “inhuman atrocities” committed by Shaka’s forces. Fynn 
noted that during the reign of Dingiswayo and Shaka: 
“It was customary to make attacks annually on some foreign tribe, the months June 
and July and August being chosen as best adapted, there being sure to find corn, 
either green or harvested, and their own requiring no further trouble beside the rivers 
being passable during those months. They never fail in committing the most inhuman 
atrocities… not omitting when leaving, to destroy the corn which they have not been 
able to consume by mixing it with the worst filth. 
 Many of the inhabitants who escaped from the spear were left to perish by 
starvation, their cattle were taken and grain destroyed, thousands were, for years, left 
to linger on roots of a most destructive character. One sort in particular could not be 
eaten unless cooked for twenty four hours in three different waters. The sharp 
cravings of hunger led them frequently to meet the fate which they knew awaited 
them, when insanity invariably followed, they frequently cast themselves from 
mountain cliffs or were devoured by tigers or wolves” (Fynn 1836, 21-22). 
 This description is clearly infused with great exaggeration, and indeed 
contradicts Fynn’s earlier evidence which states Dingiswayo despaired upon hearing 
that cooking utensils were destroyed in a raid. Moreover, Isaacs (1836, Vol. 1, 278) 
wrote that neighbouring chiefdoms sought to “excite the commiseration” of Europeans 
by spreading exaggerated reports of the destruction committed by Zulu forces. Oral 
evidence from Mbovu ka Mtshumayeli, however, does suggest that warfare in the 
1820s was distinct in comparison to previous accepted conventions, but more so in 
relation to the acquisition of territory than the destruction of food: 
“There is a law or recognised custom among the natives regarding warfare, a law 
transgressed by Tshaka, to the effect that the victors must not spoil and seize the 
country of their foes, nor kill women and children. This was the rule prior to Tshaka’s 
day, and correspond in a way to the agreement of Geneva re explosive bullets and 
other cruel acts. The country was not taken. Tshaka, however, established colonies like 
Europeans” (Mbovu ka Mtshumayeli, 44). 
 Following a number of studies on the nature and scale of warfare in KwaZulu-
Natal at this time, Eldredge (2014) asserts that these instances of ‘total war’ involving 
the killing of people were comparatively rare. Moreover, other Europeans such as 
Allen Gardiner, a missionary in KwaZulu-Natal the 1830s, Charles Maclean, Isaacs, 
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and at times Fynn himself, asserted that the accumulation of cattle was the aim of 
conflict rather than causing destruction and committing atrocities: 
“The several bloody and exterminating wars of Shaka appear to have had no object in 
view other than to enrich himself with cattle of the conquered tribes; to obtain these 
was a sufficient incentive to engage in the most daring and arduous enterprise” 
(Maclean 1839, 86). 
“The acquisition of cattle is the grand incitive to war among all the tribes in this part 
of Africa; and peace of any long duration is only to be expected by those who, like the 
Bushmen, are unencumbered with this envied description of property” (Gardiner 
1836, 266). 
 Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility that crops were destroyed in 
conflicts that escalated beyond cattle raids or the incorporation of people. Such 
reasoning may apply to the increase in conflict in Natal in the 1820s, where European 
traders based at Port Natal frequently wrote of what was in their view the dislocating 
impact of conflict on food systems: 
“This unhappy region was depopulated by Chaka and other marauding tribes who 
fled from his terrible outrages; and it was in this uninhabited state when, on our 
arrival, we found only a few stragglers who had escaped indiscriminate massacre. 
These were in the extreme of want and misery, barely subsisting on a scant supply of 
roots, often poisonous, and the cause of many deaths” (Bird 1888, Vol. 1, 84). 
“In a former part of my evidence I have stated, that on my arrival in this country 
[Natal] in March, 1824, there were no inhabitants in the District south of the Itongati. 
There was neither huts, cattle, nor grain. There were, however, many natives spread 
over the country, the remnants of tribes destroyed by Chaka, seeking sustenance from 
noxious as well as harmless roots, so that more were destroyed by this wretched fare 
than were preserved. Seldom more than two natives were then seen together. This 
was occasioned not only by the great difficulty they experienced in obtaining food, 
but from their distrusting each other. Some of these from a necessity had become 
cannibals” (Bird 1888, Vol. I, 132). 
 That much evidence is overtly centred around the notion of the ‘depopulation’ 
of Natal, however, raises suspicion, for Fynn was concerned with bringing the 
potential of Natal for formal colonisation to the attention of the Cape Colony and 
Britain. Thus, claims for the deliberate destruction of food are at best characterised by 
gross exaggeration to serve narratives of devastation and depopulation, and at worst 
are inextricably tied to a narrative of the advancement of colonists’ claims as potential 
bringers of peace to an empty land. This latter point is later reflected in Fynn’s 
evidence printed the Natal Mercury in 1853, where war and famine are tied together: 
“With regard to their claims on the land [Natal], the native population of this district 
may be thus classed: 
1. Those who for many generations have continued on their native soil under all the 
difficulties of war and famine. 
2. Those tribes who formerly occupied this country, were driven from it by the wars 
of Chaka, and returned to it, either under the first English settlers, the Dutch Boers, or 
the present government. 
3. Those who dwelt originally beyond this district, but have entered it from time to 
time as refugees” (Bird 1888, Vol. I, 114). 
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 If the destruction of food was confined to rare events of ‘total war’, it is perhaps 
noteworthy that famine is so frequently mentioned in European evidence, and to an 
extent in the oral testimonies. Part of this may also relate to the progression of 
colonists’ claims as bringers of organised food production, and this is certainly 
reflected in some evidence, yet the extent to which famine is mentioned and its 
presence in independent oral sources also suggests that other stressors may have 
induced hunger in Natal and other parts of the region. A prime stressor for which there 
is substantial evidence from multiple independent sources is the increase in cattle 
raiding, particularly in Natal, to supply the growing population of the Zulu kingdom 
and its amabutho. In 1824, and shortly before his death in 1828, Shaka ordered long-
distance cattle raids on the Mpondo chiefdom south of the Mzimkhulu. The numbers 
of cattle garnered from Faku’s Mpondo chiefdom were in the thousands, and even 
when Gardiner travelled there in 1835, he observed that: 
“The Amapondas having suffered so severely in their wars with Charka have, in 
consequence, become great beer-drinkers; and even now that they are gradually 
recovering their losses by the increase of their cattle, I fear this baneful habit, induced 
by the scarcity of milk, is likely to be of long continuance” (Gardiner 1836, 266). 
 Loss of cattle also in part seems to have induced food scarcity elsewhere south 
of the Thukela. This was noted by Isaacs in his travels in this region, although the 
reasons he gave for this were inevitably much-exaggerated and unreliable: 
“Their [community near Port Natal] cattle had been taken from them, and they were 
often destitute of the means of subsistence. Were it known that they possessed even 
corn, the Zoolas would destroy them to obtain possession of it, consequently, they 
seldom planted any, but subsisted chiefly on fish, and such esculents as grew 
spontaneously in the vicinity of their residence” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. I, 73). 
“We proceeded to the residence of Umkileeper, a poor tributary chief to the Zoolas, 
who having been subdued by Chaka, had never been able to recover his former 
wealth and greatness. He had little or no food, but he gave me a pumpkin, which was 
all he possessed” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. II, 190). 
“We proceeded onwards from this place to the abode of a small tribe which had been 
subdued and nearly annihilated by the Zoolas in the reign of Chaka; they were poor 
and harmless, depending entirely for food on the little corn and esculents they can 
raise. It is true they do raise but little of either, for were they to possess the most 
flourishing crops, instead of eliciting the commendation of the sovereign, to whom 
they are tributary, it would be the signal for their execution” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. II, 195). 
 Shortages of food also appear to have given rise to dietary changes even at the 
chiefdom level. Fynn later reported with regard to the Thuli chiefdom that: 
“The only instance in which any number of a tribe held together was in the case of the 
Amatuli [Thuli], under the regent chief Matuban. They were dispossessed of their 
cattle… Owing to their destitute condition they caught fish for food, an abomination 
with all Kafir tribes. In a few years they again possessed, but fish and Indian corn had 
become their favourite and regular diet” (Bird 1888, Vol. I, 132). 
 Thus, while cattle were in short supply, maize grew in importance, a factor 
perhaps reinforced by its relatively high productivity and shorter maturing period. 
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Despite the alleged importance of maize, Fynn also reported that the quantity 
produced barely lasted for three months of the year (Table 6.2). The only exception to 
this was apparently the Mpondo chiefdom, who occupied a “country of the most 
luxurious soil” (Fynn 1836, 24). This appears to be reflective of wider food shortages, 
which seem to have been a key factor in the instability of the 1820s, and is illustrated at 
length in the evocative but exaggerated account of Shepstone. 
“Naturally, the means of subsistence furnished by their cattle and other smaller 
domestic animals had failed first, for they were eagerly sought after by Chaka's 
soldiers; their stores of grain held out longer, but in time they were exhausted also, 
and as hopelessly as the cattle, for their granaries could not be replenished by 
cultivation, because cultivation attracted attention, and had therefore to be 
abandoned. To live at all without their usual food seemed impossible. Their dogs had 
long been too weak to capture any, and, lean and hungry as they were, had been eaten 
by their masters. Wild roots were the only means of subsistence within their reach. 
These were scarce, required much labour to procure, and afforded but light 
nourishment after all. No wonder, then, that the country was filled with the dead, and 
that, as the natives express it, the assegai killed people, but hunger killed the country. 
Many poor wretches, who could, crawled towards the Tugela to be "picked up", as 
they termed it, by Chaka's haughty vassals. There they could at least get food, 
whatever the government might be” (Bird 1988, Vol. I, 159). 
 Hunger, in the view of European writers, as well as many of Stuart’s 
informants, gave rise to cannibalism south of the Thukela (Box 6.1). The alleged 
presence of cannibalism has gained uncritical acceptance in some parts of the literature 
(for example, Ballard 1986). It is clear from just a fraction of the overall oral evidence 
on cannibalism listed in Box 6.1, though, that beliefs of its existence were always tied to 
the loss of cattle and thus a major source of protein by a community. Hamilton (1998), 
Wright (2010) and Eldredge (2014) have also suggested that cannibalism should be 
taken as a metaphor for disorder, pointing to the translation of amazimu, a word used 
to describe raiding groups, which was translated into the settler literature as 
‘cannibals’. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that Europeans had good reason to 
perpetuate such accounts for the reasons detailed above. 
 The reality that appears to be embedded within the written and oral sources 
suggests that the 1820s, particularly after the arrival of the European traders in 1824, 
was a time of severe food system stress. This arose in part due to loss of cattle to both a 
growing centralised kingdom as well as a number of smaller chiefdoms who engaged 
in raiding at the same time. Yet it is difficult to reason with the arguments put forward 
by European traders that food system stress was simply a result of Zulu expansion or 
local conflict, or the view that maize could not be cultivated because it attracted 
attention. Significantly, evidence also suggests that drought may have been an 
important factor in the prominence of food shortages, hunger and famine in the 
sources. The Africa-wide precipitation dataset of Nicholson et al. (2012) proposes that 
the first three decades of the nineteenth century were dry across southern Africa. Yet it 
has already been argued that these reconstructions, despite claiming to be attentive to 
local variation, vastly oversimplify local inter-annual differences, and so cannot alone 
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be relied upon to demonstrate drought in KwaZulu-Natal at this time. Sources relating 
to the interior highveld and Kalahari do make reference to drought between 1820-1823 
(Eldredge 1992; Nash and Endfield 2008) (Figure 3.6), but the logbook-based 
reconstructions in Chapter 4 do not reveal similar conditions in at stations in KwaZulu-
Natal or the Eastern Cape. In the later 1820s, however, the SRZ logbook reconstructions 
make clear that KwaZulu-Natal experienced years of consecutive drought between the 
rain years of 1824-1829 (Figure 4.8), while dry conditions were also observed at this 
time in the adjacent Eastern Cape (Vogel 1989) (Figure 3.6). Furthermore, Webster 
(1979) refers to three years of drought in KwaZulu-Natal between 1827-1829, and 
elsewhere in the region, Newitt (1988) has shown that the years from 1823-1830 were a 
period of prolonged drought from about Sofala to Mozambique Island. 
 
BOX 6.1 References to cannibalism in early-nineteenth century KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References to cannibalism 
“It seems impossible to imagine that in a cup so brimful of sorrow there should be 
room for one additional drop. But there was room, and that drop was the bitterest 
of all. In terror of wild beasts, in still greater terror of Chaka's ruthless soldiers and 
vassals, maddened by hunger, and altogether demoralized by the circumstances 
which surrounded him, a man conceived the horrible idea of feeding upon his 
fellow-man, and at once put it into practice. Starving wretches, in misery equal to 
his own, rallied round him, and a band of cannibals was soon formed, to be 
increased by two or three in other parts of the country. Driven first by necessity, 
they acquired a taste for this revolting practice, and continued it long after the 
necessity ceased” (Bird 1888, Vol. I, 160). 
“There used to be a saying as the sun was setting, ‘Oh! It is going to be devoured 
by cannibals’, for the impression was that cannibals lived to the west” (Baleni ka 
Silwana, 34). 
“These cannibals had splendid supplies of food, good crops. They had huge goats 
with large ears and udders as large as those of a cow. They had no cattle. The 
cannibals were said to be the people of Lupalule – that was their isibongo. The 
cannibals were also called amaBele” (Lunguza, 302). 
“There used to be cannibals formerly, viz. the people of Mbambo. These people are 
to be found in our and various other tribes. It is said that formerly the people here 
died of famine. There was a shortage of food. Wild figs were eaten, and also 
unomkizwana, a black creeping plant which exudes milky sap. The people of 
Mbambo had no livestock, such as cattle, they were cannibals, and ate people. 
Some of them admit it, others do not, saying they are being insulted” (Dabula, 88). 
 “Dingana chased the cannibals away from our part of the country. The great 
cannibal chief was Mahlapahlapa ka Mnjoli of the Radbele [Bheli] people. There 
was no cannibalism in Bungane’s day, nor Mtimkulu’s, but when Mtimkulu was 
murdered the tribe became dispersed, and as a drought set in, people, having 
nothing to eat, began to live on one another” (Mahungane, 111). 
“Cannibals came into existence because of famine, no food, no cattle” (Mbovu ka 
Mtshumayela, 27). 
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 Despite multiple indications of moisture stress in the mid- to late-1820s from 
the documentary reconstructions, evidence of drought by the European traders at this 
time is not immediately explicit. In the case of Fynn, this is easily explained by the 
dearth of daily weather descriptions as his original notes were buried with his brother, 
hence making precise dates and daily weather difficult to recall. Nevertheless, aside 
from widespread famine, several lines of evidence within these sources give reason to 
believe that drought was experienced at this time. Of the more direct evidence, Isaacs 
reported on December 1st 1830 that “the rainy season had set in much earlier than 
usual. It fell also much heavier, and was of longer duration at its intervals, than had 
been known for several years past” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. II, 116). It is significant that 
Isaacs’ claim of an early onset of the rainy season, which followed on to be a very wet 
year, is also reconstructed from the logbook wind data to be a wet year at the two SRZ 
stations. Given that Isaacs had been intermittently in KwaZulu-Natal for four years at 
the time of writing, it is reasonable to suggest that at least the years 1826-1829 were 
considerably drier. That these years were not pointed out at the time by Isaacs may 
well be because they were not judged to be exceptional. Though this may also relate to 
the fact that Isaacs, and indeed other diarists at this time were still relatively unfamiliar 
with the climatic norms of the region, or were simply not concerned with them. This 
latter point perhaps carries weight as it was only towards 1830 that Isaacs began to 
partake in crop cultivation at his Natal homestead. Whatever the precise reasons, 
though, it appears to be the case that 1830 was considerably wetter than previous 
years, and unlike previous years this in part prompted Isaacs to write of the 
agricultural potential of KwaZulu-Natal: 
“We had to pursue our way through another of those fine grazing districts which 
abound in the interior of the Zoola country. A fine savanna, rich in corn-fields and 
pasturage, that would have been a sight for a Buckinghamshire grazier, lay on each 
side of our line of march. I could at once perceive that no part through which we had 
travelled could produce corn so fine as in this district: it was growing in all the 
luxuriance of vegetation, and had reached a surprising height, so that on passing 
along the fields we found it several feet above our heads, and throwing out the ear 
exceedingly full and productive” (Isaacs 1836, Vol. II, 193). 
  Despite the absence of daily weather descriptions in Fynn’s diary, he did make 
reference to rainmaking, and reported its application in the event of drought, excess 
rain, and the appearance of comets. Fynn wrote that “Chaka placed little or no belief in 
them [rainmakers], but dreaded thunder in which case he was surrounded and 
covered by his girls till the storm was over” (Fynn 1836, 282). When combined with 
oral evidence, Fynn’s claims may suggest that rainmakers fell out of favour with Shaka 
sometime in his later reign, for Stephen Mini told Stuart that: 
“The amaZolo were the owners of the sky; they were the rain-makers; they were 
addressed as ‘Zulu! Dhlangamandhla! Gasa was the last rain-maker – he was killed on 
account of it; he was killed by Tshaka. Tshaka said to him, when he had been 
summoned to make rain, ‘Bring rain, not thunder, only rain.’ But thunder sounded. 
Tshaka said, ‘You see; you have troubled me by bringing thunder. Do not do this 
again’. But on another occasion when he wanted Gasa to make rain the thunder 
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sounded. This time Tshaka sent a force to kill him. He was killed near his mountain, 
Quedeni” (Stephen Mini, 134-136). 
 According to the later diary of Robert Garden, recorded while travelling with 
Fynn in the early-1850s, rainmakers were used when: 
“It is a whole country that is suffering under the disadvantages arising from drought 
which is to a pastoral people is one of the heaviest calamities that can befall them. An 
application to a rainmaker originated in all cases with the chief or principal men of the 
tribe and the rain-doctor knowing that the whole tribe or country requires his aid to 
obtain rain, he calls upon the chief to order every Kraal to send him cattle, and I have 
known cases says Mr Fynn, in which from 5 to 600 head have been collected for this 
purpose” (Garden 1853, 142). 
 Combined with independent documentary climatic evidence, then, the indirect 
evidence for drought suggests that widespread dry conditions were experienced in 
Shaka’s later reign. Yet drought itself does not always result in famine in well-
organised food systems, and its impacts would have varied across KwaZulu-Natal. 
Thus, the differences in food system vulnerability reported in Section 6.3.1 translated 
into differential impacts, where famine was prevalent in the outer reaches of the Zulu 
kingdom and adjacent areas like Natal. In particular, loss of cattle as a source of food, 
growing inequality, centralised umkosi rituals, amplified conflict and changes in the 
socio-political structure of small chiefdoms in these areas in the early-1820s brought 
new meanings to food insecurity, whereupon vulnerability to climate variability was 
raised, and consecutive years of drought exacerbated an already fragile situation 
causing dislocating famine. This re-consideration of the interaction of dynamics in 
KwaZulu-Natal at this time therefore further shifts the emphasis away from the view 
that a purely destructive influence of Zulu consolidation caused famine across its 
broad area of influence. Rather, the process of Zulu growth did impact on its 
neighbours, but in complex and often less dramatic ways than the sources suggest. If 
the central Zulu kingdom was more resilient to these droughts, it did undergo a period 
of heightened instability between 1826-1828, which is considered next. 
 
6.3.2.1 Food security and internal instability: Shaka’s last years c. 1826-1828 
In 1826, the Zulu defeated the Ndwandwe polity, causing its eventual breakup, and 
resulted in its population either joining the Gaza polity in southern Mozambique, 
giving allegiance to Shaka, or joining Mzilikazi’s Ndebele (Figure 6.4). This left the 
Zulu the dominant polity south of the Phongolo and subject to less immediate political 
pressures. Despite the removal of the long-standing rival Ndwandwe polity from 
political life in KwaZulu-Natal, the two years from 1826-1828 were a time of 
heightened internal instability and opposition to Shaka’s rule. At the same time, the 
slave trade through Delagoa Bay was growing significantly, Griqua and Kora were 
raiding widely on the southern Highveld, while Shaka became increasingly aware of 
European weaponry and the expanding Cape Colony (Eldredge 2014). Shaka also 
moved his capital from Bulawayo to Dukuza in 1827, which brought it closer to the 
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British traders established at Port Natal. In addition to the elaboration of institutions 
and ideologies, the previous closer proximity of threats from rival polities had aided 
Shaka’s hold on power. The removal of the Ndwandwe from the scene, however, 
brought domestic grievances to the fore in the Zulu kingdom. Eldredge (2014) has 
convincingly shown that Shaka’s arbitrary violence and capricious decision-making led 
to a loss of support, disaffection and alienation of many of the aristocracy. In the last 
three years of his reign, these unpopular aspects of his rule increased, first with the 
death of Shaka’s mother, Nandi. This event was well-remembered in the oral 
traditions, each of which recalled the violence and hunger that followed as Shaka 
proclaimed that no cultivation was allowed for three months, and no milk could be 
used but milk was to be poured onto the ground (Eldredge 2014). Fynn’s diary reflects 
this, though claims that cultivation was initially ordered to halt for a year: 
“Speeches were made by the chief urging the following resolutions strictly to be 
observed, that, as the great female elephant, or rather the overruling spirit of 
vegetation had died, it was not improbable that heaven and earth would unite, and, to 
appease the spirits, no cultivation should be allowed that year, the cattle to be milked 
on the ground and not to be used for food, while any female found enceinte during 
the next year should, with their husbands, be put to death. The first resolution was 
adhered to for three months, when the chief Chaka was appeased” (Fynn 1836, 136). 
 According to oral evidence these policies caused food shortages across the Zulu 
kingdom and its subordinates, reflected by Ngidi’s evidence which states that the 
country was destroyed by lack of food, as well as Lunguza’s testimony: 
“Nandi died sometime after I was born, for I recollect the kind of food we ate after her 
death. Those who ate amabele [sorghum] were killed; it was said only milk and curds 
could be taken. There were people who used to go about inspecting, and if they saw 
faeces at any kraal, as they would do after a grass fire by their continuing to smoke, 
they would know that they had had amabele. The people of such kraal would be put 
to death, for Tshaka said, “So he is living in a state of contentment, whereas I am 
lamenting because of my mother’s death!” (Lunguza, 307). 
 Wright (2010) suggests that these actions were attempts by Shaka to rid himself 
of opponents and to rouse feeling against his rivals. This is also perhaps evidenced in 
Fynn’s diary, where it is claimed that Shaka was dismayed by the: 
“Indifference with which all the different tribes had evinced by not coming forward to 
express their regret at the death of so important a personage… when it was decreed 
that they should be attacked, Faku, Hintze, and Makomo bordering on the colony and 
Sochangarn west of Delagoa Bay, whose cattle taken should thus be considered as 
tears which they should shed on so important an occasion” (Fynn 1836, 139). 
 Although the reasons for the eventual attacks on Faku’s Mpondo and the 
chiefdoms around Delagoa Bay (Figure 6.4) are ultimately unverifiable, in April 1828 
two large, long-distance raids, accompanied by some of the European traders, were 
sent out to these locations by Shaka. The raid on the Mpondo resulted in the seizure of 
large numbers of cattle, but within only days of returning, the force was ordered to 
march to the Delagoa Bay area. To launch a second long-distance raid so soon after the 
other apparently augmented opposition to Shaka’s rule in the Zulu kingdom, and there 
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exists little consensus on why these decisions were taken. Want of cattle due to 
ongoing drought is one option, but given that significant numbers had just been 
gathered from the Mpondo, it is unlikely that this was the sole reason. Perhaps, as 
Wright (2010) suggest, Shaka became aware of the plot to kill him and acted to send his 
conspirators a considerable distance. Whatever the case, the Delagoa Bay campaign 
was a disaster, and discontent with Shaka’s rule had reached such levels that he was 
stabbed to death by his brothers Dingane and Mhlangana at Dukuza in 1828. 
According to Dinya, Shaka’s last words were: 
“’Is it the sons of my father who are killing me? How is this, seeing I never put to 
death any of my brothers ever since I became king? You are killing me, but the land 
will see locusts and white people come.’ He then fell. True enough locusts and 
Europeans subsequently came. This is evidence of Shaka being a prophet” (Dinya, 95). 
 Interestingly, Shaka was correct in predicting the arrival of locusts, and a 
number of European eyewitness accounts of locusts in KwaZulu-Natal are given in 
1829-1830 (Table 3.5). Yet as locusts generally appear after droughts, of which there 
had been several years in KwaZulu-Natal prior to his death, this was not necessarily a 
difficult prediction to make (Eldredge 2014). 
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has investigated the complex interaction between climate variability, 
socio-political organisation, food security and conflict. The relatively sparse evidence 
that exists for the late-eighteenth century demonstrates that these linkages, along with 
trade, formed part of a dynamic that contributed to political transformation in the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, although the role of climate variability in 
this process was more to accelerate or exacerbate changes that were already underway. 
In parallel to the Zambezi-Limpopo region, one outcome of these changes was that 
pronounced differences emerged in vulnerability and adaptive capacity with and 
between the various socio-political units. This was particularly evident in the 1820s, 
where new meanings were given to food security through changes in socio-political 
structures and relations, increased expropriation of cattle, and the incorporation of 
people by the more powerful polities. Therefore, when drought struck in the late-1820s, 
communities weakened by conflict and subordinate communities or polities on the 
outskirts of the central Zulu kingdom were the first to suffer. As the drought 
continued, the Zulu kingdom also itself felt its effects, and it is not beyond possibility 
that this in some way contributed to the internal instability in the last two years of 
Shaka’s reign. Most significantly, then, this investigation reinforces the complexity of 
interactions and the imperative of studying socio-political dynamics in past societies in 
order to understand the plurality of drought impacts on diverse socio-ecological 
systems. This latter line of examination is considered more widely across southeast 
Africa in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Discussion: the consequences of past climate variability 
The previous chapters have investigated the nature of climate variability and climate-
society interaction on a number of spatial and temporal scales. This discussion will 
draw comparative perspectives across the research domain in order to understand the 
nature of high impact climate variability, evaluate the underlying causes of societal 
vulnerability and response to climate variability, and assess the significance of climate 
variability in socio-political change. The chapter will conclude by pointing to areas for 
further research on related themes. 
 
7.1 The nature of climatic stress 
The majority of written and oral reference to climate variability relates to drought, 
locust plagues and direct impacts on food systems, or ‘climatic stress’, which 
subsequently had varying significance for socio-political dynamics. As these sources, 
as well as proxy-documentary records, are of variable quality and resolution, and have 
numerous uncertainties, it is difficult to tie inferred inter-annual precipitation 
variability to written references of climatic stress prior to the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, as outlined in Section 3.2.4, written observations of climatic stress 
display correspondence with the precipitation inferences of SRZ palaeoclimate data on 
a number of scales. This coherence of very different sources is important, and permits 
broad discussion on the magnitude, frequency and spatial scales of climate variability 
that were of high importance for food systems. The most striking finding based on the 
above data over this c. 425-year analysis period is that the most widespread, severe and 
extended periods of documented climatic stress occurred at times of regional (Figure 
7.1), and in most cases, global climatic change. These were: 
• Drought, locust plagues, food shortages and famine in the Zambezi-Limpopo 
region between c. 1560-1575 and c. 1585-1600, which represented highly 
variable conditions during the relatively abrupt shift from the wet decades of 
the early-sixteenth century to seventeenth century LIA dry conditions 
• Drought, locust plagues and famine on the Zambezi and in parts of northern 
Zimbabwe from c. 1710-1770, corresponding with LIA dry conditions, and; 
• Drought, food scarcity and famine across the region between c. 1795-1802 and 
1823-1830, and locust plagues in the Zambezi and Delagoa Bay areas between 
1828-1830, which occurred amidst an abrupt shift from the dry LIA towards 
wetter conditions, but was marked by highly variable precipitation and the 
above two periods of extended dry spells. 
 The first and third of the periods stated above occurred at times of high 
variability and abrupt shifts in precipitation (Figures 3.9 and 7.1). This variability had 
regional impacts, evidenced by the wide spatial extent of recorded drought and food 
shortages, including in areas which receive higher and more reliable rainfall like 
Manyika and the Mozambique coast (Figure 2.2). By contrast, the cluster of famines 
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and locust plagues recorded in the early- to mid-eighteenth century occurred at a time 
of LIA dry conditions, which were not contemporaneous with an abrupt shift in 
precipitation variability. These impacts also were of a lesser spatial range, as they were 
only recorded in the Zambezi valley and parts of northern Zimbabwe. As these areas 
are considerably drier and receive a less reliable seasonal rain than the coast and the 
Manyika area (Figure 2.2), it is likely that their susceptibility to drought, which was 
amplified in the LIA, played a key role in increased accounts of climatic stress. The 
anomaly in this analysis, however, is the seventeenth century, when relatively drier 
conditions prevailed in most proxy records, yet there were just two written references 
to climatic stress in the entire century. While this may stem from vulnerability-related 
factors, it is perhaps noteworthy that unlike the other two periods mentioned, there are 
less explicit observations of drought and locust plagues in the Zambezi area in this 
century, a factor that may relate to the relative variability of rainfall. The seventeenth 
century, although overwhelmingly dry, experienced very low precipitation variability 
(Figure 3.9) relative to most other centuries. Although this variability remained 
relatively low in the eighteenth century in some proxy records, it increased in the T7 
isotope records, when recordings of climatic stress also increased (Table 3.5). This 
correspondence may suggest that periods of extended drier conditions, with reductions 
in precipitation amounts but low overall variability, were of less direct significance 
than periods with more highly variable conditions, though further inter-annual records 
of precipitation variability are needed to clarify this proposition. Certainly, however, 
the reduction in mentions of climatic stress in the seventeenth century reinforces that 
assumptions regarding seemingly ‘unfavourable’ climatic conditions for society 
associated with generally drier conditions are not clear-cut. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.1 Proportion of years above or below the 1036-1890 record means (blue and red 
lines), and ±1 or ±2 standard deviations (blue and red bars) of 20-year smoothed inter-annual 
records and non-annually resolved records, with clusters of written reference to climatic stress. 
 
 A further reason that precludes the assumption that climatic stress was greater 
in the periods highlighted in Figure 7.1 may relate to the variation in and changing 
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rationale for Portuguese written source coverage (Section 5.1.1.2). As Section 3.2.4.1 
suggested, however, there exists little reason to assign any major link between climate-
related observations and the spatial and temporal variability of Portuguese written 
records. Indeed, after 1530, the Zambezi valley from Tete to Sena, and Quelimane, 
produced a relatively consistent record of documents. Furthermore, coverage of the 
situation in the Mutapa state at Mukaranga was good from around 1560-1693, after 
which its move to the Zambezi lowlands brought it closer to Portuguese settlement at 
Tete and Zumbo, while the polities of Manyika and Teve were also covered throughout 
the timeframe. On a similar note, that Portuguese commercial and expansionist interest 
fluctuated between mining, trade, the conquest of the Mutapa state, and prazo society 
seems unlikely to have strongly influenced or deterred recording of climate-related 
factors. The possible exception to this is the expansion of prazo-society and food 
production around Portuguese settlements in the seventeenth century, when detailed 
reference to food production does increase. Yet as just two references to climate 
variability were found in this century, including from summaries of the sources only 
available in Portuguese (Mudenge 1988; Newitt 1995), it does not follow that reports of 
climatic stress are simply a factor of either the variability in or purpose of recording. 
 Consideration of the above aspects over this extended timeframe, then, reveals 
that the highest concentration and quantity of written reference to climatic stress is 
reflective of climatic conditions with high inter-annual to multi-decadal variability, 
magnitude and abruptness of change over wide spatial extent, though the impact of 
generally drier conditions varied. This relationship between climatic stress and periods 
of global climatic change was noted on a wider scale for southern and eastern Africa by 
Nicholson (1996), but more comprehensive consideration of this longer timeframe adds 
further weight and new dimensions to this association. This is not to suggest that more 
localised dry years of a lesser magnitude did not impact society, as these were 
recorded on several occasions (Table 3.5), but simply that the quantity of accounts in 
the periods noted above reinforce the idea that these were periods of heightened 
climate-induced stress. It is also important to note that many direct and shorter-
duration climatic events or impacts are simply beyond the resolution of the available 
data, and more annually-resolved proxies and reconstructions are needed to further 
this investigation. Similarly, examination of the Portuguese documents that are yet to 
be translated may improve this picture further, especially those relating to food rations, 
prices and production on the Zambezi prazos and coastal towns. 
 While the nature of climate variability discussed above had significant impacts 
on the climate-sensitive aspects of the socio-ecological system, differences in 
vulnerability meant that the socio-political significance of these climate impacts varied. 
In order to assess underlying sources of vulnerability, and the differences and 
similarities between these in various socio-political contexts, the next section examines 
the differences in the vulnerability and response of societies to climate variability over 
the spatial and temporal domain of this thesis. 
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7.2 Underlying sources of vulnerability 
Differences in vulnerability and the inter-linked concept of resilience were key reasons 
why the response to and significance of climate variability varied over space and time. 
This was investigated in Chapters 5 and 6, and revealed differences in the sources and 
extent of vulnerability between and within societies, but also a number of parallels in 
underlying vulnerabilities and their importance for individual and community 
response to climate variability. This section discusses these differences and similarities 
across southeast Africa with respect to food production and security, livelihoods and 
trade, and conflict and governance. In particular, the discussion will consider long-
term, structural and recurrent stresses that contributed to core sources of exposure, 
sensitivity and adaptive capacity. The overriding factor in this section, though, is socio-
political organisation and governance, which strongly impacted upon the vulnerability 
and resilience of food systems and livelihoods. 
 
7.2.1 Food production and security 
The main area of vulnerability analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 relates to food systems, 
particularly crop cultivation and the keeping of domestic animals. Basic environmental 
factors had a strong influence on these climate-sensitive livelihoods, such as the 
drought-prone, tsetse-infested environment of the Zambezi valley compared to the 
well-watered coastal areas, yet socio-political organisation and human agency played 
an equally important role in conditioning the vulnerability of food systems. 
 
7.2.1.1 Crop diversity 
Cultivated crop diversity and dependence had a major influence in the sensitivity of 
the agricultural system to climate variability. Until the seventeenth century, the 
centralised African polities in the Zambezi-Limpopo region generally remained 
dependent on the ‘traditional’ mix of drought-resistant sorghum and pearl millet, 
supplemented by a range of vegetables, with the addition of rice at different times. 
Sometime in the seventeenth century, maize grew in importance across the Zambezi-
Limpopo area, the peculiarities of which had particular significance. In the Mutapa 
state, for instance, maize began to spread when Mukaranga became increasingly 
depopulated, the state was under a high degree of Portuguese influence, and the 
generally dry conditions of the LIA set-in. Given these new population-climate 
dynamics, the shorter growing season and reduction in labour requirements for maize 
cultivation may have therefore given this grain an advantage over others, acting as an 
‘emergency crop’ as observed elsewhere (Ekblom et al. 2012). The new vulnerabilities 
associated with increased dependence on maize cultivation, however, increased the 
exposure of its cultivators to the amplification of climatic stress recorded in the 
eighteenth century. Information on maize cultivation is patchy in KwaZulu-Natal, and 
the ambiguous evidence that does exist makes assessment of the extent of its 
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vulnerability-related impacts difficult. It is possible, though, that in some of the inland 
areas, maize offered increased productivity and contributed to the population increase 
in the eighteenth century (Maggs 1982, 1989). Nevertheless, it is perhaps notable that 
the expanding Mthethwa and Zulu polities, as well as the Mutapa state at its height, 
were largely dependent on the traditional grains of sorghum and millet, supplemented 
by a range of vegetables, fruits, domestic animals, and wild animals and plants. 
 By contrast, in smaller-scale, less centralised or subordinate communities, a 
slightly lower diversity of cultivated crops was reported. For instance, only millet was 
said to be consumed in the Zambezi valley in the mid-sixteenth century, while Fynn’s 
evidence suggests that maize became the dominant staple in the smaller polities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, especially after a loss of cattle herds. In the sixteenth century, Santos 
noted that smaller communities in the Zambezi-Limpopo area cultivated a surplus in 
crops such as rice to sell to traders, yet this did little to directly build resilience in the 
food system of these communities as these grains were not consumed by locals. In the 
smaller-scale communities in both the Zambezi valley and the KwaZulu-Natal area, 
wild plants were also used extensively to supplement cultivated crops, and is perhaps 
reflective of the lesser sophistication of the subsistence-based agricultural system 
outside of more centralised socio-political systems. More important food system 
vulnerability differences in these areas and periods, however, lay in stocks of domestic 
animals and socio-political organisation, which are discussed in the next two sections. 
 Significant changes to the vulnerability of the agricultural systems of 
decentralised socio-political units came with the incorporation of much of the Zambezi 
valley, as well as lands around Quelimane and Sofala, into the Portuguese jurisdiction. 
This began in the early-sixteenth century at Sofala with the import of locally cultivated 
sorghum, but the environmental and labour-related barriers to the production of a 
consistently high surplus were reciprocated by the vulnerability of the population of 
the town itself who relied on purchased grains. The initial problems of food production 
and security at Sofala, however, were followed by an increase in the diversity of 
cultivated crops and the organisation of surplus food production in the Zambezi towns 
and Quelimane. Indeed, as early as the mid-sixteenth century these settlements drew 
on surplus production of sorghum, millet, rice, vegetables and fruits in their 
hinterlands. At the height of Portuguese influence in the seventeenth century, the 
diversity of food production increased, with wheat and maize cultivation on the prazos 
(Table 5.4) and sugar mills in the Zambezi delta area. This increase in food system 
diversity was mirrored by the increase in the organised labour force of slaves and 
colonos around these areas, yet as Section 7.2.1.3 will show, gains from the building of 
food system resilience were countered by inherent problems in the organisation of the 
prazo system. Thus, while evidence suggests that agricultural diversification led to a 
reduction in the exposure of the food system to climate variability, the shift to new 
governance and production systems brought new underlying vulnerabilities in its 
adaptive capacity. 
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7.2.1.2 Domestic animals 
Less detailed information is available on domestic animals in the Zambezi-Limpopo 
region as they had little long-distance trade value prior to the mid-eighteenth century, 
though were of vital socio-cultural value in this area, as well as a food source. 
Conversely, cattle were frequently mentioned by British traders in KwaZulu-Natal, 
and were of even greater social and dietary importance in this area. Individual and 
community cattle ownership was thus strongly tied to wealth and food system 
resilience in pre-colonial southeast Africa, helping to maintain class distinction, social 
relations and political organisation. Cattle were possessed in high numbers by the 
Mutapa state prior to the eighteenth century and in moderate numbers by the Manyika 
polity throughout the period, whereas in KwaZulu-Natal, cattle became increasingly 
centralised in the early-nineteenth century, and caused marked imbalances in 
ownership. This loss of cattle in both cases caused a considerable increase in 
vulnerability, most directly as a loss of a reliable food source, but perhaps more 
importantly in undermining social relations and the basis of wealth. In the Mutapa 
state at Chidima, the loss of cattle as a readily available livelihood source partially gave 
rise to persistent banditry in the eighteenth century, particularly in times of climatic 
stress. In KwaZulu-Natal, the export of cattle to Delagoa Bay had both positive and 
negative impacts by on the one hand increasing the complexity of socio-political 
organisation, and on the other reducing the availability of food sources. This was 
offset, however, by the growth of amabutho and their use in raiding. These increased 
inequalities thereafter resulted in loss of cattle by weaker chiefdoms through raiding, 
which increased the vulnerability of these societies to drought by enforcing a reliance 
on agriculture, hunting and gathering, and earning the name of ‘cannibals’ for some of 
these communities. 
 In a number of areas in the Zambezi-Limpopo region, such as the Zambezi 
valley and the Teve area, cattle ownership was always relatively low, and made these 
societies more vulnerable to climate variability. However, the Teve area in particular 
appears to have offset this exposure by conducting highly organised hunts and 
keeping other domestic animals such as fowls, while the Zambezi valley and coastal 
areas effectively used fishing and the gathering of fruit to in part counter these 
deficiencies. This may have been enough to survive in years of average precipitation, 
or even in the event of shorter-term drought, but in extended droughts of multiple 
years, like the 1570s and 1820s, the lack of domestic animals may have contributed to 
hunger and malnutrition, exacerbating the susceptibility of the population to the 
diseases such as smallpox, which caused extensive mortality at these times. 
 
7.2.1.3 Socio-political organisation and adaptive capacity 
Perhaps the most important influences on the vulnerability and security of food 
systems in southeast Africa related to socio-political organisation (Figure 7.2). This is 
because in well-organised food systems with social networks and the provision for 
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storage and redistribution, the impacts of drought can be buffered, thus preventing the 
amplification of climatic stress into famine or wider social dislocation. This broadly 
appears to reflect the situation in centralised polities such as the Mutapa state and Zulu 
kingdom, where the organised labour of the wider population cultivated fields in the 
capital hinterland, and the production from which was redistributed in times of stress, 
although central political instability may have affected the efficacy of these systems 
(Section 7.2.3). This was complemented by long-term planning and coping strategies 
on a local scale, such as grain storage and the sharing of food in times of stress. 
European and oral accounts provide strong evidence of similar, more elaborate central 
and local practices in early-nineteenth century KwaZulu-Natal. This mainly related to 
the centralised ‘first fruits’ festival, or umkosi, which both helped stave off food scarcity 
from consumption of maturing crops and reinforced socio-political authority. This 
appears to have become increasingly important in the expanding Mthethwa and Zulu 
polities, as it was the main meeting place for the amabutho from across the wider 
territory, as well as for the clarification of diplomatic and military strategies. Similarly 
to the centralised polities in the Zambezi-Limpopo area, cultivation of central fields 
and the redistribution of grain in times of stress were practised to help buffer food 
scarcity. What is not explicitly clear from the documents is the impact of increased 
inequalities within centralised political units on the food security and adaptive 
capacity of the poorest communities, though reduced ownership of cattle would 
suggest that there were important differences in these factors within society. Overall, 
however, it is noteworthy that in the Mutapa state at its height, and in the central Zulu 
kingdom, there is virtually no evidence of widespread reliance on wild resources, as is 
frequently highlighted in other polities with less organised food systems. 
 The documents make clear that there were major differences in food system 
organisation between centralised and smaller-scale, decentralised communities. It does 
not appear to be the case, as is sometimes idealised, that smaller-scale communities or 
political units with less evidence for social stratification, less mineral and material 
wealth, and high reliance on more localised systems of exchange, were ultimately less 
vulnerable to climate variability. Rather, labour, resource and territorial limitations 
meant that a smaller quantity of crops could be cultivated on less secure and often less 
fertile lands, while in the absence of mineral resource wealth, a proportion of this was 
also sold to the Portuguese in exchange for cloth and beads. Similarly, adaptive 
mechanisms and coping strategies, though operational at the household level, were 
less advanced than in centralised polities, and a generally more limited resource-base 
was available to barter for food, meaning reliance on wild food resources was a coping 
strategy employed much sooner in times of climatic stress (Figure 7.2). In years of 
sustained drought, a common response across southeast Africa was for individuals to 
seek protection from food scarcity by pledging allegiance to larger political units or the 
Portuguese, and later the British in Natal in the late-1820s and 1830s. These people then 
lived as subordinate communities under the overlordship of the centralised units, but a 
number of new socio-political vulnerabilities emerged from this. 
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 In the Zambezi-Limpopo area, people who sought protection from the 
Portuguese were first incorporated into the jurisdiction around the towns of Sofala, 
Sena, Tete and Quelimane, and later on the prazos that developed with Portuguese 
expansion in the seventeenth century. The prazo system in particular led to the 
emergence of new vulnerabilities. Portuguese senhors attempted to take the place of 
traditional chiefs, but the critical difference was that these new ‘chiefs’ intensified 
exploitation as they were driven by short-term profits. This gave rise to new inherent 
instabilities, such as the frequent breakdown of socio-political order, and undermined 
the gains in resilience from the diversification of the food system. This was particularly 
evident in times of drought like the 1820s, as this exacerbated pre-existing social 
tensions, and resulted in socio-political breakdown, including the migration of colonos 
and banditry among slave bands. Thus, despite decreases in food system vulnerability, 
high magnitude climatic stress on the Zambezi continued to cause a recurring nexus of 
prolonged drought, locusts swarms, famine and sometimes epidemic disease because 
of socio-political changes. 
 In KwaZulu-Natal, smaller-scale political units subject to the overlordship of 
the Zulu kingdom or other polities followed various trajectories of vulnerability. Those 
who ‘konza’d’ the Mthethwa or Zulu kingdoms were not subjugated into a state of 
poverty despite the increased demands for tribute to the central authority, as this 
process generally involved the incorporation of people, land and resources rather than 
their destruction or extortion. However, the food system of these subordinate 
chiefdoms became more vulnerable in a number of ways. Sub-chiefs were no longer 
permitted to conduct their own food-related rituals such as the umkosi as this was seen 
as undermining centralised Zulu political authority. The more centralised umkosi over a 
wider area therefore lacked sensitivity to local biophysical and climatic requirements 
regarding the planting and harvesting of different crops, and thereby increased the 
direct vulnerability of food production in parts of the composite structure of the Zulu 
kingdom. Similar processes occurred with occasional unreasonable demands for 
tribute by the central Zulu authority in Shaka’s later reign, while where smaller 
chiefdoms were less inclined to submit, cattle were removed altogether. However, as 
with the Portuguese jurisdiction, one benefit of incorporation into central authority 
was security of land-holdings and the provision of agricultural and grazing land, 
which was less secure under small, segmentary political units. In both cases of 
incorporation, though, any resilience built by the diversification of the food system and 
more advanced social security mechanisms was generally undermined by new 
instabilities and vulnerabilities that went with being subordinate to the unstable 
authority of the Portuguese or Shaka’s Zulu kingdom. Reliance on wild food resources, 
as well as banditry and migration consequently continued to be a common response in 
times of social breakdown and drought, the latter two of which led to more 
widespread competition over resources and socio-political instability. This distinction 
between socio-political organisation and structure is thus an important one, and 
demonstrates the plurality of responses to climatic stress across southeast Africa. 
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7.2.2 Livelihoods and trade 
Trade-based livelihoods such as gold mining and elephant hunting had limited direct 
relevance for exposure or sensitivity to climate variability, as low numbers were 
involved in these livelihoods. However, these activities were of high importance to 
political leaders and thus state security. This had been the case since early trade 
connections from c. AD 900, through Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe, the Torwa 
and Rozvi states and the Mutapa state in Mukaranga. Mining exports and trade 
imports of cloth and beads played a self-reinforcing role in political centralisation and 
social stratification, which was strongly linked to the financing of elaborate stone 
structures. The trajectory of change in the relative importance, profitability and 
security of gold and other precious metals involved the working out of deposits, 
increasingly unfavourable terms of trade, the shift of labour conditions towards 
exploitation, and eventually the loss of control over gold resources altogether in the 
Mutapa state. Alongside this came a decline in political prestige, increased leadership 
instability, and reduced sovereignty. Indeed, it is notable that the construction of stone-
built zimbabwe came to a halt in the mid- to late-sixteenth century Mutapa state 
(Pikirayi 1993), which commenced the gradual impoverishment of the area. Manyika, 
on the other hand, managed to retain a greater degree of control over its gold 
resources, aided by the Rozvi state who kept the Portuguese at a distance in the 
eighteenth century, and in turn had a slightly greater degree of political stability. The 
control of these resources was therefore of importance as political stability aided the 
efficacy of governance and probably centralised adaptive mechanisms such as the 
redistribution of grain. A partial parallel can be drawn between this and the control of 
cattle in the Zulu kingdom, where the reciprocity of social networks were reinforced by 
control of important resources. Nonetheless, the fostering of socio-economic inequality 
within chiefdoms that came with the expansion of trade meant that poorer people had 
fewer entitlements to cattle ownership and the redistribution of food, which made 
them more vulnerable to climatic stress. 
 The hunting and export of ivory offered an alternative livelihood to mining 
across much of southeast Africa, particularly in mineral-poor areas like Teve, where it 
was a useful source of income for both the leadership and wider population. In the 
Teve area, the ivory trade with the nearby settlement of Sofala had specific advantages, 
as cattle were less numerous, and the ivory obtained was a by-product of the extensive 
hunting that took place. Rapid response to the growing trade in ivory and cattle was 
also linked to state formation in KwaZulu-Natal. Importantly, though, the relative 
importance of trade to both the population and the leadership seems to have been low 
in the Zulu kingdom under Shaka. This perhaps reflects the unchanging primacy of 
cattle in KwaZulu-Natal, in comparison to the long-standing relationships between 
mineral resources, ivory and trade in the Zambezi-Limpopo area. Trade-related 
livelihood instability, which became increasingly prevalent when the Portuguese began 
to penetrate the southeast African interior in the 1570s, was thus indirectly important 
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for response to climate variability by way of its role in political rule, but these 
livelihoods were clearly not as important as food production. 
 A key role of these livelihoods, as well as others such as the procurement of 
salt, ambergris, fish and cotton (Appendix B) was their use as ‘convertible assets’ and 
livelihoods that could be intensified, as they were in Manyika, to barter for food 
(Figure 7.2). In the Manyika area, this appears to have taken place to the extent that 
trade-based livelihoods became increasingly popular, forcing the ruler to authorise a 
change of policy to increase the degree of concentration on agriculture, which would 
reduce both external exposure to economic shocks and risk of food scarcity. However, 
in mineral-poor areas such as the Zambezi valley, where non-food based livelihoods 
were more limited, and there was a general absence of centralised political authority, a 
more direct option for individuals in times of climatic stress was to seek protection 
with the Portuguese. Alternative livelihoods appear to have played less of a role in 
response to climate variability in KwaZulu-Natal, where there were limited precious 
metals, and cattle was dominant in socio-cultural and political relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.2 Sources underlying of vulnerability and response to climatic stress. Light blue 
shading – food system and livelihood factors; dark blue shading – socio-political factors. 
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7.2.3 Conflict and political stability 
The final area of vulnerability discussed in the thesis relates to conflict and political 
stability. The nature of conflict was very different between the two sub-regions. In the 
Zambezi-Limpopo area, this generally took the form of long, drawn-out civil war 
arising from leadership disputes, or limited-scale inter-polity conflict, both of which 
had varying impacts but limited mortality. The main documented impacts of conflict 
relate to the disruption of trade and localised systems of exchange, yet evidence does 
not suggest that conflict had major impacts on the agricultural cycle. Rather, Rezende’s 
account implies the opposite was the case, and that if a campaign encroached on 
planting and harvesting periods, it was not uncommon that warriors would desert the 
field and return to their gardens. This concurs with Beach’s (1980, 1998) arguments 
regarding the generally limited impacts of conflict in this area. Indeed, evidence in 
Section 5.4 showed that even the capture of a ruler’s zimbabwe and the installation of 
‘puppet’ rulers for an extended period of time did not undermine the functioning of 
social relations and food production to a critical degree, which is reaffirmed by 
Conceição’s (1696) evidence of tribute cultivation at the capital. Still, it is probable that 
with the reduction in political scale in the eighteenth century came a weakening of the 
efficacy of these systems, while issues such as transportation and disruption by more 
severe conflict would have also been problematic at times. This therefore demonstrates 
the resilience of the wider society and food production in the face of persistent civil 
conflict, although it is reasonable to assume that persistent instability did impact on 
social networks and security, and thus coping strategies, to some degree. The exception 
to this rule was in periods of ‘total war’, such as in the 1590s, the mortality resulting 
from which was a partial cause of the depopulation of Mukaranga. 
 Conflict was of a very different nature in KwaZulu-Natal, as it predominantly 
took the form of short-duration, high-intensity cattle raiding. The loss or gain of cattle 
as a source of food and socio-cultural wealth had significant impacts on vulnerability, 
as outlined in Section 7.2.1.2. Raiding and counter-raiding had been long-practised in 
the area, but the growth of amabutho and cattle herds brought new dimensions to these 
practices, which intensified conflict and in turn the vulnerability of polities with less 
cattle. Although these new resource imbalances increased inequalities, the mortality 
from conflict in KwaZulu-Natal was highly exaggerated by contemporary observers, 
and was perhaps only high in major campaigns (Eldredge 2014). Perhaps the best 
illustration of the difference in conflict between the two regions, however, is 
exemplified by the arrival of Nguni-speaking communities and their raiding activities 
north of the Limpopo. The impacts of this short-term, higher intensity conflict involved 
the expropriation of high numbers of cattle from polities such as the Rozvi and 
consequently undermined both the food system and socio-political dynamics. Political 
instability in the Zulu kingdom again took a different form to that in the Mutapa state. 
The increasingly despotic nature of Shaka’s rule was held together by external 
pressures, yet when these subsided after the breakup of the Ndwandwe polity, Shaka’s 
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unpredictable policies and arbitrary violence had greater impacts on internal socio-
political instability. The aftermath of Nandi’s death is a prime example, when the 
harvesting of crops and the milking of cows were prohibited for three months at a time 
of drought, the year after which Shaka was murdered. Nonetheless, the transition of 
power that followed this, unlike in the Mutapa state, was relatively smooth, and made 
little obvious difference to food system stability. Another important aspect which 
influenced political stability in both Shona- and Nguni-speaking communities was 
rainmaking. Evidence over much of the analysis period attests to a continued 
importance of this practice in spite of missionary influence, but offers little insight into 
if and when political rule was challenged by drought and climatic stress, and thus it is 
only possible to speculate on these factors from written evidence alone. 
 These differences and similarities between underlying sources of vulnerability 
in southeast Africa had profound importance for the contextual significance of climate 
variability in socio-political formation and security, which the next section summarises. 
 
7.3 The significance of climate variability in socio-political change 
Although this thesis has shown climate variability to be an important element in 
various processes of socio-political transformation in southeast Africa, evaluation of its 
contextual significance in Chapters 5 and 6 revealed very few instances where climate 
was a lone driver of societal change. Instead, and as observed elsewhere (for instance, 
Dugmore et al. 2012; Endfield 2012), climate variability formed part of a suite of 
complex, multi-causal processes that impacted upon shifting vulnerability contexts. 
This may also be a partial reflection of the more gradual nature of socio-political 
change in southeast Africa as the role of climate variability itself, for excluding the 
decline of Great Zimbabwe and the Rozvi state, there was no ‘collapse’ or abrupt end 
to state structures. Thus, the role of climate variability was more often than not to 
accelerate, aggravate or even dampen this change rather than drive it. Table 7.1 
assesses the significance of climate variability by assigning a weighted significance in 
the cases of societal change discussed at length in the earlier chapters, and ascribes 
confidence levels to these judgements. ‘Low’ significance is shown when climate 
variability was likely not a significant factor relative to others, ‘moderate’ is assigned 
where climate variability played a role in accelerating or exacerbating societal change, 
but other factors were more important, while ‘high’ proposes that climate variability 
was a principal causal contributor to the documented socio-political change. The 
confidence levels operate on the same scale, and denote the quantity and robustness of 
evidence that supports or refutes the corresponding level of significance. 
 High significance and high confidence were ascribed together in only two 
instances, in both of which there is explicit evidence of shorter-term, high-magnitude 
climate impacts on relatively decentralised political units and populations with low 
adaptive capacity in the Zambezi valley. The first of these involved the weakening of 
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socio-political structure in the 1560s-1570s, when highly variable climatic conditions 
acted on a vulnerable food system in a relatively dry environment, causing famine and 
people to seek the protection of centralised political authority. The consequent 
weakening of small-scale socio-political structure undermined the capacity of local 
communities and chiefdoms to respond effectively to heightened external threats from 
the Portuguese on the one hand and the Mutapa state on the other, resulting in the 
assimilation of much of the Zambezi valley into the expanding Portuguese jurisdiction. 
The second of these events occurred in the eighteenth century, when extended drought 
and locust plagues impacted food systems that were less vulnerable than in the 
sixteenth century, but the severity of this climatic stress, and the proximity to 
expanding Portuguese settlement and food production, meant that food scarcity was 
by this point the principal reason why individuals sought the protection of the 
Portuguese. This pattern of response to high-magnitude climate variability was 
recurrent in the Zambezi valley, and therefore climatic stress was a factor of high 
importance in socio-political change. Climatic stress on short-term scales may well 
have been of high significance to socio-political dynamics elsewhere, as the model in 
Figure 7.2 demonstrates for the cumulative impacts of sustained drought weakening 
political and ritual authority, but specific cases of this process are simply beyond the 
resolution of the available data. 
 
TABLE 7.1 Confidence and weighting of the contextual significance of climate variability in 
southeast African socio-political change c. 1450-1830. 
Societal event or change Timeframe Climatic conditions Significance Confidence 
Decline of Great 
Zimbabwe 
c. 1450-1500 Relatively dry 1420-
1450, trending towards 
wetter 
Low Low 
Rationale: Scant evidence to make direct climate-related links. Economic and political change 
appears to have been highly significant, but re-assessment and inclusion of evidence means that 
climate-induced internal stress cannot be ruled out as a contributory factor. 
Mutapa-Danda civil wars 1516-1528 Trending from 
relatively wet to drier 
Low Moderate 
Rationale: Political and trade-related aspects of high importance, though there is a possible but 
unverifiable link between drought and extreme climatic events causing food shortages at Sofala 
and subsequent meddling in African politics. 
Weakening of Tonga 
political structure 
1560s-1570s Highly variable, 
trending towards drier 
High High 
Rationale: Highly variable climatic conditions led to widespread food shortages in the dry 
Zambezi valley, Tonga-speaking chiefdoms were subdued by the Portuguese. 
Slaves seeking protection 
on the Mozambique coast 
1580s Highly variable, 
trending towards drier 
Moderate Moderate 
Rationale: Famine was one of several reasons causing people to seek protection and security in 
times of food scarcity. Low food system resilience may be equally responsible. 
Weakening of Mutapa 
state structure 
1560s-1620s Highly variable, 
trending towards drier 
Moderate High 
Rationale: The Mutapa state recovered from food shortages in the 1560s and 1570s, but famine 
reduced the ability of the state to respond to external military threats. 
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Mortality in and 
migration from 
Mukaranga 
1590s-1670s Relatively dry Low Moderate 
Rationale: Locust plagues and famine were linked as a causal factor by Portuguese writers, but 
mortality from previous conflict and the conduct of the Portuguese were of greater significance. 
Impoverishment and 
reduction in scale of 
Mutapa state 
1710s-1830 Trending from very dry 
to relatively dry, highly 
variable between 1800-
1830 
Moderate Moderate 
Rationale: Droughts and locust plagues were more prevalent in the Mutapa state at Chidima, but 
the economic decline through loss of cattle and mineral resources, and political instability through 
persistent civil war and state fragmentation were more significant. 
Increase in numbers of 
slaves seeking protection 
1730s-1760s Relatively dry High High 
Rationale: Explicit evidence that food scarcity was now the principal reason people sold 
themselves as slaves in the Zambezi valley. 
Political centralisation in 
KwaZulu-Natal 
1750s-1810s Trending towards 
wetter, with severe 
drought around 1800 
Moderate Low 
Rationale: Sparse evidence on the role of wetter conditions or extended drought contributing to 
political centralisation, evidence suggests that trade and coercion were important.  
Decline of Sena 1800-1830 Highly variable, 
drought 1823-1830 
Moderate High 
Rationale: High climatic stress but the breakdown in food production and social relations had 
already begun, while the decline in economic importance of Sena was of prime importance. 
Weakening of 
autonomous political 
units in KwaZulu-Natal 
1824-1830 Persistent drought Moderate High 
Rationale: Widespread evidence for famine, and multiple strands of evidence to suggest climate 
had a role in this, but other factors such as loss of cattle were of high significance. 
Political instability in the 
Zulu kingdom 
1826-1828 Persistent drought Low Moderate 
Rationale: Social policy and mode of governance was of greater significance in political instability, 
despite the reduction political stability at a time of growing climatic stress. 
Increase in Zambezi slave 
exports 
1827-1830 Persistent drought Low Moderate 
Rationale: The last intensification of slave exports through Mozambique to Brazil was largely a 
result of the terms of the Portuguese-British treaty which prohibited slave exports to Brazil after 
1830. Zambezi slave exports earlier may have been encouraged by a breakdown in socio-political 
order around Sena, where climate variability played a moderate role. 
 
 Despite the lack of evidence for high significance elsewhere, a higher number of 
events or periods of change in Table 7.1 revealed a moderate significance of climate 
variability in socio-political transformation. This change was of variable nature, but in 
each case denotes complex interaction with other factors resulting in a gradual change 
in the socio-ecological system. This was evidenced in the sixteenth century, where 
climatic stress was stated as one of a number of reasons why individuals sought 
protection as slaves on the Mozambique coast. Similarly, evidence indicates that a 
number of factors coalesced to stimulate political centralisation in KwaZulu-Natal in 
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the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth century. Climate variability, particularly in the 
severe mahlatule famine, then had important impacts in exacerbating pre-existing 
inequalities and fostering the voluntary incorporation of people into expanding 
chiefdoms. Moderate significance was also assigned to some climate-society links 
despite contemporaneous high precipitation variability or recurrent climatic stress on 
the basis of the differences in vulnerability discussed in Section 7.2. A prime example 
of this was the weakening of the Mutapa state structure in the late-sixteenth and early-
seventeenth century, where the lower vulnerability of the Mutapa food system enabled 
a recovery from climatic stress in the 1560s and 1570s. However, the impacts of climate 
variability in the late-1580s and early-1590s probably served to weaken the state to 
external threats, such as Maravi invasions and Portuguese exploitation, which were of 
greater significance in the weakening of political structure. Similarly, although the 
extended drought of the 1820s played a significant role in the eventual decline of Sena, 
the area was already highly vulnerable in the early-nineteenth century due to a decline 
in trade with the interior and the breakdown of social relations in prazo society. 
 A high number of events were also assigned low significance, including the 
decline of Great Zimbabwe, the Mutapa-Danda civil wars and the increase in slave 
exports from Mozambique in the late-1820s. This classification generally denotes the 
lack of an explicit link between climate variability and societal change, or the much 
greater importance of other causal factors despite previous hypotheses regarding the 
coincidence of societal change with ‘unfavourable’ climatic conditions. 
 This broad-scale summary of Chapters 5 and 6, although partially as a result of 
evidence limitations, proposes only limited straightforward correspondence between 
the severity of climate variability and its immediate socio-political consequences, 
contrary to common assumptions in the literature. However, this section illuminates a 
number of cases where climate variability interacted with other factors to play a more 
subtle role over longer-term scales through its impacts on underlying and structural 
vulnerabilities, thereby influencing socio-political transformation. The outcomes of this 
investigation therefore reflect and follow the conclusions of McCann (1999), who 
asserted the value of longer-term evaluations of historical environment-society 
interactions in Africa. 
 
7.4 Future historical climate-society research in southeast Africa 
The scope of this thesis was purposely relatively broad, and thus the main suggestions 
for future research in this spatial and temporal domain relate to the addition of further 
depth and texture in a number of areas. In the area of climate reconstruction, the 
sourcing of further high-resolution palaeoclimate proxy data, and reanalysis of existing 
sources using state-of-the-art age models would be highly beneficial for reducing the 
uncertainties and ambiguities in knowledge of past precipitation variability, 
particularly regarding the spatial dynamics of this change. Although this investigation 
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has reduced uncertainties in some places, the dominant signals that were used to 
inform the majority of Chapter 5 can only be related to societal change to a generic 
degree. Furthermore, an integrated study of the relationship between precipitation 
variability and climate modes such as ENSO over the last millennium would increase 
understanding of the nature of southeast African precipitation variability on a number 
of spatial and temporal scales, though there are numerous uncertainties with the wide 
type of existing proxy ENSO datasets (Neukom pers. comm.). 
 Despite the growing body of climate reconstructions from documentary sources 
in southern Africa (Kelso 2007; Nash and Grab 2008; Neukom et al. 2014; Hannaford et 
al. 2015), there remains considerable scope for additional work. Extraction and 
digitisation of wind data and weather descriptions in the remaining 3000 EEIC 
logbooks in the British Library, as well as any additional data in the Lisbon archives, 
would not only enhance the resolution of the precipitation reconstructions in Chapter 
4, but would most likely enable the reconstruction to be extended back to the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. The methodology applied in Chapter 4 could also 
be applied to the higher number post-1850 wind records in the ICOADS database, 
extending the logbook reconstructions to the beginning of instrumental records. 
Likewise, acquiring meteorological data from other national weather services, such as 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Mozambique, would enable further station-based 
reconstructions with the addition of these other logbook data. 
 In order to develop further semi-quantitative documentary reconstructions of 
past precipitation variability, a feasibility study is needed to assess the large amount of 
nineteenth century and pre-nineteenth century written material relating to southeast 
Africa. In this thesis, the majority of source material consulted related to African 
society, yet a considerable number of Portuguese records stored in Lisbon, Goa and 
Maputo will inevitably reveal further climate-related evidence for the Mozambique 
coast and Zambezi valley areas. Where this evidence is continuous or semi-continuous, 
this may well reveal further tropical cyclones, extreme weather events and storm 
surges on the Mozambique coast, as was found in the document from 1516 at Sofala, 
which could potentially provide a highly unique record of tropical cyclone occurrence, 
frequency and magnitude on the Mozambique coast using the methods pioneered by 
Nash et al. (2014) for Madagascar. Similarly, there is further potential for mid- to late-
nineteenth century documentary reconstructions in the nineteenth century from British 
and Portuguese colonial and missionary archival records relating to Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and adjacent areas of Zambia, which would provide much-needed 
coverage of precipitation variability to extend the relatively short instrumental record. 
 The consultation of an extensive range of written and oral sources in this thesis 
has covered substantial ground on the vulnerability-related aspects of African 
communities. However, there remains scope for more detailed studies of pre-
nineteenth century climate-society interactions in the Portuguese jurisdiction, 
particularly on the Zambezi prazos and in the coastal towns, where semi-continuous 
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records of food prices and rations are available. Certainly, incorporating such records 
for the Sub-Saharan African interior is a worthwhile task given the paucity of high-
resolution climate records prior to 1820. What may be of far greater value, however, is 
research of a similar approach and methodology to that adopted here from the period 
after 1830, through the imposition of colonial rule in 1890, and into the twentieth 
century colonial period. In this timeframe, the increased quantity of written and oral 
sources, and later instrumental climatic data and comprehensive documentary records, 
could be used to conduct a series of detailed, sub-regional studies of how changes in 
food system- and livelihood-related vulnerabilities interacted with climate variability 
on much higher-resolution scales than the more deep-rooted, longer-term perspectives 
examined here. Indeed, as precipitation and its variability remains vital to human 
livelihoods in rural southeast Africa, a detailed understanding of the social dynamics 
of adaptation to climate variability and extremes would be of increased relevance to 
policy-making and current climate-development discourses. This is not to suggest that 
the pre-1830 focus of this study is not of relevance, but the 1830s and the 1890s were 
transformative decades in southern Africa for a number of reasons, the former because 
of the migration and settlement of Nguni-speaking communities in Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique, the treks of Dutch stock-farmers across South Africa, and the increasing 
role of the British, and the 1890s as of the region-wide establishment of colonial rule. 
These events profoundly altered vulnerabilities across most of the region, but rather 
than ‘reset’ these completely, this resulted in the development of a complex mix of 
food system, livelihood and socio-political vulnerabilities in the post-colonial nation 
state. Thus, the development of sub-regional, integrated historical climate-society 
studies over the last 150 years in southeast Africa would offer considerable insight into 
the physical and socio-cultural origins, emergence and temporalities of vulnerability 
that are present today. Studies on these themes can be structured around three aims: 
1. Reconstruction of sub-regional climate variability between 1830 and the 
beginning of the instrumental record; 
2. Investigation of how changing socio-economic and political systems and 
adaptation policies shaped the nature of vulnerability and response of 
individuals and communities to such climate variability and extremes, and; 
3. Evaluation of the critical social, political and economic vulnerabilities to climate 
change that remain key to the resilience of the twenty-first century nation state. 
 Taking up this task in Africa is by far the most valuable contribution that this 
cross-disciplinary research focus on historical climate-society interactions can make to 
the reduction of research gaps and uncertainties, as highlighted with high confidence 
in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, that “constrain decision-making in processes to 
reduce vulnerability, build resilience, and plan and implement adaptation strategies at 
different levels in Africa” (Niang et al. 2014, 1204). The following concluding 
assessment builds upon this discussion by evaluating the outcomes of this research in 
relation to its original aims, and ends with an evaluation of its wider significance. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The starting point for this thesis was the divergent and often over-simplified debate 
over the role of climate variability in southeast African socio-political change, which is 
a discussion situated more broadly amongst global historiographical perspectives on 
nature-culture interaction. The main aims and research questions of the thesis were 
therefore theoretical, methodological and practical (Section 1.3). Arguably the most 
important of these aims was the initial challenge of advancing, both theoretically and 
methodologically, how to make connections between the range of disciplines and data 
sources required to engage with this debate, especially given the variable quantity and 
quality of these sources over a wide timeframe and spatial domain of analysis. To 
undertake this task, climate history, vulnerability and resilience were situated as 
‘bridging concepts’ for the integration of traditions and sources in African and colonial 
history, environmental science, palaeoclimatology, historical climatology, development 
studies and to a lesser extent, oral history and archaeology. 
 Before putting these concepts into action, however, Chapter 2 critically 
analysed the environmental, economic and socio-political background and history of 
southeast Africa over the wider timeframe of c. AD 900-1830. This comprehensive 
assessment was crucial for the later chapters, as without prior understanding of these 
aspects, as well as acknowledgement of the disagreement and uncertainties that exists 
within and between the disciplines of palaeoclimatology, history and archaeology, any 
subsequent analysis of the interaction of climate and society would be fundamentally 
flawed. This also meant engaging with a number of underlying historiographical and 
epistemological ‘currents’ that have dominated previous discussion on this research 
area, including the agency of climate versus that of humans, the weighting of internal 
African innovation against external influence, and the function of ‘worldview’ against 
complexity. Rather than adopting one or the other position, this thesis was attentive to 
each of these viewpoints in their intersection with climate-society interaction. This 
analysis consequently allowed the identification of specific research gaps on climate-
society interaction to which the following four analysis chapters could attune. 
 The first of these, analysed in Chapter 3, related to the uncertainty of 
precipitation variability over the last millennium, particularly between c. AD 1450-1820. 
This chapter took the form of an analytical review of SRZ precipitation inferences from 
a wide range of proxy-documentary sources, which were first assessed by correlation 
analysis to identify the proxies that were more representative of palaeoprecipitation. 
Using these sources, a decrease in precipitation was found in the SRZ over the last 1200 
years, with relatively clear evidence for the MCA between c. AD 800-1200, and strong 
evidence for the LIA between c. AD 1600-1800, although it is less clear whether the 
latter period extended further back than this. Uncertainties were also highlighted in 
relation to early-nineteenth century precipitation variability, particularly between 
proxy records and the precipitation classifications of the Nicholson et al. (2012) 
database. A key part of the assessment in Chapter 3 was the identification of periods of 
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climatic stress from written sources, which were of prime importance for the later 
climate-society analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. Comparison of this written evidence with 
proxy precipitation inferences revealed that evidence for climatic stress was found in 
clusters in periods of high and abrupt precipitation variability, such as c. AD 1430-1590 
and c. AD 1780-1830, as opposed to longer periods of generally drier conditions such as 
the LIA in the seventeenth century. 
 The uncertainties in precipitation variability in the early-nineteenth century 
were examined in greater depth in Chapter 4 using wind observations within ships’ 
logbooks. To reconstruct precipitation from these variables, an original method was 
developed which related reanalysis u-wind to station precipitation over a twentieth 
century calibration period of 1979-2008, and used principal component regression to 
apply these relationships to the u-wind variables recorded in ships’ logbooks. The 
reconstructions at the three stations where relationships were strongest, Mthatha, 
Royal National Park and Cape Town, showed some correspondence with other inter-
annual records from the region. In the SRZ stations, the reconstructions revealed 
evidence of dry conditions between 1796-1802, coincident with the mahlatule famine or 
the ‘great Mozambique drought’, and evidence of successive years of drought from 
1824-1829, both of which appear to have been regional dry spells. Some coherence was 
also found with documentary-reconstructed El Niño events, but this was variable. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 analysed the role of changing vulnerability contexts of food 
systems, livelihoods and socio-political organisation in shaping the impacts of and 
response to the climate variability examined in the previous two chapters. Chapter 5 
developed an indicator-based approach to quantify this vulnerability for a number of 
socio-political units and communities in the Zambezi-Limpopo region. This approach 
revealed a general trajectory towards increased vulnerability over the analysis period, 
consistent with the gradual impoverishment and socio-political breakdown of state 
structures in the Zambezi-Limpopo region. In the Zambezi valley in particular, this 
reflected an increase in the recorded impacts and response to climate variability, and it 
was thus a significant factor in socio-political change in this area. Nonetheless, 
qualitative analysis of written sources revealed that the plurality of vulnerabilities and 
responses to climate variability were highly dependent on socio-political organisation. 
Moreover, the magnitude of climate variability itself was of high importance in areas 
like the Zambezi valley, where high-magnitude rainfall variability was a predominant 
factor in recurrent disruption to socio-political order in the 1570s, 1730s and 1820s.  
 Chapter 6 used written and oral sources to assess the interaction between 
climate, conflict and food security and its importance for socio-political dynamics in 
the KwaZulu-Natal area between c. 1750-1828. Although this analysis did not use a 
semi-quantitative indicator-based approach, it did assess comparative perspectives on 
vulnerability between political units, and illuminated important interactions between 
agropastoral livelihoods, food security, social organisation, conflict, governance, trade 
and rainfall variability in both the growth of centralised political structures in the late-
C apter 8: Co lusion 
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eighteenth and early-nineteenth century and the heightened instability in the area in 
the 1820s. Climate variability was judged to be of moderate significance in both of 
these periods (Table 7.1), but the pre-conditions of increased inequalities and social 
organisation, and later the mode of governance and its impacts on food security, were 
of high importance in shaping the impacts of climate variability. 
 Chapter 7 drew parallels and contrasts in the nature of and responses to 
climatic stress across the region. This discussion reinforced the earlier suggestion that 
periods of increased climatic stress occurred at times of regional and global change, 
including the high variability of precipitation in the transition towards the dry LIA in 
the sixteenth century and its last intensification in the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth century. Examination of underlying sources of food system and livelihood 
vulnerability across the region enabled the identification of how these were shaped, in 
which socio-political organisation, governance and its stability were all key. This 
discussion therefore allowed a level of characterisation on how African society 
experienced and responded to environmental risk, as well as the identification of 
factors that conditioned the effectiveness of coping strategies and adaptations. 
 Consideration of these outcomes in relation to the original aims and research 
questions makes clear that these were successfully achieved and answered. While the 
studies in each of the analysis chapters are relevant as standalone research, the major 
value of this thesis is the cross-disciplinary approach which ties these seemingly 
disparate sources, disciplines and methodologies together, providing original insights 
into the interaction between the complex physical and cultural determinants of past 
climate impacts. This emphasis on interaction is important, as it is in contrast to much 
previous research, some of which continues to emphasise the agency of climate over 
humans (for example Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang et al. 2013), or vice versa. The sooner the 
notion of interaction gains full acceptance in both historical and contemporary studies, 
the sooner a fuller understanding of these complex processes can be achieved. 
 Perhaps the most significant outcome of this research, though, is the potential 
application of its approaches and methods to other spatial and temporal contexts, 
whether this relates individually to ships’ logbook-based climate reconstructions, or 
analysis of the influence of changing livelihoods and political systems on vulnerability 
to climate variability, or collectively in the integration of datasets and disciplines. The 
focus prior to the twentieth century represents a relatively young but highly rich area 
of research, especially in developing regions, which are arguably where such studies 
are most valuable given present and future climate-development challenges. This line 
of investigation and reasoning is certainly distinct from the conventional justification 
for past climate-society research, which has often viewed the past as a source of 
cautionary tales of maladaptation. The proliferation of sub-regional level climate-
society assessments that are sensitive to cultural and historical conditions can therefore 
make an important contribution to future, global assessments on the nature of climate 
change, underlying vulnerabilities and the design of adaptation strategies. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Evidence of climate variability not mentioned in the main text 
Event and possible climatic inference: September 1511: Scarce provisions at Sofala, 
drought? 
Evidence: “You shall pay each person as set down under his item – namely – to 
each of the first nine, five alqueires of milho and one of kaffir-corn because there 
was a shortage of milho.” Perestrello (1511, 135). 
Confidence rating: 1 (low) 
Rationale: Supply and demand problems were due to a range of causes at this time 
(see Section 5.3.1). 
 
Event and possible climatic inference: 1554: scarce provisions around Maputo bay, 
drought? 
Evidence: “There he [the king of Inhaca] gave to each person about a peck of grain 
like canary seed, which is the best provision in the country, and is esteemed by 
them like relics.” Perestrello (1554, 271). 
Confidence rating: 1 (low) 
Rationale: As Perestrello also notes that “the people of these parts are bred in the 
wilds… having no notion of cultivating the earth” (Perestrello 1554, 272), any possible 
scarcity of provisions appears to relate to the lack of local agricultural production 
rather than the potential adverse impacts of a drought event. 
 
Event and possible climatic inference: 1560: floods in the Mozambique coastal plain 
– very wet year. 
Evidence: “As these lands are all flat, when it rains heavily in the Winter the streams 
along the way fill, leave their beds and cover the whole land like a deluge. This year 
the Portuguese were caught in one of these floods and most of them abandoned their 
goods and others remained, either upon a tree or near one.” Fernandes (1560, 475). 
Confidence rating: 2 (moderate) 
Rationale: Explicit evidence of flooding, but unclear whether this is representative of 
an extreme weather event or anomalously wet year. 
 
Event and possible climatic inference: June 1593: scarce provisions in KwaZulu-
Natal, drought?. 
Evidence: “Nothing was brought for sale except a cow belonging to the lord of the 
country, because provisions were scarce that year, owing to want of rain” Lavanha 
(1593, 327). 
Confidence rating: 3 (high) 
Rationale: Explicit evidence of lack of rain in 1593. 
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Event and possible climatic inference: 1861: famine in KwaZulu-Natal, drought? 
Evidence: “Ilanga li ka Mbete – this is the name of a great famine which occurred in 
Zululand about the year 1861. It got its name because of people leaving their homes 
and going to pick and feed on figs etc. In Swaziland the same famine was known as 
indhlala ka ngongoni” Falaza (129). 
“There was a great drought; it was called the drought of Mbete. The land was 
destroyed. The king ordered the people to be sent to ask for rain from Langalibalele 
ka Mtimkulu. Indeed they crossed the Tukela with the rain following close behind 
them” (Magolwana, 111). 
Confidence rating: 2 (moderate) 
Rationale: Explicit evidence of drought and severe impacts, though date uncertain. 
 
Event and possible climatic inference: Seventeenth century cold LIA conditions. 
Evidence: “In these lands, especially in Matuca and Manica, it can get very cold in 
June and July, almost everyday the waters are frozen and the fields covered in frost” 
Macedo (1633, 15). 
“In the Mocranga… sometimes the water freezes and, in the highest mountains, the 
bodies too” (Sousa 1697, 237) 
Confidence rating: 1 (low) 
Rationale: Lack of continuous records on temperature for comparison. 
 
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
The consequences of past climate change for state formation and security in southern Africa 
 293 
Appendix B 
Vulnerability indicator assessment 
 
1505-1560: Food, trade and conflict in the early-sixteenth century. 
Indicator M
u
ta
p
a 
M
an
yi
k
a 
S
of
al
a 
Crop diversity 0 0 0 
Domestic animals -1 0 1 
Animals hunted -1 - 0 
Wild resources -1 -1 -1 
Cultivatable territory -1 0 1 
Quantity of minerals controlled 
and mined 
0 -1 1 
Prices of and demand for minerals 0 0 0 
Quantity of ivory hunted -1 0 0 
Prices of and demand for ivory 0 0 0 
Alternative livelihood options 0 0 -1 
Access to and participation in 
inter-continental trade network 
0 0 0 
Access to local trade network -1 -1 0 
Leadership contention and stability -1 -1 - 
Sovereignty -1 -1 1 
Presence of local conflict or raiding 0 0 1 
Presence of external conflict -1 -1 0 
Presence of slavery -1 -1 1 
Inferred fertility of land -1 -1 -1 
Hazard prevalence 0 0 1 
Occurrence of epidemic, disease, 
plague or pests 
- - - 
Total -11 -8 4 
 
Sources: 
Food system: Alcáçova (1506), Goes (unknown year), Barros (1552) and Frois (1561) 
on Mutapa state, Almada (1516) and Barbosa (1518) on Sofala. 
Livelihoods and trade: Alcáçova (1506) and Barros (1552) on mining, Barbosa 
(1518), Velho (1547) and Botelho (1552) on ivory, Almada (1516), Barbosa (1518), 
Bhila (1982) and Beach (1994) on access to trade, Phimister (1976), Mudenge (1988) 
and Newitt (1995) on prices. 
Socio-political: Veloso (1512) on Mutapa political dynamics, Sepúlveda (1542), 
Velho (1547), Bhila (1982) and Mudenge (1988) on conflict, Barbosa (1518) on socio-
political situation of Sofala area. 
Biophysical: Almada (1516), Barros (1552) and Fernandes (1560) on fertility and 
hazards. 
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1561-1624: Climatic stress, violence and Portuguese penetration. 
Indicator M
u
ta
p
a 
M
an
yi
k
a 
T
ev
e 
Z
am
b
ez
i v
al
le
y 
In
h
am
b
an
e 
S
of
al
a 
S
en
a 
Q
u
el
im
an
e 
Crop diversity 0 0 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 
Domestic animals -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Animals hunted -1 0 -1 0 0 1 1 -1 
Wild resources -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 
Cultivatable territory -1 0 -1 0 0 1 1 0 
Quantity of minerals controlled 
and mined 
-1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Prices of and demand for minerals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quantity of ivory hunted -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 1 
Prices of and demand for ivory -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Alternative livelihood options -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
Access to and participation in 
inter-continental trade network 
-1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 
Access to local trade network 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 
Leadership contention and stability 1 0 0 0 - - - - 
Sovereignty 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Presence of local conflict or raiding 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Presence of external conflict 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Presence of slavery -1 -1 -1 1 0 1 1 1 
Inferred fertility of land 1 1 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 
Hazard prevalence 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Occurrence of epidemic, disease, 
plague or pests 
1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total -3 -3 -1 6 3 3 6 4 
 
Sources: 
Food system: Azevedo (unknown year), Monclaro (1573), Santos (1609), 
Castelbranco (1618) and Fernandes (1562) on food system. 
Livelihoods and trade: Santos (1609), Anonymous (1573), Monclaro (1573) and 
Couto (1616) on minerals and ivory, Bhila (1982), Mudenge (1988) and Newitt 
(1995) on trade. 
Socio-political: Santos (1609), Castelbranco (1618), Beach (1980, 1994), Mudenge 
(1988) and Newitt (1995) on socio-political situation. 
Biophysical: Carneiro (1573), Monclaro (1573) and Santos (1609) on fertility, 
Monclaro (1573) and Santos (1609) on locust plagues, Santos (1609) on epidemics. 
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1625-1692: Livelihoods and vulnerability under the Portuguese. 
Indicator M
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Crop diversity 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Domestic animals -1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 
Animals hunted -1 0 -1 -1 1 1 -1 
Wild resources -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Cultivatable territory -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Quantity of minerals controlled 
and mined 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Prices of and demand for minerals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quantity of ivory hunted 0 0 -1 0 0 1 1 
Prices of and demand for ivory -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Alternative livelihood options -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 
Access to and participation in 
inter-continental trade network 
1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 
Access to local trade network -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Leadership contention and stability 1 1 0 - - - - 
Sovereignty 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Presence of local conflict or raiding 1 0 0 1 -1 1 1 
Presence of external conflict 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Presence of slavery 1 0 -1 1 1 1 1 
Inferred fertility of land -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Hazard prevalence 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Occurrence of epidemic, disease, 
plague or pests 
-1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 
Total -1 -5 -6 1 0 3 1 
 
Sources: 
Food system: Bocarro (1631-49), Macedo (1633), Gomes (1648), Barreto (1667), 
Anonymous (1683) and Rezende (1634). 
Livelihoods and trade: Bocarro (1631-49), Macedo (1633) and Anonymous (1683) on 
minerals and ivory. Phimister (1976) and Newitt (1995) on prices and demand. 
Socio-political: Bocarro (1631-49), Rezende (1633) and Newitt (1973, 1995). 
Biophysical: Bocarro (1631-49), Macedo (1633), Pereira (1663) and Anonymous 
(1683). 
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1693-1760: The rise of the Rozvi and climatic stress on the Zambezi. 
Indicator M
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Crop diversity -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Domestic animals 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Animals hunted 0 0 -1 0 1 1 -1 
Wild resources -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Cultivatable territory 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Quantity of minerals controlled 
and mined 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Prices of and demand for minerals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Quantity of ivory hunted 0 0 -1 0 0 1 1 
Prices of and demand for ivory -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Alternative livelihood options 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 
Access to and participation in 
inter-continental trade network 
0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 
Access to local trade network -1 -1 -1 -1 1 0 -1 
Leadership contention and stability 1 1 1 - - - - 
Sovereignty 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Presence of local conflict or raiding 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 
Presence of external conflict -1 -1 0 1 1 1 -1 
Presence of slavery 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Inferred fertility of land -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Hazard prevalence 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Occurrence of epidemic, disease, 
plague or pests 
1 1 1 1 1 1 - 
Total 0 -3 -1 2 7 6 -3 
 
Source: 
Food system: Conceição (1696), Sousa (1697) and Xavier (1758). 
Livelihoods and trade: Conceição (1696), Sousa (1697) and Xavier (1758) on 
minerals, ivory and trade access, Phimister (1976) and Newitt (1995) on prices and 
demand. 
Socio-political: Conceição (1696), Ribeiro (1698), Mudenge (1988), Beach (1980, 
1994) and Newitt (1995). 
Biophysical: Conceição (1696) and Xavier (1758) on fertility, Miranda (1766) on 
hazards and locust plagues. 
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1761-1830: Climate and socio-political breakdown in Zambezia. 
Indicator M
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Crop diversity -1 0 -1 -1 -1 
Domestic animals 1 1 0 0 -1 
Animals hunted 0 0 0 1 -1 
Wild resources -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Cultivatable territory 0 0 0 1 0 
Quantity of minerals controlled 
and mined 
1 0 1 1 1 
Prices of and demand for minerals 1 1 1 1 1 
Quantity of ivory hunted 0 0 0 1 1 
Prices of and demand for ivory -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Alternative livelihood options 0 -1 -1 0 0 
Access to and participation in 
inter-continental trade network 
0 0 0 0 -1 
Access to local trade network 0 -1 -1 0 0 
Leadership contention and stability 1 0 - - - 
Sovereignty -1 0 1 1 1 
Presence of local conflict or raiding 1 1 1 1 -1 
Presence of external conflict 1 1 1 1 1 
Presence of slavery 0 0 1 1 1 
Inferred fertility of land - -1 -1 -1 -1 
Hazard prevalence 1 0 1 1 1 
Occurrence of epidemic, disease, 
plague or pests 
1 0 1 1 0 
Total 4 -1 2 7 -1 
 
Sources: 
Food system: Castro (1763), Anonymous (1780),  
Livelihoods and trade: Castro (1763), Anonymous (1780), Bhila (1982), Newitt 
(1995). 
Socio-political: Castro (1763), Miranda (1766) Anonymous (1780), Bhila (1982), 
Mudenge (1988) and Beach (1994) on political stability and conflict, Alpers (1975) 
and Newitt (1995) on slavery. 
Biophysical: Miranda (1766), Ferrão (1810), Newitt (1988) and Silva (1830, 1831) on 
hazards. 
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Alternative livelihoods 
Documentary evidence of alternative livelihoods. 
Alternative 
livelihoods M
u
ta
p
a 
M
an
yi
k
a 
T
ev
e 
Z
am
b
ez
i 
va
ll
ey
 
S
of
al
a 
S
en
a 
Q
u
el
im
an
e 
Iron x x x x    
Copper x x      
Quartz x x      
Metal-working x x x x    
Salt x    x  x 
Weaving x x x x x x x 
Cotton    x x x x 
Timber crafts    x  x x 
Sugar    x x x x 
Ambergris   x  x  x 
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Appendix C 
‘Foods used by the natives when in distress’. Quotes taken from Fynn (1836, 305), except for 
izinongwe (Mmemi ka Nguluzane, 238) and armatingoola (Isaacs 1836, Vol. I, 87). 
Name of plant Description 
Imbecca Water lily: stalk as flour and leaves as spinach. The roots are boiled for 24 
hours without which it would be bitter. 
Ingonolla A creeper round trees with leaves resembling a French bean. When about 6 
feet high eatable. The roots are peeled, cut in pieces and parboiled, it is then 
cut in slices as thin as a wafer and planted in a running stream for 36 hours. 
It is then again boiled and affords excellent food. Without undergoing the 
above process it causes temporary insanity. 
Umguambaler Spreading root which is divided and boiled in four waters. The first is 
thrown away and the fourth remains 24 hours. One person eats on trial 
before a number will be allowed to partake. Belching of wind from the 
stomach decides its safety, otherwise it causes madness for a short period. 
Esondu Part of the wild date. The lower part above the ground is eaten raw or 
boiled and is much like nuts. The fruit has the flavour of gingerbread, but 
only the skin which covers a large nut is eaten. 
Esindu Wild coffee tree; also eaten in the same manner. 
Incamanga Wild plantain. The heart is juicy and astringent. The seeds make coffee or 
are eaten parched and sometimes smoked by the natives in lieu of dakka. 
Imbase Forms a small hedge of straight branches from the ground and yields roots 
nearly the size of a man’s body. It is peeled off a thin rind of a reddish 
colour and ground between stones, the small fibres extracted and eaten 
raw; being extremely sweet it is often baked after grinding and eaten with 
milk. It is sometimes made into a wine by first baking the root after 
grinding, on which boiling water is poured and when cool it ferments 
without any other additions. 
Isebalarn Bulbing plant about six inches high with leaves resembling the water lily. 
The leaves are arrow shaped, speckled with white spots. The bulbs are the 
size of a potato but without it is boiled in two waters it is of a bitter taste 
and burns the throat. 
Undongna Plant bearing pods, the seeds of which produce oil but are frequently 
parched and eaten. 
Untumba Large plant with lance shaped leaves, small white blossoms and produces 
large globular bladders which on sudden pressure explodes with a loud 
noise. It is great abundance near Natal and the inside bark is used by the 
natives to string beads. 
Ebondo A long tuber very like a potatoe and altho’ good eating does not resemble 
the original so much as the Amasamban which Mr Fynn believes to the 
potatoe in its wild state. The Umpanga grows about three feet high. It is a 
species of wild date or belongs to that tribe The centre of the root is dried, 
ground into powder and eaten with milk when corn is scarce. It bears a nut. 
Moondi Root much esteemed by all Kafirs, grows only in Faku’s country and the 
Zulus. Much resembles stick liquorish in flavour. 
Izinongwe A fruit eaten when famine is on. The Ngema people [part of the Qwabe 
tribe] expressed an unwillingness to join the Qwabe’s in the proposed hunt 
on the ground that, there being a scarcity of food, they were busy eating 
ingadi marrows, alias izinongwe. 
Armatingoola Plum; the natives consume with great avidity in their incursions where 
there are no kraals. 
